INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 2004-2009: THE WASTED YEARS

INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 2004-2009: THE WASTED YEARS

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

At the turn of the millennium and till 2004, India in terms of its foreign policy achievements stood on a promising threshold. The nuclear weaponisation tests of 1998 had endowed India’s foreign policy with boldness and assertiveness. India had placed itself in a position where it could operate strategic partnerships at the same time with the United States and Russia, effectively. Indeed, it seemed that India was on an ascendant trajectory towards global power status.

In 2009, as India rings in the incumbent Congress Government for a second tenure, India in terms of its foreign policy achievements gives the impression that it has stumbled in retaining its strategic autonomy in foreign policy formulation. Not only the ascendant trajectory towards global power status seems less of a certainly, but also India’s standing as the regional power in South Asia stands diminished.

India’s foreign policy during the period 2001-2009 stood defined by a single frame especially from July 2005 US-India Summit onwards. This was the Indian Prime Minister’s over-riding obsession to push through the Indo-US Nuclear Deal at any cost. The Deal may have some merits but in its pursuance with an obsessive fixation, India’s handling of its foreign policy in 2004-2009 became uni-directional as opposed to a multi-directional focus required to secure India’s wide national security interests.

One gets the impression that whether at the global level or at the regional level in South Asia, India’s foreign policy formulation and attitudinal inclinations during 2004-2009 was dominated by a single perspective as to how it would be viewed in Washington and what would be the effects on the processing of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal.

India’s foreign policy 2004-2009 can rightfully be described as a period of “wasted years” because the foreign policy momentum that had been built over from 1998-2004 was virtually stalled if not reverse-geared in pursuance of the above objective.

Consequently, in mid-2009 as the incumbent Government sets out for its second term, India’s security environment has become more threatening and complex, calling for some hard-headed thinking, bold and forceful measures and a foreign policy intent on re-ordering its neighborhood.

In mid-2009, India does not seem to figure in the global strategic and power calculus as a nation with strategic autonomy in foreign policy formulation and decision making. India today is being perceived as more of a camp-follower of the United States on the lines of Great Britain and Japan.

Lest the Indian Government be led to believe that its return to power with a convincing lead is also an endorsement of its foreign policy and national security policy, it is definitely not so. India’s electorate, despite its anger with the Government’s weak counter-terrorism policies and its flawed approaches towards Pakistan, endorsed a second term solely on the grounds of economic security.

Indian electorate’s political endorsement for a second time with a convincing margin has been given with a “trust” that in the present global economic crisis and global recession, the Congress Government was better equipped with continuity to lessen the impact on India’s economy and job markets.

As India embarks on another five years of governance with the same Government, despite its poor national security record, it is imperative that India’s “wasted years” of its foreign policy during 2004-2009 are reviewed so that the country adopts a fresh foreign policy template and re-calibration undertaken.

This Paper is not intended to be a monograph on India's Foreign Policy 2004-2009. It only intends to highlight the straitjacket in which India placed iself in the foreign policy field and the strategic fallout from the same.

This Paper therefore intends to limit itself to the examination of two major defining features of “India’s Foreign Policy 2004-2009 “which says it all as to why it is being termed as “Wasted Years” :

India’s US-Centric Foreign Policy 2004-2009: The Strategic Costs.
India’s Consequent Losses in Global Power Play.

India’s US-Centric Foreign Policy 2004-2009: The Strategic Costs

The most striking characteristic of India’s foreign policy during the period 2004-2009 was that it became totally US-Centric in its manifestation. Admittedly, there was a long flurry of foreign dignitaries visiting India from all over the world and an Indian exodus to world capitals. Institutional bilateral mechanisms in existence with other countries continued to be alive. Yet all of these activities were receiving secondary attention in the overall scheme of things.

Form July 2005 onwards India’s prime foreign policy focused entirely on the processing of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal. In the process as the processing of this Deal become more vexatious due to shifting of goal-posts by the United States establishment, India’s entire foreign policy and diplomatic efforts assumed US-Centric proportions.

The foreign policy costs of India’s US-Centric foreign policy in institutional terms were many and in brief could be listed as under:

Reminiscent of the Nehruvian mould, India’s foreign policy became more personalized in the person of the Prime Minister. PM Dr Manmohan Singh is reported to have threatened to resign on the issue when faced with opposition from Congress Party detractors and others.
Nehru was mystified by China and became oblivious to the strategic and national security dangers that lurked as a result of romanticizing China.
Dr Manmohan Singh seems to have been mystified by the United States. In the period 2004-2009 he was romanticizing the United States in terms of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal only, to the exclusion of other pressing strategic dangers to India. During this period India’s reading of its foreign policy challenges was largely determined by Washington’s prism especially in South Asia and in relation to Pakistan more specifically.
Foreign policy handling was being increasingly being taken over by the Prime Minister’s Office.
The National Security Adviser who should have been exercising a monitoring watch that foreign policy did not get detached from national security moorings was also drafted in processing of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal to the detriment of his prime function

The US-Centric orientation of India’s foreign policy during 2004-2009 inflicted heavy costs on India obliquely and tangentially in terms of South Asia.

India under intense pressures (US leverage on the Nuclear Deal) was forced to engage Pakistan in peace dialogues. India was fully conscious that what it really was doing amounted to duress in dealing with a confirmed “terrorist state” which even at the height of the US-pressurized dialogues was merrily inflicting “acts of war” on India through the multitude of its state- sponsored terrorist outfits.
India ignonimously signed the Havana Agreement with Pakistan on Counter-terrorism Cooperation. It was repulsive to Indian public opinion.
Under US pressure and US think tanks studies recommendations the Indian Prime Minister was virtually on the verge of gifting away the strategic Siachen Sector to Pakistan, It was overlooked that Siachen Sector was India’s strategic perch on both Pakistan and China and a strategic wedge to India’s advantage.
Had The Indian Army not applied brakes, India would have lost hold of this vital strategic territory like Nehru lost Aksai Chin to China.

While India’s foreign policy establishment was engaged in US-Centric pursuits, India became oblivious to its embattled South Asian neighborhood to the detriment of India’s own national security interests. Noticeably, the following needs to be recounted:

China increased its influence and intrusiveness in South Asia.
China continued with the defense build-up of Pakistan’ military machine.
China maneuvered Nepal into its sphere of influence, political and military. In fact Nepal was gifted away as a buffer state by India to China due to misperceived priorities as a result of strategic inattentiveness of the Indian foreign policy establishment.
China imperceptibly wiggled its way into Sri Lanka to now command appreciable influence at India’s expense.

All of the above would have been excusable had India made strategic gains arising from accepting a US-Centric orientation in its foreign policy. The record is sadly otherwise, and the following points therefore need to be made;

United States was a gainer during 2004-2009 in that it could prevail over India and succeeding in pushing it into amenability to give primacy to US strategic interests in South Asia centering on Pakistan over India's own national security interests.
India was the nett strategic loser as its US-Centric policy failed to generate corresponding strategic gains for India in relation to Pakistan or China.

India’s US-Centric foreign policy would have been argued as justified had the United States in reciprocal terms conceded the following to India:

India was recognized in declaratory terms by the United States as the pre-eminent regional power in South Asia. Attendant also should have been a stern warning to its protégé Pakistan to desist from de-stabilizing South Asia based on its promiscuous relationship with China
USA would have resisted Pakistan’s blackmail on US military build-up of Pakistan Army on specious grounds of ‘war on terror’ requirements.
USA had embarked on a concerted campaign to secure for India a Permanent Member Status of the UN Security Council. On the contrary the United States has been evading the issue.

None of the above has accrued and on the contrary, the new US Obama Administration seems to be all set for a repeat of United States’ Pakistan-Centric policy. The center-piece of India’s US-Centric policy, namely, the Indo-US Nuclear Deal has yet to achieve its full finalization.

Strange as it looks that while India follows a US-Centric foreign policy, the United States continues to adhere to its traditional Pakistan-Centric policy to the strategic dismay of India’s policy establishment and in annoyance of India’s public opinion.

India’s Consequent Losses in Global Power Play

The global strategic calculus and the global power play cannot be overlooked in India’s foreign policy formulations if it intends to be serious about emerging as a contender for global power status

In 2004, India stood well poised for an ascendant trajectory in the global pecking order. Nations with ambitions for an ascendant trajectory need to be alive to and exploit for their own national security interests the contemporary strategic dynamics and the trends in making.

The global strategic dynamics during the period 2004-2009 was characterized by the following features:

United States global predominance was under challenge and the United States lay strategically distracted in Iraq and Afghanistan. USA was not making any headway in its global war on terror as a result of double-timing by Pakistan
Russia was in a resurgent mode honing both its strategic and military strengths. It had embarked on a mission to reclaim its erstwhile status as an independent global power center.
China was in a virtual ‘Cold War’ mode with USA. China’s rapid military modernization was generating sharp ripostes from USA.
The Islamic World was in ferment against the United States.
Russia-China strategic nexus was firm, if not strong and both were working to forge the SCO as a counter-foil to NATO.

Amongst the powers aspiring for global power status, India stood out in terms of her nuclear weapons arsenal, resurgent economy, and a powerful conventional military power.

India was therefore in a bargaining position in terms of her national aspirational goals. Russia stood firmly behind India in terms of the time-rested Russia-India Strategic Partnership. China despite all its disputes with India and competitive rivalries was grudgingly and growingly adapting itself to India’s rise.

The United States was keen to evolve a strong strategic partnership with India to pre-empt the emergence of a Russia-India-China strategic triangle.

India thus had all the right cards at its disposal on the high table which could have generated strategic gains for India from all the major powers.

However, India during the period 2004-2009 fumbled in playing her cards well. The reason being that a cardinal failure was committed by losing India’s strategic autonomy in the pursuance of US-Centric policy focused on the Indo-US Nuclear Deal and not more widely on United States ‘quid-pro-quos’ for India’s tilt in the global power game.

Pakistan as a nation whose very existence is being debated assumes primacy over India in US strategic thinking because it generates strategic threats and problems for the United States. India however, as a responsible regional power and with greater strategic potential to offer to any global power does not even figure on the United States strategic radar.

In the process, India today stands reduced to being a mere ‘camp-follower’ of the United States, type-casted in that role by her own limited perspectives in foreign policy formulation during 2004-2009.

India today seems to have missed the bus in terms of securing a seat on the global high table and emerging as a global power of consequence. To reclaim her national aspirations India’s foreign policy has to break-out of her self-imposed straitjacket of limited perspectives and limited options.

Concluding Observations

India's foreign policy 2004-2009 can rightly be termed as “wasted years”. These years were wasted because the present Indian Government tailed to grasp the multi-directional momentum that was built up at the term of the millennium.

In 2004-2009 period India’s foreign policy was reduce to an uni-directional obsessive fixation to get the Indo-US Nuclear Deal to the exclusion of both a wider regional and global approach.

In this process, India lost very heavily in terms of collateral damage to its regional strategic interests and national security interests. Particularly in relation to Pakistan, India’s foreign policy was no longer being determined by Indian national security interests.

India's current troubled security environment and the slippage that has taken place in India ascending the trajectory towards global power status calls for a total re-calibration of India’s foreign policy by the incoming Government.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)