Note No 445	17-May-2008
SRI LANKA: Eastern Provincial Council Election & its Results- Update No. 139 By Col. R.Harharan (Retd) The swearing in of Sivanesathurai Chandirakanthan (better known as Pillaiyan, his nom de guerre of militancy days) as the chief minister of the newly created eastern provincial council on May 16, 2008 marks a new turn in Sri Lanka politics. It came about after a great deal of backdoor bickering, rumours and heart burning. Even as the decision to choose Pillaiyan was being debated in the high security office of President Rajapakse, not far from there the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) unwittingly greeted the event with a suicide bomber ramming his motorcycle into a police van killing ten people and injuring 95 others. The two contrasting events illustrate the Yang and Ying of Sri Lanka politics and militancy. Pillaiyan, heads theTamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) the new found ally of the ruling United Peoples Front Alliance (UPFA). It was formed out of cadres who walked out of the LTTE along with Karuna, the estranged Batticola leader. The participation of the TMVP as an ally of the ruling alliance was controversial. The TMVP cadres have gained an unsavoury reputation as armed political bullies indulging in intimidation, extortion and kidnapping of kids. And they had a record of violence against the Muslim population. To top it all, they retained the arms of their insurgency days for "their own protection"! And no political party wanted to be seen with them. All the three major opposition parties – the United National Party (UNP), the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) - have complained of election malpractices including rigging and intimidation by the UPFA and TMVP. The election commissioner had also acknowledged these complaints. These are to be out rightly condemned. However, such aberrations have been hardy perennials of elections in Sri Lanka (as also in its South Asian neighbours) and the May 10 election has proved to be no exception. But the more significant thing was the election was conducted without any major violent incident. This is a commendable achievement considering the explosive mix of multiple ethnic, religious and linguistic character of the province, with its near-equal population of Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalas. There had been no complaints of the TMVP members overtly displaying their weapons during or after the elections. Similarly there was no conspicuous LTTE activity to interfere with the polls. These would indicate that the administration had established its firm control over the province, which is good news for the harried population. The President took a political gamble the first time when he formed an alliance with the TMVP for the PC polls. This was unpleasant news to his Muslim allies. However, he managed to persuade MLAM Hisbullah, influential eastern Muslim leader to part ways with the SLMC and ally with the UPFA. The SLMC headed by Rauf Hakeem fought the election as an ally of the opposition UNP. The President's gamble appears to have paid off as the UPFA group won 20 out of the total 37 seats of the provincial council (including two bonus seats) as against the UNP's 15 seats and one each won by the JVP and the Tamil National Democratic Alliance (TNDA). The President has now taken a second gamble by making Pillaiyan the chief minister of the eastern PC, disregarding the vociferous claims of Hisbullah for the post as a Muslim claimant. Though there are eight Muslims as against only six Tamil (TMVP) members among the UPFA's 20 councillors, Muslim dissent does not appear to worry the President. The President must have counted upon the internal divisions among Muslim members to work in his favour when he nominated Pillaiyan. Pillaiyan is as yet an unknown political personality just as the TMVP is a less known political entity. So far most of the Sri Lanka watchers and analysts have tended to see him in relation to Karuna or as the Tamil troubleshooter of President's brother and advisor Basil Rajapaksa, the Military Intelligence, or the Security Forces. The TMVP has invariably been understood only in the negative glow of its highhanded conduct with the public or for its friction with the Muslims, the STF etc. In this context, TMVP's political proposals handed over to Thissa Witharana, the Chairman of All Party Representatives Committee (APRC) in May 2007 are useful. The TMVP document provides some understanding of its stand on issues connected with ethnic relations, provincial autonomy, devolution, nature of war against the LTTE, and support to Rajapaksa. As a political entity and partner of the UPFA, the TMVP is in a position of power now to turn some of its beliefs and recommendations into reality. Some of these are as follows: TMVP believes that devolving political, administrative and financial powers from the Centre to the peripheral units of governance (provincial councils) within an un-divided and united Sri Lanka holds the solution to the Tamil issue The powers to be devolved to the provincial governments should be clearly defined and not restricted by the Central Government except under special circumstances defined in the constitution. The Southern Sinhala polity has to unite to defeat the LTTE terrorism. At the same time it has to be accommodative to seek and offer political solution to the Tamils. This two- pronged approach only can permanently put an end to terrorism in Sri Lanka. Though Tamil has been recognized as a national language in the constitution, it has not become an administrative reality. The use of Tamil by the Tamils while dealing with the government and its institutions should become a reality. Tamils must be chosen to serve the government and its various services based upon merit. Their services should be recognized and rewarded on their merit. No Tamil should be excluded from any of the government services because he/she is a Tamil. State-aided colonization schemes in the north and east should be brought to an end, while the movement of people across the island should be free and unrestricted. Special provisions should be made to earmark adequate financial and administrative resources to re-build the north and east and speed up development and progress. The TMVP's views on issues like the merger of north and east are practical and realistic rather than reverting to polemics of the past: The TMVP recognizes the merger of the north and east brought through the Indo-Lanka agreement. The 13th amendment to the constitution as originally brought forth through this agreement, should be the starting point for further constitutional reform. However, the reality of de-merger has to be accepted under the present circumstances. The TMVP demands that a referendum should be held in the east on the merger of north and east after the completion of two years of provincial council elections in the north and east. Elections for the Northern Provincial Council in areas under government control should be held as soon as possible and the Council should be permitted to function without any let or hindrance. Conditions must be created in the north and east for people who are living as refugees in India and the IDPs to return and resume their normal lives in areas of their original habitation. Elections for the provincial Councils should be held only after such conditions are created. Except for the diehard Eelamists, others would probably find the above proposals as pragmatic and having reasonable chances of success in the present circumstances. But how far Pillaiyan and the TMVP will be able to get at least a few of them implemented? If Pillaiyan is serious about the TMVP proposals, he should be ready to undergo a trial by fire awaiting him as a chief minister. Then only he can burn a number of ghosts that haunt the TMVP and as a corollary Pillaiyan's reputation. Much of this is a mind game on what people come to believe from experience. It cannot be always achieved by political gamesmanship or propaganda. The first is to get an image make over for the TMVP. The TMVP should gain more respectability. This comes not only by power but by public conduct of the party men. Pillaiyan will have to disprove the adage power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. This is a tall order for any party. But there is little choice for Pillaiyan. He will have to rein in his petty war lords and local chieftains who might be tempted to flex their muscles more and distribute favours now that the TMVP is in power. Collection of money, subscription or other forms of extortion from the public for the party coffers or otherwise will have to be stopped. Public property seized, lands illegally occupied or procured under coercion, will have to be restored to original owners. Pillaiyan has to get rid of the anti-Muslim halo that hovers around him as a TMVP leader. He will have to curb the temptation to dish out favours for Tamils. Only free and fair conduct towards all ethnic groups, particularly Muslims, can redeem his image. If he fails to do so, the President might leave him in the cold as a political liability because his own reputation is at stake in making the eastern PC a viable entity. Pillaiyan is often described as the point man of Basil Rajapaksa. So Pillaiyan will have to acquire his own independent identity when he embarks as the chief minister. This can come through only with impeccable performance. But the moot point is will Pillaiyan be allowed to do so by the Rajapaksa triumvirate for fear of "growing too big for his own good." He has to create a positive political image among Tamil population who are very skeptical about his credentials and capabilities. For this he will have to shed the militant image and don the mantle of a Tamil political leader. There is reservoir of capable and forward thinking Tamils in other political parties and public entities. He should not hesitate to muster their support for the common good. The successful conduct of the Eastern PC elections and installation of Pillaiyan at the helm as the chief minister is a victory for President Rajapaksa. However, east will require a lot of handholding and sympathetic consideration as it embarks on a new path. Though the election has given the President and his party a foothold in the east now, he has the more difficult task of establishing it in a tricky environment. He has to make the UPFA not merely as a vehicle of power but also of development. This can be done only through empowerment of the provincial council with adequate financial and administrative resources. Unless the ruling alliance is seen as a proactive participant in the development of east there will be no ownership of the people in it. And then the only winners will be bureaucracy and corruption. We have seen this happen too often in the past. Other political parties, particularly the opposition, will have to recognize the reality of eastern province and see the political developments there in the national perspective. The UNP and SLMC will have to rethink their strategies to recoup their waning fortunes. And that means overcoming internal personality clashes, revamping the leadership styles and motivating party members. These are the realities of the east which are far beyond cosmetic changes of power sharing. The task ahead is much bigger and more difficult and goes farther than mere power play. (Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)
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