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13-July-2008
Nuclear Deal & Safeguards Agreement: Some Observations
By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan.
The way the Government dealt with the nuclear deal and the safeguards agreements should be a good case study for management institutions in the country as to how a good product can be ruined by poor management, unwarranted secrecy and in the final stage unnecessary subterfuge!
Too late in the day, the government woke up to the necessity to connect with the people on the deal but the press conference held on the 13th at New Delhi, the government representatives who should have been very confident and assertive were found to be defensive and tentative.
It was apparent, that the nuclear deal had an implied strategic dimension with the leftists not agreeing to the deal whatever be the merits when USA is involved. Instead of hoping against hope of winning them over, no effort was made to take the opposition into confidence from the beginning. No effort was made either to continue discussions in all seriousness with senior retired scientists who held high positions in the Indian nuclear establishments as well as the bureaucrats.
It was known that besides Russia and France, even the IAEA suggested that India will first have to make a deal and persuade the USA to help her tide over its fuel problems relating to nuclear power, much before the Russians could go forward with Koodamkulam 3 to 6 and the French could help us with their highly advanced light water reactors!
The Government has only in the last year or two admitted in its website and in statements of some ministers that India’s nuclear power programme is greatly hampered for want of raw uranium needed not only for our breeder experimental reactors but for our own indigenously built civil PWHRs. What is unsaid is that we are unable to exploit the available uranium resources fully because of local/regional objections and that the cost of mining is many times more than what we can get from abroad.
The result was that scientists were talking politics and politicians among whom many may not know the difference between fission and fusion were expansive on technical issues!
Briefly, the nuclear deal gives
• To get out of isolation we had brought ourselves in with the 1974 “peaceful test” . We now have an opportunity to rejoin the international non proliferation architecture. If we miss the boat now, as Dr. Kakodkar said “history will not forgive us”.• To keep our economy with a growth curve of 8 percent, we desperately need to improve our energy position where every megawatt from whatever source we get is necessary. It is being said that at the most with all the nuclear deals entered into, the percentage of nuclear power may not go beyond 8 percent. Imagine substituting this 8 percent with coal which we are supposed to have in “enormous quantities”. The coal we have is not of good quality. To burn this quantity of poor coal for increase in power production, will result in unacceptable carbon emission levels. Further, coal is found only in one region of India and surface transportation is difficult. The transport costs will also be high.
• In the short term, we need uranium from all available sources. Later, with the fast breeder reactors in position in the next two decades or more we may not need uranium from outside. Further on, with the third thorium stage, all these deals in one sense will become irrelevant!
• This deal does not interfere with India’s weaponisation programme. Nor does it interfere with its research programme including the breeder reactors and other research reactors. India has the option of retaining as many civilian reactors as it wants and place the rest voluntarily under international safeguards. Thus the safeguards agreement comes into the picture whenever an externality is introduced
• The question arises whether India needs so many civilian reactors outside the safeguards agreement? There is no need but this is one privilege the recognised weapon states have and India has been given this privilege. But this does not mean that India is recognised as a weapon power statutorily, but for all purposes with the deal and the safeguards agreements, India stands in between, which by itself is an achievement. The caveat is that India like a weapon power cannot withdraw all those coming under clause 11 of the agreement once an externality is introduced!
• This means that India could retain its plutonium for its weapons programme as much as it needs. It is my assessment that with the two research reactors and the fast breeders including the experimental one, there is no need to retain other civilian reactors outside the safeguards if we are genuinely interested in joining the international non proliferation architecture. We are allowed to keep what we need and place the rest with the IAEA. What more do we want?
• This would in effect mean an entry into NPT by other means. This will be further confirmed when we sign the FMCT as we have promised for that will allow us to retain the weapon grade plutonium we already have and place future stocks with the international agency.
• Much is being made of the deal and the agreements restricting the supposed “strategic space” created by the Pokharan II tests. There has been a demand that in the nuclear deal a provision should be made that will give India the “right to test”. It is beyond comprehension how a responsible party could make such a demand? It is like asking for a “right to murder”. Well, you murder and face the consequences! With India getting more and more enmeshed with globalisation and reaping the consequences of an economic boom, testing another device is unthinkable. It is still more unthinkable of any state using a nuclear device now. It does not mean that we should not have any deterrence. At some point we will have to decide that we have enough.
• The second issue is whether we need to test at all now. We have a robust device first tested in Pokharan I and a vastly improved one in the second device tested in Pokharan II. Do we need more? We do not need a fresh test of a fusion bomb as the one tested in Pokharan was not a failure though not a complete success
• Again much is made of the “Hyde Act” and there is a suggestion that the US should be approached to amend the deal to say that the Hyde Act will not apply. How awkward it would be for us to demand another government to amend its own laws in our favour! The Hyde Act is mostly a wish list and as we move along in nuclear trade, US commercial interests and their pressure would bring their legislators round to engage in nuclear trade with India- Hyde Act or no Hyde Act. Secondly, Hyde Act does not come in the way of nuclear trade with Russia or France though others particularly the Scandinavian countries and perhaps Australia in the Nuclear Supply Group may place similar conditions on their supply of nuclear material.
• The nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA is a document that is unprecedented both in its scope and content. The preamble that recognises India’s position is not a wish list but one that takes into account India’s unique position of being a weapon power and yet not a weapon power! It is the first of it kind between the IAEA and a State outside the NPT. There is an organic link between the preamble and subsequent clauses.
• The Preamble recognises India’s three stage nuclear programme. It recognises further India’s sovereign and inalienable right to carry out nuclear research.
• It takes note of the relevance of India separating its civilian and military nuclear facilities and India’s wish to place voluntarily its nuclear facilities under the agency’s safeguards
* Not being a supplier agency it takes note of India’s need for access to reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies as well as the Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over its lifetime of India’s reactors. ( Those placed under the IAEA safeguards). At least the IAEA is not opposed to it.
• Further more, it takes note of India taking “corrective measures” to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.
• Criticism of the safeguards agreement is mainly based on the last two issues of continuous fuel supplies and corrective measures. In the press conference on the agreement held on 13th, the representatives were also not forthright in explaining the provisions that are unprecedented and favourable to India thus giving an impression that there is some thing wrong with the formulations.
• It is better that the formulations are not that precise as that would give India enough space to manoeuver and make its own decision in keeping with international laws. Firstly, India should build a strategic reserve. The amount needed could be decided later. Once the strategic reserve is in position then we have one layer to be used if there is disruption. After that we can go to the IAEA with a special report and if no remedial action is taken, we can do as we think best. However such a situation is not going arise in the near future. It will take many years for another transfer of fuel supply even if we start importing from today!
• There is an undertaking by India that the safe guarded material will not be used in anyway for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or to further any other military purpose. This will never arise. Similarly there is a provision that safe guarded materials can be used for non nuclear purposes.
• There is also a provision for special arrangements where safeguarded and unsafeguarded materials are kept together along with the procedures involved for separating them.
• The important thing to note is that internationally India is allowed to keep unsafeguarded nuclear installations and material for its military and research programmes which by itself is unique.
The nuclear deal and the safeguards agreements are something we grab and move forward. It is not too late even now. There will always be a push and pull effect with India trying at every stage to be wanted to be treated as a nuclear weapon state while the nuclear weapon powers and the international agencies would at every step and every turn try to remind India that she is not a nuclear weapon power. This will go on. It is for the Indian planners to ensure that India’s strategic interests are kept intact, whether or not there is international recognition of its nuclear weapon power status.
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