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Paper no. 2456
13-Nov.-2007
Sri Lankan Tamil Cause: An Uncertain Future - International Terrorism Monitor---Paper No. 304
by B. Raman
With the death of S. P. Thamilchelvan, the head of the political wing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), under mysterious circumstances on November 2, 2007, the Sri Lankan Tamil cause faces an uncertain future.
2. Thamilselvan, the presumed No.3 in the pecking order of the LTTE leadership after Prabakaran and Pottu Amman, the chief of the intelligence wing of the LTTE, was the only leader not involved in any major act of terrorism either in Sri Lankan or Indian territory. The direct involvement of Prabakaran and Pottu Amman in many acts of terrorism in Indian territory, including in the brutal assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister, in May 1991, would rule out for ever the Government of India having anything to do with the LTTE so long as the perpetrators of Rajiv's assassination continue to head the organisation and seek to control the destiny of the Sri Lankan Tamils.
3. P. Nadesan, a former Sri Lankan Police officer, whom Prabakaran has nominated as the successor to Thamilchelvan, is not a leader of any calibre. He is essentially a stooge of Prabakaran, who has not given any evidence so far of having an independent mind of his own.
4. As demonstrated by the LTTE's spectacular raid on the Anuradhapura air base of the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) on October 22, 2007, the LTTE's morale, motivation and capacity for resilience are still strong despite the set-backs suffered by it in the Eastern Province and the damage, which the Sri Lankan authorities claim to have inflicted on its Navy and commercial ships, which were being used for gun-running. Morale, motivation and resilience can keep the LTTE fighting for years, but they alone would not be sufficient for making the Tamil cause prevail. The Tamil cause cannot prevail without a plurality of political leadership in the LTTE, with a vision of what is achievable and what is not.
5. As an insurgent-cum-terrorist organisation, the LTTE is any day far superior to Al Qaeda, but as a political or ideological organisation it is far inferior to Al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden is a blood-thirsty terrorist leader who has no qualms about killing not only non-Muslims, but even his co-religionists, but one has to grudgingly admit that he has allowed a plurality of leaders to emerge in his organisation so that it does not have to depend only on him for its future successes.
6. That is why many analysts agree that the elimination of bin Laden will not mean the end of Al Qaeda. Other leaders will take over and carry on with its operations. Prabakaran is an extremely jealous political leader, who has not allowed alternate political leaders of any stature to emerge either in the LTTE itself or in the Sri Lankan Tamil community. Thamilchelvan, who might have been able to take over the leadership and keep the LTTE fighting, is gone. Pottu Amman may be a brilliant and dreaded intelligence chief, who knew how to kill with precision, but he has given no evidence of any political standing, which would enable him to rally round the Tamils after the death of Prabakaran. There have been unconfirmed reports that the dynasty bug has bitten the LTTE too and that Prabakaran is trying to groom his son, who grew up in the West, as his successor. Even he won't be able to mobilise the Tamils.
7. Thus, if the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) succeeds in its projected aim of decapitating the LTTE by killing Prabakaran ---either through its own efforts or with the help of Pakistani and Ukrainian pilots--- that could mark the beginning of the withering away of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. That has been the fate of all terrorist organisations over-dominated by a single person. That was the fate of the organisation headed by Carlos. After his arrest by the French intelligence in August, 1994, it has withered away. That was also the fate of other ideological organisations such as the Baader-Meinhof and the Red Army faction of Germany. One can also cite many other instances of what happens to an insurgent or terrorist organisation when its leader does not tolerate the emergence of other leaders.
8. The SLAF has valid reasons to target Prabakaran. He has killed more political leaders----Sinhalese as well as Tamils--- than the leader of any other terrorist organisation in the world. He has been responsible for innumerable deaths of innocent civilians. If the Sri Lankan authorities conclude that he has to be eliminated in order to stop the bloodshed, nobody can question their right to undertake a decapitation strike.
9. A successful decapitation strike may not mean the immediate end of the bloodbath. In fact, more blood will be shed by the angry and frustrated followers of Prabakaran in the short term, which may last about two years or so. Thereafter, the inevitable process of withering-away will set in and the LTTE will cease to exist as a terrorist organisation in the medium and long-term.
10. It is in the interest of not only Sri Lanka, but also India and the rest of the international community that the LTTE ceases to exist as a terrorist organisation. The Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka would also want to put an end to the LTTE as a political organisation so that there is no well-motivated organisation which defends the aspirations of the Tamils. If the Sri Lankan authorities succeed in putting an end to the LTTE as a political organisation too, Sri Lanka will be back to the pre-1983 years when a highly chauvinistic Sinhalese majority rode rough-shod over the rights of the Tamils
11. Make no mistake about it. President Mahinda Rajapakse and other Sinhalese leaders are no lovers of Tamils. They may smile and smile, but they would like nothing better than to crush the LTTE even as a political organisation so that the Tamils could be ultimately reduced to the status of the Red Indians of the US.
12. India has a moral responsibility to see that while terrorism ends in Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese majority is not able to take the country back to the pre-1983 days. A reversion to the status quo ante can be prevented by preserving the assets of the LTTE as a political organisation, which is able to articulate and fight politically for the interests of the Tamils without degenerating once again into a terrorist organisation shunned by the international community. The elimination of Thamilchelvan reduces India's options in working for such a political organisation, but this should not discourage India from interacting closely with different sections of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka and abroad in order to see that the Sri Lankan authorities do not succeed in extinguishing the Tamil political struggle for their legitimate rights.
13. President Rajapakse is no different from Prabakaran in certain matters. Both live in their own self-created world of illusions. Prabakaran thinks he can still achieve an independent Tamil Eelam despite the attrition of capability and international support. Rajapakse thinks that he can crush the LTTE militarily and impose a dictated peace on the Tamils. So long as Prabakaran is alive, the LTTE will keep fighting like a ferocious animal. It might have lost territory in the Eastern Province, but territorial control is never an important factor for an insurgent or terrorist organisation. We saw in Afghanistan that the loss of territorial control did not mean the end of the Taliban. It has staged a spectacular come-back. Morale and motivation are more important than territorial control. Both remain intact and as strong as ever as one saw at Anuradhapura.
14. If Mr. Rajapakse is an intelligent political leader with a vision and with a recognition of his responsibility to look after the interests of all Sri Lankans---whether Sinhalese or Tamil--- he would have accelerated the search for a mutually acceptable political solution, even while maintaining his counter-terrorism operations. He has abandoned the search for a political solution, thinking that a military victory is not far away.
15. Caught between the illusions of two political leaders, the prospects for a negotiated political solution have further receded. It is not only the Tamil community, but even Sri Lanka as a whole, which faces an uncertain future. The calculated inactivism of the Government of India is contributing to a drift, which could prove detrimental to India's interests. Public opinion in Tamil Nadu should be more active in persuading the Government of India to see that under the pretext of ending the terrorism of the LTTE, the Sinhalese majority does not once again crush the legitimate Tamil political aspirations.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
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