Counter-Terrorism Efforts in Canada

Counter-Terrorism Efforts in Canada

Guest Column by Sushant Deb

Terrorism is a global challenge. The September 11, 2001 attacks on US were a powerful example of this. Canada is not immune to that threat. For example, the 1985 bombing of an Air India jet departing Toronto killed 329 individuals – most of them Canadians. This was not the first time for Canada to face terrorism. The October crisis of 1970 was the wakeup call for Canada. Many people may be surprised to learn that, with the exception of US, there are more terrorist groups active in Canada today than in any other country in the world. Their presence can be attributed to Canada’s proximity to the US, one of the world’s pre-eminent terrorist targets.

Indeed, Canada’s responses against terrorist activities have their origin in the October Crisis of 1970. At that time, a minister in the government of the Canadian province of Quebec, kidnapped by members of a radical organization who advocated the separation of Quebec from Canada, was killed by his captors. In response, the Canadian government invoked an act of Parliament temporarily revoking many democratic freedoms of Canadians. And, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) began a campaign of investigation and infiltration of the separatist organization and other perceived domestic terrorist organizations. In the 1980s and 1990s, terrorism in Canada involved religious extremists (mainly from Islamic Groups), political activities surrounding the separation of states in India, Sri Lanka, Ireland and the Middle East. This counter-terrorism (CT) function shifted to the Canadian Security Intelligence Agency (CSIS) in 1984. The CSIS and other law enforcement agencies in the country assumed responsibilities for the investigation of such incidents and prevention of further domestic violence. A full scale Canadian Government CT policy did not exist yet. The September 11, 2001 attacks on US, only country bordering Canada, was a reminder again for Canada to have some CT strategy and plan. In a taped massage released on November 12, 2002, Osama Bin Laden identified Canada as a target for attack.

Canada’s CT policy involves several federal government department and agencies. CSIS has assumed a prominent role in its capacity as an intelligence-gathering agency and as an advisor concerning possible national security threats. This information is passed on to other government departments to initiate specific actions. Information is also gathered before any major international events to be hosted by Canada that could become the target of terrorist activity. The security and intelligence functions of CSIS apply only within the borders of Canada. Foreign intelligence, including offensive operations in other countries, is not a part of the mandate of CSIS. The Government of Canada introduced the National Security Policy (NSP) in April 2004. The scope of NSP includes personal security, national security, and international security. The NSP includes measures to address terrorist threats; one such measure was the creation of the Integrated Threat Assessment Center (ITAC). The Solicitor General of Canada, under the authority of the Government of Canada, is responsible for the National CT Plan. The National CT Plan establishes notification process, federal government coordination mechanism, and federal public communications framework. The plan includes operational protocols, list of available federal resources, roles and responsibilities of federal departments and agencies and provincial and territorial governments, overview of the counter-terrorism legislative framework and international conventions and agreements, and links to other federal and provincial plans. All terrorism incidents are initially investigated by the RCMP and may be coordinated with the relevant Canadian Departments and Canadian Agencies. Depending on the degree of the incident/situation, the process may be escalated to Interdepartmental Policy Advisory Group (IPAG) and then to the Prime Minister. The IPAG also has inputs/presence from the Canadian Provinces.

CSIS is at the forefront of Canada’s national security establishment as such; its programs are proactive and pre-emptive. The service’s role is to investigate threats, analyze information and produce intelligence. While CSIS is at the forefront of Canada’s national security system, several Canadian departments (such as: Public Safety Canada (PS), Department of National Defense, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Department of Justice Canada, and Transport Canada) and Canadian agencies (such as: RCMP, Communications Security Establishment, Canada Border Services Agency, Privy Council Office, National Security Advisor (NSA), Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Canada (FINTRAC), and Canadian Air Transport Security Authority) also provide services that, taken together, help to ensure the safety and protection of Canadians.

There are five phases to Security Intelligence, which are: (A) ‘Government Direction’ coming from the Minister of PS. Through these directives, CSIS develops policy guidelines including guidance in the use of investigative techniques. Intelligence priorities are evaluated each year based on annual assessment and review of the changing security environments; (B) ‘Planning’ encompasses the entire intelligence process, which begins with threat assessment and ends with the delivery of intelligence products; (C) ‘Collecting’ information necessary to conduct an investigation from various sources, including, open sources (such as: newspapers, periodicals, academic journals, foreign and domestic broadcasts, official documents, and other published materials) members of public, foreign governments, Canadian partners, as well as technical interception as well as security liaison officers (SLOs) posted abroad; (D) ‘Analyses’ of the quality of the information gathered to prepare security intelligence reports and threat assessments; and (E) ‘Distribution’ of these documents to appropriate Canadian government law enforcement authorities. For example, RCMP uses threat assessments to determine the level of security required to protect foreign diplomatic missions in Canada. Furthermore, Section 12 of the CSIS Act directs the Service to collect-analyze-retain information and intelligence on activities that may, on reasonable grounds, be suspected of constituting a threat to the security of Canada. It places no geographic restrictions on intelligence gathering. According to CSIS, terrorism inspired by the ideology of al-Qaeda is the primary international threat to Canadian security.

The ITAC was created in the CT branch of the CSIS in October 2004 to collect and evaluate information about domestic and international terrorism. The ITAC’s role is to help prevent and reduce the effects of terrorist incidents on Canada and its people. Several Canadian Departments and Agencies are responsible for collecting information about threats to Canadian security. Such information is known as security intelligence (SI). The participating departments include, CSIS, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Transport Canada (TC), and the RCMP. Prior to the establishment of ITAC in October 2004, there was no single Canadian federal level organization responsible for producing comprehensive threat assessments (TAs). A TA is an analysis of the intent and capability of terrorists to carry out attacks. These TASs are distributed to the Canadian security intelligence community, provincial emergency authorities, first responders, and the private sector. ITAC also shares and receives security assessments (SAs) from its international partners.

The RCMP, the Canadian police, assists in helping Canadians keep their communities safe and secure by implementing community and federal policing. While CSIS is strictly concerned with collecting information and security intelligence for the purpose of advising the government, the role of the RCMP (and other law enforcement agencies) is to investigate criminal activity and to collect evidence that can be used in criminal prosecutions. The CSIS is, however, mandated to investigate individuals and groups that may pose a threat to the security of Canada. Immediately after September 11, 2001, the Government of Canada moved quickly to implement an Anti-Terrorism Plan designed to give agencies like the RCMP the tools it needed to detect-deter-disable-prosecute terrorists. A few important responses immediately were:

· On December 11, 2001, Canada and US announcing the Smart Border Declaration, a 30-point plan aimed at fighting terrorism;

· The RCMP received a total investment of $576 million to fund 17 initiatives to fight terrorism in December 2001;

· The RCMP playing a crucial role supporting the Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program announced by the Canadian government in April 2002.

The RCMP investigative tools include:

· Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs): INSETs gather information to prevent, detect and prosecute criminal offences against national security. There are four INSETs in urban centers such as Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, and Ottawa.

· Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs): This program is a multi-faceted law enforcement initiative comprised of both Canadian and American partners. Five core law enforcement partners are in involved in IBETs to share information and work on national security, organized crime and other criminality transiting the Canada/US border. There are 23 IBETs operational across Canada.

· Technology Enhancements: The RCMP receives funding for infrastructure systems for intelligence and investigation, such as, fingerprint identification access systems, automated intelligence information systems, forensic identification-laboratory services, real time identification Live Scan units, counterfeit travel detection, documenting screening entry to Canada, fingerprint card conversion technology, and laboratory information management systems.

· Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Response Team (CBRN): self-explanatory.

· Protection of Designated Persons and Sites (PDPS): This includes enhanced security at airports, Canadian Air Carrier Protective program, National DNA databank, and implementing-policing the Anti-terrorism Act.

Implementing CT Strategy, Plan & Policies (SPP) is not cheap; keeping track of those and their effectiveness is even difficult as there is no established benchmark. We know that the US expenditure is huge; for example, Congressional Budget Office, 2005 annual report states the appropriations have increased to $88.1 billion. Although actual figures of federal, provincial, international, and private expenditures are difficult to calculate, there has clearly been a massive increase in Canadian Government spending on CT SPPs since September 11, 2001 attacks in USA. It is well known that the Canadian agencies blamed a lack of funding from the beginning (after 9/11 attacks in US). For example, the distribution of the first $7.6 billion budget in 2001 shows $2.2 billion to Air Transport Safety, $1.0 billion to immigration related frauds, $1.6 billion to Joint Task Force (the military), $1.2 billion to improve border security/crossing infrastructure, and $1.6 billion to increased intelligence and police officers, marine security, improved coordination and information sharing. Based on this and similar information from the past few years, it is safe to estimate that at least an amount of $11 billion per year are currently spent implementing and managing CT SPPs by Canadian Government. Arguably then, the policy question raised against these CT activities is: Do these programs work? More specifically, do they reduce the likelihood of, or damage from, terrorism events or discourage individuals from acquiring motivations to carry out political violence? A ‘cautious’ answer to that question is: perhaps the SPPs are preventing from a 9/11 type attacks on Canada since the national policy was tabled in the Canadian Parliament in April 2004; but the probability remains high being a neighbor to USA and also since the presence of “Jihadi” type networks are not totally eliminated from Canada. [The word ‘Jihadi’ in the context of this article means al-Qaeda and other similar groups identifying Canada as target country].

After having said that, we need to emphasize the fact that there are very few CT SPP evaluation studies available to measure Canadian efforts in terms of quantity vs. degree of prevention of terrorism. Canadian departments and agencies are using host of metrics to measure the outcomes of or the performances of respective organizations; unfortunately most of these are ‘cosmetics exercises’. The Canadian Parliament, however, established a committee called Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) with the responsibility of conducting in-depth reviews of the past operations of CSIS to determine whether the CSIS is in compliance with the Canadian law. It is important to understand that SIRC is a review agency, so it does not provide oversight of current CSIS activities. However, by preparing "snapshots" of CSIS operations over almost two decades, the Committee has developed a comprehensive understanding of the Service's activities. By conducting reviews, SIRC helps to ensure the ‘democratic accountability’ of one of the Government's most powerful organizations, thereby safeguarding Canadians' fundamental rights and freedoms. The CSIS Act gives SIRC the right to have “access to any information under the control of the Service or of the Inspector General.” As a result, the Committee has the absolute authority to examine all of the Service's activities, no matter how sensitive and no matter how classified that information may be. The sole exception is Cabinet confidences, which means deliberations among Ministers. A typical review requires hundreds of staff hours and is completed over a period of 4-5 months. Thousands of pages of hardcopy and electronic documentation must be obtained from CSIS files, reviewed and analyzed. Briefings from and interviews of relevant CSIS staff normally form part of any SIRC review, as do field visits whenever a review involves a regional office or a Security Liaison Officer post abroad. In almost all cases, the interviews and the examination of documents generate follow-up questions to the Service, to which detailed answers are expected. A report on the results of the review, always a classified document, is presented to the Committee at one of its monthly meetings. Sometimes Members will request that follow-up inquiries be made. Once finalized, the review document is provided to the Director of the Service and the Inspector General, CSIS.

Each year, the Committee also conducts a series of reviews in a CSIS region. These cover warrants, surveillance, targeting authorizations, community interviews and other matters. Regional reviews give SIRC an opportunity to examine how Ministerial Direction and CSIS policy actually affect the day-to-day work of investigators in the field. SIRC's reviews can include findings or recommendations. Although these are not binding, the Committee's role is to advise and warn, so that the Service and those bodies of government that direct it, may take steps to modify policies and procedures as needed. A summary of each review, with all classified information removed, is included in the Committee's Annual Report to Parliament. Recently published such reviews by SIRC indicate that there have been many instances of violation of human rights by this spy service of Canada. One most recent such example is -- ‘Court Orders CSIS to Hand Over Secret File’; News from Ottawa, dated October 20, 2009 -- in the case of Algerian-born terror suspect Mohamed Harkat. The ITAC’s TAs is also found to be not effective. For example, a few papers written during 2006 by the researchers within the South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG), Paper #s 1833, 1838 and 1841 clearly indicates that “Jihadi” type networks comprising of former residents from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and India are very active in both Canada and USA. Fortunately, many of these folks are apprehended from time to time by FBI and RCMP in US and Canada respectively. But the fact remains that the ‘Jihadi’ elements in both countries present serious threats to the security and safety of the citizens of both countries.

In general, most conceivable elements or areas of CT are indeed addressed by the NSP of 2004 and indeed are implemented by the CSIS and ITAC with participations from relevant Canadian Departments and Canadian Agencies. This author found a few ‘holes’, due to lack of correct word, in the current CT SPP implementation and management.

One major area of improvement requires efficiently maintaining the ‘connection of dots’ and reviewing the ‘dots’ frequently for reliability and checking the breakdown of ‘connections’. The US 9/11 Commission coined these terms in its report. The CSIS and the ITAC spend so many resources in information gathering; the analysis of serious missed opportunities should be continuously kept in mind. For example,

· If the RCMP and CSIS generate intelligence data regarding terrorist threats to Canadian airports, then these should be shared with Transport Canada; and Transport Canada, in turn, should provide the Canadian TSA personnel access to these intelligence data.

· The background investigation information generated by the RCMP for applicants for restricted area related jobs must be weighted seriously by aviation and maritime industries and be mandated by the appropriate Canadian departments and agencies.

Another area not maturated yet is the smooth operations of the IBET mechanism. Better understanding between Canada and USA is needed to iron out the protocols on sharing information. Yes, the cross-government data exchange standards needs to be addressed and agreed at a higher levels so that the border security personnel can implement CT policies effectively.

The inadequate budget for technical infrastructure by the Canadian Government is yet another area to address. The Canadian technical infrastructure is not equal to that of USA or NATO or some of the G8 countries. There must be adequate budgets provided for new technology so that there is neither incompatibility in coding nor interoperability deficiency. This is an important issue that bureaucracy normally forgets, especially in emergency or quick feed situations that require rapid exchange of secret data. The control of financial laundering by the terrorist groups is another area needs equally serious attention by all governments, such as FINTRAC of Canada and G8 countries sponsored FATF.

In conclusion, we should note that terrorism has often been described as an asymmetric threat in the sense that vast resources and investment are considered necessary to protect against the threat of attacks that can be carried out by small numbers of individuals, limited resources, and small monetary investments. Today, there are several types of terrorism affecting Canada directly such as ‘Religious Extremism’, a direct threat by al-Qaeda; ‘Violent Secessionist Movements’, risks to Canadians from other countries; ‘State-Sponsored Terrorism’, a serious problem affecting Canada’s security; and ‘Domestic Extremism’, resulting in violence threatening Canadians, especially among immigrant communities. In summary, to minimize serious terrorist attacks on Canada of 9/11 magnitude, it is imperative that Canada aligns and coordinates with countries with same cause by tightening the loopholes in the CT strategy-plan-policy such as areas mentioned above, which is by no means a complete list. Further in-depth evaluation research should be undertaken immediately on Canada’s counter terrorism efforts that accommodates no truce only elimination of terrorism.

(Sushant Deb is a management consultant in aviation safety-security-quality and counter-terrorism. Dr. Deb is a member of Flight safety Foundation (FSF), American Society for Quality (ASQ), and International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals (IACSP).)