CHINA UNRESTRAINED

China Unrestrained

by Bhaskar Roy

A commentary carried by the Chinese armed forces publication, the “Military Digest” in April, this year calls for close attention. Titled “Phase of Exercising Restraint in National Defence is 0ver” and republished in the China Institute of International and Strategic Studies (CIISS- April 25) website the commentary made it abundantly clear that Party Chief Hu Jintao had taken China’s military to a new height. At the 17^th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in September, 2007, Secretary General Hu Jintao’s political report declared that the country will strive to “occupy a well matched military position in the world while becoming the third economic power in the world”.

The commentary can be considered an authoritative Chinese declaration from the Central Military Commission (CMC), which is chaired by President and Party General Secretary, Hu Jintao. The CIISS is a PLA think tank.

There has been a rather quick change in China’s Military doctrine from the more passive advice of “hide your strength and bide your time” of Deng Xiaoping (1991-92) to the assertive and forward military (defence) doctrine under Hu Jintao (2004 onwards). The “Military Digest” commentary indicates that immediately on taking over as the Party Chief at the 16^th Party Congress in 2002, Hu Jintao signaled military power must grow in tandem with economic power. It is said that in his first political report to the Party Congress Hu unveiled his plan in cloaked words, that while economic development was primary, national defence was in close secondary position. In other words, Hu Jintao had turned the Deng Xiaoping order of the “four modernizations” with economy at the top and national defence at the bottom, almost on its head.

Almost immediately after Hu Jintao took over the Chairmanship of the CMC in October, 2004 from his rather-reluctant-to-leave predecessor Jiang Zemin, his first political move for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was to elevate the status of the armed forces under the Party’s control. He assured all support to the PLA to safeguard the nation’s interests. “Nation’s interests” is a very broad term, and in the context of today’s China, goes well beyond the country’s borders.

The commentary pointed out that Hu Jintao’s speech at the PLA Day celebrations in 2007 emphasised that development had to be protected with military power, and the two had to develop together. In other words, as China’s economic development expanded horizontally across regions, its military might had to develop and project its power alongside. Hu Jintao unveiled a national doctrine of immense importance to the rest of the world, of which little notice has been taken, in China’s neighbouring countries like India. China’s political, trade and economic interests abroad will be backed with overwhelming military power especially where developing countries are concerned. This would include its energy and trade sea lanes which now extend to Africa, South America and to Australia.

For a greater appreciation of President Hu Jintao’s national doctrine, it is necessary to refer back to the 2004 “Greater Peripheral” strategy thesis by Dr. Chen Yang, then Deputy Director of Strategic Research Centre of the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), think tank of China’s external intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Briefly, Dr. Chen saw China’s security primarily encompassing a vast area from East Africa, West Asia, Central Asia and Indian Ocean in the West to Oceania in the East. This is the area where China’s military power would operate.

It is interesting to note that Dr. Chen’s thesis appeared when Hu Jintao was the Vice Chairman of the CMC and was about to take over this very important establishment.

China’s military development has been officially divided into four phases. First was the Mao Zedong phase. Under Mao, China’s strategic forces took birth and developed at a fast pace in a short period. Chinese scientists and engineers working in western facilities returned home in the 1950s, answering Mao’s call to help the nation to wipe out past humiliations suffered under colonial occupation. China exploded its first atomic bomb in 1964 and built strategic missiles to ensure that “China will not be humiliated again”. But the economy collapsed under Mao and the strategic weapons programme hit a plateau.

The second phase saw progress under Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping took advantage of the comparatively peaceful situation in the world, and worked on his policy to “exercise restraint, with the purpose of putting all forces (resources) together to strengthen economic building”. Deng realized that a strong military could be built only when supported by a strong, sustainable economy. It is not that Deng Xiaoping capped military development. Far from it. In fact, the foundation for naval and air force development were laid by him. He ensured a peaceful environment to allow the country’s holistic development.

The third phase of development was under the leadership of Jiang Zemin. The PLA got a much improved deal, including increased emoluments and the beginning of reorganization. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and informization of the military were activated. This was a quantum jump for the PLA, transiting to information warfare without going through the full phase of mechanization. This was a significant achievement. In the fourth phase of development, Hu Jintao appears to have given the PLA just what it wanted – power projection across the border and overseas.

The PLA is a very important institution in China’s internal politics. Though it has rarely been called on to act decisively in internal political developments except towards the end of the cultural revolution and later to quell the students’ demonstration in 1989, it has always been the guarantor to the CCP’s security. The party commands the gun, and the gun protects the party.

Deng Xiaoping had tried to curtail the PLA’s power, which he called “mountain warlordism” . At that point of time it was only he who could control the PLA leaders. Deng, after all, was the political commissar of the famous 4^th Field Army of the CCP’s Long March, a notch above the commander. Jiang had to negotiate and compromise with the PLA, and bought their allegiance through promotions and perquisites. It was, however, Jiang’s Prime Minister, Zhu Rongji who clipped the PLA’s financial independence significantly, by delinking the PLA from business. The aim was to make the PLA a professional army, fund it adequately from the government budget, and stop its distractions from pursuits like business and trade.

The “Military Digest” commentary of April, this year seems to suggest that other than the doctrine of “Greater Periphery” security, an internal power struggle may be in the offing. This commentary seems to have jumped from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao in China’s military development history, almost discarding Jiang Zemin’s role, though Jiang’s contribution to military building is officially acknowledged.

There are other indications that Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao may be sniping at each other. Jiang Zemin broke Deng Xiaoping’s unwritten rule that retired leaders should not openly criticized the present leadership’s environmental policy in March this year. This happened when Hu Jintao was under tremendous pressure on the Lhasa riots and the Tibetan issue. On May 4, the Xinhua and the People’s Daily carried a report on the Communist Youth League (CYL), which has been more successful in enrolling members than the main Party. The CYL is Hu Jintao, main support base.

If the factional infighting between Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai group and Hu Jintao’s Communist Youth League (CYL) faction plays out externally, the “Greater Periphery” strategy may actually activate sooner rather than later. Serious internal power struggle in China usually has a cold effect on its external relations.

The driving imperative is how quickly China can secure its energy and raw material pockets abroad and their routes to China through the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Obviously, it requires military and political force projection established categorically to control or protect this vast strategic area. This would require positioning its military abroad much in the same manner as the US does. Washington would be the last power centre that Beijing would attempt to disturb in this strategic region. Most others, including India would be targets of coercion. China’s strategic forces already cover this entire strategic region. It is now for its navy and the air force to provide tactical power. The PLA navy’s submarine arm is getting ready to do the job with the Soveremny class destroyers acquired from Russia, the indigenously built Type-093 nuclear power submarines and the Type-094 nuclear power and nuclear missile armed submarines. With the underwater submarine base for the Type-093 and Type-094 submarines in Sanya in Hainan Island Province in the South, not only the seas upto the Malacca Strait but the India Ocean are already in the range. The Gwadar Port in Pakistan, built and paid for almost totally by China is an almost ready naval base.

At the core of the new military doctrine is the emphasis on information warfare (IW). The commentary in the “Military Digest” explained that without IW capability it would be like a blind soldier fighting from memory. On the other hand with strong IW capability it is possible to blind the enemy. Recent Chinese espionage activities discovered abroad deal mainly with acquisition of technology related to stealth weapons and IW.

There is no reason to doubt that China’s “Greater Peripheral” strategy is no longer strategic thinking, but a strategic reality. It will now be the decision of its neighbours from Japan to India whether to succumb to China’s might or retain their independence.

(The author is an eminent China analyst with many years of experience of study on the developments in China. He can be reached at grouchohart@yahoo.com)