Note no. 391	11.07.2007
SRI LANKA: THOPPIGALA AND AFTER ? Update No. 123  By Col R Hariharan (Retd.)  The Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence in a terse announcement said that the security forces had captured Baron's Cap (Thoppigala), the last stronghold of the LIberataion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the east. This success was awaited for the last three months. The fall of Kokkadicholai, approximately 14 km south of Batticaloa, on March 28, 2007 had kindled high public expectations of Thoppigala's capture any time soon. This was only to be expected as the security forces had almost ended the LTTE domination of highways A5 on the west and A27 on the southwest that provided depth to the Thoppigala base. But it had taken three months for nearly two brigade strong troops to gain control of Thoppigala, manned by 300 to 400 LTTE cadres. And that is one fourth of the total time taken for the mission of 'wresting control of east from the LTTE.' This was no surprise as the nature of terrain and the extensive booby trapping and mining had made progress of security forces slow. In Sri Lanka Update No 118 of April 3, 2007, "Looking beyond consolidation" (available at http://www.saag.org/%5Cnotes4%5Cnote376.html ), I had cautioned upon the ground  realities not matching public expectations as follows:    However, LTTE's resilience and innovation in insurgency warfare should not be under estimated. Thoppigala is unlikely to fall like a plum, ripe for plucking. The 300 plus LTTE cadres at Thoppigala cut off from resources and external support could fight it out of desperation. With their exit routes blocked they will be literally fighting with their back to the wall. Thus Security Forces deployed in operations in Thoppigala could be tied down for a longer time than anticipated. Even after Thoppigala is captured attacks by mobile LTTE bands can be expected to continue in this sector.   Fortunately for them, the security forces were not been taken in by public expectations in planning the operations. They appear to have conducted the operations focusing on three aspects: minimising own casualty, attrition of LTTE defenders and concentration of superior fire power and force. Though there must have been every political temptation to speed up the operation, the Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka appears to have maintained to his style of progressive consolidation of successes. With this he has enabled the forces to minimise casualties, which is a great morale booster for future operations. The coordinated use of air force fighters and multi-barrel rockets appear to have been well thought of as they demoralise defenders even if they don't inflict huge casualties. This is likely to be a regular feature of operations in the future.  The LTTE on its part, despite the military setbacks in the east over the last one year and its ongoing feud with Karuna for even a longer period, appear to have been well prepared for the inevitable. This involved pulling out cadres from other areas as and when they became indefensible to fall back upon main defences. Despite the loss of most of the artillery assets in earlier operations, it is significant that the LTTE had retained essential artillery fire power till the last days, abandoning cumbersome assets. Young LTTE deserters had reported LTTE's loss of morale in the face of casualties, food shortage etc. However, this does not appear to have affected the ability of the hardcore of fighters left behind to create and use integrated minefield defences to break the momentum of attacking troops to face the conventional troops intelligently. LTTE appears to have pulled out essential cadres from its defences in a planned manner. If intelligence reports quoted in the media are correct,  a group of 200 cadres led by Ramesh had sneaked out of Batticaloa area in the second week of June and travelled north across Welikanda, Serunuwara, Mutur and Manirasankulam in Kinniya using jungle tracks. This was probably the route adopted for thinning out. However, there are likely to be small groups left behind to carry out low level operations in the east. Unfortunately, the capture of Thoppigala is not going to be the end game of LTTE in the east. Guerrilla operations are likely to be stepped up till they become expensive for LTTE to carry on the fight in the east.  The LTTE's guerrilla operations likely to continue would include hit and run raids on government assets, Claymore attacks to disrupt free movement of troops particularly on road axes, and settling scores with Tamils including Karuna and company, who oppose LTTE. Any new development projects that could come up in Tamil areas could also be targeted. Thus in the coming months, the Tamil areas of east can expect a period of low level operations to continue. Encounters with escaping LTTE cadres like the one recently faced by the naval marines in Kuchaveli area, north of Trincomalee, are also likely. However, LTTE actions in the east will be muted and restrained by the loss of control over resources and territory, if not the shortage of manpower. Thus to compensate such limitations in the east, LTTE could attempt some spectacular actions against more visible targets in Colombo. At the same time, the completion of security forces operations in the east, or at least restricting it to minimum levels, would probably release at least two brigades of troops for operations in the north. This can come in handy as and when operations in the north are joined in. Operations in the north In the north, the LTTE would be literally fighting with their back to the wall to defend the heartland of LTTE territory.  If the defence of Thoppigagal is any indication of LTTE's fighting capabilities, the war in the north could drag on for at least two years, as assessed by both the Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka and the Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. LTTE has probably stashed away adequate reserves of arms and ammunition over the years to fight out the mother of all operations as and when it comes. But their limitations will be exposed as the operation drags on. Thus time is going to be an essential but invisible resource for both sides. Considering this the security forces planning operations in the north will have to rework the strategies. And they appear to be doing so. These would include preponderance of fire power, destruction of reserves and dumps, naval blockade to prevent seaborne supply routes of LTTE and intelligent use of Special Forces behind the lines. The number of small encounters along the forward defended localities in Muhamalai, areas west and east of Vavuniya, and along the Omanthai-Mannar axis show the two sides jockeying for domination. For the time being, security forces that were bent upon pushing LTTE back along the Omanthai-Mannar axis appear to be recasting their plans in face of the strong resistance. Use of Special Forces for operations to destabilise the LTTE behind the forward lines appear to have been resorted to with some effect. Similarly, LTTE appear to be using small armed groups infiltrated to cut down and curtail free movement of troops and carry out selective killings behind the forward lines in Jaffna. Both sides are also using heavy mortars and artillery bombardments to keep the heads down in the defences. These are usually preliminary preparations for war that could seamlessly be joined in. So the 'cleansing of the east' as the security forces call it increases the chances of eruption of war in the north. In this context, the seizure of two trucks last month lined with over one ton of explosives wired and ready behind their panels showed the high level of sophistication LTTE has achieved in carrying out terror attacks. The police seizure of the car of a Kilinochi government official in Colombo transporting explosives hidden in the petrol tank also shows LTTE's ingenuity and detailed planning in furthering its terror operations. Fortunately, these operations were neutralised with the seizure of the vehicles. But they have shown the LTTE's potential to conduct such operations remains undiminished. They are likely to carry out such attacks as and when the battlefield stresses get too much. This is going to put further pressure on the police to tighten security measures, particularly in carrying out search operations in cheap lodges and hotels in Colombo much to the discomfort of travelling public.  According to defence columnist Iqbal Athas, the two explosives laden truck operations were controlled and directed from Canada and the UK respectively as revealed in interrogations. This would indicate the LTTE's capability to control terrorist operations from the sanitized settings in Canada and the UK. This could be the red rag for the civil society in these countries to further tighten the screws on Tamil militants based in their soil. The Sri Lanka Navy's success against a fleet of Sea Tiger boats in an encounter off Point Pedro in the north-eastern tip of Jaffna peninsula on June 19, 2007 has confirmed that the Sea Tigers continue to have major problems in reasserting themselves in the seas off the coastline from Point Pedro to Alampil in the south. This will have a major bearing when large scale land operations in Mullaitivu and Thenmarachi come through. The large high-powered LTTE boat seized in the action was well armed and equipped with radar to take on air craft as well as naval targets. It underlined the naval capacity built by the Sea Tigers over the years in improving the weaponry, equipment and performance of boats. The action off Point Pedro indicated Navy's ability to launch a well coordinated operation involving more than one command.  At the same time, it is useful to remember that the Navy's success came barely a month after LTTE's successful sneak raid on naval posts in Delft Island in May.  That would indicate that things are not so water tight on the Mannar coast. And that can make a big difference, unless India fully cooperates to keep its coast sanitized. In all probability, despite the exchange of political rhetoric, India has already taken action to do so. So the blue print for a full scale war appears to be nearing completion. President Mahinda Rajapaksa also appears to have given the green signal for it when he said, "To bring about permanent peace to this country the government is dedicated to chase out the terrorists from the Northern Province soon, like they were chased out from the Eastern Province," while speaking at a function at Thambalagamam two days back. But a mixture of conventional and insurgency warfare is an explosive one and things do not go according to the blue print. So chasing out the terrorists from north could become a messy process as past history has shown, because the LTTE has nowhere to go. The situation makes utter mockery of the Co-chairs' reported effort to resurrect the peace process after their closed door meeting at Oslo on June 25, 2007. The absence of any statement at the end of the meeting would indicate that it was not only peace process that was discussed. The hardening stand against local LTTE operators in the UK and Australia during the last couple of weeks would indicate they might have discussed tightening the thumbscrews on LTTE's local network in their countries.  Or have they given a lead time to the government to come down heavily upon LTTE to 'soften up' its journey to the peace process? Only time will tell. The tragic reality is that chances of peace are sinking in the horizon as weapons are cocked and bombs are primed. One cannot help feeling sorry for the ordinary people of Sri Lanka, particularly in the north and east and in Colombo, who are bearing the burden of war they are financing, at the cost of their lives. More than devolution of powers, human rights violations, abductions, colonization and all other issues the most urgent issue now is the right of the citizen to live in peace -that is bringing back peace. And surprisingly the cause of peace appears to have very few takers because it has been going on for too long. For the decision makers of war, it's a distant thing fought by soldiers. And success in war is a heady thing that tends to blur the larger picture. This is what has happened in Sri Lanka. (Col. R Hariharan, an intelligence specialist on South Asia, is a retired Military Intelligence officer. He served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)
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