Paper no. 1572	11. 10. 2005
INDIA’S VOTE IN FAVOUR OF REFERRAL OF IRAN  NUCLEAR ISSUE TO UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (IAEA MEETING SEPTEMBER 2005) REVIEWED By Dr Subhash Kapila (Readers of the authors papers on Iran’s nuclear programme issue in recent weeks questioned in their feedback the silence on  India’s vote in favour of a UN referral of Iran’s nuclear programme issue. This paper is in response to the readers demands – The Author)   Introductory Observations Iran’s nuclear programme issue dominated global headlines in the weeks preceding the crucial September 2005 meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at Vienna. By now the salient facts of this contentious issue stand well publicized and what now needs to be highlighted is that a seemingly unbridgeable fissure divides Iran on one side and the United States and the European Union (EU-3) on the other side. Significantly, this fissure has divided the international community also on the right of Iran to a full nuclear fuel cycle for a civilian nuclear energy programme So far, resolutions at the IAEA, have found unanimous support, even if it meant prolonged behind the scenes parleys to achieve unanimity. The vote on the resolution sponsored by EU-3 for a referral of the Iran nuclear programme issue to the United Nations Security Council in mid-September 2005 defied efforts at unanimity. In the 35 members IAEA Board of Governors, 22 members voted for the United States backed EU-3 resolution, 12 members abstained and one voted against it. Russia and  China were the significant abstentions followed by  Pakistan, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Vietnam, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Yemen, Algeria and  Tunisia. Venzuela voted against the resolution defying its powerful hemispheric neighbour. India’s posture in voting in favour of the US-backed EU-3 resolution evoked global surprise and frustrating disappointment and shock from  Iran.  India, at best, was expected to cast an abstention vote like  Russia and  China and the other Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members. The following questions emerge when India’s vote for  Iran’s referral to UN Security Council is reviewed. India’s official explanation on voting for UN referral. Is it convincing? India’s stand at IAEA November, 2005 meeting? Pakistan’s culpability in WMD proliferation. Why no punitive measures? India’s national interests. Are they served by India’s vote? India’s external image following the vote–the United States pressure predominant India’s negative domestic reactions both political and media India’s Official Explanation on Voting for the Iran Referral. Is it Convincing? India’s official explanation on voting for the US-backed EU-3 resolution on Iran’s nuclear programme should first take into account the Indian Prime Minister’s statements on the Iranian issue during his United States visit in July 2005 and those on the eve of the IAEA vote in mid-September 2005. A discernible change in stance is visible. The Washington Post carried the Prime Minister’s remarks in July 2005 as under “We would like Iran to honour its obligations” “Our interest would be to work with like-minded countries that a constructive solution can be found for the problems that Iran is expressing that the world community is expressing about Iran. We have strong civilisational links with Iran. Also, I say that Iran is the largest Shia Muslim country in the world. We have the second largest Shia Muslim population in our country and I do believe that thanks to our unique history, we can be a bridge” On the eve of the IAEA voting, commenting on Iranian President’s telephonic call to the Indian Prime Minister the Foreign Office official spokesperson made the following statements: “The President raised the issue about Iran’s nuclear programme in the IAEA. The Prime Minister advised the President that Iran should consider taking a flexible position so as to avoid a confrontation” “The Prime Minister repeated the necessity to make concessions. India supports the resolution of all issues through IAEA” When the Iranian President's telephonic call came to the Indian Prime Minister on the eve of the voting, it can be safely surmised that India had already decided to vote for the UN referral. Why could not have the Iranian President be explained  India’s stand and decision rather than the statements above? Now coming to the Indian official explanation on its IAEA voting in favour of the UN referral, it runs on the following lines: India agreed to vote for the EU-3 resolution on being assured that no immediate referral to UN Security Council will be made. The decision will be deferred till the November 2005 meeting of IAEA India therefore has gained time for intensive consultation by both sides “so that an outcome satisfactory to both Iran and the international community can be evolved” Bereft of any inside information of the Indian Government, analytically, the following can be said: The Iran-Western countries stand off on the Iranian nuclear programme has defied any satisfactory outcome even after two years of Iran-EU 3 negotiations While India advised Iran on the eve of the vote to make concessions and adopt flexible stands, was similar advice given to western countries How does India expect that in the period September-November 2005, Iran-Western countries could arrive at a satisfactory outcome? Or was it that the India-EU compromise was aimed at gaining more time for India to evolve her stand on the vexatious issue?   India’s “yes” vote in favour of the US-backed resolution becomes even more intriguing when the NAM statement after the IAEA meeting is taken in account. The NAM statement makes the following significant points: Resolution brings into question the inalienable right of all members states of NPT to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes Draft resolution was tabled at a very late hour on Friday evening that made it impossible for delegations to obtain instructions from their respective capitals NAM had suggested that the Draft Resolution be deliberated in November 2005 meeting and then seek a consensus decision. However, NAMs major concerns and those of like-minded states were not taken into account. “Any references, whether explicit or complicit, to the UN Security Council on the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme by pre-determining Iran’s non-compliance in the context of Article XIIC of Agency’s statute and without allowing time for Director General International Atomic Energy Agency to complete its work in resolving the remaining issues of contention is not correct basis for moving forward” What were India’s compulsions for giving a “yes” vote on a divided-support resolution and on which NAM countries had serious doubts? India’s Stand at November 2005 IAEA Meeting India’s “yes” vote in favour of the US-backed EU3 Resolution at the September 2005 IAEA meeting places it in a piquant situation when the issue re-surfaces at the November 2005 meeting of the IAEA. With hardly any likelihood of softening of respective stands of Iran and the Western countries, can India then be expected to once again cast a “yes” vote referring Iran for sanctions by the UN Security Council. A “yes” vote by India at the November 2005 meeting would imply that India endorses the Western stand, whose essence is that: Iran has not complied with NPT provisions Suspicions that Iran’s nuclear activities could threaten international peace As this author has mentioned in his earlier paper (SAAG Paper No. 1551, dated 27/09/2005: Iran’s Nuclear Programme Western Opposition is More Geo-political than Legal) that essentially the Western case against Iran is more geopolitical than legal, would India be endorsing United States and Europe’s geo-political agenda rather than taking a stand on the legalities of the issue and Iran’s rights under the NPT. The United States geo political agenda, by extension, includes a regime change in Iran. Would India like to endorse such an agenda?  Pakistan’s Culpability in Iran’s WMD Proliferation. Why No Punitive Measures? The Western case in terms of suspicions of an Iranian nuclear weapons programme rests largely on evidence of traces of enriched uranium on Iranian centrifuges. Iran has indicated that these centrifuges were supplied by Pakistan. It is well known that  Pakistan as the world’s most brazen WMD proliferator was involved in the Iranian nuclear programme from the early 1990’s  Just because Pakistan politically submitted itself to United States  political pressures post – 9/11 to American dictates, its WMD proliferation cannot be condoned. Speculation also abounds that one of the major reasons for Pakistan’s submission for Pak-Israel talks was that Israel wanted Pakistan to provide all details of nuclear assistance provided by Pakistan to Iran If  India could persuade the EU-3 to postpone the Iran referral to November 2005, India should now insist that any “yes” vote in November would be contingent on including Pakistani WMD proliferation also in the same referral to UN Security Council If Iran’s potential for nuclear weapons production is a threat to international peace, then, Pakistan’s assistance to Iran in this direction was the original sin and calls for punitive actions. Pakistan also needs to be referred to the United Nations for endangering international security by its WMD proliferation India’s National Interests – Are They Served by a “YES” Vote on the Iran Referral? India’s foreign policy formulations towards any region or country needs to be fashioned by only two determinants (1) The national security determinant and (2) the economic security determinant. In terms of India’s national security determinants, despite its past support for OIC pro-Pak resolutions on Kashmir, Iran has furthered India’s national security interests by not providing strategic depth to Pakistan, by providing India access to  Afghanistan which Pakistan has denied even after US occupation of Afghanistan and similarly providing India access to the Central  Asian Republics Iran very explicitly has supported India’s position on terrorism and those who sponsor terrorism in the Delhi Declaration signed between the two countries on strategic cooperation In terms of economic security, the significant billion dollars deals signed on gas and oil supplies by Iran at pegged oil prices are significant gains for India. Iran also offers India a sizeable market for its entrepreneurs A “yes” vote by India certainly would sour the evolving strategic co-operation between Iran and India. A souring of India-Iran relationship would impact more heavily on  India’s national security interests where India has no alternative option available for strategic access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. It could also lead to loss of access to sizeable oil and gas supplies in closer proximity of  India India’s External Image Following the Vote-The United States Pressure Predominant. India’s external image has taken a severe beating as a result of the “YES” vote. In the run-up to the September 2005 IAEA vote, United States Congressmen and analysts were vociferous in virtually holding a gun to India’s head that should India not side with the United States on this issue, India could virtually write off any hopes for the July 18,2005 USA-India nuclear deal Earlier in March 2005, the United States Secretary of State on a visit to  New Delhi indicated United States disapproved of the India-Pakistan-Iran pipeline deal. The message was clear for India - to lay-off  Iran When India cast its “YES” vote in favour of the US-backed resolution, the message for external observers of India ’s policies/attitudes was clear in that India had succumbed to United States pressures, and rather tamely. India’s follow-up protestations to the contrary did not carry much weight when the US President congratulated the Indian Prime Minister for the “YES” vote and a bevy of US Congressmen/analysts expressed appreciation at India ’s “YES” vote India’s decision makers need to take lessons from China on handling critical issues with the United States India’s Negative Domestic Reactions both Political and Media India’s domestic reactions to the Indian Governments “YES” vote in Vienna on the Iranian referral issue have been severely negative. Except for some defence by noted born-again strategic analysts, the Indian domestic reaction both political and in the media has been very critical. India’s political parties, including the ruling Congress Party’s main coalition partner, the Leftists have strongly criticized the Congress Government’s “YES” vote against Iran. They have demanded that  India should withdraw from its stand in the November 2005 IAEA meeting Except for an odd op-ed in the media justifying the Government’s stand, the remainders have been by and large not supportive. In an op-ed in the newspaper, “The Hindu” which is strongly pro-Congress, I believe, strident criticism appeared as follows: ·        “First, all its pretensions to a Permanent Seat in the United Nations Security Council, India on Saturday (19th September) flunked its first real test as a rising world power” ·        “The irony of the Indian capitulation on Iran is that its display of political weakness comes at a time when the US has finally becomes aware of India’s strategic weight and significance and is attempting desperately to harness this for its own ends’ ·        “Any deal or partnership that hangs on such a slender thread which attempts forcibly to re-write India’s strategic equations and undermines the strategic autonomy cannot possibly be in the national interest’  Surely, India’s policy formulations and decision makers should have foreseen the strong negative domestic reaction to an Indian “YES” vote, when perceptibly in domestic eyes too, it has been made under US pressure. That this has happened suggests that a “disconnect” exists between the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of External Affairs on vital foreign policy issues Concluding Observations The most significant lesson that emerges from this issue is that India’s Prime Ministers can no longer run foreign policy as a “personalized prerogative”. Foreign policy issues and especially critical ones like the one where India’s national respect is involved are becoming emotive issues and increasingly entering the domestic political debate. Unfortunately, India’s  “YES” vote at Vienna has been perceived as a capitulation to United States pressure and an endorsement of  America’s geo-political agenda in the Gulf Region in particular. Regrettably, it does not connote, in its present timing, that India as a rising power has demonstrated the capability of taking independent decisions in its national interests. It follows, that the ruling government of the day must increasingly take the Indian Parliament into confidence and the general public sentiment must be respected Also, in the same context it needs to be noted that the Congress Governments stands and confabulations on the India-Pakistan peace dialogue, on troops reductions in  Kashmir and de-militarisation of Siachen are equally critical issues: these cannot be solely decided by the Prime Minister with a handful of strategic analysts/advisors. They need to be debated in Parliament at length and with transparency. Finally, noting widespread criticism of the Congress Governments “YES” vote on the Iran referral case, the Government can only get out from the corner in which it has painted itself, by taking into account the domestic sentiments on the issue. To maintain that domestic sentiments cannot determine national interests, and could be ignored, would be a travesty of political logic (The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email drsubhashkapila@yahoo.com)
Back to the top Home  | Papers  | Notes  | Forum  | Search  | Feedback  | Links Copyright © South Asia Analysis Group  All rights reserved. Permission is given to refer this on-line document for use in research papers and articles, provided the source and the author's name  are acknowledged. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes.