CHINA: TIBET- INDIAN OCEAN TRADE
ROUTE –MIXING
STRATEGY, SECURITY AND COMMERCE.
Guest Column by D. S. Rajan
The
Importance of Yadong in Tibet
The People’s Republic of China (PRC)
is now revealing, more assertively than before, its high
expectations with
regard to the opening up of Sino-Indian border trade
specifically through revival of Yadong (Shigatse,
Tibet) Trade Post, which was set up on May 10, 1962, but
subsequently closed down due to what the Chinese say, the
worsening of the Sino-Indian
relations at that time. The new
emphasis on Yadong’s importance is being noticed at
a time when, taking the cue from the importance given to
border trade by Premier Wen Jiabao during his April 2005
visit to India, the leaders in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)
have already started expressing hopes for a substantial
increase by 2010 in the volume of Tibet’s trade with India
and Nepal to US$ 3 billion.
Border
Trade and the New Drive:
The economic and strategic importance
to China of its border trade through opening up of Yadong,
was well articulated in a recent
Chinese language write-up in the authoritative
journal “ Eastern Liaowang”.
This was also covered by Beijing’s CCTV and
reproduced in the Website of the China-Tibet Information
Centre (September 12,2005). Captioned
“ From Tibet to Indian Ocean”.
It disclosed that since the April 2005 visit of
Premier Wen Jiabao to India, investigation groups from the
Tibet Government, Rikaze (Shigatse) Administration and the
Central Committee for Drafting Laws (CCDL) have paid visits
to Yadong. The
visits, meant to revive that port in the changed
circumstances, resulted in the finalisation of a report
by the TAR Government (July 20,2005) on the subject of
‘Possibilities of Opening up Yadong ’, which is now with
the CCDL in Bejing for its approval and enactment of
necessary laws.
The aforesaid visits were followed by
trips by Tibet officials to both the Border Trade Markets
designated by India and China - Changgu (Sikkim) and
Renqinggang (Tibet, 28 kms from Nathula Pass) respectively.
The officials have
found brisk construction activities in the sites of
both the Markets. “Eastern Liaowang” then revealed that
the Renqinggang Border Market is likely to open in the
later half of 2006. (‘China Daily’ of September 12,
2005 separately referred to a press statement of a Sikkim
Government spokesman that the border trading through Changgu
would begin on October 2, 2005).
“Eastern
Liaowang” then went on to stress the strategic importance
of opening-up of Yadong Port, by describing the
latter area as an important military base in
China’s Southwest. As next stage to expected
completion of Qinghai-Tibet Railway in July 2006, a railway
project linking Lhasa and Yadong is being envisaged under
the TAR’s 11th Five Year Plan. Once this
line is operational, goods from China’s Western parts can
reach South Asia nations via Yadong, thus reducing the
dependence in this regard on transportation through Hongkong
etc. The item then quoted a high Tibet official to say, “
Tibet’s trade is now entirely carried out through Tianjin
Port, which is more than 5000 kms away. Once Yadong opens
up, the distance between Lhasa-Yadong and Indian ports like
Calcutta would only be around 1200 kms. Thus Yadong
could undoubtedly become a bridge and link between China’s
Western parts and the South Asian nations”.
The journal then predicted that Yadong
region’s economy would boom as a result of the expected
investment in capital construction and service industries
there, after the trade port opens. Cross- border trade will
pick up with commodities like silk reaching India from
Shanghai and Hangzhou. Referring to press reports, it
highlighted the possibilities of a Shanghai-India linkage
in another way, following the likely materialization of a
Gas Authority of India-China Petroleum and Chemical
Corporation joint petrochemical project in the PRC, aimed at
transporting its products to that city through China’s
East-West Oil pipeline.
Beijing by all indications is on a
border trade offensive, which is being felt in respect of
China’s neighbours in all directions – Russia, Vietnam,
Myanmar and the countries in Central and South Asia.
Regarding Central Asia, the Chinese plan to open three
Border Trade Markets by end of the year. In South Asia, the Khunjerab
Border Market linking Kashgar (Xinjiang, China) with
Pakistan is already operational. Starting of cross-
border trade now through Sikkim and reactivating Yadong
Trade Post show that the offensive, under the overall
Western Area Development Strategy of China, has taken deep
roots. The Strategy
itself fits in well with the new “ People- First”
approach of the Post-Jiang Zemin leadership which lays
stress on a balanced and sustainable development, implying a
need to give equal emphasis to the prosperity of both the
backward inland provinces and advanced coastal
regions.
Strategic
and Security Dimensions:
The Chinese over-all border trade
policy has also a security dimension, which the neighbouring
countries can ill afford to ignore. Development is the
declared primary goal of China now for which it needs an
“international environment of long term stability and a
stable surrounding environment”. The PRC has accordingly
formulated a new security concept with ‘mutual trust’ as
basis. It is clear that trade will indirectly impinge on the
concept’s implementation. New Delhi views the Indian Ocean
region as important from the viewpoint of economy, trade,
politics and security and as such may feel that any
extension of Beijing’s influence in that region could lead
to a strategic competition between the two in the region. In
fact, this is already happening.
Energy security amply reflects the
situation. With the PRC becoming a net importer of oil in
1994, the protection of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCS)
has become a priority for Beijing. This has led to an
urgency in China to build a blue water navy capable of
patrolling the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Chinese
interplay between trade and security comes through clearly
in their ‘commercial’ port project at Gwadar (Pakistan),
capable of serving as a transit terminal for crude oil
supplies to Xinjiang and moves to build a road and rail
network linking Myanmar with the bordering Yunnan province.
An additional point in this connection relates to Chinese
efforts to construct a pipeline connecting Yunnan with gas
fields in Myanmar in the interest of promoting transport and
energy sectors in the former. In response, New Delhi is
aiming to build a pipeline to India from Myanmar, via
Bangladesh.
India will be fully justified to be
concerned about the geo political and long term implications
of China’s initiatives particularly in establishing
Tibet-Indian Ocean trade links. This cannot be seen in
isolation without looking into the progress that needs to be
made in the vexed border dispute.
(The Writer is
Research Fellow in the Observer Research Foundation, Chennai
Chapter , India . He was earlier Director, Cabinet
Secretariat, Government of India, and New Delhi. email:dsrajan@orfonline.org )