Indian Fatalities in Kabul Blasts -
International Terrorism Monitor----Paper No.
623
By B. Raman
According to media reports from Kabul, there
were at least six Indian fatalities among 17
persons killed by two terrorist attacks in
Kabul on February 26, 2010. The two attacks
were directed against private guest houses
patronised by nationals of India, the US and
the UK working in Kabul.
2. The Indian fatalities were sustained in a
car bomb explosion outside a guest house
normally used by Indians working in Kabul.
There were two suicide blasts carried out by
human bombers outside another guest house
normally used by US and British nationals.
These blasts were followed by an exchange of
fire with Afghan security personnel that
lasted about an hour.
3. According to a despatch from the local
correspondent of the "New York Times",
Zabiullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesman, said
in a claim over the telephone that suicide
bombers of the Afghan Taliban targeted two
sites in the Shari Now district "where the
foreign people are staying." He added: "The
actual targets are foreign people."
4. Thus, he did not specify that the Indians
were the targets. On October 8, 2009, a
suicide car bomber had detonated his vehicle
outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul, killing
17 people. Whereas the October 8 blast
specifically targeted Indian nationals and
was suspected to have had the sponsorship of
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),
the February 26 attack seemed to have been
an initiative by the Afghan Taliban meant to
convey a message to the international
community that the operational capabilities
of the Afghan Taliban remained unimpaired
despite the current offensive by US-led
forces in the Helmand province and the
arrests of nearly about 15 Afghan
Taliban leaders by the ISI in different
cities of Pakistan under US pressure.
5. While there is so far no evidence to show
that Indians were exclusively targeted on
February 26, the fact that of the two
targets attacked by the Taliban one was
known to have been the preferred place of
stay of Indian nationals would indicate that
it wanted to kill and intimidate Indian
nationals in addition to other foreign
nationals.
6. The fact that the Afghan Taliban has
claimed the responsibility for the two
attacks should not rule out the possibility
of the involvement of anti-India Punjabi
organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LET) in the attack----- either for
orchestrating it or for motivating and
facilitating it.
7. Speculative media reports from Kabul have
highlighted the fact that the Kabul attacks
occurred a day after the meeting of the
Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan at
New Delhi on February 25. There are no
convincing indicators of a link between the
two.
8. A more relevant and worrisome question
for the Indian intelligence will be whether
the Kabul attack of February 26 could have
been a follow-up to the Pune blast of
February 13. The investigation into the Pune
blast has not yet made much headway. It has
not yet been clearly established who carried
it out. The LET is among the suspects. The
possibility of a linkage between the Pune
and Kabul incidents has to be kept in view
during the investigation. If such a linkage
ultimately emerges, that would indicate a
new jihadi offensive by the LET against
Indian nationals and interests not only in
India, but also in Afghanistan and possibly
in Bangladesh and the Maldives too in the
months to come.
9. Our counter-LET strategy has to be given
a regional dimension through stepped-up
monitoring, intelligence-sharing and
operational co-ordination with the
intelligence agencies of Afghanistan,
Bangladesh and the Maldives.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New
Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute
For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail:
seventyone2@gmail.com)