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Note no. 394
07.08.2007
THE FORGOTTEN ACCORD AND THE UNWANTED WAR
By Col R Hariharan (Retd.)
[Excerpts from this article were included in a presentation made by the author at a symposium 'Twentieth anniversary of Indo-Sri Lanka Accord' organised by the South Asia Peace Institute at Colombo on August 2, 2007.]
The year 2007 has three milestones in Sri Lanka's political history ? 50th year of the Banda-Chelva pact, 30th year of founding of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and 20th year of Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. They mark the sequential development of an unattended national issue. Undoubtedly, the most significant of them was the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, signed between Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President JR Jayawardane on July 29, 1987.
The Indian Peace Keeping Force was inducted into Sri Lanka in 1987 with a lot of goodwill to help the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. However, their good intentions were not enough when political directions morphed their role from peace keeping to counterinsurgency warfare. Thus the acronym IPKF ended up as a kind of oxymoron after it got embroiled in a bloody war with the LTTE.
The history of IPKF, written in blood, is intertwined with the story of how both India and Sri Lanka mismanaged a golden opportunity the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord offered to usher in peace to Sri Lanka. Unfortunately, during the last two decades both the countries appear to have wished away the Accord and the hard lessons it taught them. For this amnesia Sri Lanka is paying heavily, leaving at least 64,000 people dead since the IPKF sailed off for good from Khoddiyar Bay in 1990. And the benign Indian neighbour watches the situation with seeming indifference.
The signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was the apogee of India's active involvement in Sri Lanka from 1983 to 90. In this period India tried out all possibilities - supporting the Tamil cause and militancy, helping the Sri Lanka Government and the Tamils across the table to resolve their differences, jointly work with Sri Lanka to help evolve a consensus on devolution for Tamils within a united Sri Lanka, and lastly underwrite an acceptable minimum package for Tamils in Sri Lanka through the signing of the Accord. During these swings of policy, at different times India had courted the antagonism of Sri Lanka Government, Sinhala political opposition, and Tamil separatist segments, notably the LTTE.
So the perceptions of India's role, and as a corollary the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, differ widely. There were a few weaknesses in the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord that made it self defeating. Yet, it opened a new chapter in India Sri Lanka relations with cooperation rather than confrontation as the corner stone of their policy. After 20 years, India's role is better appreciated now by most of the Sri Lankans than in 1987 only because the IPKF men fought and died to uphold the Accord in a country that was not their own. This recognition is a small, but fitting tribute to 1255 Indian soldiers who died in Sri Lankan soil.
Was the IPKF a success? Indian troops operation which started off as a conventional one in 1987 quickly changed into a full fledged counter insurgency operation. In such an environment, how do you measure success? The popular perception of success in wars is in terms of territorial gains and body counts. In insurgency wars these yardsticks are flawed, because the battles are for the mind of the people. If territorial gain and body counts were the only the yardsticks of victory, Americans would be considered victorious in Iraq. However, even on this scale the IPKF proved itself. By August 1988 it had LTTE seeking the refuge of Wanni jungles to save itself from the onslaught of IPKF. Within a year after IPKF completed Operation Checkmate-I (Battle of Nithikaikulam) in August 1988, it had restored normal life to the people of northeast. The IPKF, despite some aberrations and limitations imposed by political dispensations, gave them a feeling of security and gained their trust; both of these are absent there to this day. People of Colombo revelled without a conscious thought of the war in the northeast had their good night sleep!
The Accord did fail to fully provide the much vaunted equal rights for Tamils it promised. Though the IPKF reduced LTTE to a spent force, IPKF's ill timed exit before the administration could consolidate itself in the northeast ensured the resurgence of LTTE. So the Accord did not deliver fully. The reason for this was simple; political expediency took over both the countries and warped the goals of the Accord. As a result Sri Lanka did not put its heart and soul in making the Accord a success. India fared no better, with its political priorities clouding its responsibilities in Sri Lanka following a change of rulers in the South Block.
Today with the benefit of hindsight, it would be worthwhile to understand what the half hearted implementation of the Accord, particularly the use of Indian troops in support of the Accord, taught us. These are timely because war hysteria is riding high in Sri Lanka and India is repeatedly called upon to intervene again in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka setting is in a bizarre setting of 'peace-less peace process', with Eelam War IV riding on the shoulders of a desecrated ceasefire agreement. And political expedience is very much alive in both countries.
The Accord
Both India and Sri Lanka implemented the Accord with many compromises giving in to the pulls and pushes of internal political compulsions. These made them forget three cardinal requirements - openness, transparency and inclusiveness for any public policy to succeed. These were markedly absent in both India and Sri Lanka from the conception to execution of the Accord.
The Accord was conceived to bridge the huge ethnic divide between Tamils and Sinhala communities. However, lack of transparency aggravated the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust about India's intentions among many Sinhalas because earlier India had given refuge and provided training to Tamil militants. In the Accord, India had laid great emphasis on its regional security interests in Sri Lanka along with its concerns for finding an equitable solution to the Tamil issue. Thus many Sri Lankans including the LTTE saw arrival of Indian troops in Sri Lanka as a coercive move through show of force. While this hurt the national pride of sections of Sri Lankans, it provided an excuse for LTTE to denounce the Accord as an instrument to establish Indian hegemony.
On the other hand, many Tamils nurtured a deep distrust of the Sri Lanka leadership's commitment to the Accord, based on the past history of Sinhala-Tamil relations strewn with broken promises. Some Tamils had high expectations of India delivering a virtual 'Eelam' just as independent Bangladesh was created in 1971 with the help of Indian armed forces in East Pakistan. They were disappointed when this did not happen. Everyone forgot that they have to work hard to make the Accord reach its logical conclusion of permanent peace.
In this charged atmosphere, the style of working of both Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President JR Jayawardane even within their own political ranks was neither participative nor consensual. This resulted in lack of goal clarity and critical analysis of issues among the politicians and bureaucracy. These were passed on down the line. Rajiv Gandhi's lack of political experience, and his new set of advisors lack of complete understanding the complex Sri Lanka situation did not help the matter. The Indian leadership grossly underestimated Prabakaran's commitment to the cause of Tamil Eelam and his desire to don the mantle of sole arbiter of Tamils.
According to a recent statement of the Chief of the Research and Analysis Wing of that period AK Verma the Indian Prime Minister had ignored the agency's advice against the use of military force to disarm LTTE. It is clear that India did not use its intelligence agencies to fully explore other options to get the LTTE back to the table before going to the war mode. On their part Indian intelligence agencies also probably overestimated their ability to influence Prabhakaran's thought process (which in any case is a mystery in a conundrum, encapsulated in an enigma).
On the other hand, Indian leadership also perhaps underestimated JR's political acumen in turning the situation to his advantage. I remember the advice of the late Rajendra Duraiswamy, a retired senior civil servant with years of experience under JR Jayawardane, when I met him Jaffna in August 1987. "Don't under estimate JR," he said. "He is going to have Rajiv, a baby in politics, for breakfast and make you fight the LTTE. He has uncanny ability to spot a weak link and take full advantage of it," he added. At that time it sounded absurd because we never thought it would happen. Unfortunately, Rajendra never lived to see his prophecy come true because he was killed in the early stages of Jaffna operation.
We also failed to read the signals in Prabakaran's speech at Suthumalai on his unhappiness about the formulation of the Accord, particularly regarding the limited devolution and the recognition of other Tamil militant groups. Looking back, LTTE was probably looking for reasons to go to war regardless of India's promises. And excuses for that were coming up fast - Thileepan's fast unto death, suicide of 12 senior LTTE leaders apprehended with arms by Sri Lankan Navy, and so on. I remember the chilling remark Mahathiya, the number two man in the LTTE hierarchy, when he came to collect the dead bodies of 12 of his comrades after they had committed suicide while in Sri Lankan custody. When I told him of the need for reconciliation because India was capable of waging a war for 50 years, he looked at me with contempt. He told his aide "tell the colonel that today we are collecting 12 bodies and he will collect 1200 of Indian bodies before he leaves." (He was right in a way. We suffered 1255 dead before we left Sri Lanka. However, he could not prophecy his own future as subsequent events proved.)
When democratic societies wage counterinsurgency war, the military strategies will have to be progressed in tandem with a matching political strategy. This requires strong leadership commitment to a vision. This was not there in Sri Lanka and the political opposition, particularly the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) used the stress generated by war in the society to their advantage. The JVP stoked the "revolutionary fires" of opposition to the Accord and created an internal crisis in Sri Lanka. Prime Minister Premadasa, dead set against the Accord, leveraged the same feelings to win the Presidential poll. In India the political opposition played the same game. The new Prime Minister VP Singh's priorities were different. He had neither time nor inclination to tackle Sri Lanka. And thus both the leaders 'killed' the Accord at the altar of political expediency with more deliberation, than it was executed by its creators.
LTTE was clearly a gainer in this 'democratic exercise'. The change of leadership in midstream in both countries made it difficult for the IPKF to meaningfully operate in the absence of a clear political agenda. And LTTE took full advantage of President Premadasa's antipathy to the Indian dispensation that made him to supply arms to LTTE even as India was fighting his war with LTTE! This was not a new phenomenon. LTTE had used Indian public sentiments after 1983 to gain arms and funds from India, but did not hesitate to fight India to preserve its turf. So it was not surprising when it turned against Premadasa after using him to its advantage. What is not amusing is that the LTTE has continued to use 'democratic political aberrations' in Sri Lanka and India to its advantage to this day.
The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord clearly redefined India's role:
1. As the largest power in South Asia, India has a role in ensuring stability and security of the region. India would like to play this role in partnership with Sri Lanka.
2. The two countries can evolve formulations to achieve a win-win situation. In handling complex issues however, there were limitations of enforcing such formulations evolved without political consensus. 3. While India sympathises with the Tamil struggle for equal rights, it will not accept separatism in Sri Lanka. On its part as a united and democratic nation Sri Lanka has to treat its Tamil citizens equitably to ensure stability in the neighbourhood. If necessary, India will not hesitate to use its armed forces to help achieve these objectives.
4. India felt the Accord provided a workable framework for Tamils to gain a measure of autonomy. However, the failure of successive Sri Lanka governments to implement the Accord, showed a lack of faith in the Accord. Thus it will now be for Sri Lanka to evolve its own methodology to resolve the problem peacefully. India will always be ready to assist this process.
5. India has a large Tamil population with strong political and economic clout in the national scene. As they have living links with Sri Lanka Tamils, the political and military shocks of Sri Lanka situation will echo in Tamil Nadu. And to certain extent it will condition Indian attitudes towards Sri Lanka. This is inevitable in democratic polity, and has to be factored in building relations between the two countries. It is in the national interest of both the countries not to allow parochial considerations to overtake rational judgement.
Conduct of military operations
Indian army is perhaps the only force in the world that had been involved in fighting insurgents for nearly six decades. Yet immediately after the Accord was signed, the Army Headquarters had sent a hastily constituted ad-hoc force to Sri Lanka, rather than its reserve formation. This showed that it had anticipated a policing function rather than full scale military operation in Sri Lanka. So when the war against LTTE was launched, troops were hastily pulled out from various formations and put into battle with little or no briefing. This was the reason for Indian troop's high casualties in Jaffna operations. This it is grossly unfair to label their intent as 'aggressive.' Of course, this was perhaps a flaw in military planning as the political agenda was murky.
When the Army made up its mind for a quick 'surgical operation' it seemed to have ignored its own vast experience in handling insurgencies. Before the operation commenced, the commander of Indian forces (IPKF had not come into full form at that time) had advised against getting embroiled in fighting LTTE. Before the operation, in my MI assessment I had estimated a three-year campaign to reduce LTTE to manageable proportion. (Actually, we did better.) Apparently, the Army had already made up its mind to launch the operation to look at these assessments.
However, the IPKF initiated a number of visible developments to show its concern for the ordinary citizen. The telephone exchange was once again buzzing in Jaffna. Power supply was stabilized with serviceable generators. There was a breakthrough in restoring train services and the Yal Express was once again running from Jaffna to Colombo. Electric supply was restored in full. Many buildings were repaired or reconstructed. An interface to attend to grievance of the population was created though they did not directly fall within the IPKF ambit. These measures helped us in getting along smoothly.
There were a few human rights violations which I felt needed better attention and follow up action. Unfortunately, at that point of time human rights was not a priority on the military agenda. There is no agency within the army solely tasked to address this important issue. Unless there was an operational or disciplinary impact, generally armies the world over do not pay adequate attention to human rights violations. That is why wars continue to be amoral.
Globally, we have reached a higher level of human rights consciousness than ever before. Therefore armies need to do more than pay lip service to human rights and humanitarian issues during operations. It is not enough if troops are put through training sessions on human rights. As most of the troops come from societies where human rights violations are common place and often condoned, it is difficult for them to understand the its importance. Commanders should be exemplary in their own conduct and take transparent action in handling such violations. It is heartening to see Indian army is taking steps to set this right. Some important court-martials have been thrown open to the public to create greater confidence in military justice system. Such actions will also result in greater accountability down the line and tone up discipline within the armed forces. Summary powers given to security forces over large areas for long periods under special enactments are often misused. There is no doubt these are needed in combating violent insurgency; but they need to be applied with accountability in specific areas for a specific period to avoid their misuse. This is an important aspect very relevant to Sri Lanka now.
Takeaways
Both India and Sri Lanka have sidelined the Accord, and the political and international security environment in the region has changed. Considering these realities, it will not be practical to reactivate the Accord in its original form. However, the Accord had provided three points of concurrence between the stakeholders: providing an equitable devolution of power to Tamils within a united Sri Lanka, India's continuing support in finding such a solution through a peaceful process, and recognition of northeast province as an area of traditional inhabitation of Tamils. These assets accrued after considerable effort should not be sacrificed for short term political gain.
The Accord and its aftermath have created better understanding of the Tamil issue among Sri Lankans, particularly Sinhalas more than ever before. There is a strong constituency in Sri Lankan who would like the issue to be settled peacefully. They should be encouraged rather than looked upon with suspicion to build a national consensus and vision for a united Sir Lanka where citizen feels he has a stake. The policies and actions of government need to reflect its concern for creating security and trust in the government. To achieve this, quality of governance including law and order, security of life and property must be ensured through rule of law.
Structuring the decision making process and governance thorough transparency, inclusiveness and public participation rather than horse trading and backroom politicking at all levels should be encouraged.
Time bound action should be taken to finalise a devolution formulation that is acceptable to most of the political constituencies. In the meanwhile development projects should be taken up in north and east to show visible results of peace.
Ensure greater accountability among law enforcing and security agencies and re-establish rule of law. Take visible action to improve human rights and handle humanitarian issues with sympathy, compassion and consideration.
The political process to bring the Tamils to support peace has to go in tandem. There is a great deal of global support and sympathy for Sri Lanka and its problem. This is manifest in the increasing pressure they are bring upon LTTE to make it more profitable for them to talk peace than progress war. Sri Lanka should not take their goodwill for granted because they would like Sri Lanka to conduct itself in an exemplary way in issues related to good governance and human rights.
India has clearly shown it stands for a united Sri Lanka. However, its actions will always be conditioned by its national interests. So both Sri Lanka and India will have to ensure that their policy perceptions and actions foster greater bonds between the two countries and help Sri Lanka achieve stability and peace. Sri Lanka should understand that with India's foreign policy horizon widening as it gains more economic clout, there are limitations to its intervention in Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka has shown it can handle LTTE militarily on its own terms. Military effort alone is not going to defeat the ideas that LTTE represents, even if it produces operational victories. However, the political process so essential to consolidate the military gains in tandem is still a non-starter. This is linked to evolving a political consensus which would probably never fully meet the aspirations any one section of society. However, time is an irreplaceable resource and if Sri Lanka dithers any further more lives will be lost. Already nearly 10 percent of the population is living as refugees in their own country and it will hurt the nation if more are added to their ranks because of inaction.
(Col. R Hariharan, an intelligence specialist on South Asia, is a retired Military Intelligence officer. He served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)
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