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Paper no. 2616
11-Mar.-2008
China’s Military Budget – Should India be Concerned?
By Bhaskar Roy
China declared last week (Mar.4) that its defence budget for 2008 was pegged at US $ 59 billion, a rise of 17.8% over last year. The last year’s defence budget was US$45 billion, an 18% rise over the previous year.
The budget was declared on the eve of the first session of 11th National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s Parliament. This was done to try and convince the world and especially the USA, that Beijing was being more transparent about its military spending. The US defence experts and policy makers have recently been mounting pressure on China for greater clarity and transparency of its military modernization. It had become obvious to the Americans for the first time that Beijing’s hectic pace of power projection growth was getting far beyond national security and Taiwan.
The declaration of the budget actually gave away nothing. The NPC spokesman Jiang Enzhu’s only clarification was the rise in spending was due to increase in pay packages in the armed forces, rise in oil prices and some small armament expenditure. This Chinese policy comes from Master Sun Tzu’s philosophy that keys to victory are “adaptability” and inscrutability”.
“Adaptability” is in the apparent move towards responding to international demands of transparency. The “Inscrutable” is reflected in Beijing’s refusal to reveal more than what it thinks is good for itself, and keep others guessing. This also relates to Sun Tzu’s theory of denial and deception.
Jiang Enzhu also said that the defence allocation in the budget was in proportion less than even that of India’s! This is also a charade to mislead the common man all over the world, who may not examine the statement very closely. It also gives a point to China’s friends in other countries to argue the proportionate angle in support.
Something like this could also arm China’s friends in India, who insist that India should not respond to Beijing’s warnings over Arunachal Pradesh especially after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to the State last month. Some of these voices are increasingly being seen in India as China’s Trojan Horses or “Assassin’s Mace”.
The highly respected and independent “Stockholm Institute of Peace and Research Institute” (SIPRI) calculated that China’s declared military budget of 2006 in terms of purchasing power was around $188 billion, next only to USA’s $529 billion.
China’s declared military budget hides more than it reveals. This budget cannot explain major indigenous production of its nuclear powered submarine, the Type-093 which was inducted in the PLA Navy (PLAN) last year; the Type-094 nuclear powered and nuclear JL-2 missile armed submarine which is to be inducted by the PLAN; the new Shan Class submarines, the DF-31 and DF-31A intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS), and the JF-10 and J-17 (Thunder) aircraft, to name a few.
Apart from the above there have been foreign acquisitions especially from Russia beginning 1992-93. These acquisitions included SU-27 aircraft along with production agreement, 3 Sovereinmny class destroyers and 12 Kilo class submarines.
According to Russian experts, China’s defence acquisition from Russia between 1990-96 was worth $ 26 billion. The figure is low as prices were fixed at local prices and China paid at least half the amount in barter trade of goods Russia needed badly. The actual figure would be close to $ 150 billion. The destroyers and submarines were procured by the Chinese subsequent to 1996.
China is reported to have deployed, according to recent information, around one thousand M-9 missiles on its eastern coast, targeting Taiwan.
The above are representative examples only. It defies any logic how China’s declared defence budget accounts for all these and more. Even if the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) used a quarter of the weapons and equipment against Taiwan, the island nation would be wiped off the face of the earth.
What China is preparing is to make a quick and decisive strike against Taiwan if the latter declared de jure independence. It will not give enough time to the US forces in the region to respond in Taiwan’s defence. Chinese President Hu Jintao recently warned Taiwan of “dire consequences” if its forthcoming referendum on UN membership succeeded.
The Chinese could have easily taken over Taiwan in the 1950s. Chairman Mao Zedong decided against it and opted for a future peaceful unification. He saw in capitalist Taiwan a growing golden goose which would benefit the mainland ultimately. To-day, real Taiwanese investment in the mainland is well over $100 billion.
The Pentagon recently submitted its annual report to the US Congress on China’s military development. Its conclusion should seriously alarm China’s neighbours, especially countries of South East Asia and India. The report noted the PLA’s growing capability in cyber warfare.
Interestingly, however, the USA decided for the first time to discuss the Pentagon report with Chinese defence officials. It suggests that Washington may seek to get a commitment from Beijing over the security of its own interest including Taiwan and Japan. China would gladly do it. The US floated idea of an alliance with Japan, Australia and India to counter China militarily has almost fizzled out. The US policy did not fit in with the post cold war world, and certainly not the 21st century. The theory started crumbling when the new Labour government in Canberra declared it will not be part of any such arrangement. Last month, China and Australia held their first strategic dialogue when Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiaci visited Australia.
A Chinese comment in the context of the US floated alliance following Australia’s withdrawal would be pertinent to note. It asked Japan and the US to get out, noting that Japan was the main proposer of the alliance. The comment, however, was silent on India. It could mean two things. Either India was considered unimportant, or India was isolated for some special attention. Given Chinese perception of India today, the later is more likely.
Beijing made no secret of its perception that it considered India as a part of US plans to encircle China, and hence its pressure politically and on the Sino-Indian border. India’s official denials do not appear to have convinced China. Or Beijing may be using this to try and further tighten the screws on India.
The Globe, a publication of China’s State Council controlled news agency, the Xinhua, wrote (Feb.27) that the Indo-US defence co-operation was to counter China, and the US intended to form a strategic partnership with India to capture South Asia to counter China. The Xinhua (Feb.27) even went further with a report headlined “India building its defence to become an imperialist power in South Asia – the world is worried”. The report went on to say that the US-India nuclear co-operation was part of India’s ambition to become a super power and its conventional defence build up was to dominate South Asia.
US officials may like to say that China would not oppose India in the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG), but one is not so sure. The NSG decides on the basis of consensus. But Beijing may have found a new friend in Australia, and a few undecided West European countries in the NSG. Most of the West European countries appear to be fixated on China’s market, given their own slow economic growth, and they may fall in line to appease Beijing.
Denying India membership in the NSG will not necessarily prevent development of its nuclear weapons programme. The Chinese know that. But staying outside the NSG would harm India’s energy security in the long term, deny India access to a wide range of advanced technology and, politically, disallow New Delhi a seat in one of the most important international Clubs.
China is known to have denied India membership of the APEC though that may be overcome this year. It also tried to keep India outside the ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Wherever India gets in Beijing bargains for a place for Pakistan, too.
Beijing’s “counter-India” strategy was drawn up in the 1950s. As is well known, the Chinese always take a long term view and work towards it. India was consciously identified as an eventual competitor or contender for the pinnacle seat in Asia. Periodic “friendly” declarations that the two countries have been friends for two thousand years except for a very short period of animosity are deceptive illusions that have swayed many Indians. The fact is there was no relationship except for a few Buddhist monks travelling to an area that is China today, and a very few Chinese intellectuals travelling to Nalanda and some places to chronicle the land.
Build Kingdoms to tear down a Kingdom. The strategy is to encircle India in concentric circles of countries friendly to or befriended by China and inject in them fears of India threat. That is why China embarked on another long term propaganda or psychological warfare employing its official media, military strategic experts and political scientists to project the “India Threat” theory among India’s neighbouring “Kingdoms”. Beijing launched the “India Threat” theory long before anyone even thought of the “Chinese Threat” theory.
China usually does not enter into military conflicts if the objective can be achieved through other means. The 1962 attack was an exception. They had carefully calculated India’s military weakness. It had also convinced Moscow, according to a Chinese expert, that this thrust would be short and would establish their “rightful” territorial claims. Soviet Union’s neutrality was consolidated. Beijing claims that their army withdrew as a good gesture. The fact, however, is that there was no way the PLA could have held on to the territory. China was lucky. India did not use its air force due to some internal miscommunication. They threatened a similar adventure in 1967, but withdrew for talks when they realized that the Indian army of 1967 was not that of 1962.
New dimensions have been added to China’s “counter-India” strategy in recent years. This is heavily military oriented, a result of its hidden military budget. Chinese medium range nuclear ballistic missiles like the DF-21 and DF-21A covers most of India and the surrounding seas as well as the Indian Ocean. The growing fleet of its nuclear submarines are eventually going to patrol the Indian Ocean.
After constructing the Gwadar Deep Sea Port in Pakistan, investing $ 2.2 billion non-refundable aid, it is seeking similar facilities in Kutubdia, Bangladesh. Chinese military advantage in Myanmar needs no emphasis.
Equally important is the rapid development in China’s cyber warfare capability including C4ISR. In the last two years China’s military hackers defaced India’s Defence Ministry and Bhaba Atomic Research Centre (BARC) Websites. Although no real damage was done, these are precursors.
Chinese cyber warfare obviously is meant to disable the opponent’s communication systems. To further perfect their killing ability, the Chinese need to enter India’s cyber operated strategic area. These include ports, air ports, railways and the Indian companies that produce software for these systems.
The large hidden portion of China’s defence budget also funds transfer of arms, military equipment and facilities to friendly Kingdoms. For example, Pakistan’s Gwadar Port is a designated military establishment. Bangladesh was provided the C-102 ship-to-ship missiles last year. Kickbacks are also given to preferred political parties through military sales. Bangladesh’s viscerally anti-India political party, the BNP, was given kickbacks in 2005 from the sale of F-7 aircraft. The kickback was for elections to help the BNP to defeat the perceived pro-India Awami Leagaue.
Briefly, this is the importance of China’s growing military budget and modernization, posing a threat to India’s security in more ways than one.
(The author is an eminent China analyst with many years of experience of study on the developments in China. He can be reached at grouchohart@yahoo.com)
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