AFGHANISTAN:
STRATEGIC DISCONNECT IN UNITED STATES – INDIA STRATEGIC
PERSPECTIVES IN THE MAKING
By Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
Convergence of national security
interests led the United States and India to a shared
endeavor to displace the Taliban regime from Afghanistan in
2002 and thereafter underwrite the process of its emergence
as a democratic, progressive and moderate Islamic state.
Since 2002, the United States and India
have invested in Afghanistan’s political future in terms of
security and economic reconstruction. The United States
focused along with NATO Forces on military operations to
liquidate the continuing and still existing resurgent
Taliban onslaughts to ensure security and stability in
Afghanistan. India’s involvement in the economic
reconstruction and restoration of infrastructure,
communications, connectivity, power generation,
administration and the social sectors has been massive
amounting to over US $ 1 billion in Afghanistan.
The overall central strategic
objectives in Afghanistan of United States and India were
two fold (1) Afghanistan should emerge as a democratic,
progressive and stable state, and more importantly (2)
Afghanistan should never ever become a Talibanised state and
an epicenter of global terrorism. Nothing has happened to
warrant a change in these joint strategic objectives.
Taliban of all hues, harbored, aided ad
abetted by Pakistan continue to be the central instrument
which challenges this shared US-India endeavor to reclaim
Afghanistan. Challenging the might of US & NATO Forces by
asymmetrical warfare it has claimed hundreds of lives of US
& NATO soldiers securing peace in Afghanistan.
Taliban egged-on by Pakistan has
attacked India’s reconstruction projects in Afghanistan and
killed Indian engineers and technicians engaged in these
projects.
Taliban’s central message in these
strategies for the United States and India is that both
should get out of Afghanistan. It is not the message of the
Afghan people who hate the Taliban for their medieval
Islamic brutalization of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2002. It
is the message of the Taliban on behalf of its masters, i.e.
Pakistan.
Pakistan has never invested in
Afghanistan’s political future or its stability and
security, ever since its inception in 1947. Pakistan
continues to view Afghanistan as the legatee overlord after
British withdrawal and serve Pakistan as its strategic
backyard. The history of Pak-Afghan relations is replete
with its continuous efforts by Pakistan to destabilize Afghanistan.
Pakistan never realized that the
manufacturing of 9/11 Islamic Jihadi onslaught on mainland
USA in the ISI Jihadi factories in Taliban Afghanistan would
bring about United States forceful military intervention in
Afghanistan, displace its proxy Taliban regime in Kabul and
deprive Pakistan of its strategic backyard in Afghanistan.
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the fall of Taliban regime in Kabul due to US
military intervention, Pakistan implemented a three-pronged
strategy (1) Overtly, a façade of assisting United States in
its global war on terrorism (2) Covertly, putting into
effect a resurgent Taliban asymmetric warfare against US &
NATO Forces in control of Afghanistan (3) By attrition over
a period of time inducing strategic fatigue in US & NATO
resolve and prompting their exit.
Reverting back to the present, what is
noticeable are three main trends, namely (1) United States
officially shows no signs of strategic fatigue and is
revising its strategies in Afghanistan (2) Indian Prime
Minister even after the devastating major suicide attack on
the Indian Embassy, engineered by Pakistan’s ISI (US
official assertion publicly declared) that India will
continue its reconstruction presence in Afghanistan, and (3)
Within NATO, Britain more noticeably has exhibited strategic
fatigue and advocated initiatives along with Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia for dialogue with the Taliban.
The dangers of strategic fatigue in
Afghanistan stand vividly discussed in this Author’s SAAG
Paper No. 2902 dated 29 Oct 2008 entitled “Afghanistan:
United States/NATO Strategic Fatigue Spawns Dangerous
Alternatives”.
This Paper brought out that the return
of the Taliban to Afghanistan through such advocacy of
partial power sharing in Kabul by the “moderate” Taliban ( an
unholy interpretation of the Taliban) would be disastrous
for United States global standing. Also was brought out
that “US Intellectuals Must Disabuse Their Minds that
Pakistan’s Sensitivities are Paramount in Solution of
Afghanistan Conflict”.
The last named is a dangerous trend
which has picked up more steam in the United States policy
analysis circles. Some excerpts of this line of thinking
are listed in the Annexure to this Paper.
Pakistan-orchestrated line of thinking
in the United States briefly runs as follows (1) Pakistan is
hampered in extending full support to United States in
Afghanistan because of its strategic insecurities emanating
from India (2) At the heart of Pakistan’s strategic
insecurities is the unresolved issue of Kashmir (3) United
States should pressurize India to compromise on Kashmir to
enable Pakistan to effectively cooperate with USA in
Afghanistan.
Pakistan's linkage of Kashmir with
Afghanistan is only a blackmail attempt sensing that with
strategic fatigue setting in policy advisory circles, Pakistan could reap rewards from USA on Kashmir or if
nothing else cause a cleavage in the US-India Strategic
Partnership.
The United States needs to arrest and
officially refute such tenuous thinking in its policy
advisory groups. Implicit in this is the danger of a
serious disconnect emerging in US-India strategic
perceptions on Afghanistan and a greater danger of impacting
adversely on the overall evolution of the US-India Strategic
Partnership, still on the making.
Some perspectives not covered in this
Author’s above referred Paper are offered for pondering over
now as follows:
- India Has Legitimate National
Security Interests in Afghanistan.
- Taliban Incorporation in
Power-Sharing in Kabul Will be Opposed by Other
Stake-holders in Afghanistan
- United States Must Recognize that
Afghanistan is Not Iraq
India Has Legitimate National
Security Interests in Afghanistan
The following points need to be made in
this connection (1) India’s legitimate national security
interests in Afghanistan pre-date United States involvement
in Afghanistan (2) India’s national security interests have
acquired heightened salience with its emergence as the
regional power in South Asia and its ascendancy towards
global power status (3) India’s national security interests
today extend far beyond South Asian confines and a stable
and secure Afghanistan, free of radical influences, on the
immediate periphery of South Asia on the West, is an
important pivot for India’s national security.
Surely, neither US officialdom or its
intellectual circles can dispute India’s national security
interests in Afghanistan for today they are no longer
Pak-centric but an extension of its growing power.
The United States needs to review its
Pak-centric South-West Asia perspectives and recognize the
reality that Afghanistan as a democratic, progressive and
moderate Islamic country in a strategic partnership with
India as the regional power (and global power in the making)
would together provide a strong bulwark of stability for
South Asia, Central Asia and the Gulf Region.
Should the United States not recognize
this reality then it has to face harsh strategic realities
(1) India will not sacrifice its national security interests
in Afghanistan to facilitate United States’ assuaging of
self-inflicted strategic insecurities of Pakistan (2)
Kashmir would be “non-negotiable" for any Indian political
dispensation in power and (3) US pressures in this direction
could impact adversely on the evolving US-India Strategic
Partnership.
Taliban Incorporation in
Power-Sharing in Kabul Will be Opposed by Other
Stake-holders in Afghanistan
India always opposed the Taliban regime
and Taliban in Afghanistan – even when US Assistant
Secretary of State Robin Raphel was hobnobbing with them in
Mazar-e-Sharif and advocating US diplomatic recognition of
the Taliban – a move wisely dropped by her seniors.
Taliban is virulently anti-Indian in
outlook and has been the nursery of Jihadi terrorism in
Kashmir as it has been in Afghanistan. The Indian psyche
stands strongly singed by the visuals of IC-814 (Indian
Airlines) plane hijacking to Kandahar in Afghanistan
depicting the Islamic Jihadi hijackers and other noted
terrorists being spirited away by the Taliban to safe
sanctuaries in Pakistan.
Does this not evoke memories in the
United States of Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar (along with
their hierarchies), all master-minds of 9/11, being spirited
away to Pakistan in 2002?
India is an important stake-holder in
Afghanistan and would not look kindly on any
British-Pak-Saudi efforts to bring back the Taliban in power
in Kabul through a back-door entry, and pregnant with
prospects of enlarging its hold in Kabul once established.
The US establishment does not ponder over the latter
perspectives when it seconds the British proposal
reluctantly.
More importantly, there are other vital
stake-holders in Afghanistan’s stability and who have
consistently opposed the Taliban all along, namely, Russia
and Iran. Russia and Iran can be expected to vehemently
oppose the inclusion of Taliban of any hues in power sharing
in Kabul. And if USA persists on such a course, then one
can expect the “Great Game” to return to Afghanistan, to the
detriment of US national security interests.
Can the United States forget that US
military intervention in Afghanistan was made successful
with the tacit support of Russia and Iran.
The only other stake-holder left in
Afghanistan is China and China would whole-heartedly support
Pakistan's position and of the Taliban with which regime it
had strong linkages.
United States Must Recognize that
Afghanistan is Not Iraq
General Petraeus assuming command of US
Central Command after a successful tenure in Iraq carries
inherent dangers of repeating the Iraqi experiment in
Afghanistan. Afghanistan geo-politically, geo-strategically
and geographically in terms of terrain configuration is
vastly different from Iraq.
Afghanistan therefore presents
political and military challenges vastly different and
vastly complex than in Iraq. It is also challenging in
terms of application of US military power as in Iraq
armored and mechanized warfare was a force multiplier. In
Afghanistan reliance will have to be on heli-borne operations
in the vast open space of this nation.
More significantly, the United States
with a rapid military surge coupled with the manipulation of
Sunni tribals could engineer a workable exit strategy from
Iraq. Even in Iraq there is no exit of US Forces till
2011.
Other than forsaking its vital national
security interests in Greater South West Asia by an “exit
from Afghanistan at any cost," the United States is in for a
long, long military haul in Afghanistan. And for this it
will require to double the Afghan National Army at its own
costs as unlike Iraq, there are no oil revenues flowing in
for the same.
In such an extended and open-ended US
involvement in Afghanistan, the United States could count
handsomely on only one stake-holder and that is India.
And that too because India like the United States has vital
national security interests in Afghanistan. and both enjoy a
strategic convergence there without any competing interests.
Concluding Observations
Pakistan’s diabolical attempts to
engineer a hasty exit of United States and India from
Afghanistan through the playing of the “Taliban Card”
coupled with that card spawning advocacy of dangerous
alternatives by the US policy establishment (under British
pressure) carries in it the dangers of a serious disconnect
emerging in US-India strategic perspectives on Afghanistan.
India cannot be expected to sacrifice
its national security interests in Afghanistan, which are
comprehensive and not Pak-centric, to facilitate the United
States assuaging Pakistan’s strategic insecurities.
Should the United States deviate from
its strategic congruencies with India on Afghanistan, then
India would have been left with no other alternatives but to
explore other options to protect her legitimate national
security interests in Afghanistan.
United States and India today share
strategic convergences on a vast array of strategic
challenges in the meeting of which India can play a sizeable
part. The United States should be mindful that neither
by word or deed a disconnect takes place in US-India
strategic perspectives, least of all Afghanistan.
(The author is
an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst.
He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia
Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila@yahoo.com)
ANNEXURE
SELECTED EXCERPTS
The Strategic Challenge in Pakistan
Afghan Hinterland by Michael Schuer, Jamestown Foundation,
Vol. 15, Issue 30 dated August 12, 2008
- “The assumption based on the error
that two nations can have identical interests had led
the West to allow any and all nations to play a role in
Afghanistan of their own choosing, a policy that will
ultimately help undo Western interests there”.
- “The best example of the
destructiveness of the “we’re all in this together”
policy is, the role India is being allowed to play in
Afghanistan."
- Commenting on why the Indian
Embassy was bombed in Kabul and why it took so long in
coming, he said “To ask that question would have to
recognize that the United States and NATO have allowed
their Kabul surrogate President Hamid Karzai and the
Indian Government to use their supposedly selfless
project of Afghan reconstruction as a tool with which to
destroy one of the historic tenets of Pakistan’s
national security (having a Pro-Pakistan, Islamist and
Pashtun dominated Afghan Government).
Behind The Indian Embassy Bombing,
Robert Kaplan, The Atlantic, August 1, 2008
- “The Karzai Government is openly
and brazenly strengthening its ties with India and
allowed Indian consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat
and Mazar-e-Sharif. It has kept alive the possibility
of inviting India to help train the new Afghan Army.”
- “Karzai’s open alliance with India
is a casus belli for ISI” (Pakistan Army’s intelligence
agency)
- “Only by assuaging the ISIs fears
while allowing India’s rightful place in Kabul, can we
get more cooperation from Pakistan to fight extremism”.
- “Pakistan is far more threatened
by Talibanization than the US is but victory will
require deft diplomacy including alliances with some
Taliban elements against others.”
Bruce Riedel, Earlier President
Clintons Security Advisor and now with President-elect
Obama’s team
- “Pakistan should not be
pressurized because its security establishment believes
that it is threatened by US-India-Afghan alliance to
dismember Pakistan.”
- “Pakistan’s military command
continues to believe the two nation theory and wants
Kashmir to be incorporated into the South Asian homeland
for Muslim. To this extent, Afghanistan, they say is
within Pakistan’s security perimeter.”
- “Strategic fatigue has set in” (in
the US and NATO Policy establishment.
Foreign Affairs Journal: Essay on
Afghanistan by Barry Rubin and Ahmed Rashid
- "Pakistan cannot be pressurised"
- "Pakistan feels that it faces both
a US-Afghanistan-India alliance and a separate
Russia-Iran alliance each aimed at undermining
Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan an dismembering the
Pakistani state."
- "Pakistan's legitimate sources of
insecurity need to be addressed while increasing
opposition to its disruptive activities."
-
"Promote dialogue between India and Pakistan to resolve
Kashmir issue."