Tibet Issue – China’s Spat over Advani remarks: Broader
Implications
D. S. Rajan
How is the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) evaluating the very recent stand on
the Tibet issue, taken by the Indian opposition National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) leaders Mr L. K. Advani and Mr
George Fernandez? There is no official statement in this
regard from Beijing so far, but from what has been commented
upon by the authoritative analysts in the PRC, contours of
emerging Chinese perceptions, having implications for future
Sino-Indian ties, are becoming visible.
The “Global Times”
(in Chinese, an affiliate of the People’s Daily, 1 April
2008) carried an interview with Professor Sun Shihai, a
known South Asia expert and Deputy Director of the
well-connected Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and
Colonel Dai Xu of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force.
Setting the background to the interview, the journal pointed
to Mr Advani’s reported statement that things have changed
as his party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, does not accept
China’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh , that the Indian
government’s step of cancelling the meeting of Indian
Vice-President with the Dalai Lama is unjustified and that
India should not be scared of China. On what Mr Fernandez
said, its spotlight was on the leader’s observation that
India has sold out to China, description of the Vajpayee
Government’s agreement over Tibet as part of China as a
“sin” and appeal to India to boycott the Beijing Olympics.
Professor Sun, in
his response, felt that the two Indian opposition leaders
represent the ‘hawkish’ factions in India; irrespective of
the question whether their views reflect ‘geo-politics’ or
‘election politics’, their aim is to play the “ Tibet
Card”, in consonance with the cry of certain groups in the
country about the “so-called suppression of peaceful
demonstrations in China”. He then went on to say that such
“discordant voices” have exposed the faces of the two as
“politicians” and that in any case, they cannot hide the
main current of Indian public opinion, which stands in
strong condemnation of violence in Tibet and Tibet
independence activities.
Both Professor Sun
and Colonel Dai Xu of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air
Force have told the Global Times that the Tibet issue will
have no impact on Sino-Indian ties. The latter, specifically
referring to some Indian press reports alleging that the
Chinese troops have been intruding into the Pangong Tso area
of Ladakh since January 2008, more than 10 times so far,
compared such despatches to “episodes in a novel without any
factual basis”. Connecting the press reports to the
‘rightist tendencies’ of certain Indian circles, Col. Dai Xu
pointed out that allegations of intrusions had even merited
denials of the Indian Defence Ministry in order to make
records straight; the Indian Defence and Foreign Ministers
had themselves viewed such allegations in the context of the
Sino-Indian perceptional differences on the Line of Actual
Control.
“Global Times’ is a
paper intended to brief the Chinese population about
international affairs and it is not surprising that as per
the need of the hour, it has made an effort to assure the
readers within the country that the public in India is
supportive of Beijing’s stand on the Tibet issue; the
reality however is that the opposite is true, with all
political parties excepting the Left and the media in India,
generally remaining critical of Beijing’s high-handedness in
Tibet. What is coming out clear is that the views of Chinese
scholars are a part of the ongoing urgently required
domestic propaganda about happenings in Tibet.
The Chinese
criticisms against Mr Advani’s statements seem to mark a
trend, which may have implications for future Sino-Indian
relations. China, which looks satisfied with India’s
handling of Tibet protestors, has reasons to feel uneasy
with New Delhi’s failure to share its views that the Dalai
Lama is the instigator of Tibet unrest. India’s External
Affairs Minister has on the other hand spoken highly of the
spiritual eminence of the exiled leader, while in
Washington. New Delhi’s appeal for a dialogue between all
those involved stands in contrast to Beijing’s conditional
dialogue approach. The PRC may also not be happy over
India’s willingness to officially discuss Tibet issue,
considered purely China’s internal affairs, with the US.
Adding to such a situation comes now the attack on the
Indian main opposition, which means that the Indian
political spectrum, minus the Left, has come to occupy the
wrong side of Chinese reckoning about the Tibet issue.
The focus may need
a shift to the traditional strategic culture of China and
its applicability to the case of ties with India,
independent of whichever political party is in power in the
latter. China’s current strategy demands maintenance of
peace in the world and periphery to suit to its
modernisation needs. The PRC has accordingly evolved a path
based on its “peaceful development” with a “ win- win”
relation internationally. Simultaneously, imperatives
relating to national sovereignty have emerged as stronger
motivations for Beijing. Taiwan and Tibet are clear cases in
this regard. On its part, India, as its economy and global
status grows, has come under compulsions to adopt a
proactive foreign policy course, aimed at seeking linkages
abroad, with an eye on much needed resources for the
country’s development. New Delhi’s Look East policy is an
example. A competition between China and India for power
and influence in this process appears inevitable. To their
credit, in the national interests of each, they have been
able to make serious efforts to improve bilateral ties,
especially in economy and trade.
At the same time, a
host of core concerns including the boundary question
continue to confront the two nations. The Tibet unrest has
added complications to such situation. The Chinese Premier
has himself acknowledged that Tibet issue is sensitive one
in bilateral ties It can not escape attention of both China
and India that the Tibet issue and the Sino-Indian border
problem are linked to each other; the Chinese border claim
vis-à-vis India is based on their perceived territorial loss
as a result of the 1914 British India-Tibet boundary treaty.
In the current context, the happenings in Tibet can be seen
as having placed China in a rather weaker position at the
ongoing border talks. Also, they are expected to lead to
some additional burden to China by way of deploying more
troops in Tibet, which India may find difficult to ignore. A
seemingly disloyal Tibetan population, not conducive to
defence operations in Tibet, could become another negative
factor for Beijing. Overall, the troubles in Tibet may
further strengthen Beijing’s resolve to keep the Sino-Indian
border talks prolonged. Stability in Tibet in real sense is
expected to elude China for quite some time to come; this
coupled with the chances of protracted border negotiations,
may cast a shadow on Sino-Indian ties, which are otherwise
undergoing a dynamic transformation in the economic field.
Beijing may prefer to adopt a line of “ shelving the
disputes, while seeking common development” in its border
policy vis-à-vis New Delhi, similar to what it is already
doing in respect of other cases like the South China Sea
islands dispute. A key question will however be whether such
a line would be acceptable to India.
(The writer, Mr D.S.Rajan, is Director
of Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India, Email:
dsrajan@gmail.com)