SAUDI ARABIA: THE STRATEGIC SHIFT TOWARDS RUSSIA?

SAUDI ARABIA: THE STRATEGIC SHIFT TOWARDS RUSSIA?

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Contextual Reference: Author’s SAAG Paper No. 2154 dated 28.02.2007 “Russia’s President Putin’s Second Strategic Foray in the Middle East (February 2007)

Introductory Observations

Saudi Arabia’s tentative strategic shift away from the United States was significantly discernible when during Gulf War II against Iraq in 2003, Saudi Arabia denied the United States the military use of its bases for the Iraq military intervention.

Saudi Arabia had been the most unreservedly staunch ally of the United States for the better part of the last century. Relations became strained, though not breakable following the 9/11 Islamic Jihadi bombings in New York and Washington. The majority of those involved in the 9/11 bombings were Saudis. While the 9/11 bombers were trained, financed and their plans operationalised by Pakistan intelligence agencies, the Saudi label became stuck in US public memory and moreso with Osama bin Laden also being a Saudi.

Contextually, the above along with other strategic shifts at the global level and the regional level led to a visible shift in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy stances. At the global level, Russia’s strategic resurgence and its strong influence over Iran and Syria could not be ignored by Saudi Arabia.

At the regional level, the growing regional profile of Iran in the Middle East strategic profile along with the prospect of Iran’s nuclear weapons, threatened Saudi Arabia’s traditional pre-eminence in the Middle East and the Islamic world.

Saudi Arabia’s traditional strategic support of the United States stood diluted by US military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, a downslide in US image in the Islamic world and the United States inability to rein in Iran.

Saudi Arabia under its new monarch, consequently have carried out course corrections in their foreign policy attitudinal stances by making their foreign policy more multi-directional and broad based. Saudi Arabia’s initiatives manifested themselves in the Saudi Arabian monarch’s visits to China and India. More significantly the increased stress on building good relations with Russia in the last couple of years was visible.

Russia too responded likewise and more forcefully. Evidence of this were the three forays by President Putin in the period 2005-2007 to the Middle East with special emphasis on visits to countries closely allied with the United States.

The strategic significance of these two way Russia-Saudi Arabia initiatives stand analysed in the above referred Paper of this Author, including the likelihood of an arms deal.

This month firm evidence has surfaced of a Saudi Arabia arms deal totaling $ 4 billion which is a significant shift from existing Saudi military purchases pattern from the United States and European countries.

This Paper attempts to analyse this Saudi Arabian strategic shift under the following heads:

Saudi Arabian – Russia Arms Deal: Background, Extent & Western Reactions
Strategic Significance of the Saudi Arabia-Russia Arms Deals
Russia Preferred Over China for Arms Deal by Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia-United States Relationship: The Impact of the Deal and Future Prospects

Saudi Arabian – Russia Arms Deal: Background, Extent & Western Reactions

The Saudi Arabia-Russia arms deal though kept under wraps till recently was not a stunning surprise. There were enough indicators suggesting that it was in the offing.

In the above referred Paper, this possibility was reported along with President Putin’s offer during his Saudi Arabia visit of nuclear reactors, space program cooperation, investment in the GLONASS program and launching Saudi satellites into space.

Saudi Arabia seems to have picked its choice on the more substantive and potent component of the Russian President’s offer.

Following President Putin’s visit there commenced a flurry of visits to Russia by Saudi dignitaries and officials for discussions on the arms deal. The more notable of the visits was by the Saudi Defense Minister in August 2007 and by Saudi Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz in November 2007. During his visit, the Crown Prince had meetings with President Putin also.

Earlier Russia had dispatched Russia T-90 tanks to Saudi Arabia for field trials.

Known details of the Saudi Arabia – Russia arms deal are as follows:

Value of the deal - $ 4 billion
Major military hardware purchase
1. Tanks T-90 - 150
2. Helicopters MI-17 and MI-35 - 100
3. BMP Armoured Infantry Combat Vehicles - In hundreds
4. Air defense systems BVIC M2 F - 20
5. Other military equipment - Details undisclosed

Russian T-90 tanks will be delivered to Saudi Arabia in the time frame 2008-2009.

Saudi Arabia has earmarked over $12 billion for purchase of military hardware. A $ 4 billion order to Russia implies that nearly 33% of the $ 12 billion planned expenditure on arms purchases would go to Russia.

United States and European countries have reacted with dismay over the Saudi Arabia-Russia arms deal because besides the geo-political implications it means a sizeable loss in arms sales for defense industries. A sampling of their reactions is as follows:

Saudi Arabia turned to Russia for arms deal after the US Senate over-ruled US arms requests from Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia then turned to France but the deal fell through after France insisted on extending the deal to include naval equipment
Saudi Arabia was attracted to Russian purchases by their economical prices and thereby more bang for the buck
Saudi Arabia was attracted to Russian tanks because of the T-72 performance in Gulf War and as opposed to US Abrams tanks in desert terrain
Western opinion however was that Saudi Arabia will revert back to US and the West for military equipment as Russian arms deliveries lag behind schedules.

Whatever be the truth of the above, the fact still remains that this Deal carries a lot of strategic significance and political significance in a traditionally pro-American Middle East.

Strategic Significance of the Saudi Arabia- Russia Arms Deal

The overall geo-strategic and geo-political significance stands covered in the above referred Paper. The conclusion of the Saudi Arabia – Russia arms deal further reinforces the conclusions contained therein.

Geo-strategically, some aspects which need to be highlighted are:

Saudi Arabia was the only major Arab and Islamic country which had not turned to Russia for its military hardware inventories so far.
With induction of Russian military hardware as enumerated above, Saudi Arabia’s military inventories in terms of firepower and mobility would rest heavily on Russian equipment
Saudi Arabia and Iran as the two contenders for regional pre-eminence on both littorals of The Gulf would now possess sizeable Russian military hardware on their inventories.
Russian dependence of both Saudi Arabia and Iran in terms of military hardware gives Russia a “controlling power” in terms of conflict escalation and conflict resolution over these two countries and enhances Russian salience in the Middle East strategic calculus.

Geo-politically, the following factors need to be high lighted:

Russia has been able to wean over a number of US traditional allies in the Middle East with Saudi Arabia being the most notable.
Comparatively, Russia today can claim a better political influence in the Middle East as opposed to the United States. This affects the global balance of power.
Russia under Putin has been able to reassert and solidity its strategic and political influence in the Middle East. Russia can no longer be dismissed from the strategic calculus of the Middle East by the United States.
Russia’s concretizing the relationship with Saudi Arabia enables considerable political gain for Russia in the Islamic World

Sizeable arms deals like the Saudi Arabia-Russia Arms Deal are not mere commercial transactions. Such deals have the potential to alter the regional military balance besides heralding new political preferences by the regional actors.

Russia Preferred Over China for Arms Deal by Saudi Arabia

This question becomes pertinent for analysis when it is taken into account that in the late 1980s Saudi Arabia, despite being a more staunch ally then of the United States, turned to China for supply of CSS-2 Chinese Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs). It was the Saudi acquisition of IRBMs from China which stirred the missile race in the Middle East.

With such a record and the Saudi Monarch’s visit to China in 2006, China should have been a natural preferred choice for Saudi Arabia for a sizeable arms deal.

That it has not happened so, can be attributed to any or a combination of the following reasons.

Russia is the preferred choice because of the salience in global and regional affairs made possible by Russia’s resurgence.
Russia is the preferred choice because Russia has been in unequivocal in vocal support on all contentious issues that plague the Arab world despite that the fact such Arab stands are in conflict with the United States. China is relatively silent or muted on these issues.
Russia exercises a potent strategic and political influence in restraining Iranian regional adventurism. In Saudi perceptions, Iran is considered as a major threat.
China itself depends on Russian military weapons and equipment for its armed forces.

One short deduction that can be made here is that China is a long way off from displacing the United States or Russia from the Middle East strategic calculus. Despite China’s strong economic presence in the Middle East it does not seem to carry strategic and political clout.

Saudi Arabia-United States Relationship: The Impact of the Deal and Future Prospects

Saudi Arabia’s arms deal with Russia and that too a sizeable one, is surely going to displease US Senators and the Pentagon. It will add fuel to the fire of those who have been critical of Saudi Arabia after 9/11 and its reluctance thereafter to host US military presence in Gulf War.

However, the US Administration presumably views this development as one of political signaling to USA over its contemporary strategic policies in the Middle East. Presently the US Administration would be less likely to assess it as a long term strategic shift in Saudi policy formulations towards the United States.

Realistically, Saudi Arabia in its strategic calculations towards this strengthening of its relations with Russia has been prompted by a couple of reasons, namely (1) Perception that certain sections in USA have become hostile to Saudi Arabia (2) Diversifying its sources of strategic and political support with US power getting diffused (3) Strong perception that in its Cold War with Iran, Russia is better placed than USA to exercise restraint on Iran’s regional adventurism.

At the same time, the Saudi’s would equally and realistically be expected to conclude that United States global and regional power is likely to predominate for many decades to come. It is a strategic reality that cannot be ignored by Saudi Arabia even as it opens up to Russia.

In the overall analysis what can be summmed- up is as follows:

US-Saudi Arabia relationship would continue on an even keel but minus the implicit warmth and trust that prevailed for decades.
United States would have to factor-in in its Middle East strategic calculus that Saudi Arabia is no longer a “strategic pillar” to protect US security interests in the region, but at the same time it will not join any anti-US Arab or Muslim coalition.

Concluding Observations

The Middle East today finds itself in a state of strategic flux post-9/11 and US military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Strategically, new leaves being turned in terms of relationships would be a logical development. Moreso, with Russia’s growing resurgence and a determined Russian effort to embed itself firmly in the Middle East.

In such a strategic and political environment, regional actors like Saudi Arabia are becoming better placed to resort to political signaling in terms of their relationships with major powers.

Possibly, one could place the discernible strategic shift in Saudi Arabia towards Russia in this category. The Saudi shift cannot be ignored by the United States whatever be the longevity of the shift.

Russia can smugly sit in the Middle East conscious of the fact that the United States today has to operate in this region in a reactive mode and that geo-politically Russia is better placed to win strategic gains in the regions..

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila@yahoo.com)