 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
Paper no. 864
18.12. 2003
ATTEMPT ON MUSHARRAF'S LIFE
by B. Raman
On December 14, 2003, a powerful explosion involving, according to a Pakistani estimate, about 250 kilos of explosives, partly damaged a bridge in a densely populated locality of the Rawalpindi Cantonment hardly a minute after a car carrying President Pervez Musharraf from the Chaklala airport to his residence (the Army House) and the other vehicles in his convoy had passed over it. He had returned from a visit to Karachi. There were no human casualties.
2. The explosion has been interpreted by Pakistani security officials as having been aimed at his life. If so, this is the third unsuccessful conspiracy to kill him since he came out in support of the USA's military action against Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda and the Taliban after the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the USA. The other two conspiracies reported last year did not reach the stage of execution as closely as the December 14 one. The Pakistani investigating authorities came to know of the earlier conspiracies, which failed to materialise, during their investigation into the car bomb explosion outside the US Consulate in Karachi last year.
3. It would not, therefore, be wrong to describe the latest incident as the first attempt actually carried out, but which failed to achieve its objective of killing him. The fact that the Pakistani security agencies responsible for his protection were oblivious of the planning of the conspiracy and of the identities of those conspiring indicates serious gaps in intelligence coverage.
4. Due to the enhanced perceptions of the threat to his life since the US military action under Operation Enduring Freedom started on October 7,2001, his physical security set-up has been considerably strengthened, with the US physical security agencies training and advising the officials responsible for his protection and providing them with modern gadgetry required for it.
5. Whereas the US security agencies have been playing an active role in the protection of interim President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, including the provision of the close-proximity ring personnel (bodyguards), in the case of Musharraf, the US role has been advisory, indirect and invisible.
6. According to the version of the incident as emanating from the Pakistani security agencies, the improvised explosive device (IED) planted under the bridge had attached to it a remote-control device as well as a timing device. The idea being that if the remote control device was neutralised by the jammer attached to the pilot vehicle going in front of Musharraf's car, the timer would still work killing him.
7. The remote control mechanism was reportedly neutralised by the jammer, stated to have been supplied by the USA. The timer did work, but about one minute after the convoy had crossed the bridge.
8. Normally, terrorists use timers to attack fixed targets and remote control devices to attack moving targets so that the IED could be detonated just as the target is within killing range. The use of a remote-control and a timer mechanism in tandem, if true, speaks of some sophistication in the skills of the conspirators.
9. The timing of the device almost to a minute to the expected crossing of the bridge by Musharraf's car indicates that the conspirators knew of the exact time of arrival of his aircraft from Karachi and the route his convoy would be taking and were able to estimate with disturbing near-accuracy when the convoy would cross the bridge. This would not have been possible without a mole in the set-up responsible for the travel and protection of Musharraf.
10. Since the time of landing of the plane and of his movement by car from the airport to his residence would have been worked out closer to his departure from Karachi in view of the need for security, the tip-off would appear to have come from someone who was very closely involved with the planning of the security for his movement.
11. The IED could not have been planted much ahead of his arrival. It must have been done closer to his arrival. It is remarkable that those responsible for his route security failed to detect the planting of the IED, which speaks of a serious act of negligence.
12. Thus, complicity as well as negligence would seem to have facilitated the task of the conspirators, whose failure to finally carry out the mission should not mask the seriousness of the lapses in the physical security set-up of Musharraf.
13. The Pakistani authorities have rounded up about 40 suspects and also suspended some police personnel responsible for security over the bridge. They do not seem to have any idea of the identities of the conspirators. The needle of suspicion presently points to Al Qaeda, the Pakistani components of bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF) and the Pakistani sectarian organisations. The death of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in a plane crash in August,1988, and the assassination of Lt.Gen. (retd). Fazle Haq at Peshawar in October,1991, were attributed to Shia sectarian terrorists angered over the massacre of Shias in Gilgit in August,1988.
14. The two previous conspiracies directed against Musharraf were attributed by the Pakistani authorities to the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen Al-Alami (meaning HUM-International), a wing of the HUM, which is a founding member of the IIF since February,1998. Since the beginning of this year, there have been one anti-Pakistan message attributed to bin Laden and two anti-Musharraf messages attributed to Ayman al-Zawahiri, his No.2.
15. The attempt on the life of Musharraf coincided with the visit of the Indian Advance Security Liaison Team to Islamabad to discuss with the Pakistani authorities the arrangements for the security of the Indian Prime Minister during his forthcoming visit to Islamabad next month for the SAARC summit. There is till now no reason to believe that the explosion had anything to do with the visit of the team or with the SAARC summit of next month.
16. However, the indicators of inside complicity and external negligence should be a matter of some concern to those responsible for the security of our Prime Minister. We should not fight shy of seeking the co-operation of the intelligence and security agencies of the US, the UK, and Canada for making effective security for our Prime Minister. Such co-operation could be in the form of intelligence collection and sharing, advice on the effectiveness of the physical security arrangements being made by the Pakistani authorities and monitoring of the security arrangements in order to detect and remove in time any deficiencies.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat,Govt. of India, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow, and Convenor, Advisory Committee, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter . E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com )
Home | Papers | Notes | Forum | Search | Feedback | Links
Copyright © South Asia Analysis Group
All rights reserved. Permission is given to refer this on-line document for use in research papers and articles, provided the source and the author's name are acknowledged. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes.