Myanmar: Developments in Myanmar and the Security of North East
Col R. Hariharan
[Excerpts of
this article were included in a presentation by the author at the National
Seminar on “Recent Developments in Myanmar : Implications for India”, organized
jointly by the Department of Politics & Public Administration (University of
Madras) and Center for Asia Studies (Chennai on 29 October 2009.]
Turbulence in
Myanmar
Myanmar is going
through throes of change after over 45 years of military rule. The first
multiparty elections under the new constitution are to be conducted in 2010. The
new constitution was confirmed through a referendum with barely three weeks
notice even as Myanmar was being devastated by cyclone Nergis in 2008. Despite
its long gestation It hardly represents the democratic aspirations of the
people.
Originally, after
the 1992 general election was held and the National League for Democracy (NLD)
swept the polls, the ruling junta had announced that the newly elected members
would draft the new constitution. But the elected members of parliament hardly
had a hand in drafting the new constitution in the deliberations of the National
Convention entrusted with the task. Although it met on and off for almost 15
years, less than two percent of the parliament members were involved in the
final draft.
The members of the
National Convention were handpicked by the military to push through the draft
scripted by the army. To prevent active involvement of NLD in the process during
the tortuous course of constitution making, the junta ensured Aung San Suu Kyi
was kept under house arrest. The elected NLD members of parliament were never
allowed to present their views in public; in fact they were hounded out and
persecuted. The new constitution also does not meet the legitimate demands for
autonomy of major ethnic communities that had been waging war for their rights
for over four decades. There had been no public discourse on the draft.
So it comes as no
surprise that the new constitution is more of a cosmetic exercise than a
meaningful effort to transfer power to a democratic government. Its purpose
appears to be two fold: to legitimise the role of the army as a power over and
above the elected government and to appease growing international demand for
restoration of democracy so that sanctions slapped on Myanmar are lifted.
The Tatmadaw (army)
has a favoured position in the new constitution. The president has to be an army
officer endowed with power to appoint Union ministers and chief ministers of
states. He will also nominate judges of the Supreme Court. The Tatmadaw has the
right to independently administer all affairs of the armed forces. And the
highest court of the country will have no jurisdiction over them! The Commander
in Chief of armed forces nominates the ministers of defence, security and home
affairs, and border affairs. He shall also appoint armed forces officers as
security and the border affair ministers in the governments at the level of
state, region and in the self-administered division and zones. It is the C-in-C
who nominates parliament members for 25 percent of the seats reserved for the
armed forces in Union Assembly (upper and lower houses).
Problems of
political democracy
The president has
to be an army officer; and persons whose children and spouses owe "allegiance to
a foreign power” are barrred from being elected president. Thus the junta has
ensured that Aung San Suu Kyi is not allowed to occupy the highest office in the
“democratic government” on both the counts as her husband and her children are
British citizens. Without her active leadership it is doubtful whether the first
step to democracy would ever go further to reach the final goal of making
Myanmar a full fledged democracy.
The process of
changeover to even limited democracy is not likely to be a smooth process. With
the army continuing to wield unfettered power, the civilian government would be
hampered from taking independent policy initiatives in three major areas that
had been the bane of the country. These are people oriented development,
restoring integrity of institutions of governance, and ensuring equitable rights
to all citizens regardless of their ethnic origin.
Without Aung San
Suu Kyi's active participation in the run up to the elections, the NLD
leadership might find it difficult to repeat its successful electoral
performance of 1992. In any case, the army is likely to use strong arm tactics
to ensure the NLD is edged out in the election. Coalition politics was never the
strong point of Myanmar’s short lived democratic experiment from 1948 to 1962.
The opportunistic coalition governments were notorious for infighting, floor
crossings and corruption. Thus the chances of a coalition government
successfully functioning appear remote. So a period of political instability may
well be in the offing. This would only reinforce the army’s belief that it was
fundamental to ensure national stability.
Ethnic insurgency
Ethnic insurgency had been the
blight on Myanmar from 1948 onwards. The military regime had recently been
trying to disarm members of ethnic insurgent groups that had signed ceasefire
agreements (ceasefire groups) and enroll in border guards force. However, this
process is not complete. Three major ceasefire groups in the northeast bordering
China —the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the United Wa
State Army (UNSWA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)—all of have
reportedly rejected its request to disarm and The Kachin Independence
Organisation is still dragging its feet.
The MNDAA’s Kokang troops, who
are of Chinese ethnicity, had clashed with the troops last month and a few
thousand Kokang people had taken refuge in Chinese areas across the border. The
UNSWA, an ally of MNDAA, is one of the biggest insurgent groups bordering both
China and Thailand. Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) which refused to sign
the ceasefire agreement had been in conflict with the government troops along
Thai border. These ethnic insurgent groups have little incentive to lay down
arms and join the mainstream even when the civilian government is sworn in. As
long as the question of their autonomy is not resolved, they are likely to
continue to be active. Historically, the army had used the ethnic unrest as the
reason for legitimising its hold on power. With the army controlling the defence,
border affairs and home affairs ministries, the civilian government has little
chance of resolving the issue politically.
International
power play
The international
sanctions are likely to be lifted when a semblance of democracy is restored the
election as part of the new U.S. initiative on Myanmar. Once that happens there
is likely to be an international scramble to gain access to Myanmar’s abundant
natural resources including oil and natural gas. Inevitably, this could turn
Myanmar into a seat of global power play. Both India and China would be watching
these developments with caution.
China had used the
era of international sanctions to increase its strategic and economic influence
in Myanmar and helped the junta to weather international sanctions. As a
veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), China had
baled out the military regime from international collective action on more than
one occasion. This has enabled the Chinese to become well entrenched in the
country, building strong linkages with the army. Chinese also dominate the
nation’s economic development, trade and commerce. Their influence is likely to
be transferred to the political arena also.
In short, China has
created a client regime in the military junta. China is unlikely to loosen its
hold on Myanmar as it provides strategic land and sea access from Chinese
mainland to India and the Indian Ocean. Myanmar’s 1930 km long coastline
dominates the eastern arch of the Bay of Bengal, leaning on to the Malacca
Strait could help China's mavy to widen its reach. Despite building closer
economic links with the U.S. in recent times, China continues to be wary of the
U.S. extending its strategic reach in this region. Its suspicions have already
been kindled with the increasing Indo-US strategic convergence. So China is
going to loom large in front of all nations, including India, aspiring play a
bigger role in Myanmar on all fronts.
India’s security
compulsions
Geostrategy
dictates that India should keep Myanmar in its foreign policy horizon for
strategic, economic and developmental reasons. Myanmar’s geographic location
astride the India-ASEAN trade routes increases its value for India. It can also
open up external land and sea communication links to landlocked north-eastern
states. Myanmar’s ocean boundaries are barely 30 km from the Andaman Islands
increasing its maritime security potential. Unfortunately, Myanmar’s strategic
significance in India’s national security does not appear to have been given the
recognition it deserves.
North East is
connected to rest of India by “Siliguri Corridor” a tenuous 30-km wide link
flanked by Bangladesh and Nepal. Thus strategically, northeast is vulnerable to
the developments in its neighbourhood in both peace and war. Large scale illegal
migration of Bengalis from Bangladesh into the region has created demographic
imbalances resulting in social and economic unrest. The assertion of distinct
ethnic identities has resulted in the rise of separatist insurgencies in this
region. The assistance received from China and Pakistan at different times had
been important for their survival. They also have safe havens in Bangladesh and
Myanmar.
India had striven
to improve relations with the military junta Myanmar from 1992 onwards as a part
of its Look East Policy. This policy had limited success. Despite promises,
Myanmar regime had shown little inclination to evict Indian insurgent groups
from its soil. Its interest in joint operations against them had been equally
poor.
The development of
Northeast had been hobbled due to Bangladesh's reluctance to permit transit of
Indian goods through its territory. To overcome this problem India has been
implementing a multi-modal scheme to open up road and sea access from the
Northeast through Myanmar to other ASEAN countries as well as the Indian Ocean.
However, India’s two major infrastructure projects including the Sittwe multi
modal projects and the much heralded Myanmar – India pipeline have made only
slow progress.
During the last two
decades, trade and development links between the two countries have improved.
However, due to inertia on both sides, growth of trade between the two countries
had only been in fits and starts. There appear to be no vigour on either side's
attempts to improve mutual trade.
Keeping the hyper
sensitivity of the military to the issue of restoration of democracy and freeing
of Aung San Suu Kyi, India had soft pedalled them, broadly keeping a neutral
stance on these issues. India’s attitude of ignoring the struggle for democracy,
focusing only on building relations with the military regime has shocked civil
society the world over. In this process India had ignored the democratic forces
which would be coming to limelight in the coming years. Thus India will be
starting with the baggage of poor credibility while engaging with Myanmar
polity. Ushering in of democracy in Myanmar is likely to increase India
competitive role with China. And already China enjoys a head start in the
country with geo-political and economic advantages. Added to this is its
international clout as a permanent member of the UNSC. And China is unlikely to
make India’s task any easier. Thus India's best long term bet would be to
improve its relations with the political parties and the new government.
Other potential
triggers
There are other
potential triggers that could destabilise the entire region either directly or
indirectly. These issues are connected with the national security of India; and
the northeast could become their epicentre of action.
Tibetan issue:
As the Dalai Lama is aging and the Tibetan refugees, particularly the younger
generation, are getting restive over China’s intransigence on Tibet. If the
issue gets out of hand, it could impact followers of Tibetan Buddhism in
Arunachal Pradesh. This could activate not only India-Tibet border but also
India-Myanmar border. Of course there is the added possibility of a
confrontation with the Chinese over the Arunachal border claims of China.
China’s
subversive support: Although
China-India have been trying to build cordial relations with India, China’s
capability to support to insurgents from Manipur and Assam and use them as a
pressure point in any political or military confrontation with India should not
be ignored. Myanmar could play a vital role in denying sanctuaries and safe
passage to insurgents on its soil.
Maoists in Nepal:
The ascendancy of Maoists, who are pro-Chinese, to power in Nepal and the spread
of their influence provides China a potential opportunity to increase, if not
replace, Indian influence in Nepal. If China gains a strategic foothold in
Nepal, it would result in manifold increase of northeast's vulnerability. In
such a situation any military confrontation in the region is likely to isolate
northeast from the rest of India.
Myanmar’s nuclear ambition:
- The military
regime in Myanmar confirmed plans to build a nuclear research reactor for
“peaceful purposes” in early 2002 with the help of Russia. Selected students
and army officers have undergone nuclear orientation and training in Moscow.
Nuclear physics departments have been established in the universities of
Rangoon and Mandalay with their enrolment controlled by the military regime.
Uranium deposits have been found in several areas: Magwe, Taungdwingyi,
Kyaukphygon and Paongpyin in Mogok, and Kyauksin and in southern Tenasserim
Division and the Russians are said to be involved uranium mining.
- In this nuclear
backdrop, recent reports about a secret deal on developing nuclear
facilities between Myanmar and North Korea are significant. Both the U.S.
and Thailand have voiced their concerns on these reports. Australian
strategic studies analyst Desmond Ball and Thailand-based journalist Phil
Thornton in 2007 have claimed that Myanmar had secretly constructed a
nuclear reactor that would encompass reprocessing technology designed to
extract weapons-grade plutonium. These reports were based on information
given by defectors and need corroboration.
If true, it could introduce a
new strategic nuclear paradigm in the region. That might lead to a situation not
dissimilar to India’s western front where it is facing an unstable, nuclear
Pakistan. Though, it seems unlikely that Myanmar would invest on such “nuclear
game,” India will have to keep a careful watch for developments in this
respect.
Avenues for
action
The stability of
Myanmaris directly related to the creation of a stable democracy. It is in the
longterm interest of the region that Myanmar is turne into a stable democratic
country. Their international community could become complacent after a civilian
government comes to power after the 2010 elections. The experience of Myanmarese
people's struggle during the past four decades have shown that it would not be
possible for them to gain a reasonable response from a brutal regime unless
there is international support.
The two giant
neighbours India and China along with the US hold the key to ensure stability in
Myanmar. Only concerted action on their part could achieve any meaningful
results. At present the perspectives of the three nations are based only on
their national strategic interests in Myanmar. However, they need to join hands
to evolve a new paradigm for change in Myanmar. Such a coordinated strategy
could improve the chances of freeing democracy from the shackles of its military
rulers.
India should have
an action plan to help progressive democratisation of Myanmar. With its strong
democratic credentials, India should be able to revive its relationship with
political leaders and build a win-win relationship.
India should try
and separate trade and developmental relations with Myanmar and ASEAN from the
effects of regime change in Myanmar. It has to evolve strategies in
collaboration with Thailand and other interested nations of ASEAN to make this a
reality.
As there is a
friendly Awami League regime in Bangladesh, India should strive to open up
alternate land and sea routes through Bangladesh for widening the scope of trade
and industry in northeast.
(Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, is
associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis
Group. E-Mail:
colhari@yahoo.com
Blog:
www.colhariharan.org)