Nuclear
Trade With India: China's Role In NSG
By B. Raman
The next three steps in
India's quest for civilian nuclear energy
would be the approval of the draft of the
India-specific safeguards agreement jointly
prepared by officials of the Government of
India and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) by the Board of Governors of
the IAEA before it is formally signed by
India and the IAEA, a consensus in the
Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) on the
removal of the restrictions on nuclear trade
with India and the approval of the agreement
(known as the 123 agreement) reached by the
officials of the US and India by the US
Congress.
2. While the decisions
of the IAEA and the NSG would determine the
conditions under which the member-countries
of the IAEA and the NSG would trade with
India in civilian nuclear matters, the US
Congress would decide the conditions under
which the US would trade with India in the
nuclear field.
3. The IAEA is
expected to take a decision by the end of
August and the NSG in the beginning of
September if the US has its way. It has been
reported that Pakistan, which is a member of
the Board of Governors of the IAEA, has
already submitted a long memorandum to the
IAEA raising objections to the proposed
safeguards agreement on procedural ground,
on grounds of merit and on the ground that
it would amount to unfair discrimination to
Pakistan.
4. The procedural
objection is that the required minimum
notice has not been given to the
member-countries of the Board of Governors
to consider the agreement carefully and that
an attempt is being made to rush through the
approval process. The objection on merit
relates to alleged dangers of diversion of
uranium purchased by India from overseas
suppliers for weapons purposes thereby
adding to the threat to Pakistan. The charge
of unfair discrimination to Pakistan is
sought to be justified on the ground that
there is no simultaneous attempt to lift the
NSG restrictions on nuclear trade with
Pakistan. It is learnt that Pakistan has
suggested to China that the two should
co-ordinate their positions at Vienna just
as they had co-ordinated their positions on
the issue of permanent membership of the UN
Security Council for India.
5. Pakistan is not a
member of the NSG and would, therefore, have
to depend on China for taking up the issue
of alleged unfair discrimination to
Pakistan. Since his recent visit to Japan to
attend the G-8 summit, during which he met
President Hu Jintao of China bilaterally in
the margins of the summit, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and his advisers have been
expressing the confidence that there may not
be any difficulty from China. That was
before Pakistan circulated its objections.
6. It has been noticed
since the Sino-Indian war of 1962 that
whenever there was a conflict between Indian
and Pakistani interests and between Indian
and Pakistani concerns on any issue,
Beijing favoured the Pakistani interests
over the Indian and paid greater attention
to Pakistani concerns than to Indian
concerns.
7. The first departure
from this practice was seen during the
Kargil conflict of 1999 when Beijing agreed
with the US position that Pakistan should
withdraw its troops behind the Line of
Control (LOC). It was the Chinese insistence
on this during the visit of Nawaz Sharif,
the then Prime Minister, to Beijing at the
height of the conflict that made Nawaz fly
to Washington DC and request for a
face-saving to enable Pakistan to withdraw
its troops behind the LOC.
8. However, China
agreed with Pakistan's position of opposing
the permanent membership of the UN Security
Council to India. Chinese interlocutors
whom I have had an opportunity of meeting in
various seminars denied that Pakistan's
opposition had in any way influenced the
Chinese position. According to them, China
opposed India's permanent membership because
the Government of India tried to ride
piggy-back on Japan.
9. These interlocutors
also felt that in the NSG China would
strongly underline the need to remove the
restrictions on nuclear trade with Pakistan
without linking it to the lifting of the
restrictions on nuclear trade with India.
Would it be so? India has to keep its
fingers crossed.
10. Annexed is an
article written by me on August 12, 2007,
tracing the evolution of the Chinese
position on this issue till then. It is
available at the web site of the South Asia
Analysis Group (SAAG), New Delhi, at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers24/paper2330.html
(The writer is
Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and
presently, Director, Institute For Topical
Studies, Chennai. He is also associated
with the Chennai Centre For China studies.
E-Mail:
seventyone2@gmail.com)
ANNEXURE
Paper no. 2330
12-Aug-2007
CHINA & THE 123
AGREEMENT: An Update
By B. Raman
Between July, 2005,
when India and the US agreed in principle on
civilian nuclear co-operation, and June,
2006, Beijing's reaction was unmistakably
unenthusiastic. It sought to justify its
lack of enthusiasm on the ground that such a
special waiver to India, when it has not
signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and not given up its military nuclear
ambitions, could weaken the global
non-proliferation architecture.
2. While Chinese
Government spokespersons avoided outspoken
comments on the India-US deal while making
obvious their lack of enthusiasm for it, the
government-controlled media in China
observed no such restraint. For example, the
"People's Daily" wrote on November 4, 2005:
"This would be a hard blow on America's
leading role in the global proliferation
prevention system as well as the system
itself. This will bring about a series of
negative impacts. Now that the United
States buys another country in with nuclear
technologies in defiance of international
treaty, other nuclear suppliers also have
their own partners of interest as well as
good reasons to copy what the United States
did. A domino effect of nuclear
proliferation, once turned into reality,
will definitely lead to global nuclear
proliferation and competition. Always
calling itself a 'guard' for nuclear
proliferation prevention, the US often
condemns other countries for irresponsible
transfers but this time, it hesitates not a
bit in revising laws, taking the lead in
'making an exception' (in the case of
India).Such an act of the United States once
again proves that America is not at all a
'guard' of NPT and the treaty, however, is
no more than a disguise serving the US
interest. The most immediate reason for the
foundation of NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group)
was India's first nuclear test in 1974,
after which the United States instantly cut
off its nuclear cooperation with India and
established the NSG in 1975 to restrict
selling sensitive nuclear technologies and
raw materials to non-NPT countries. Over
the past 30 years, the United States has
always been trying to prevent India from
access to nuclear technologies. Today,
however, the United States wants a change."
3. The editorial came
in the wake of a meeting of the Nuclear
Suppliers' Group (NSG) on October 20, 2005,
at which a US representative briefed the NSG
members on the Indo-US deal and spoke of the
US intention to move for the lifting of the
NSG restrictions against India after the
passage of the enabling legislation by the
US Congress and the finalisation of a formal
bilateral agreement (the 123 Agreement now
signed) by India and the US.
4.. The lack of
enthusiasm for the Indo-US nuclear deal was
again evident at the time of the visit of
President George Bush to India in the first
week of March, 2006. In the daily media
briefing of the Chinese Foreign Office at
Beijing on March 2, 2006, its spokesperson
Qin Gang said: "India should abandon nuclear
weapons and strengthen atomic safeguards.
India should sign the NPT and also dismantle
its nuclear weapons. As a signatory
country, China hopes non-signatory countries
will join it as soon as possible as
non-nuclear weapon states, thereby
contributing to strengthening the
international non-proliferation regime.
China hopes that concerned countries
developing cooperation in peaceful nuclear
uses will pay attention to these efforts.
The cooperation should conform with the
rules of international non-proliferation
mechanisms."
5. This negative
attitude was in a great measure caused by
the Chinese suspicion that the Indo-US
nuclear deal was the US' quid pro quo for an
Indian willingness to co-operate with the US
in countering the growing Chinese power in
the Asian region. This suspicion was
strengthened when our Prime Minister, Dr.
Manmohan Singh, decided not to attend the
summit meeting of the Shanghai Co-operation
Organisation (SCO) as an observer at
Shanghai in June, 2006. The Indian
explanation that since India was only an
observer of the SCO and not a full-fledged
member, its participation at the level of
the head of Government was not warranted did
not seem convincing to Beijing. The Prime
Minister's decision not to go was
interpreted as due to the US suspicion that
one of the main objectives of the SCO was to
counter the US presence and role in the
Central Asian Republics. As a result,
China's lack of enthusiasm for the Indo-US
nuclear deal continued.
6. In the meanwhile,
President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan
initiated a campaign to counter the Indo-US
deal at two levels. He did not oppose the
deal. Nor did Pakistan energetically try to
have the deal disapproved by the US Congress
through Congressmen and Senators sympathetic
to it. Instead, it sought to counter the
deal by using the following arguments.
First, it will be discriminatory to Pakistan
if it was not made applicable to it too.
Second, it will create a military nuclear
asymmetry in the sub-continent by enabling
India to divert its domestic stock of fuel
for military purposes, while using the
imported fuel for civilian purposes under
international safeguards. Thus, it will have
an adverse effect on Pakistan's national
security.
7. The US rejected the
Pakistani arguments by pointing out that
Pakistan's economy was unlikely to grow as
rapidly as the Indian economy in the short
and medium terms and hence it should be
possible to meet its energy requirements
from conventional sources. The US also
repeatedly made it clear that in view of the
role of Dr. A. Q. Khan, the so-called father
of Pakistan's atomic bomb, and some of his
colleagues in clandestinely supplying
nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and
Libya, Pakistan cannot be treated on par
with India, which had an unimpeachable
record of non-proliferation.
8. While sticking to
his arguments, Musharraf requested the
Chinese leaders during his State visit to
China in February, 2006, for Chinese
assistance in the construction of six more
nuclear power stations, with a capacity of
600 or 900 MWS each. The Chinese reportedly
agreed in principle to supply two stations
of 300 MWs each to be followed later by four
more. This subject again figured in the
General's bilateral discussions with Mr.HU
in the margins of the SCO summit in June,
2006, and in the subsequent discussions
between the officials of the two countries,
who met at Islamabad and Beijing for doing
the preparatory work for Chinese President
Hu Jintao's visit to Pakistan from November
23 to 26.
9. Gen. Musharraf and
his officials were so confident that an
agreement in principle for the construction
of two new nuclear power stations (Chashma
III and IV ) would be initialed during Mr.
Hu's visit that they even set up a site
selection task force.
10. Then for reasons,
which were not clear, there were indications
of changes in the Chinese attitude---less
negative towards the Indo-US nuclear deal
and increasingly guarded on the Pakistani
request for new nuclear power stations. In
the case of India, the changing Chinese
attitude was reflected in the daily media
briefing of the Foreign Office spokesperson
and in a media interview given by the
Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi. In the case
of Pakistan, the change was reflected in the
daily media briefings of the spokespersons
of the two Foreign Offices at Beijing and
Islamabad.
11. In an interview to
the Press Trust of India (PTI), which was
circulated by the agency on November 20,
2006, before the arrival of Mr.Hu in New
Delhi, Mr. Sun Yuxi, the Chinese Ambassador
in New Delhi, was reported to have stated as
follows: ``Every country has the right to
develop energy in any form, including
nuclear form, to meet its development
needs. The objectives of non-proliferation
should also be maintained and strengthened."
When it was pointed out by the agency that
India had contended that it abided by all
non-proliferation rules although it had not
signed the NPT, he said: ``Anything which
can strengthen non-proliferation efforts
should be welcomed by the international
community.'' He added that Foreign Secretary
Shivshankar Menon had recently apprised him
about the issue and told him that India was
trying to strengthen the non-proliferation
regime. “I (would) like to take his word...
If India is making effort, if any effort (is
being made) to strengthen non-proliferation,
I agree,'' he said. The Chinese envoy,
however, refused to comment on the Indo-U.S.
civil nuclear deal on the ground that it was
a bilateral issue between India and the US.
12. A few hours later,
in response to a question on the subject,
Jiang Yu, spokesperson of the Chinese
Foreign Ministry, said at Beijing: "China
has sought more information and explanations
from India to address the concerns of some
countries on the Indo-US civilian nuclear
deal. We hope that Indian side can attach
importance to these opinions and provide
more information and explanations. Chinese
side has noted that during the deliberations
in the NSG regarding US-India nuclear
cooperation, some countries expressed
concern and doubts. The Chinese side will
continue to participate in these relevant
discussions with an earnest and responsible
attitude."
13. Almost coinciding
with these explanations at New Delhi and
Beijing, the spokespersons of the Foreign
Ministries of Pakistan and China tried to
discourage expectations in Pakistan that
Gen. Musharraf and Mr.Hu would be
initialling a memorandum of understanding on
the Chinese supply of two more nuclear power
stations. They described the reports in this
regard, which had been appearing in the
Pakistani media for weeks before Mr. Hu's
visit, as speculative and not based on
facts.
14. The Joint
Declaration issued on November 21, 2006, at
the end of the formal talks between Dr.
Manmohan Singh and Mr.Hu said: "Energy
security constitutes a vital and strategic
issue for producing and consuming countries
alike. It is consistent with the common
interest of the two sides to establish an
international energy order, which is fair,
equitable, secure and stable, and to the
benefit of the entire international
community. Both sides shall also make joint
efforts, bilaterally as well as in
multilateral fora, to diversify the global
energy mix and to increase the share in it
of renewable energy sources. Global energy
systems should take into account and meet
the energy needs of both countries, as part
and parcel of a stable, predictable, secure
and clean energy future. In this context,
international civilian nuclear cooperation
should be advanced through innovative and
forward-looking approaches, while
safeguarding the effectiveness of
international non-proliferation principles.
Both countries are committed to
non-proliferation objectives and agree to
expand their dialogue on the related issues,
in bilateral and international fora."
15. The reference to
promotion of international civilian nuclear
co-operation through "innovative and
forward-looking approaches" was interpreted,
with some validity, as confirming the
evolution of the Chinese view on the Indo-US
deal from negative to hopefully positive. As
a result, there was a greater confidence in
New Delhi that China might not oppose the
removal of restrictions applicable to India
when the matter formally came up before the
NSG at the initiative of the US. This
guarded optimism was also evident from an
interview given by Shri Pranab Mukherjee,
the Indian Minister For External Affairs, to
Shri Karan Thapar of the IBN-CNN TV channel
on November 26. The relevant extract is
annexed.
16. Dr. Manmohan Singh
and Mr.Hu had formal talks hardly for a
little more than an hour. The
carefully-formulated position on the nuclear
issue could not have been the outcome of
such a brief meeting. The final version of
the Joint Declaration was already ready
before the two leaders formally met and
approved it. It had been drafted by the
officials of the two countries in their
preparatory meetings in the weeks before Mr.
Hu's arrival. The change in the Chinese
position must have been the outcome of these
discussions in the weeks before Mr. Hu's
visit and not a sudden change on the eve of
the summit or at the summit itself.
17. As against this,
the change in the Chinese position with
regard to Pakistan's request for six more
nuclear power stations came about suddenly
in the days (not weeks) before Mr. Hu's
arrival in Islamabad. Well-informed
Pakistani sources attributed the more
guarded Chinese position to the bilateral
discussions between President George Bush
and Mr.Hu at Hanoi in the margins of the
summit of the Asia Pacific Economic
Co-operation (APEC) Organisation on November
18 and 19, 2006. The speculation was that
during these bilateral discussions, Mr. Bush
pointed out to Mr.Hu that the Chinese supply
of new nuclear power stations to Pakistan
could not be projected as a continuation of
the Chinese assistance to Pakistan under a
1985 bilateral co-operation treaty under
which CHASHMA I and CHASHMA II were given
and hence would need the clearance of the
NSG. According to this speculation, Mr. Bush
was also reported to have referred to the
Pakistani rejection of repeated requests
from the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to hand over Dr. A. Q. Khan for an
independent interrogation and pointed out
that the Chinese supply of the new power
stations could encourage Pakistan's
non-cooperation with the IAEA.
18. It was believed by
these sources that Beijing, which has been
projecting itself as a responsible and
co-operative interlocutor of the US, Japan
and South Korea on the question of North
Korea's nuclear test and has won praise for
its role in bringing North Korea back to the
negotiating table, did not want this
positive image to be dented by disregarding
the reservations of Mr. Bush relating to the
supply of new power stations to Pakistan.
It, therefore, changed its stance at the
last minute.
19. There was no
substantive reference to the co-operation
between China and Pakistan in the field of
civilian nuclear energy during Mr. Hu's
visit to Pakistan. The joint statement
issued on November 25, 2006, by Gen.
Musharraf and Mr.Hu said: “The two sides
also agreed to strengthen cooperation in the
energy sector, including fossil fuels, coal,
hydro-power, nuclear power, renewable
sources of energy as well as in the mining
and resources sector.” Addressing a press
conference after his talks with Gen.
Musharraf, Mr.Hu said in reply to a question
on nuclear co-operation: "Cooperation in the
energy sector is an important component in
the relationship between the two countries.
We reached a common understanding on
strengthening energy cooperation. We would
continue this cooperation in future as
well." While Mr.Hu himself did not refer to
any future supply of new nuclear power
stations, some Pakistani analysts
interpreted Mr. Hu's remarks as indicating a
willingness to supply more nuclear power
stations.
20.Pakistani officials
and analysts close to the Government tried
to give the impression that the fact that no
memorandum of understanding was signed did
not mean that the Chinese were not going
ahead with the project. But, the Chinese
Foreign Office spokesperson was very clear
on this point during a media briefing on
November 20, 2006, at Beijing. He said: "As
far as I know, there will be no new
arrangement in this area."
21. Interestingly, in
reply to a question on this subject, Mr.
Sean McCormack, a spokesperson of the US
State Department, said in Washington as
follows on November 27,2006: "The US
welcomes strong ties between China and
Pakistan and urges China to play a
constructive role in world affairs. We
encourage development of bilateral relations
between Pakistan and its neighbours. China
and Pakistan have a long history of
relations. As for any sort of nuclear angle
on this, I’m not aware of anything new that
was announced or is allowed for by these
agreements other than what was already
grandfathered in by the Nuclear Suppliers
Group. So I don’t think there’s anything new
on that front.”
22.What he apparently
meant was that in addition to the Chashma I
and Chashma II power stations given by China
under an old agreement of 1985 for civilian
nuclear co-operation between China and
Pakistan, there would be nothing new for
the present till approved by the NSG.
What was significant
was that China paid attention to the US
reservations on this subject instead of
going ahead with its assistance as it did in
the past in matters such as the supply of
M-9 and M-11 missiles and nuclear equipment
to Pakistan. This new attention to US
reservations is what the Americans welcomed
as China's constructive role.
23.There was no
reference to China's possible assistance to
Pakistan for the construction of Chashma IV
and V for nearly seven months ---either from
the Pakistani side or from the Chinese side.
On July 18, 2007, there was a surprising
reference to it in a Chinese statement on
the Pakistani commando action in the Lal
Masjid. This caused anger against the
Chinese, who were suspected to have forced
Musharraf to order the commando action after
the kidnapping of six Chinese women by some
students of the girls' madrasa attached to
the Masjid. The "China Daily" reported as
follows on July 18, 2007: "China did not
push Pakistan for operations against the Red
Mosque, Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Luo
Zhaohui said. It is the consistent policy of
China not to meddle in the domestic affairs
of other countries, he told The News, a
major Pakistani daily. Luo said he was
considering an invitation to visit the
mosque but it was made impossible due to the
unstable security situation. "We enjoy very
cordial relations with the ruling party here
and likewise we maintain friendly ties with
other segments of the society including the
political parties of the opposition," he
said. "I had no knowledge as to why Chinese
nationals are being targeted and were the
victims in five recent incidents", Luo said,
referring to several Chinese who were killed
in that country. He said if Chinese
continued to be targeted, cooperation
between the two countries could suffer. To
protect the 3,000 Chinese working in
Pakistan, China and Pakistan have decided to
set up a Joint Task Force (JTF), the
Ambassador revealed. China and Pakistan are
still close friends and neighbors, Luo said.
The Chinese Government is in discussions
about proposed Chashma-III and IV for
nuclear power projects. Chashma-II will be
completed early next year, he said."
24.Apparently concerned
over the anti-Chinese turn in some sections
of public opinion in the tribal areas, the
Chinese once again started talking of
possible Chinese assistance for the
construction of Chashma III and IV in order
to reassure Pakistani public opinion that
China would continue to be a steadfast
friend of Pakistan. China's reversion to its
pre-November,2006, positive stand on Chashma
III and IV also came in the wake of reported
Chinese concerns over the real purpose of
the reported concert of democracies
involving India, the US, Japan and Australia
and moves for a joint naval exercise
involving these four countries plus
Singapore.
25.On August
2,2007,Pakistan's National Command
Authority met under the chairmanship of
President General Pervez Musharraf, to
discuss, inter alia, India's 123 agreement
with the US. A statement issued at the end
of the meeting said:“The US-India nuclear
agreement would have implications on
strategic stability of the region as it
would enable India to produce significant
quantities of fissile material and nuclear
weapons from un-safeguarded nuclear
reactors.The objective of strategic
stability in South Asia and the global
non-proliferation regime would have been
better served if the US had considered a
package approach for Pakistan and India with
a view to preventing a nuclear arms race in
the region and promoting nuclear
restraints.While continuing to act with
responsibility in maintaining credible
minimum deterrence and avoiding an arms
race, Pakistan will neither be oblivious to
its security requirements, nor to the needs
of its economic development which demand
growth in the energy sector.The meeting
reviewed Pakistan’s objective and plans for
civil nuclear power generation under IAEA
safeguards, which is part of the overall
energy strategy to meet the requirements of
economic growth in the country. This
objective will be pursued on priority basis
especially in view of the increasing oil
prices."
26. A Press Trust of
India despatch from Beijing after the
conclusion of the 123 agreement has cited a
Chinese spokesperson as indicating that
China would adopt a "creative" approach to
the development. This recalls the use of the
expression "innovative" at the time of Hu's
visit to India.
27. When the issue of
the NSG relaxing or lifting its present
restrictions on India comes up before it
formally in the wake of the 123 agreement,
three Scenarios are possible:
SCENARIO I: China does
not agree to it. This Scenario is unlikely
as this could affect the forward momentum in
Indo-Chinese relations.
SCENARIO II: China
agrees to it without any conditions in the
interest of its good relations with India
without worrying about its impact on its
relations with Pakistan. It seems to be an
over-optimistic scenario for the present.
SCENARIO III: China
agrees to it subject to the condition that
there is a similar relaxation of the NSG
guidelines in the case of Pakistan so that
it could sell Chashmas III and IV to
Pakistan.This Scenario was posed to Shri
Pranab Mukherjee by Shri Karan Thapar. His
answers were evasive, but one got the
impression that India would not be unduly
concerned over this so long as the
restrictions on its international purchases
are lifted.
28. In the eventuality
of Scenario III materialising, there could
be a delay in the implementation of the 123
agreement due to the following reasons:
- The US might
insist that before clearing the supply
of Chashma III and IV to Pakistan, China
and Pakistan should sign a formal
agreement similar to the Indo-US deal
under which Pakistan would separate its
military and civilian infrastructure and
sign a Pakistan-centric safeguards
agreement with the IAEA, which would
apply to its civilian infrastructure.
- There could be
Congressional opposition to the US
agreeing to this till the Pakistan
Government makes A.Q.Khan available for
interrogation by IAEA experts.
ANNEXURE
EXTRACTS FROM SHRI
PRANAB MUKHERJEE'S INTERVIEW TO SHRI KARAN
THAPAR
Karan Thapar: Hello and
welcome to Devil’s Advocate. As attention
starts to focus on India’s relationship with
China and United States, those are the two
key issues I shall raise today in an
exclusive interview with External Affairs
Minister Pranab Mukherjee.
Mr Mukherjee, let’s
start with the Chinese President’s visit to
India, which has just been concluded. The
joint declaration says, “International
civilian nuclear cooperation should be
advanced through innovative and
forward-looking approaches while
safeguarding the effectiveness of
international non-proliferation principles.”
Do you interpret that as an endorsement of
the Indo-US nuclear deal?
Pranab Mukherjee: No.
After all we are also for non-proliferation.
At the same time, what is being done with
India, especially with regard to the Indo-US
nuclear deal, they are giving a special
treatment to India because of India’s track
record related to non-proliferation.
Karan Thapar: So,
you’re saying that China has not endorsed
it?
Pranab Mukherjee: No.
China has endorsed it. I am just explaining
the ‘innovative’ word.
Karan Thapar: So, when
officials of your ministry have given an
assessment to The Hindu, as they did on
Friday, to say that China will not come in
the way of any decisions of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group to lift restrictions on
international civilian nuclear cooperation
with India,” you agree with that agreement?
Pranab Mukherjee: I
hope so.
Karan Thapar: When you
say hope so, is there some doubt? Is there
some uncertainty?
Pranab Mukherjee: No.
There is no uncertainty. I hope that they
will not come in the way.
Karan Thapar: So you’re
confident that China will not come in the
way?
Pranab Mukherjee: Why
are you playing with words? In diplomacy, we
don't play with words. What we say is we
wait till the official outcome comes.
Karan Thapar: But you
are confident?
Pranab Mukherjee: I am
confident.
Karan Thapar: There is
a lot of speculation that China might end up
offering a similar nuclear deal to Pakistan.
So far in the newspapers, there is no
mention of it. But if it were to have been
offered quietly and not made public, would
you be concerned?
Pranab Mukherjee: We
shall have to recognise the fact that
different countries have different
relationships with different countries,
keeping in view their own perspectives.
Relationship of one country need not stand
in the relationship of the other country.
Therefore, we shall have to keep that fact
always in view while assessing the
relationship between two countries.
Karan Thapar: Very
interesting. Most people will interpret that
to mean that if China does give Pakistan a
nuclear deal similar to the Indo-US nuclear
deal, India will have no objection?
Pranab Mukherjee: It's
not a question of my objection or
non-objection. It's a question of what
happens in the ground reality. Therefore, we
shall have to keep in view… For instance,
Pakistan is being supplied with
sophisticated weapons by the USA over a long
period.