Maritime dimensions of Mumbai terrorist attacks on 27th November 2008

Maritime dimensions of Mumbai terrorist attacks on 27^th November 2008

Guest Column By Commodore R. S. Vasan

With all the dust settling down in Taj, Trident and the Nariman house, It has now been confirmed now that the inflatable boats found near the Gateway of India were the ones used by the terrorists to come ashore in Mumbai and indulge in the indiscriminate attacks at Cama hospital, GT hospital, CST station, Trident hotel, Taj hotel, Wadi Bunder, near Metro Cinema, Girgaum, Chowpatty and a Petrol pump near bootleggers pub. The first hand accounts by some of the foreign tourists indicated that the casually dressed arms carrying young terrorists specifically were looking out for those with British or American passports. This combined with the fact that Nariman house which operated as a Jewish center was targeted indicates that the operation is supported by Al Queda or the LeT with known antipathy towards Brits, Jews and Americans. It also brings backs to memory the attack on foreign tourists in Bali in early 2003 where the attacks were aimed at tourist destinations favoured by the westerners.. The Deccan Mujahedeen (DM) claimed responsibility for the attack. However, this lead was inferred by the police as a ploy to mislead the agencies to believe that the attacks were carried out by jehadi groups in Hyderabad.

The well planned and coordinated attacks at eleven places and firing by the terrorists has claimed more than 185 people including 16 police and 22 foreigners. The list of police personnel killed in the encounter includes, ATS Chief Hemant Karkare, Additional CP Ashok Kamte, encounter cop Vijay Salaskar. More than 325 have been injured. The NSG, Army and the marine commandos had carried out the flushing out operations. A total of nine suspected terrorists have been killed and one terrorist nabbed.

With the conclusion of the Operation Cyclone, this analysis is aimed only at examining the adequacy or lack of it in the preparedness of our maritime forces and other security agencies that have a major role in thwarting such attacks. The naval authorities at Mumbai initially said that the ingress of the terrorists by boats was not substantiated. However, it was clear by the end of the day that the terrorists did use the sea route and in a brazen act landed at the Gateway of India. The boats were abandoned and the hit squads fanned out towards their targets. The naval ships of the prized western fleet and the dockyard facilities are just a stone’s throw away from the landing point. Even the private yards some which are engaged in building/repairing modern warships are also located adjacent to the naval facilities.

Navy's action/perception. In a media interview on Thursday, 25th November 08 the Commander-in-Chief of Western Naval Command indicated that both the naval and coast guard surface and air units were deployed to locate the mother ship. If even a percentage of these very forces were deployed in a coordinated manner earlier based on the wonderful intelligence provided, there was a good chance of thwarting the attack.

Surely this is a clear case of 'bolting the stables after the horses have fled'. Vice Admiral Bedi the Commander in Chief also said "We are up against highly motivated forces. My commandos have told me that we are up against professional terrorists who have done their homework well and know how to cause maximum damage".

If that was the reaction of the Chief of Western Naval Command, the SNC Chief Vice Admiral Damle said "As per the information that they not only came from the sea route but some elements have escaped through the sea route. Indian Navy is strong there and we have already started investigating the vessels or ships or any crafts which are considered suspicious on the west coast particularly in the vicinity of Mumbai. So, Indian Navy is taking active participation to finding out how they came in which is a separate issue, but if there in an attempt to take that route to rescue, that is also being investigated by our units,".

The Coast Guard likewise deployed most of its assets only after the attack indicative of lack of proactive measures. The statement by the Coast Guard that they lack resources and man power point to the need for pooling of the resources of all the agencies concerned with a view to have coordinated action. This is inescapable till the force level shortages are made good.

Unfortunately, the statement by the top brass of the Navy, Coast Guard and those in power does not evoke any sense of confidence that all is well on the aspects of maritime security. , That the attack has been very well planned and the planners would not have overlooked the aspect of ingress/exit including a reasonable degree of safety for the mother ship can hardly be doubted. By the time the searches were launched it is almost certain that the mother ship would have got away to safe havens under the cover of darkness on a new moon day (planned?) and mingled with the rest of legitimate and innocent traffic on the high seas. However, after mayhem, chaos and the loss of innocent lives at Mumbai the action by the Marine Commandos who swung in to action immediately is worthy of praise.

Even if the vessel is located it would mean precious little except assisting in the post mortem and ascertaining the modus operandi adopted by the terrorists. It was also suspected that a cargo ship MV Alfa, a Vietnamese ship which sailed from Karachi may; have been involved and was intercepted, but the authorities did not find anything incriminating and let the vessel off. If MV Alfa or another mother ship was indeed involved, the vessel would have ensured that there are no tell tale evidences of having launched the boats; after all the only action required of the ship was to carry the inflatable boats and the hit squad and disgorge them at a point from where the group could be on their own.

In addition, the location of an Indian trawler Kuber which was reported missing since 13^th November was located by the Coast Guard. A dead man (skipper) with bullet wounds, four bodies of the crew of this vessel found by the Coast Guard, a satellite phone and GPS maps of Southern Mumbai which were found on the boat suggests that in a well planned operations, the terrorists had decided to use one of the Indian vessel to merge with Indian fishing vessels and evade detection. Also it raises question about what was done on getting the report of the missing boat since 13^th November. Except during monsoons and inclement weather boats do not go missing on either coast, so it is clear that this aspect was not investigated and was perhaps assumed as a routine incident.

Not withstanding the almost defensive statements of the two Admirals on the west coast, it is clear that the maritime forces, security agencies and the Government machinery were unprepared and caught off guard despite the warnings that were issued from time to time about Mumbai being the next target. The fact that the next threat could come from the sea was discussed debated and understood as a 'real and potential' danger staring us in the eye. The IB had clearly sounded the warning bells and claimed that the Maharashtra Government and the Coast Guard were warned about the impending attack through the sea routes. The fact that a large number of cadres were trained by the ISI and the Pak Navy in water borne operations for a period of 12 -18 months and the attacks are imminent was made known. How much more specific intelligence is needed? It is clear that there was hardly any response and there was no coordinated collective action to respond to this 'actionable intelligence'. The Navy apparently has said that it did not receive the intelligence raising serious questions about the existing protocols for transferring of sensitive and vital intelligence. Also as per some reports the Navy was engaged in an exercise to defend Gujarat coast from sea attacks. If this is true, there are some very serious questions to be asked about what prevented the Navy from stopping the intruder.

The history of porous borders do go back to fifteen years ago when for the first time RDX was landed on the western coast with the connivance of both the customs and the police authorities who fell victims to the lure of a bribe of RS7 lakhs to let the consignment reach Mumbai by road after landing at Shirodi a coastal village. This was used to deadly effect in the Mumbai blasts in March 93. Subsequent to this, the Navy launched 'Operation Swan' to augment coastal security. This apparently has been handed over to the Coast Guard recently.

Looking specifically at the security of seas off Mumbai, there is definitely an overlap and there are many agencies involved. The number of agencies involved is more than a dozen that involves both the State and the Central agencies. It was decided that the Marine Police wing would look after up to 5 nautical miles and the Coast Guard would have a responsibility up to 30 nautical miles (some reports say it is up to 12 nautical miles). The Blue water forces of the Navy were to look after the areas beyond these limits. What would happen in the overlapping areas in a dynamic situation as the one witnessed, and who would coordinate the efforts are in the grey zones of confusion.

The port is required to declare and control an area in which it coordinates the movement of all vessels including that of the Navy and the Coast Guard, as the same channel is used by all vessels seeking entry in to Mumbai. The Gateway of India has hundreds of boats which cater to the tourist traffic. These ply through the nights with hardly any effective control. The fishing harbours have a traffic that by and large is controlled by the fishermen themselves. In this context the startling statement made by the fishermen association that they did report to the State Government the landing of the RDX some weeks ago tells a sad tale of the unresponsiveness of the Government machinery even when something as serious as the landing of the RDX has been reported.

Aspects of International Ship and Port Security Code (ISPS). The Mumbai port has been declared as an ISPS code compliant port. The ISPS was implemented on 01 July 2004. The IMO initiative was taken post the 9/11 attack where it was feared that the medium of the seas would be used for terrorist attack just as the air medium was used to attack the WTC. The ISPS also caters for equipping vessels with Automatic Identification System which would pass the position to the designated authorities... However, it is mandatory only for Passenger ships and other vessels above 300 GT (Gross Tonnage) engaged in international voyage. In India it was sought to be made compulsory for fishing vessels and even those involved in coastal traffic.

While the states were required to identify a Recognised Security Organisation(RSO), strangely, India designated Indian Register of Shipping (IRS) a ship survey authority with no experience and knowledge in security matters to be designated as RSO. With no expertise in security matters, IRS was required to audit, validate and approve the security measures on ships and ports. It is clear that the DG Shipping felt that it was their turf and either the Navy or the Coast Guard should not be allowed to be the RSO despite the obvious choices. That the Government approved this shows the lack of understanding of maritime security matters.

Security of Bombay High and off shore assets. The Director General Coast Guard is the chairman of the Offshore Security Coordination committee(OSCC) which specifically looks at security of our off shore installations including Bombay high the invaluable network of our energy initiatives.. The OSCC includes Navy, Air force, FODAG, Intelligence Bureau, Reps from the concerned ministry, ONGC, Oil companies etc. According to some first hand accounts, those in the committee feel that there is too much of overlap in their duties.

Coastal /Border Security. The customs apparently were to take a lead in coordinating the combined effort for surveillance and other measures for coastal security in Maharasthra. It is evident that the initiative has failed for some very obvious reasons of command, control and coordination.

Post Kargil, the Group of Ministers (GoM) made many recommendations in 2000 to augment border security. Notable ones pertaining to coastal security are:-

a) The Indian Coast Guard is designated as the lead intelligence agency at sea.

b) Creation of marine police wings by maritime States with the initial funding coming from the Center.

c) Implementing better coordination between the agencies concerned.

d) Creation of Joint Operations Room for coordinated action.

Unfortunately, even after eight years of these recommendations, it is clear that we have a long way to go before securing our long coast line and far flung Islands against determined attacks. While the Coast Guard has been designated as the lead intelligence agency, in our system, it is known that intelligence is hardly shared between agencies concerned. The Coast Guard would take ample time in being recognized as a lead maritime lead intelligence agency. There are issues of funding, training, cadre management and such like which are yet to be resolved if the Coast Guard is to do justice to this unenvious task.

The marine police wings are slowly taking shape in all the nine maritime states. In many cases the Coast Guard has been requested to train the initial lot and provide advice on the way to grow as a maritime service capable of apprehending and prosecuting the offenders at sea in the areas of jurisdiction. The assets are limited to boats, some rudimentary equipment and basic weapons that would be obsolete at the time of induction itself. They also lack air assets which are highly essential to keep the long coast lines under effective surveillance.

While all the agencies do talk about synergy and better coordination, on the ground it is just not happening. There are issues of turf wars and one-up-manship which come in the way of effective coordination and exchange of information. The Navy and the Coast Guard do feel that there is mutual interference in their role and task. The other agencies such as the customs, police, Intelligence Bureau and other ministries do not exactly interact with each other to synergise their strengths and over come weaknesses. A single agency that can be nominated as a nodal agency and vested with the powers to oversee the coastal security is long over due despite persistent recommendations by successive naval chiefs.

In the light of the above, the following are the recommendations:-

Have a single maritime agency to look after coastal and off shore security. The joint forces command model structure being practiced in the A&N group could be adopted with necessary modifications including the civil machinery.
Strengthen the hands of the Coast Guard if it has to perform its new role as the lead intelligence agency on maritime issues.
Modernisation of forces particularly the marine police wing if has to take on the kind of seaborne threats. The marine police wing would need to have night vision binoculars, advanced weapons and compatible communication devices and sea worthy boats.

Equipping the Border Security Force (Marine wing) in border areas with similar assets and ensuring proper coordination with the nearest maritime agency.
Accountability of those in charge of acting on intelligence reports and a feed back system on actions taken on the intelligence reports to ensure that such inputs have been noted and acted up on.
Instead of depending on the NSG, create and train special forces with in the state to cut down on time delays in transporting them from the Capital. The initial training and kitting up could be supervised by the NSG.
Designate the Indian Coast Guard as the Recognised Security Organisation in lieu of the Indian Register of Shipping and strengthen the hands of the Indian Coast Guard on the lines of the US Coast Guard.
Regulation and monitoring of boat traffic in tourist spots. This should include pleasure craft, sail craft, chartered boats, tugs and other means of water transport.
Integration of all surveillance means with the agencies viz, Indian Navy, Coast Guard, Customs, Police, Port Trusts and other state agencies. With the IT capability of the country this should hardly pose a challenge to achieve effective integration for accessing as required by agencies charged with certain responsibilities.
Integration of security measures for nuclear installations along the coast with that of the maritime security forces.
Prompt follow up on missing boats to rule out the aspect of hijacking.
Registration and accounting of all fishing boats irrespective of tonnage
Develop the fishermen as the first line of defence. Awareness and sensitisation programmes need to be conducted by the Coast Guard, Customs and the Navy on a regular basis.

Conclusion

Finally, the most important aspect of not being prepared for counter terrorism stems from the lack of preparedness and assertiveness from the Government in power. Nothing that the Government has done thus far promotes any sense of confidence amongst the citizens who are at the receiving end. The responses of those in power after each blasts or a terrorist attack have never been translated to concrete actions. On the part of the agencies that are charged with protecting our borders and our citizens, they need to shed the apathy, rise above themselves and get on with the task for which they were created in the first place and be accountable. It is only then that we as a nation would have developed some measure of capability to prevent the kind of gruesome attacks witnessed in Mumbai.

(The author is presently the Head, Strategy and Security Studies at the Center for Asia Studies at Chennai and can be contacted at rsvasan2010@gmail.com)