Pakistan in the Global Strategic Calculus

PAKISTAN IN THE GLOBAL STRATEGIC CALCULUS

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

Pakistan’s importance in the global strategic calculus emerges not from the virtues of its national strengths, national power attributes or its power potential. Its strategic importance arose from negativity in the role of a “regional spoiler state”, firstly in United States calculations and thereafter in a more sinister manner in China’s strategic formulations against India and the United States.

In the global strategic calculus, Pakistan does not enjoy any salience except in the strategic formulations of the United States and China. The United States and China have endowed on Pakistan a “strategic halo” exaggerated far beyond its strengths and potential to attain their respective strategic ends.

The United States strategic engagements with Pakistan have been spasmodic and seemingly more linked to specific time frames coincident with American larger strategic interests whether it was during a specific stage of the Cold War or in Afghanistan at different times. To that extent it can be said that Pakistan’s worth in the United States strategic calculus is not intrinsic or guided by long term strategic interests.

China’s strategic investments in Pakistan have been strategically sinister and with long term strategic goals as the end view. The “Pakistan-China” strategic alliance in China’s strategic calculus caters both for impeding India’s rise as a global power and as a Chinese pawn to be used as a “strategic counter-pressure point” against the United States in the evolving global power play.

China’s moves to build Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and long range nuclear ballistic missiles arsenal was not a tactical move but a long range strategic investment. By these two flagrant strategic violations of international commitments China has ensured that Pakistan as a nation would “eternally” be indebted to China.

Pakistan however continues to be an insecure nation state despite these strategic trappings which it perceives qualify her to be a global player and a strong factor in the global strategic calculus. The strategic reality however is that more lately Pakistan is being perceived in the global strategic calculus as a “global strategic liability” arising from its reputation of being the epicenter of international terrorism and an irresponsible nuclear weapons state which has conclusively engaged in WMD proliferation to rogue states.

Pakistan therefore figures “negatively” in the global strategic calculus as a “global strategic liability” because the megalomaniac delusions of Pakistan Army military rulers coupled with their scant regard for effecting the economic development and social betterment of the Pakistani masses have produced their own set of insecurities.

The Yale Global Journal in a foreword on an article on Pakistan recently, not surprisingly observed: “The relentless pursuit of military domination – relying on nuclear weapons and superpower alliances, combined with inadequate measures to ensure succession or control – has left Pakistan on the edge of insecurity, the effect of which could be felt by the rest of the world.”

Against this background, it becomes necessary to examine Pakistan’s figuring in the strategic calculus of the United States and China and how valid have been their strategic investments on Pakistan. This Paper intends to proceed to examine the following factors:

United States Strategic Calculus: The Role of Pakistan
China’s Strategic Calculus: Pakistan’s Over-riding Salience in China’s Grand Strategy
Pakistan’s Strategic Negativities Affecting its Strategic Potential

United States Strategic Calculus: The Role of Pakistan

The role of Pakistan in United States strategic calculus needs to be examined at two levels to arrive at substantive conclusions on whether Pakistan would figure as an “indispensable strategic asset”: (1) United States perceived strategic utility of Pakistan to serve American global strategic interests and (2) Pakistan’s perceptions of United States strategic utility to serve Pakistan’s strategic aspirations.

The historical pattern of United States strategic engagement with Pakistan does not present a continuous time line in the last 60 years. United States strategic engagements with Pakistan fall into three separated time spans: (1) The first engagement was in the 1970s when Pakistan offered itself to be a part of US military architecture in the Middle East and containment of the Soviet Union. Pakistan hosted American U-2 strategic surveillance flights at Peshawar but caved in to Soviet threats after the U-2 downing incident (2) Pakistan’s role as US proxy to launch Islamic Jihad against the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in the 1950s (3) Pakistan’s grudging participation in the US global war of terrorism in displacing the Pakistani Taliban protégé regime in Afghanistan following 9/11 and commitment to ensure Taliban/ Al Qaeda do not de-stabilize the Karzai region in Afghanistan put in place under US/UN auspices.

A strategic reality check of Pakistani contributions during these three separated strategic engagements of Pakistan by the United States would reveal the following: (1) Pakistan unlike other US allies did not contribute militarily to US war effort in Cold War conflicts in Korea, in Vietnam and the Middle East despite being member of CENTO and SEATO (2) In the conflict against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Pakistan Army was not used to further US strategic interests. The main Islamic Jehad fighting was done by Afghan militia groups. The Pakistan Army siphoned away large quantities of cash and weapons and equipment for its own use against India (3) In the post 9/11 US military intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan Army’s record has been perfidious and negated US strategic interests. Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar continue in safe havens in Pakistan. Pakistan Army continues to assist and facilitate Taliban attacks in Afghanistan on US/NATO Forces.

The nett assessment that emerges is that (1) United States strategic engagements with Pakistan were separated by time-spans and could be termed as spasmodic (2) United States perceptions of Pakistan’s strategic utility were time-specific and not arising from long term strategic perspectives (3) When so strategically engaged by the United States, the Pakistan Army did not loyally pursue US strategic objectives. On the contrary the Pakistan Army and its Generals double-timed the United States for their own narrow strategic ends.

Moving to the question of Pakistan’s perceptions of United States strategic utility to serve Pakistan’s strategic aspirations, the Pakistan Army has consistently bemoaned that the United States has constantly let them down in relation to Pakistan’s confrontation with India.

Overall, it can be summed up that the role of Pakistan in United States strategic calculus has been unsatisfactory and unsavory.

Political and strategic expediencies brought about United States spasmodic strategic engagements with Pakistan and vice versa. Such considerations hardly form the foundation or provide viability to Pakistan’s figuring as an enduring strategic asset in the United States strategic calculus as it faces complex strategic challenges in the evolving global power play.

China’s Strategic Calculus: Pakistan’s Over-riding Salience in China’s Grand Strategy

China’s ‘Grand Strategy’ is premised on a single strategic fixation that the United States as the status-quo superpower would impede the rise of China to super-stardom in the global power-play. To offset this strategic disability, China is conscious that it cannot prevail over the United States in any direct armed conflict. China’s Grand Strategy” is therefore focused on creating “counter-strategic pressure points” against the United States in critical strategic regions of the world.

China’s strategic engagements with Soviet Union/Russia have been spasmodic dependant on the temperature of US-Russia relations at a given time. China therefore has no enduring and viable strategic allies across the globe with the exception of Pakistan and North Korea.

Pakistan’s over-riding salience in China’s ‘Grand Strategy” arises from the following factors (1) Pakistan’s geographical contiguity with Pakistan courtesy the territory of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (2) Pakistan’s propensity to be a strategic ‘rental state’ ready to be made use off by any power willing to pay Pakistan’s price (3) Pakistan’s territory as land routes for China’s access to the Gulf Region (4) Pakistan’s location in close proximity to the Hormiz Straits, critically vital for US strategic interests and valuable as a Chinese counter-pressure point against the United States (5) Convergence of Chinese and Pakistani strategic interests in Afghanistan and so also against India (6) Use of Pakistan as leverage against Islamic fundamentalism insurgency in China Xinjiang (7) Pakistan’s pronounced hostility and armed confrontation with India which China considered as arch-foe especially after 1962 (8) Pakistan’s pronounced national sentiment of anti-Americanism.

Pakistan and especially the Pakistan Army Generals of successive generations were ready to rent out Pakistan strategically to any power willing to pay the strategic price.

Post - 1974 especially the price Pakistani Army Generals demanded was that Pakistan was strategically available in case China was ready to equip Pakistan with nuclear weapons and strategic missiles arsenal. China was ready to do so assured by the belief that by doing so, Pakistan's strategic bondage could be ensured.

Pakistan’s quid-pro-quo was letting China build the Karakoram Highway linking Xinjiang to the Arabian Sea and the building of Gwadur as a Chinese naval base on the eastern flank of Hormiz Straits. China was thus facilitated a strategic presence in the North Arabian Sea and so also in the Gulf Region.

While China may not have measured upto Pakistan’s aspirations for military intervention against India in the 1965 and 1971 Wars, the bulk of Pakistanis perceive China as an enduring strategic ally which in defiance of global pressures built up Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal and strategic missiles arsenal.

In Pakistani perceptions, China in this process has endowed Pakistan with a status of joining the select group of global nuclear weapons powers and the strategic salience that goes with it.

The emerging global power play suggests that China would sorely need to build some sort of strategic coalition to confront the United States. In that context, Pakistan emerges as a valuable strategic asset in China’s ‘Grand Strategy’

In fact one US commentator and policy analyst has predicted that if ever an armed conflict breaks out between China and the United States it will be not over Taiwan but over Pakistan. This Author is inclined to agree with this summation.

Pakistan’s Strategic Negativities Affecting its Strategic Potential

Pakistan’s ability to acquire a forceful strategic salience in the global strategic calculus is relative to the following factors (1) The global and regional power play and security environment (2) Pakistan’s domestic negativities.

In terms of the global and regional power play and security environment relative to Pakistan the following factors tend to negate Pakistan’s strategic salience (1) The United States and the West will continue to strategically dominate global power play (2) Regionally, India in a rising trajectory of strategic and economic power will outstrip Pakistan strategically by wide differentials (3) China seems to be headed for a confrontation with the United States (4) In a US-China confrontation Russia is unlikely to be an active participant on China’s side.

Pakistan’s domestic negativities which would likely devalue Pakistan’s strategic salience and strategic utility to any strategic patron including China can be enumerated as under: (1) Political instability (2) Confrontation between civil society and Pakistan Army (3) Confrontation between civil society and Islamic fundamentalists (4) Talibanisation of Pakistan being attempted by Islamist fundamentalists (5) Sunni-Shia sectarian divide and conflict (6) Economic backwardness and poor social indicators.

Adding the above two sets of factors, the picture that is likely to unfold for Pakistan is: (1) United States growingly gets disillusioned with Pakistan’s strategic utility as an asset to serve American national security interests (2) China is likely to exploit Pakistan’s growing insecurities arising from the foregoing and draw Pakistan more firmly in Chinese strategic embrace, despite its domestic negativities (3) Pakistan continues as an authoritarian state on the Chinese model, though not ideologically.

China as an authoritarian state can afford to strategically co-exist with Pakistan’s negativities but the United States as a nation with democratic credentials to defend cannot overlook Pakistan’s negativities for long. China therefore enjoys both strategic and political advantages in Pakistan relative to the United States.

Concluding Observations

Pakistan has never figured in the global strategic calculus as a potential power on the rise or as a potential global player. If and wherever Pakistan has been brought into global strategic consciousness it has been by default on the part of the United States and China. Then too it was highlighted in the global consciousness on the strength of Pakistan’s negativities as a wayward unstable nation made more dangerous by a nuclear weapons arsenal and as the epicenter of global Islamic Jihadi terrorism.

China’s gifting of a nuclear weapons arsenal and strategic ballistic missiles to a politically unstable nation was not a benign strategic act to strengthen Pakistan’s security. China had a sinister strategic design to use Pakistan as its cats-paw against the United States and India in a long term perspective.

Whereas in the United States and India, strategic formulations tend to be short sighted, the same is not true of China. Accordingly, both the United States and India need to review their strategic assessments on Pakistan.

Pakistan’s strategic preferences vis-a-vis the United States and China should have been evident to strategic policy planners when it turned to China for its nuclear weapons and missiles arsenal and in the process it became a “strategic bonded slave” of China.

In the evolving global power-play between China and the United States, the latter may be well-advised to discount Pakistan as an American strategic asset in its long-range policy formulations.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila@yahoo.com)