Quagmire of Al-Qaeda and Taliban
By Kazi Anwarul Masud
WHAT if the anti-Indians Taliban were to
confine their objective to terrorism in
India and they were to renounce themselves
against any global ambitions for regime
change in wayward Muslim countries and the
‘degenerate” West for establishing Caliphate
throughout the world? Would the
Western world withdraw the NATO forces from
Afghanistan and condemn that country and
part of Pakistan to be ruled by extremist
Islamic regime given their belief in one
man, one vote, one time and Sharia as “the”
source of law and not “a” source of law, and
as an Islamic scholar states that ‘it goes
without saying that it is the responsibility
of every Muslim to lead his life in an
Islamic state governed by the Quran and
Sunnah and in a society that is established
by Sharia”?
Admittedly it is difficult to believe in any
such declaration by the Islamic extremists
but there is a general consensus that state
sponsored terrorism is more India-specific ,
and if Pakistan were to rein in and destroy
them in totality- difficult to believe that
such a thing could come to pass given that
these terrorists are regarded as “freedom
fighters”- and should Pakistan refuse then
the US and Western world could withdraw
financial and military support given to
Pakistan and also impose strict sanctions,
and/or give India full support in destroying
the terrorists?
The Western fear that such support to India
could result in (a) stoking a Indo-Pak
conflict into a full fledged conflagration
resulting in destabilization of South Asian
region, (b) further increase anti-US
sentiment in Pakistan ( US is already
extremely unpopular in Pakistan and a poll
suggested that 80% of Pakistanis were
against US drone attacks despite the fact
that some of these attacks killed the
leaders of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) and
helped Pakistan army’s military operations
in Waziristan and in terrorist infested
areas of NWFP, and (c) enthuse some
indigenous elements in Pakistan to help
al-Qaeda acquire nuclear material and
cause greater threat to Western interests
and people. But would it necessarily be so?
Albeit the Romans ruled the world by sword
which is neither practicable nor desirable
in the present day world. If tectonic shift
in the US foreign and defence policies,
described by Madeline Albright, from Clinton
administration to Bush administration and
the invasion of Iraq is any lesson, then use
of only hard power is likely to exacerbate a
localized problem into a global issue. One
wonders whether Walter Russell Meade’s
thesis( Foreign Policy magazine-Carter
Syndrome- Jan/Feb 2010) that US Presidents
have over the years been influenced by the
beliefs of first US Treasury Secretary
Alexander Hamilton that the US should have a
strong national government and a strong
military to pursue a realist global policy;
Woodrow Wilson while agreeing with the
Hamiltonians on the need for a global
foreign policy emphasized on the promotion
of democracy and human rights as core of the
US policy; Thomas Jefferson dissented from
the globalist approach and wanted the US to
minimize its commitments and dismantle the
national security state; and lastly
Jacksonians are populists “suspicious of
Hamiltonians’ business links, Wilsonians’
do-gooding and Jeffersonians’ weakness”.
Branding Barak Obama of Carter Syndrome
Walter Meade suggests that Obama comes from
the old fashioned Jeffersonian wing of the
Democratic Party and believes in reducing
America’s costs and risks abroad by limiting
US commitments and that the US can better
set an example of spreading democracy
abroad by practicing it at home and
moderation abroad. Given Bush
administration’s abject failure of its
project to spread democracy abroad and
devaluing American attractiveness to the
world by changing the logic of the ouster of
Saddam Hussein from owning weapons of mass
destruction, his alleged intent to use the
weapons on the West and his links with
al-Qaeda, all being proved wrong, to
regime change from dictatorship to
pluralism( end result being sectarian
conflict and a tottering democracy) Barak
Obama appears to be far more practical in
the use of US military power demonstrated by
his approval of General Stanley McChrystal’s
AfPak policy of winning the hearts and minds
of the people in place of shock and awe.
Walter Meade is optimistic that Obama could
extract US forces from Afghanistan and Iraq,
a contemporary equivalent of
“Vietnamization” policy of Richard Nixon and
open up with Iran as Nixon did with
radicalized Red Guard China as a follower of
Jeffersonian policy of managing US concerns
with lowest possible level of risk. He,
however, may fail if Afghanistan remains
intractable or unforeseen events turn his
policy into an incoherent reversal of
fortune like Jimmy Carter’s “failure” in
Iran imbroglio. Carter’s defence to Meade’s
article has been robust as has been that of
Carter National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brezezinski.
The point of discussion here is not the
success or failure of Carter administration
but whether US withdrawal from AfPak
region, given the facts that the core
Taliban leadership is unable to provide
financial and technical support to
terrorists elsewhere and is hiding under
intense US pressure, the rag tag forces in
Somalia and Yemen can be destroyed by US
hard power, assuming that a Taliban
Afghanistan and part Pakistan can be bottled
up and would remain satisfied with ruling
their domain, and finally with the belief
that India would be able, with the help of
the international community, to defeat the
anti-Indian terrorists both inside India and
across the border, is a feasible option for
the West.
A fundamental assumption in this analysis is
that both Afghanistan and Pakistan being
mainly tribal societies and deeply devoted
to religion cannot escape Talibanization at
the end of the day and also because
Afghanistan will remain divided along ethnic
lines and would never have liberal democracy
that in any case has been totally alien to
the Afghan people.
The West has also to realize that the very
basis of the creation of Pakistan was on
religious ground and for the better part of
its independence in 1947 the country has
been ruled by the military and
intermittently by corrupt democratically
elected government who were essentially
composed of landowners, military- industrial
complex or as described by South Asian
expert Stephen Cohen by “moderate
Oligarchy” an informal political system
that ties together senior members of the
military, the civil service, the key players
of the judiciary and other elites-- having
little love for democracy as is understood
generally.
The assumption made in this paper of the
declining influence of al-Qaeda in Pakistan
is refuted by South Asian expert Steve Coll
in his testimony to the US House Armed
Services Committee in January this year said
that compared to five years ago today
al-Qaeda’s influence declined in North
Africa and Iran but has grown in Yemen,
Somalia and Pakistan. Coll speaks of the
paradox that while al-Qaeda’s political and
ideological support has been declining
sharply in the Muslim world, it has proved
to be resilient as a source of “disruptive
terrorist violence”. Referring to the attack
attempted aboard the flight in the US a
rigorous poll conducted last year by The
Program on International Policy Attitude at
the University of Maryland found that in
Pakistan where the US is very unpopular
only 9% supported the botched airline attack
and only 5% supported in Indonesia. Coll
estimates Afghan Taliban fighters to be in
the range of twenty five thousand added by
about a thousand from Pakistan. He, however
thinks that “the potential of the India
focused groups, with or without clandestine
cooperation from Pakistan security forces or
A.Q.Central, to repeat or exceed the scale
of provocative attack carried out at Mumbai
in November 2008, presents in my judgment,
one of the most serious current threats to
US interests in the complex of the risks and
dangers posed by al-Qaeda” (The Paradoxes of
al-Qaeda-The New Yorker- Jan 27, 2010).
To repeat: al-Qaeda remains committed to its
globalist agenda of fighting the West; the
Taliban has the narrower aim of establishing
its sway in Afghanistan and parts of
Pakistan with little or no interest in
expanding their terrorism beyond their
areas; and the India-focused terrorists aim
at destabilizing India’s politico-economic
structure and the “liberation” of Kashmir.
It is true that the three cannot be
separated into water tight compartments yet
broadly the aims described appear to be
true. The West, therefore, should leave
Afghanistan and Pakistan to its inevitable
fate of becoming Talebanized and concentrate
on al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb and the
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Assist
India to fight India-focused terrorists in
every possible way and convince Pakistan
that this fight is not against Pakistan but
in its own interest as the fight will also
strengthen Pakistan’s fight against TTP
and other Islamic extremists.
But the withdrawal of the NATO forces would
be a contentious issue. Last year Pakistan
had cautioned the United States against
withdrawing from Afghanistan without putting
in place a stable and broad-based government
in the country. US National Security
Adviser James Jones was unequivocally told
that Pakistan was against a sudden
withdrawal of allied troops from Afghanistan
and that US must not repeat the mistake of
past of disengaging from the region after
the departure of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan. The US adviser was in Pakistan
for discussions on the Af-Pak strategy
review and to evaluate the role Pakistan
could play under the revised policy, now
revealed, by the Obama administration.
‘Pakistan believes that withdrawal at this
stage can frustrate efforts for bringing
peace and security to the region and have
serious repercussions on its security,’ the
sources said. According to a statement
issued by the Pak Foreign Office the need
for close coordination and consultation on
all issues of importance was emphasized.
Pakistani leaders stressed the need for
working for a broader reconciliation in
Afghanistan, including engaging the Taliban.
The US NSA told the civil and military
leadership that the US did not plan to stay
in Afghanistan for a long period and
reconciliation efforts would be launched.
‘General Jones spoke of the US’ preference
to simultaneously tackle the issues of
governance, economic development, national
integration and counter-insurgency. With
differences of opinion in Washington on the
issue of deploying additional troops in
Afghanistan, the security adviser appeared
unclear about what would be the final
decision. Pakistani leaders clarified that
Islamabad was not opposed to additional US
troops being dispatched to the region.
General Jones was told that Pakistan’s
concerns primarily centred on implications
of the deployment strategy for additional
troops. It is believed that General Jones
appeared keen to assess the health of the
PPP-led government because of numerous
challenges confronting it. He underscored
the strategic importance of Pakistan for US
plans in the region.
Responding to concerns expressed over
growing Indian role in Afghanistan, the NSA
said the US understood Pakistan’s
sensitivities. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza
Gilani told the General Jones that
‘Pakistan is fully committed to taking its
ongoing operations for clearing its
territory of terrorists and extremists to
their logical conclusion, although its
forces are overstretched because of
continuous tension on the country’s eastern
border’. Gilani said it was imperative for
the US to be sensitive about Pakistan’s core
interests -- Kashmir, water, Indian military
capability and the need for a balance of
power in South Asia. He said the US would
have to use its influence with India for
resumption of ‘composite dialogue’ and
easing tension with Pakistan to enable it to
concentrate its attention and energy on the
fight against militancy and terrorism. The
American Security Adviser had suggested in a
recent interview that an exit strategy could
be on the cards. ‘But we also need a better
plan with the allies to gradually turn over
responsibility for the country to Afghan
institutions and organizations in as short a
time as possible.’
Early this year it was reported that the
simmering discord between Washington and
Islamabad came to a boil when the US
ambassador to Pakistan publicly complained
about harassment of American diplomatic
personnel by Pakistani authorities and
obliquely hinted that Islamabad risked
losing US aid to projects if they continued
to deny visas to US officials and space for
the US mission to fulfill its multi-billion
assistance program. Ambassador Anne
Patterson’s warning was followed up by a
rare public admonition of Pakistan from the
US mission in Islamabad in which it
expressed concern about the ''continued
provocative actions and false allegations
against US personnel working to implement
the new partnership between the leaders of
Pakistan and the United States.'' The
wording of the statement suggested that the
US believed there was a growing militaristic
constituency in Pakistan that was now
operating independently of the civilian
government. One Pakistani newspaper
“Nation," ran a Wall Street Journal
correspondent out of the country by
alleging he was a CIA agent, recalling the
horrible tragedy which befell his
predecessor Daniel Pearl.
In the same toxic spirit, hard-line sections
in Pakistan have reportedly contrived to
distort remarks by the Indian Army chief
Deepak Kapoor that New Delhi has to prepare
for a war under a nuclear overhang. In the
most recent instance, Kapoor’s remarks about
the need for India developing capability to
fight a two-front war has been translated to
''Indian General threatens Pakistan and
China with war.'' While a few Pakistani
analysts have responded soberly to the new
doctrines being discussed in New Delhi, most
commentators, including current and former
generals, diplomats, and analysts have
reacted hysterically to what would be
considered doctrinal deliberations in any
mature society.
According to an Indian newspaper the idea
behind the whipping up of mass hysteria
against US and India in what is now being
dubbed ''Paranoidistan'' appears to be a
ploy by hard-line elements in Islamabad to
disengage from fulfilling its bilateral and
international obligations to tackle
terrorist elements. With each terrorist
incident, Pakistan is coming under
increasing pressure from US to give up its
obsession with the non-existent threat from
India and focus on confronting its
home-grown threats eating away at the
country. The Pakistani military has
signalled clearly that it does not subscribe
to the US prescription, and General Kapoor’s
outline of new Indian doctrines has come in
handy for this escape act. After distorting
Gen Kapoor’s remarks and generating a
sulfurous discourse in the media, the
Pakistani military high command and the
civilian cabinet defence committee both met
to assert that ''Pakistan would never allow
its security to be jeopardized.'' Pakistan’s
beleaguered president Asif Ali Zardari,
under pressure from the army, also joined
this military-ISI generated hysteria by
promising a 1000-year confrontation with
India over Kashmir. None of this escaped the
attention of Washington, which dispatched
yet another high-powered Congressional
delegation led by former presidential
candidate John McCain to talk to Pakistan.
McCain was unrelenting in response to
Pakistani protests against drone attacks,
bluntly insisting that the ‘‘(drone) attacks
are imperative to defeat the enemy,'' and
''with an improved decision making process
the civilian causalities are totally
minimized.'' The US delegation also heard
protests from the Pakistani leadership about
security measures introduced by Washington
for screening Pakistani nationals among
citizens of 13 other state sponsors of
terrorism and ''countries of interest.'' But
with new arrests in the Najibullah Zazi case
and developments in the CIA forward base
bombing case both revealing links to
Pakistan; US threshold for Islamabad’s
policies are diminishing and Pakistan is
seen as a state sponsor of terrorism in all
but formal designation. In fact, Pakistan –
or Paranoidistan, as some Indian officials
refer to it in private – becomes the
immediate focus of attention after any
terrorist attack, including ones like the
Christmas Day bombing attempt of an airplane
in Detroit, where there was no immediate
Pakistani link. ''The fact that this
particular person was not trained in
Pakistan does not change the fact that the
inspiration for all of this comes from al-Qaida,
and al-Qaida's leadership is based in the
remotest areas on the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border,’’
Pakistan anger and frustration was further
increased by the demands of the Western
leaders that India be given a seat in the
solution of the Afghanistan problem. In
January British PM Gordon Brown spoke of his
belief that India has a major role to play
in Afghanistan.” In saying neighbours should
come together, there was probably a hint to
Pakistan that it should stop dragging its
feet on an enhanced role for India in
Afghanistan. Islamabad has been rather
uncomfortable about India's $1.3 billion aid
to its western neighbour and the work India
is engaged in much lauded by the British
government in the realms of reconstruction
and developing infrastructure in
Afghanistan, not to mention the re-opening
of Indian consulates in that country and
India's growing popularity makes it
increasingly insecure for Pakistan.
Pakistan's despondency been reflected in its
ambivalence towards the Afghan Taliban,
which it sees as an asset if and when
western troops pull out of Afghanistan,
which, according to US President Barak Obama,
will begin in August 2011. Brown, however,
signalled that there were elements within
the Afghan Taliban, who were mercenaries. He
saw scope in co-opting them back into the
mainstream. In March this year India accused
Pakistan of harboring 42 terror camps that
are "still active” and that lack of a
serious attempt or effort by that country to
dismantle them. Indian Defence minister A K
Antony also said India did not expect a
"miracle" from the resumption of Indo-Pak
talks which concluded recently at the
foreign secretary-level here noting it was
just a beginning. He also said the recent
Indo-Pak talks could not be considered a
failure as this was just a beginning and no
miracles were expected from this effort.
Indian Defence Minister also made light of
the recent threat by Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD)
Chief Hafiz Saaed against India.
Notwithstanding the recent Indo-Pak foreign
secretary-level meeting for which India took
initiative, JuD chief Hafiz Mohd Saeed has
said that Pakistan will have to "fight a war
at all costs" if New Delhi is not prepared
to hold talks. Saeed denied accusations
about his involvement in planning and
carrying out the Mumbai attacks. He
exhorted people to go to Kashmir for jihad
against India. Hafiz Saaed called Pakistan
government “cowardly". Saeed’s comments came
days after the foreign secretaries of India
and Pakistan held talks in New Delhi on
February 25, the first official parleys
between the two sides since the Mumbai
attacks. Though there was no breakthrough in
the talks, the world community welcomed the
development in the hope that it would lead
to normalization of ties between the two
countries. Saeed, also the founder of the
banned LeT, was placed under house arrest in
Lahore in December 2008 after the JuD was
declared a terrorist group by the UN
Security Council in the wake of the Mumbai
terror attacks. He was freed after about six
months on the orders of the Lahore HC. The
Pakistan government challenged his release
in the Supreme Court, but no hearing has
been held in the matter for several months
after the case was adjourned for various
reasons.
One factor that has to be taken into
consideration is India’s absence and
consequent diplomatic weakness in the
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). In
OIC Summits and ICFMs resolution on Kashmir
and the state of Muslims in India are
routinely adopted along the lines drafted by
Pakistan. It remains to be seen how India is
going to counter Pakistani diplomatic
offensive once India starts selective
strikes against India-specific terrorists
living in Pakistan. Unless the scale of
conflict is increased by Pakistan India
would be well advised to keep in
proportionality principle and not act as
Israel is doing in occupied territory. But
before India embarks on extra-territorial
military venture she should garner
international support and if possible that
of UNSC, in all possibility it would be
vetoed by China, so that international
community is convinced that global peace and
security cannot be guaranteed without taking
care of, what Bruce Riedel calls “the
epicenter” of international terrorism.
For the residents of
this region Indo-Pak rivalry remains a fact
of life despite the fact that India of 1947
and of today are vastly different in
population, economic and military strength,
and has been given a seat in the G-20 that
has replaced the G-8, a board for managing
the politico-economic developments of the
world. Though it is doubtful if all the
members of G-20 are competent to shoulder
this responsibility undoubtedly the
elevation to this group, with the
possibility of elevation to a still higher
and exclusive international club, has given
India the confidence to manage the
instability in the South Asian region. But
refusal to accept India’s new found elevated
position coupled with being a nuclear nation
reminds one of George Kennan’s containment
policy, fleshed out in the Truman Doctrine,
to arrest the spread of communism in Europe
through Marshall Plan and the creation of
NATO. Harry Truman reasoned that containment
was necessary so that free people are not
subjugated by totalitarian regimes. This
imperfect analogy can be compared with
al-Qaeda and Taliban brand of Islamic
extremism that can also be comparable to
President Dwight Eisenhower’s apocalypse
management of an implacable enemy in the
shape of communism, seen by Eisenhower as a
permanent fact of international life( he
could not have foreseen the demise of
communism) that had to be contained and
managed.
In the case of
assistance to India by the US Barak Obama
could take recourse of Nixon Doctrine,
announced under the shadow of Vietnam War,
calling upon US allies to take care of their
military defense but that US aid would be
given as requested. Undeniably Truman and
Nixon Doctrine and Eisenhower “Apocalypse
Management” and the present day fight
against Islamic extremists have different
context. Yet the choice of permanently
living under the threat of terrorism that
has lost global support and particularly in
the Islamic world, and assuming that some
countries will eventually have to live under
theocratic rule it stands to logic that the
international community should cut its
losses when there is still time and stop
dreaming that Western type of democracy can
be effected in all countries. Samuel
Huntington’s first, second and third wave of
democracy testifies to the fact that
conditions have to be made possible for
democratic institutions to sustain. Till
then the international community should
ensure that duty to protect and duty to
prevent endorsed by the UN Summit and the
civilized code of behaviour is practised by
all countries of the world.
(The writer is a former Ambassador and
Secretary of Bangladesh)