Nuclear Deal: Battle Won, War Begins - What will be China's Role?

Nuclear Deal: Battle Won, War Begins - What will be China's Role?

By Bhaskar Roy

India won the battle at the IAEA with the Board of directors (BOD) passing the India specific nuclear deal, unanimously. It was not as easy as it may have looked. A number of countries including China, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand recorded their questions, concerns and apprehensions. When the issue of India’s exemption from NSG guidelines as a non-NPT state comes up at the 45-member non-proliferation body, many of these objections may be put up by a joint front. The NSG decides by consensus only while the IAEA had a voting alternative where India clearly had the majority. As the old Chinese saying goes, a competent general never enters a battle unless he is sure of victory.

The war at the NSG will be fought on different issues – the two specific ones being non-proliferation and strategic considerations.

US Ambassador to India, David Mulford, has come out to say that the USA would work for a “clean” exemption for India and not an “unconditional” one. This is contrary to the understanding the Indian government had from the United States. Ambassador Mulford, of course, speaks on the briefings he receives from Washington and not on his own. It, therefore, suggests that some readjustments or fall-back positions are being worked out in the White House and the US State Department.

There can be a world of difference between “clean” and “unconditional” waiver at the NSG. A “clean” waiver can severely restrict India’s international access rigidly to non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS) conditions and intrusive inspections which will be much worse than the position India currently enjoys with its indigenous capabilities. An unconditional waiver would be in line with India’s position as an “advanced nuclear state”, an euphemism that recognizes India’s own declaration as a nuclear weapons power.

The India-IAEA agreement and the “123” agreement deal clearly with peaceful nuclear energy co-operation. Neither of the two agreements seek to interfere through the “backdoor” into India’s nuclear activities. But a number of NSG member countries seek exactly to do that. If the USA refuses to work for an unconditional passage for India, New Delhi would have to rethink its position.

The Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman, Dr. Anil Kakodkar, has taken a strong position that an unconditional passage it has to be. He was emphatic in an interview with The Hindu (Aug.3, 2008) that there was no question of debating whether India was a nuclear state or not. The fact has been established. Dr. Kakodkar also pointed out that the draft proposed by the USA to the NSG which contained gradual imposition of non-proliferation label and earliest possible implementation of full-scope guards on Indian nuclear facilities, has been thrown out, and no longer exists.

One should not get too alarmed with the periodic recall by serving and former US officials that the “123” Agreement is consistent with the restrictive and condition-marked Hyde Act. The Hyde Act is American law and does not in any way force India to act according to it. It may seem that this Act constricts and restricts India, but that is an American political decision that the US President will have to take if a situation arises. Actions under such laws are evoked depending on USA’s relations with the particular country. Actions are also taken whether an act exists or not.

The US could have imposed harsh sanctions on China and Pakistan in the past on nuclear and missile proliferations. Laws exist to do so. But political realities from Washington’s perspective prevented any real action. It may be recalled that following May 11 and 13, 1998 nuclear tests (Pokhran-II), India came under severe technological sanctions from the USA and other countries that still exist. Absence of a Hyde Act did not prevent punitive actions against India, since the politics at that particular time was not in India’s favour. We have since come a long way. India has grown rapidly in global stature and strategic importance, and commands a high price. If India conducts a nuclear test, which is unlikely in any case, subsequent developments will have to be addressed politically.

Different countries which continue to block India’s getting an unconditional passage in the NSG have different reasons. New Zealand has its own internal laws which does not even allow American warships to visit unless the ships are declared nuclear free. Japan’s caution arises from its World War-II sufferings. Some European countries look at it in an ideological frame of preventing anything that could lead to war. China, which has one of the worst proliferation records, sees the issue as empowering India, its rival in Asia or, as Beijing is beginning to say, “mainland Asia”. This probe to test change in geographic area in comparing its strength in Asia needs to be noted for the future.

The reasons for China’s opposition to the nuclear deal with debilitating strings attached is the most pernicious of all objections. It has worked out a deceitful position. While Beijing says that it recognizes India’s need for energy for economic development and has no objection to civilian nuclear energy commerce, it adds the co-operation must adhere to international obligations and conform to international safeguards against proliferation and strengthen it (Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, July 17, 2008).

This is China’s official position, as also reflected at the IAEA BOG meeting in Geneva earlier this month on the India spacific agreement. At the IAEA China mainly left it to Pakistan to warm the pitch for the NSG. A question arises whether China would have gone along if the same deal and conditions offered to India would also have been offered to Pakistan?

To appreciate this question some recollection is necessary. China built Pakistan’s strategic nuclear power and delivery system almost entirely. The so-called father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, Dr. A. Q. Khan acted more as a conduit and manager rather than a nuclear scientist. He is a metallurgical engineer by training, and stole some designs from European companies. The real man is Dr.Samar Mukarband and, an Islamic oriented scientist.

China’s clandestine nuclear transfer to Pakistan continued till 2004, according to some reliable reports. The main Chinese objective was to keep India entangled with Pakistan, and an India-Pak parity was maintained which China retained its advantages over India. Change of India’s focus from Pakistan to achieve minimum nuclear deterrence against China disturbed Beijing seriously. China has maintained three positions officially and through their government controlled media; )i) both India and Pakistan must roll back their strategic nuclear programmes, but India should do it first because it tested first in 1998 (ii) if India is given this deal then Pakistan should also be a recipient, to maintain parity (iii) empowering only India will lead to an arms race in South Asia including in nuclear arms.

China’s duplicity comes out rather transparently – the deal could be good if Pakistan also gets it, but it is bad if Pakistan does not. Beijing would have been quite sure that Pakistan would not get such a deal, at least far now, because of the country’s dire political situation when the USA has given some thought whether Islamabad’s nuclear assets should be secured by them in a military action. Therefore, killing the India deal in the current form as it is proceeding, is the best option.

China’s record of violating international non-proliferation regimes is legend, including to Lybia through Pakistan and Dr.A.Q.Khan. It is, therefore, ironic that the same country takes a holy stand in a movement to prevent proliferation.

There is a quiet media propaganda that those countries that are supporting India are doing so in the interest of commerce and not with responsibility towards a safer world. The first is, of course, correct. Commerce is an important factor and the world moves on it. The second part is odious. India’s non-proliferation record is impeachable despite many attempts by the non-proliferation lobby to paint India with a black brush. This same non-proliferation lobby needs to answer why they were rather mute over blatant proliferation activity by China and Pakistan.

Will China kill the India passage at the NSG unless it in a “conditional” waiver? Usually, the Chinese policy makers work with a group and, if possible, use others to do their job. There is another scenario the Chinese have been studying very closely, gathering lessons from the Falklands war, for example. Once a quick strike is made and the objective won, the international community tends to forget it in a short time and move to other business. It would not be surprising if China took this route at the NSG unless it sees greater dividends in falling in line.

China’s decision to constrict India may have some serious impact on bilateral relations. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh took a political risk by writing to President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to support India at the NSG. Whether the Prime Minister should have written to the two Chinese leaders at all, can be debated. But Dr. Singh appears to have put the issue of the bilateral strategic relations for development and co-operation squarely to the Chinese leadership.

The agreement on the separation (military and civilian) of nuclear facilities for the purpose of the nuclear deal accords India a nuclear weapons state status. Neither the “123” agreement nor the IAEA agreement reflect the Indian strategic programme. With its impeccable record on proliferation, its regional and global position, India will be approaching the NSG with credentials that cannot be ignored.

Efforts to force India to the NPT, the CTBT, and still under discussion Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) are unacceptable to India. If conditions are sought to be imposed, India will have little option but to pull back. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has clearly kept this road open, but hopes India will not be forced to walk on it.

If China and like minded countries, for their respective reasons, force India to withdraw, it could certainly affect the sub-regional, regional and global political and strategic balances. The issue is up in the air, with hopes for a soft landing and claps all around.

(The author is an eminent China analyst with many years of experience of study on the developments in China. He can be reached at grouchohart@yahoo.com)