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Note no. 436
07-Apr.-2008
Sri Lanka: Two Unhealthy Political Developments - Part I- Legitimising the TMVP – Update No. 135
Col R Hariharan (retd.)
Political developments in Sri Lanka have been as rapid as the abnormal deluge that has bogged down the troops in the forward lines of north. There had been some realignment of political fronts as the country approached the May 10 deadline for the first ever provincial council elections in the east since the de-merger of the north-eastern province. Ideally this should be a healthy development. But Sri Lanka, like many other democracies in the neighbourhood, is caught in the vortex of populist politics, and disregard for scruples in the quest for power among political parties. The battle array of the two fronts reflects s this politics sans principles with focus on issues of power rather than commitment to ideals.
Specifically, two unhealthy but interconnected political developments that could become hazardous for national security are evident in this political exercise. The first and more insidious development is legitimisation of the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Padaigal (TMVP) as a political party without disarming it and anointing it as a partner of the ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA). The second is the potential powder keg of growing feeling of alienation among Muslims in the east in the emerging provincial political dispensation.
Legitimising the TMVP
TMVP has a murky history that is almost wholly militant and non-political. It is a product of miscegenation of soured militancy and failed quest for power through the use of arms. It owes its origins to Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Karuna (to be factually correct a.k.a Kokila Dushmantha Gunawardena), the Batticaloa leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who broke up with Prabhakaran in March 2004. The LTTE's major preoccupation in the early years of Karuna's exit was typical – to gun him and his followers down. Karuna made a half hearted attempt at politics. This was apparently beyond his ken as surviving LTTE pistol group assassins became the top priority. Ultimately this preoccupation became a zero sum game that ended any political role for him. But it provided Karuna and the TMVP a legitimate (at least from their point of view) reason to retain the arms they had brought along when they quit the LTTE fold. In any case, the state had neither the inclination nor the determination to disarm yet another Tamil militant group in its own back yard, particularly when it was fighting the LTTE with the TMVP assisting it to effectively curb the LTTE activity.
Karuna became a war lord of sorts ruling the Tamil areas. The cadres helped the Sri Lankan military operations that intensified from 2005 onwards. Initially they operated collectively in groups and later individually. They occupied the power vacuum created amidst the Tamil population as the territory was cleared of LTTE control. Karuna had problems in visibly exercising his command mainly due to absentee landlordism and continued LTTE threat to his life. The effective leadership power was wielded by Pillayan, his second in command. The security forces appear to have preferred him as he was eager, willing and available to go along with the security forces operations. Pillayan climbed up to the top of the leadership ladder after the TMVP eased out Karuna from the leadership making some accusations of financial misappropriation of party funds against him.
The TMVP activities were not endearing them to others. Their actions related more to a vigilante militia than a political party. There were innumerable complaints against the behaviour of armed TMVP cadres roaming around the Tamil and at times Muslim areas from many quarters. They included Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, the four co-chairs of the Tokyo Donors Conference, political parties of all hues, community leaders, civil society organisations, highly reputed international and local not for profit organisations, and human rights and humanitarian organs of the United Nations.
The list of TMVP misconduct included the whole range of offences in the penal code - extortion, child recruitment, 'tax collection,' kidnapping, intimidation, muzzling the media, and even killings. There were accusations of army colluding with TMVP in some of these actions either by ignoring or participating in the misdeeds. Demands for disarming the TMVP were as loud as the deadly silence of the government response to the demands. The Sri Lanka government had to take some action to satisfy the mounting international criticism against the TMVP and probably Karuna, now without power and following, became probably a willing fall guy.
The TMVP without Karuna but under Pillayan became an important partner of the UPFA alliance when it contested the local body polls in Batticaloa district a month ago. Of course, the elections were by and large peaceful and polling was heavy. The TMVP cadres did not display their hardware during the elections according to the government. This point has been disputed by some of the political parties and civil society bodies. That is immaterial because the TMVP still retains the weapons. TMVP won eight of the nine local bodies. The UPFA alliance won the ninth - the Batticaloa council. The government show-cased the local body elections to the international audience as the coming of age of democracy in the east. In a way it was a coming of age, but of politicisation of extremism. This is where the genuineness and credibility of the forthcoming PC polls hang now.
The issue is not simply one of legitimising TMVP; but legitimising extrajudicial role of armed groups to operate politically in areas of their choosing, while the rule of law is consigned to the books. Though the TMVP might be more inclined to assume a political role, it has to disarm itself to become a legitimate political party as other Tamil militant groups had done in the past. Only that would be an affirmation of its faith in the power of the ballot rather than the bullet. Even in Nepal, the Maoist arms were mothballed before they participated in the elections.
The memories of letting loose armed gangs in the east after the Indian peace Keeping Force (IPKF) left the island in 1990 provide a gruesome lesson for the state in handling the issue casually. The east was handed over to the LTTE control by a clever President Premadasa to lay the rule of law on the then Chief Minister Varadaraja Perumal who had made a misguided unilateral declaration of independence for the northeast in his last hurrah. The LTTE went on a rampage and in the blood bath that followed it killed at least a thousand Tamil youth who had put their faith in the government.
The bottom line is security of ordinary people is the responsibility of the state. It cannot deputise it to warlords or irregular militias. If the state cannot ensure personal security, how can it conduct free and fair elections in the true democratic spirit? History is replete with examples of how politics and guns in a democracy cannot coexist.. Pakistan in our own neighbourhood has been sapped of its strength due to not adhering to this simple truth. It is still reaping the bitter fruits of ignoring a simple basic dictum - only politics and not guns can have a place in democracy.
A second aspect is such moves set a bad precedence in future negotiations for peace with the LTTE. Ultimately the future of the armed LTTE cadres has to be decided. Even during the IPKF's early palaver with the LTTE, the cadres' future was discussed. If they are to retain their arms, they have to be part of a legitimate force of the state accountable to the organs of the constitution. From this count, this political move to take TMVP within the UPFA fold without disarming it could weaken state's case in future negotiations as and when they take place with LTTE (no harm in hoping I suppose). It also sends the message that as long as such extremist groups maintain their identity and remain politically useful they can get away with anything and exist outside the pale of law.
The only regime that had been practising such black tactics is Burma where the military junta has signed ceasefire agreements with a large number of ethnic insurgent groups. They have been allowed to retain their structure, put on a state retainer, and act as government proxies in their regions with detrimental results. A few powerful groups have been allowed to retain their arms and they are virtually ruling the roost. A few other groups are into profitable poppy cultivation and have become bastions of drug traffic causing concern to both China and the rest of the world. These groups have encouraged illegal arms traffic to feed insurgencies in India's northeast and Bangladesh.
Sri Lanka is politically far more advanced than Burma to fall into such easy but risky subterfuge in handling the TMVP. A suspicion that the removal of Special Task Force (STF) personnel from 10 posts before the election was carried out at the behest of the TMVP persists in the minds of many commentators. If this is true it is an unhealthy beginning for the new "political role" of the TMVP. With Pillayan already speaking of his aspirations to be chief minister of the eastern provincial council (and why not if he wins majority seats!) the credibility of the government exercise in "liberating the people of the east from LTTE control" and ushering in democracy would be low. One can only hope at least after the elections are over, the disarming of TMVP would follow. It is never too late to start what is good for the people.
Lastly, there is the global threat of small arms proliferation in which insurgent and militant groups' contribution is at least a million weapons. In South Asia alone at least 100,000 to 200,000 are in the hands of insurgent groups, past and present. This figure does not include weapons in the hands of criminal gangs. Sri Lanka has a sizeable contribution to the stockpile of such unaccounted arms that are floating in the sub continent. This encourages a host of crimes – smuggling, corruption of government officials, human traffic, and illicit arms and drug traffic. The pilot survey of the Hambantota district by the National Commission Against Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms Sri Lanka has clearly shown how the illicit weapons from north and east are contributing to crime even in a Sinhala majority district. So how can there be normal political life in the east, with illicit arms in the hands of legitimately elected representatives? Only the people of Sri Lanka can answer this question.
(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)
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