SRI LANKA: Emerging Trends After the Presidential Election

SRI LANKA: Emerging Trends After the Presidential Election - Update No. 192

Col. R. Hariharan

Elections always leave their footprints to indicate emerging political and social trends of nations. The just concluded presidential election in Sri Lanka is no exception to this.

The election has proved the limitations of poll forecasts. Even where these are done by unbiased agencies, the impact of ‘swing factor’ in voting preferences affects the accuracy of forecasts. President Mahinda Rajapaksa had always remained the favourite at least among non-Tamil voters. As expected, he swept through some of the traditional opposition strongholds with high margins; this would indicate his lead was beyond the impact of any swing factor. Otherwise he would not have captured 17 of the 22 electoral districts.

The popular vote for the President is perhaps in recognition of his leadership role in ending the 26-year old Tamil insurgency. Probably for the same reason 40.2 per cent of the voters (4,173,185) preferred General Sarath Fonseka, a political novice. It would be reasonable to place relative popularity of the two candidates on this count at 6:4 in favour of Rajapaksa.

During the six months of peace after the war ended, President Rajapaksa could not clean up his administration and improve governance which came under severe criticism during the war. Presumably, the voting public were ready to overlook these aberrations and vote for another term of Rajapaksa’s rule because the General, supported by a jerry-built coalition, could not win their confidence in his political avatar.

If we go merely by numbers, General Fonseka supported by both the UNP and the JVP, secured less votes than the UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe when he contested the last presidential poll without the JVP support. But if we go by the dismal performance of the opposition parties and strong showing of the ruling UPFA in the provincial council elections held before the presidential poll, for a beginner the General’s performance was commendable. Thanks to him, both the opposition parties also probably managed to save their face by putting him up as a common opposition candidate. Otherwise, either of the parties might not have matched General Fonseka’s score.

However, in the north and east where the Tamils are in substantial numbers, votes polled were in favour of General Fonseka. Similarly electorates like Nuwara Eliya, where plantation Tamils are in large numbers, preferred General Fonseka. The General’s Tamil votes were probably more in appreciation of his recognition of Tamil grievances than any other issue.

The runaway victory of Rajapaksa shows the ruling coalition as of now could win a majority in the parliamentary poll. So if Tamils really want to improve the situation they will have to carefully plan their strategy in supporting either of the coalitions. It is going to be a hard choice between pragmatism and emotions.

In the Tamil dominant Northern Provinces barely 20 percent of the eligible voters polled. The displacement of population due to the war, fear of revenge killings, and Tamil apathy to the election in which two architects of the Eelam War were fighting each other, probably reduced the voter turnout. In future elections in the north, we might not see more than 30 per cent voting unless the voters’ lists are updated taking into consideration internal and external migration of Tamil population.

The election in the north and east has shown the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which supported Fonseka, continues to retain its influence over loyal section of Tamils voters. On the other hand Rajapaksa’s votes, particularly in the north, probably represent the limited influence of two Tamil parties – Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) and the Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) that had supported him. Similarly, the influence of Tamil Makkal Vidutahali Pulikal (TMVP) led by Pillaiyan in the east could be ephemeral during the parliamentary poll.

The election has exposed the limited reach of SLFP and the UNP among Tamils. They will have to work hard to make inroads into Tamil strongholds in the north. It is doubtful whether either party would gain any advantage by migration of Tamil parties’ leaders to the party ranks. So we can expect the Tamil parties to continue their piggy back ride on them in the parliamentary poll also.

The TNA will face a big challenge in handling the pulls and pressures of parliamentary poll alliances. It has hardly any time to consolidate its position at the grass roots. It will also face more dissent in making hard choices. The marriage of convenience between the UNP and the JVP for the presidential election would be under serious threat as the parliamentary poll nears. There are more chances of it coming undone. This is going to make the options of TNA even more difficult.

Muslim votes continue to be divided between the two main political coalitions. Probably the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) support was useful in helping Fonseka coming on top in the east. Whether it could do so when the opposition is not united in the parliamentary poll remains an open question.

The election has demonstrated the Sinhala- Tamil divide as a hardy perennial in Sri Lanka politics. This cannot be wished away by homilies. With the parliamentary poll around the corner, President Rajapaksa will have to create a sense of trust and security among Tamil population by positive action, particularly as he has been elected by massive Sinhala votes. Presumably this is what prompted the President immediately after the election to talk about his intention to meet Tamil aspirations (including constitutional amendment).

However, four aspects of government conduct during and after the election are disturbing. These are: the personalisation of politics, witch hunting within the government including army, muzzling of free press and disregard for electoral rules of conduct.

It was personalised politics that induced the ‘psychological warfare’ against General Fonseka and key opposition leaders like Mangala Samaraweera. It started with hundreds of armed soldiers and policemen surrounding the hotel in which the General and his family, along with some political leaders were staying. The ‘siege’ for nearly the whole day was show strength to buttress claims of Fonseka plotting a coup or to assassinate President Rajapaksa. It had its impact with the General in turn talking of a government plot to kill him.

It did not end there. The humiliation of the General who led the army to victory six months back continued with a raid on his office and 15 retired army men of his staff were arrested for alleged conspiracy to assassinate President Rajapaksa and his family. The high drama is sure to have sent a clear warning to the opposition leaders not to take those in power lightly. This unhealthy trend could continue during the run up to the parliamentary poll.

There had been strong allegations of interference of ministers and government officials in the poll process. There had also been a number of violations of Election Commissioner’s orders including armed violence, intimidation and misuse of government media during the campaign period. In one such instance Dr. Jayalath Jayawardena MP belonging to the UNP has accused the supporters of Deputy Civil Aviation Minister Sarath Gunaratne of trying to chase him and other UNP members away from the counting centre to create the “necessary environment to rig” the Presidential poll.

After the election, the government has systematically tried to single out those considered as opposition supporters and take action against them. It has carried out the biggest ever purge in the military sacking those considered a ‘direct threat to national security.’ According to media reports 14 military officers including five Major Generals have been issued letters of compulsory retirement. This witch hunt sets a political precedent that could create schism within the armed forces affecting its efficiency and morale in the long term.

Media that had supported the General are also facing the flak. The editor of Lanka, a pro-JVP paper was arrested. The visa of a Swiss reporter, who asked a slightly embarrassing question at a press conference, was withdrawn till the President rescinded the order. The office of the website Lanka e news was sealed to prevent airing of critical comments. These are only a few of such incidents of threat to the media.

As expected, these actions have drawn adverse international attention. Both the U.S. and the European Union have urged the Sri Lankan authorities to investigate reports of "irregularities" during the country’s recent election and ensure the safety of the defeated opponent. Leaders of opposition and civil society have also expressed their serious concerns.

But in the past the government has shown little concern or sincerity in handling complaints of governance and lawless conduct. The ruling coalition and the government have to change their style and create a peaceful environment for conducting the parliamentary poll by their actions. Unless they do this, the credibility of the poll and its conduct could become suspect.

President’s likely actions

The President has to walk the talk to show his readiness to act on three major issues: meeting Tamil aspirations, cleaning up the image of his government, and attend to urgent demands of post war economy. The process of wooing Tamil is going to be tricky as it has to be done without antagonising Sinhala ‘vote banks.’ We can expect the President to increasingly allow free movement to the north, speed up visible development projects and rehabilitation effort in the war ravaged villages, and announce substantive reduction in high security zones occupied by troops. He is also likely to try and get the TNA leaders under his wing, taking advantage of existing differences among them.

After showing the opposition that he was in no mood to ‘forgive and forget,' his political priority would be to gain absolute majority for the UPFA in parliament. However, it is not going to be an easy task as he has to clean up the image of his government. That would require substantive improvement in rule of law, withdrawal of the state of emergency and quick disposal of cases of the LTTE prisoners and suspects held in custody. We can expect him to take a series of measures on these aspects but their outcome could get corroded due to the current atmosphere of confrontation.

Even after six months since war ended, Sri Lanka is yet to gain its full benefit. The $40-billion economy has to be put on its feet. Foreign investments in government securities to the tune of about $ 1.6 billion have been made. Both India and China are involved in upgrading infrastructure. In spite of this, Sri Lanka has a few problems.

High food prices and swelling numbers of unemployed could turn the population restive. The President cannot dish out liberal largesse to the people as he is required to introduce cost cutting measures as agreed upon when the International Monetary Fun granted a loan of $2.6 billion. With their own problems of economic management, both the EU and the U.S. might not be forthcoming to bale out the President, particularly as they have been unhappy with his style of governance and cavalier attitude to their concerns. In such a situation, we can expect the President to lean on both India and China for substantive increase in economic assistance.

(Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com Blog: www.colhariharan.org)