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Note no. 548
22-Oct-2009
SRI LANKA: Importance of being Fonseka – Update No. 183
Col R. Hariharan
General Sarath Fonseka, Sri Lanka’s Chief of Defence, has been recently hitting the headlines for reasons other than military. Sections of Colombo media have been speculating on the possibility of the General contesting the 2010 presidential poll as opposition candidate against President Rajapaksa. The speculation has refused to die down despite denials by the General. It will probably gather further momentum as the election storm brews further in the political horizon.
Even during his service as army commander, the much-decorated General had always been a figure of media controversy. A man who relished hands-on action than sophistry, General Fonseka’s was known for his off-the cuff, and at times inept, “politically incorrect,” remarks. Often, they raised a lot of dust in their wake. Calling the Tamil Nadu politicians “a bunch of jokers” typified his style. As army commander, his “rough and ready” methods focusing only on results and ignoring hierarchy, adopted during the war did not endear him to some of the officers. During the war he also tread on a lot of toes not only in the armed forces but also in the corridors of power. He had little patience with critics. He did not take kindly to media that questioned his style or methods and even branded them as unpatriotic.
General Fonseka also showed a Sinhala nationalist streak that endeared him to the Sinhala right wing elements. This came out in clear terms in an interview to Canada’s National Post in September 2008. The General said “I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we treat them like our people…We being the majority of the country 75%, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this country…We are also a strong nation.” His said other communities “can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things.” This remark cut at the very basis of President Rajapaksa’s thesis portraying his government as an equitable option for everyone including the Sinhalas and minorities.
There had been a great deal of public adulation of General Fonseka for his significant contribution in leading the armed forces to victory against the LTTE. A first rate professional soldier, he did not change his style even in picking his successor. He recommended Lt Genearl Jagat Jayasuriya as army commander, superseding seven other generals. President Rajapaksa elevated him as chief of defence staff in recognition of his valuable contribution in winning the Eeelam War IV. However, as CDS he had a grandiose vision. Though the LTTE had been routed and the government had regained full control of all the territories held by the Tamil insurgents, the General spoke of adding 100,000 more soldiers to build an army of 300,000 to wage peace.
The rapidly growing public personality of the General probably overawed political leaders, who were increasingly feeling marginalised. This must have set the alarm bells ringing among them as they were hoping to garner full credit for the victory in the Eelam War. They were getting wary of too much credit going to the apolitical General.
In any case, the war was over and the political rat race was on. So the politicians have started questioning the relevance of General Fonseka’s presence as a popular public personality outside the political spectrum. Second rung leaders of the ruling coalition have started making oblique statements sidelining the contribution of the General in the Eelam War.
From his recent statements, one could make out that the developing environment within the government is not to the General's liking. The army expansions the General spoke of have not come through and his tenure is ending by December 2009. The crowning irony was the offer to appoint him the secretary in the ministry of sports! No wonder the General did not accept the offer.
After the ruling UPFA coalition mauled the opposition in the series of post war provincial elections, President Rajapaksa plans to hold the parliamentary and presidential elections in early 2010. He appears to be hopeful of securing the vital two-thirds majority in parliament that would give a lot of freedom of action for him. In the progressively marginalised General Fonseka the two major opposition parties - the United National Party (UNP) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) - see a potential opposition candidate who can give a run for the money in the presidential poll.
In the opposition’s political calculus probably only General Fonseka has a chance of redeeming their reputation as he has a nation wide appeal. The JVP has spoken of its readiness to back General Fonseka to contest the presidential poll. Media reports indicate the UNP backroom politicians are working overtime to convince the reluctant general to join the presidential race.
However, the General has to agree to be pitted against Rajapaksa as opposition candidate. It is not going to be an easy decision to make. It is going to challenge his strategic acumen, so effective in battlefields, in the political arena that is an entirely different ball game. And President Rajapaksa being an astute politician, who has managed to divide every political party, is likely to take every action to thwart opposition plans and persuade the General with other options.
Despite the General’s immense popularity, there are some difficulties in projecting him as an alternative to Rajapaksa. General Fonseka is one of the three architects (the two Rajapaksa brothers being the other) who under the leadership of President Mahinda Rajapaksa brought an end to the legend of Prabhakaran and the LTTE. In the saluting parade held on May 28, 2009 the General had acknowledged the President’s leadership contribution in winning the war. He said: “This battle victory was largely dependent on leadership of the officers and soldiers who fought on the battleground. President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the Defence Secretary and all those here and abroad who offered leadership and guidance to this fight deserve our tribute and commendation.” So he will have the difficult task of sidelining the President’s contribution and pass of as a better candidate.
Unlike the President, the General is not politically savvy. He has little experience in the rough and tumble of peace time politics. Political horsetrading and doublespeak may not figure in his skill sets. During the war he had made some harsh comments about the UNP and its leadership under Ranil Wickremesinghe. Will he able to motivate them now to support him wholeheartedly is a moot point. In this election, the UNP should be able to gain the traditional Tamil votes that were denied to it in the last Presidential election. The ruling coalition has probably alienated a large number of Tamil voters by its rigid attitude in handling the 2.5 lakh Tamils displaced due to the war. Thus conditions are more congenial for UNP to woo Tamil votes.
However, Fonseka is very much associated with the whole post war architecture for handling the Vanni IDPs. So its negative fall outs are sure to affect his electoral fortunes as well. Moreover, the General had shown a cavalier attitude to the human rights issues, high on the Tamil agenda. So most of the Tamils may not support the UNP if Fonseka is projected as its candidate. This could make a difference as demonstrated in the last election when Rajapaksa won by a wafer thin majority through Southern Sinhala votes after Tamils did not turn up to vote.
It seems General Fonseka will continue to haunt the columns of media as well as the minds of many politicians. Can the General’s strategic ability that helped him do so well in war help him decide his political dilemma? That is a question only he can answer. And that is the importance of being General Fonseka.
(Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com Blog: www.colhariharan.org)
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