India, America, Musharraf, and War: An Analysis

South Asia Analysis Group

Paper no.479

19. 06. 2002

INDIA, AMERICA, MUSHARRAF, AND WAR: An Analysis

by Arvin Bahl

In response to the December 13^th attack on the Indian Parliament allegedly carried out by Pakistan supported terrorist groups Lakshar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed and masterminded by the top brass of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s intelligence agency, India initiated a massive military buildup along its border with Pakistan. The attack on an army camp by militants in Jammu on May 14^th, which killed 34, increased tensions in the region, and the war rhetoric from New Delhi.

The Vajpayee government has often been accused of “jingoism” for contemplating military action against Pakistan. India has been urged restraint by key world powers, especially the United States. The United States has sent key officials to both India and Pakistan in order to ease tensions and has called on Islamabad to end its support for terrorism against India.

Yet, the military option should not be ruled out. First, India cannot rely on the United States to force Pakistan to end its support for terrorism because the Bush administration views Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf as indispensable in its “war against terrorism.” It is not likely to apply coercive pressure to Pakistan to end its support for terrorism and has thus given Musharraf the impression he can act impunity. Also, while America can do a great deal to force Pakistan to end its support for terrorism against India and defuse tensions in South Asia if it desires to do so, it is likely that Musharraf may still be hesitant to end Pakistan’s support for terrorism in Kashmir in spite of such pressure. Given such a situation, military action can be a viable option in India’s battle against terrorism.

Pakistan’s Proxy War Continues

Despite Musharraf’s repeated promises to curb terrorism against India, terrorism against India continues unabated. According to the Institute of Conflict Management, 1,178 have been killed due to militancy in Jammu and Kashmir from January 1^st to May 15^th. Infiltration from the first three months of the year was 222 compared to 119 at the same point in time last year. The Institute of Conflict Management also notes that more than 200 have died due to militancy in Kashmir in the month of May.

It is often stated that Musharraf and his government do not have control over the Islamic fundamentalist militants operating in Kashmir and that the militants are simply acting on their own volition. Yet, this is not the case. Militants operating in Kashmir are trained, equipped, and their entry into Kashmir is facilitated by the Pakistan Army and the ISI. In a conversation between Musharraf and General Mohammed Aziz in May 1999 that was intercepted by Indian intelligence and confirmed by the CIA, Aziz told Musharraf, “We have them (militant Islamic groups) by the scruff of the neck and whenever desired, we can regulate the situation.”

Testimony from captured militants confirms this. In an article on Rediff, a well respected online Indian news outlet, Mohammed Ashraf, a captured militant in Kashmir is quoted as saying, "I sneaked into the valley from Kupwara sector along with three others in March this year with active support of the Pakistani Army deployed in the forward posts.” The article notes that Ashraf said he had “received arms training from a camp run by the Mujahideen with the help of Pakistani army in Muzaffarabad.” After training, “he along with five others were told to sneak into the valley to join the Mujahideen here. They were later taken to a Pakistani Army camp at Lipa, just across Kupwara in Kashmir.”

Even the United States, which has long attempted to ignore and focus attention away from Islamabad’s direct involvement in supporting terrorism in Kashmir, has rejected the notion that Pakistan cannot end incursions across the Line of Control. Ari Flescher, the Whitehouse spokesman asserted, "Pakistan has a robust military force, and the ability internally to take action to prevent terrorists from crossing through the Line of Control.” In The New Republic, a prominent American political journal, editor Lawrence Kaplan quotes a Bush administration official as stating, "Musharraf, could clamp down on infiltration in a minute if he wanted to. He's certainly done so before."

Washington and Islamabad: An Analysis

Given the way in which the Bush administration perceives its interests, the United States is unlikely to exert the extremely coercive pressure that is needed to curb Pakistan’s support for terrorism. Above all, the United States desires the preservation of Musharraf’s regime. From the view of the Bush administration, Musharraf is indispensable in the fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban both nurtured by the ISI in the past. Washington also views him as the only one who can keep Pakistan together, quash religious extremism, prevent anarchy, and safeguard the country’s nuclear arsenal. War between India and Pakistan could threaten to destabilize Musharraf’s regime and the American fight against Al-Qaeda in western Pakistan. America had also been very hesitant to put pressure on Pakistan to stop its support for terrorism even prior to September 11^th despite the fact that numerous reports authored by the State Department have pointed to the role of Pakistan in supporting terrorism. Not even Lakshar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed were banned before the attack on the Indian parliament despite extensive involvement in terrorist violence in India in the past. In the post Cold War era, Washington has for the most part has attempted to remain relatively neutral in South Asian affairs.

But more importantly, it is extremely unlikely that Musharraf would permanently end Pakistan’s support for terrorism, stop facilitating militants to cross the Line of Control, and dismantle the terrorist infrastructure simply because of American pressure. First, Musharraf does not have much incentive to comply with American requests because he understands that Washington views him as indispensable as noted above, which has given him the impression that he can act with impunity. In addition, Islamabad views support for militants in Kashmir as an effective way to cause tremendous losses to India in Kashmir with comparatively low losses for Pakistan and eventually force India out of Kashmir. Islamabad would view ending support for militants as giving up significant leverage over the Kashmir issue.

The leadership in Islamabad may not deem it sensible to permanently end its support for militants and dismantle its terrorist infrastructure simply because of a military buildup of Indian forces on its borders. This would allow India to achieve its goal of ending terrorism in Kashmir without any cost and without firing a shot. From the perspective of hardliners in Islamabad, this would also cause Pakistan to be perceived as a weak nation and encourage aggressive Indian action in the future. It is also likely that Musharraf does not India’s threats of military action seriously. Judging from India’s extremely restrained behavior in the past, one is inclined to think that the actions of the Vajpayee government are perhaps a bluff, simply an attempt of the Vajpayee government to shore up domestic support, or mere coercive diplomacy to get the America to force Pakistan to crack down on Islamic militants. An article in the June 10^th issue of Time demonstrates that Musharraf is thinking along such lines. The article notes, “Those who know him (Musharraf) insist that the aplomb is real and that his composure stems from his belief that India doesn't enjoy the sort of military superiority that experts assert and will shy away from war.”

Musharraf’s domestic support could be threatened by stopping infiltration across the Line of Control and dismantling Pakistan’s terrorist infrastructure. Jihadi groups determined to continue their holy war in Kashmir could turn on Musharraf and threaten his regime if he prevents their infiltration into Kashmir and cracks down on them.   Musharraf is also likely to draw opposition from vested interests in the ISI and the Army who would be resolutely opposed to any attempt to end the insurgency. But most importantly, support for the Kashmir cause extends to all sections of Pakistani society, as Pakistan’s struggle for Kashmir is a battle for the essence of its existence. Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir is based on the two nation theory, the same theory that justified Pakistan’s creation and the partition of the subcontinent: Muslims of the subcontinent cannot peacefully coexist in a secular democracy with people of other faiths and thus must have their own separate Islamic state. To Pakistan, India’s hold on the Muslim majority state of Kashmir is a denial of its rationale for existence. Jihadi groups operating in Kashmir are not seen as “terrorists,” but as “freedom fighters” to large sections of the Pakistani population. Such views even extend to the English educated middle class. In Dawn, Pakistan’s most widely circulated English language paper, Ayaz Amir often known as a “ liberal” columnist refers to the jihadi campaign in Kashmir as the “Kashmiri freedom struggle.”

Any attempt to halt infiltration across the Line of Control are likely to be cosmetic and temporary, intended merely to appease Washington and defuse tensions with India. Islamabad might halt infiltration also if it believes a temporary halt in infiltration across the Line of Control will bring India to the negotiating table to discuss Kashmir or that in exchange for ending support for militants the United States would pave the way for international mediation on Kashmir. It is extremely unlikely, however, given the situation outlined above that Islamabad will dismantle its terrorist infrastructure and permanently end support for anti-India terrorism as New Delhi demands.

Military Action: Justifications and Possible Consequences

The purpose of this paper is not to advocate military action, but to demonstrate that it is a viable option that deserves some consideration. The decision to go to undertake military action against Pakistan is one to be made based on strategic calculations and intelligence. But there are reasons to consider the military option.

* Military action across the Line of Control would have the potential of destroying terrorist training camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, eradicating Pakistan’s terrorist infrastructure, and severely diminishing its war-making capabilities and ability to wage a proxy war against India.
* Military strikes would also raise the cost of sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir to Pakistan by making it clear that attacks in India will be responded to with destruction in Pakistan, thus making Pakistan pay for its proxy war.
* Military action would have an important psychological dimension, as it will demonstrate that the restraint India has exercised is not a sign of weakness. Military action would make it clear that India will not be made to suffer endlessly at the hands of Pakistan backed terrorist groups. Between 20,000-60,000 have died as a result of Pakistan’s proxy war. According to the Patterns of Global Terrorism Report 2001 released by the United States State Department, India topped the world in “significant terrorist attacks” with 38, much higher than any other country. Very few nations would not take actions against such provocations. Strong military action would have the potential of deterring Pakistan from supporting anti-India terrorism in the future.

It is often stated that instead of military action India should respond to the “political grievances” of the Kashmiri people. The example of Israel, which despite frequent use of military force still continues to suffer from terrorist attacks, is often mentioned to indicate that military force against terrorism is ineffective. Yet as B. Raman notes in many of his earlier papers, the militancy India is facing since 1993 is not indigenous or due to grievances against Indian rule in the state as it was earlier, but rather is a result of Pakistan supported Islamic fundamentalist groups whose espouse a pernicious radical Islamist ideology. The overwhelming majority of the militants killed in Kashmir are Pakistanis. Pakistan has attempted to thwart attempts by the Indian government to respond to the grievances of the Kashmiri people, for example, by assassinating separatist leader Abdul Ghani Lone, who was strongly considering participating in elections in the state. A recent poll by the British based firm MORI International has shown that 61 % of Kashmiris believed they would be better off economically and politically as Indian citizens, while only 6% preferred Pakistan. Over two-thirds of the respondents believed that Pakistan’s involvement in Jammu and Kashmir has been harmful. Over 88% believed that ending the infiltration of militants across the Line of Control would help bring peace to the region. This data suggests that taking strong action against Pakistan can help India better respond to the grievances of the Kashmiri people.

The Nuclear Dimension

There has been much concern over the possibility of nuclear war in South Asia. But such fears are overblown. India has a no first strike policy and Pakistan’s official policy is that it will be willing to use nuclear weapons should the survival of its nation be threatened. The sort of action that India is contemplating would not in any way threaten the existence of the Pakistani nation and it would be absolutely irrational for Islamabad to even contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in this sort of limited conflict should it arise. Moreover, Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems notes that India has between two to three times as many warheads as Pakistan. Should a nuclear war erupt, Pakistan would face complete annihilation of its nation, but India probably would not.

Yet, Pakistan is not the first nation that comes to mind for most Indians when thinking of “rationality.” Rather when thinking of Pakistan one is inclined to think of a nation of jihadi warriors and suicide squads that is prone to self-destruction. Pakistan’s perceived irrationality in the eyes of the Indian public is an effective tool of Pakistani nuclear blackmail that encourages India to behave with restraint. Concerns over nuclear war had been greatly increased due to Pakistan’s nuclear tests carried out in late May,1998, of the Ghaznavi, Ghauri, and Abdali missiles and Islamabad’s frequent statements that it is not afraid to use nuclear weapons. These actions have seemed jingoistic to many observers, or even irrational or self-destructive. Rather they are quite rational. The purpose of testing nuclear missiles was to frighten India into not taking any military action against Pakistan and getting America and other nations to force India to behave with restraint and promote Indian de-escalation. By raising the specter of nuclear war, Islamabad hopes to internationalize the Kashmir issue and bring about third party mediation, something that India has always strongly opposed. When Pakistan drew sharp criticism from the West about its nuclear tests, even Musharraf admitted that nuclear war would be “insane.”

Conclusion

The purpose of this article is not to advocate military action. That decision is one to be taken by the military based on their knowledge of the strategic situation. Rather this author purports to demonstrate that considering the military option is not a sign of “jingoism,” but of vital importance. To demonstrate a knee-jerk reaction against war because one views war as inherently “destructive” is destructive in itself. This author also remains very skeptical about Musharraf fulfilling the promise he made in his January 12^th speech that “no organization will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir" and believes any stoppage in infiltration across the Line of Control is likely to be only temporary given the circumstances outlined above. It would be wishful thinking given the situation as outlined above to think that Pakistan will be dismantling its terrorist infrastructure, shutting down its camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, and permanently ending its support for terrorism against India.

This author also believes that there needs to be a rethinking of the Bush administration’s policy towards South Asia. In the few months prior to September 11^th Washington and New Delhi were rapidly improving ties as Washington. September 11^th helped reverse that trend as Washington saw the need to enlist Musharraf in its “war against terrorism”. Musharraf’s sincerity as a “frontline state” in the “war against terrorism,” however, remains to be doubted as he has released Islamic radicals after arresting them, and members of his security forces and the ISI have been reported to have been aiding the Taliban in the aftermath of September 11^th. By placing too much importance on Musharraf in the “war against terrorism”, he is being emboldened to take actions that threaten to bring South Asia to war. Despite the domestic situation in Pakistan outlined above, Washington can still do a tremendous amount to force Pakistan to permanently end its support for jihadi terrorism. After all, it was pressure from Washington that forced Pakistan to help America destroy its creation, the Taliban, as the United States made it clear to Musharraf that Pakistan would be faced with international isolation and reapproachment between Washington and New Delhi if it didn’t help America. More importantly, noted Pakistani nuclear expert Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy of Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad revealed in a speech at Princeton University that Pakistan risked losing its nuclear arsenal had it not cooperated with Washington. The United States must do all it can to force Pakistan to end its support for terrorism because Pakistan supported terrorism does not threaten only India, but the entire free world, as we saw on September 11, when terrorists aligned with the Pakistan backed Taliban struck American soil. Many Pakistan supported groups operating in Kashmir against India have close ties to bin Laden. India is an emerging world power and the predominant state in South Asia. Both India and America have a lot to gain from a strong relationship with one another. Moreover, the shared norms of liberalism, democracy, and secularism make “natural allies” of the world’s oldest democracy and the world’s largest.

If the United States desires a stable Pakistan, the solution does not lie in one man, but rather in forcing Pakistan to end its support for terrorism against India. Pakistan cannot support a proxy war against India without seeing the strengthening of fundamentalist forces in Pakistan. In Foreign Affairs, a reputed journal on international relations, Sartaj Aziz a former finance minister and foreign minister of Pakistan is quoted as saying, “ For every ten [militants] who are trained here to fight in Kashmir, one goes and the rest stay in Pakistan and cause trouble.”

A great error in Washington’s perception is reflected in that it is applying pressure to Musharraf to stop infiltration across the Line of Control and crack down on Islamic fundamentalist terrorists operating against India merely because it is very afraid of a war between India and Pakistan, which would threaten its fight against Al-Qaeda and risk the downfall of Musharraf’s regime, not because it sees that an end to Pakistan’s proxy war is of fundamental interest to its own security. Washington and the rest of the world must recognize that Musharraf, the architect of Kargil, and the Pakistani government are not the cure to the virus of jihadi terrorism that has caused so much horror and destruction to the world, but are amongst its creators.

(The writer is an undergraduate from Princeton University and can be contacted at e-mail: abahl@princeton.edu)

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