Paper no. 1223	17. 01. 2005
INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES 2005: A Perspective Analysis by Dr. Subhash Kapila  Introductory Observations: India’s foreign policies, fortunately, have enjoyed bipartisan political support domestically, markedly from the 1990s onwards. The year 2004 witnessed a change of political complexion of the Government in India raising uncertainties in international quarters that under a Congress-led Government foreign policies may revert back to the Nehruvian mould. Initial pronouncements by the new Government and especially its new foreign minister created some confusion. However, international realities and global security environment soon forced the new Government to prudently stick to the earlier general direction.   India’s foreign policies first significant change in direction, attendant with change in India’s economic policies took place under the stewardship of a Congress Prime Minister from South India and not belonging to the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, namely Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, who recently passed away. He was the initiator of India’s ‘New Look’ foreign policies.  Foreign policies of any nation do not function in a vacuum. They are a product of the prevailing international environment and the country’s indices in terms of its geo-strategic location, economic health, military strength and domestic stability. Hence PM Narasimha Rao’s ‘New Look’ foreign policies arose from the prevailing international environment at the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and its global countervailing power and the need for India to detach its foreign policies from domestic minority vote bank considerations and also to focus on neglected regions. Hence the thrust for a strategic partnership with Israel in West Asia and the ‘Look East” foreign policy. So also was the quest for a substantive relationship with the United States. This was not to the liking of many of the Congress Party hierarchy. The latter half of the 1990s till 2004 witnessed a BJP Government in power. Its tenure coincided with the post-Cold War era, the major rise of United States unilateralism and the new American policies of pre-emption and military intervention in global affairs without restraint. The Vajpayee Government of the BJP continued with the overall general direction of foreign policies of the Narasimha Rao Government.  However greater intensity was accorded to the build-up of US-India strategic cooperation, normalising and enlarging cooperation with China, besides Vajapayee’s personal commitment to bring a military adventurist and terrorism proxy-war nation like Pakistan to the dialogue table.  India’s Foreign Policies-Imperatives for a Change of Direction/Nuances: Constancy of operational factors/considerations are not the hallmark of the international situation. It is a rapidly changing world, where increasingly the global security environment undergoes changes rapidly and new equations are struck and new doctrines postulated by United States unilateralism, at times in immoral contradiction of its established and declaratory policies e.g. Compromising on counter-terrorism against Islamic Jehad and condoning Pakistan's WMD proliferation.  While the turn of the millennium augured well for the general direction of Indian foreign policies under two separate political dispensations with an over-emphasis on a US-India strategic partnership, the last few years of the 21st Century indicated otherwise.  The last few  years of the 21st Century in terms of international/political developments impacting on India’s foreign policies presents the following broad picture: United States with its tactical obsession with Pakistan has placed the emerging USA-India strategic partnership on the back-burner. India is no longer a priority for USA. Russia at long last has realized that it is no longer a “natural ally of the West”. The post-Cold War knee-jerk reaction of forging a strategic alliance with China has not brought the desired fruits. Russia may look for resurgence on its own strengths. China despite a phenomenal rise in trade with India and a flurry of visits by senior Chinese leaders to India has yet to give up its strategic nexus with Pakistan. China continues with the military build-up of Pakistan and establishing the infrastructure of a Chinese military presence in Pakistan. The Indian sub-continent or so called South Asia , presents a dismal security environment. Pakistan strategically buoyed by American political, economic and military aid continues with its illusions of strategic parity with India and has not displayed any indicators of political maturity or conflict resolution. Turmoil and conflict continues in Nepal and Sri Lanka. Bangladesh under the present political dispensation is anti-Indian and emerging as an alternative base for Pakistan’s proxy war against India. The indicators above present significant challenges for India’s foreign policies in 2005 as they generate imperatives calling for a change in direction/nuances of India’s existing foreign policies thrusts. The thrust of this paper is to present a perspective analysis of India’s foreign policy challenges for 2005.  United States-India Relations Under Challenge of Continued Engagement:  The turn of the millennium effervescence in United States-India relations has evaporated and so also the prospects of a meaningful strategic partnership emerging in the future. This is the stark reality in 2005 notwithstanding the rhetoric emerging in Washington and New Delhi.  This situation is not of India’s making. This situation has been generated by United States and an avoidable one at that strategically. The United States had a choice to make and that was whether the emerging United States-India strategic partnership could be jettisoned in favour of enlisting the dubious services of Pakistan to further American strategic expediency with relation to Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. The United States chose the latter. To add insult to injury, the United States has moved further ahead with weapon-systems and military equipment aid in an effort to placate Pakistan’s military rulers call for conventional parity with India. Pakistan was also surreptiously designated as a Major Non-NATO ally without taking India into confidence. In Indian perceptions the above has seriously eroded United States credibility  in terms of its declared policies, intentions and deviations from the two foregoing. It is galling for Indians to see the American President extolling the Pakistani military dictator as a valiant fighter against terrorism and a steadfast ally. Indians have not forgotten General Musharraf’s role as the architect of the Kargil War (1999), the proxy war by the Pakistani Army in Jammu and Kashmir and the American condonation of Musharraf’s WMD proliferation.  American policy makers are likely to dismiss the above as Indian whining. They forget that all of the above has: Endangered and ruled out a United States-India strategic partnership. Will force India to look for alternatives to preserve its national security interests. Likely to make India resist US pressures against development of her ICBM and SLBM arsenal. India’s major foreign policy challenge in 2005 would be how to walk the tight-rope in keeping alive India’s engagement with the United States and not let them go on the glide-path towards estrangement. The responsibility on India is heavy as the United States is not likely to make India’s task any easier with their narcissistic obsession with Pakistan. On the contrary, the United States may exert avoidable pressure on India on the Kashmir issue to placate the Pakistani military dictator. India would need strong political will to ward off such pressures. For more on this, readers may refer to this author's paper: “United States-India Relations on Glide Path Towards Estrangement?” (SAAG Paper No.1183 dated 10-12-2004).  Russia-India Relations Present Hope of Re-kindling of Strategic Partnership: Russia no longer presents the strategically dismal picture as it did in 1991 or in 1996. It may be economically down, but not down and out. The Russian Federation has reasonably weathered its national crises one after the other. Its strategic assets are intact and it cannot be ignored in any global strategic calculus. Within Russia, the Atlanticists with their slogan of “Russia as the natural ally of the West” have lost the debate and Russian foreign policy is veering towards its traditional focus.  In terms of India’s foreign policy formulations, Russia presents the following perspectives: Russia has had a history of strategic relationship with India. India’s armed forces have a 60-75% dependence on Russian military inventories. Russia seems to intend to re-kindle a strategic partnership with India as evident from President Putin's recent visit to India. Russia could emerge as a major source of energy security for India. If the above factors were not enough the recent American policies of being insensitive to India’s national security interests (Pakistan-specific) is likely to prompt India too in re-kindling its strategic partnership with Russia.  This issue stands elaborated in this author's paper entitled: “Russia Re-kindles Strategic Partnership With India” (SAAG Paper No.1180 dated 07-12-2004).  The challenge of re-kindling Russia-India strategic partnership should be pursued forcefully by Indian foreign policy planners in 2005.  India’s Challenge in Relations With China-Enlargement With Vigilance: China’s policies towards India changed significantly after India’s nuclear weapons tests in 1998. China after its initial hysterical reactions on India’s nuclear weaponisation settled down to accept the new strategic reality on its Southern frontiers.  China’s new approaches towards India manifested itself in the following ways: China ensuring peace and tranquility on the Sino-Indian frontiers. China-India economic cooperation and two way trade registering a phenomenal growth which is likely to tough  US $10 billion. Increased China-India military-to-military contacts. All of the above augurs well for Sino-Indian relations, but at the same time Indian cannot ignore the following Chinese moves: China’s slow movement on the boundary dispute dialogue. China’s continued military build-up of Pakistan. China’s strategic military cooperation in South Asia with Pakistan and Bangladesh, both adversarial with India. China’s development of naval infrastructure on India’s flanks-Gwadur (Pakistan) and Chittagong (Bangladesh). China therefore prevents a significant foreign policy challenge to India in 2005. India’s foreign policy planners need to aim at: Enlargement of Sino-Indian relations. Attempt dilution of Sino-Pakistan strategic nexus by imaginative diplomatic maneuvers. Emphasising the strategic realties on China of the choices of cooperating with a rising major power like India as opposed to building up a regional spoiler state in the form of a pygmy  state like Pakistan. Concurrent with India’s attempts to enlarge and enhance its relationship with China, India needs its utmost to exercise vigilance and detailed scrutiny of China’s  strategic moves in South Asia, till such time China shows definite signals of change of priorities in its South Asian policies.  India and the European Community and the Potential for Multi-polarity: The European Community with specific reference to France and Germany offers the potential for working towards a more multi-polar world. The European Community with the rising value of the “Euro” and its attraction as an alternative to the US dollar in terms of global nesting of financial reserves and trading leads to the prospects of the emergence of an alternative “Euro Trading Area” to the Dollar.  The rising economic strength of the Euro coupled with the political independence of countries like France and Germany offers an attractive foreign policy challenge to India. India also enjoys the luxury of being a lucrative market for European defence equipment sales. A selective use of this option by India could help Indian foreign policy planners to elicit favourable political responses for India’s national security and economic interests.  India and West Asia-Strategic Interests Should Outweigh Political Platitudes: India’s new Congress government under the influence of its constituent partners of the coalition like the Communists and the Muslim League besides the Nehruvians in the Cabinet have tried to veer India’s foreign policy in West Asia towards platitudinous approaches on the Palestine issue and opposed to Israel. This has caused concern within the Israeli government.  India’s national security interests are best served by its intensifying the strategic cooperation with Israel followed by the Narasimha Rao Government and the Vajpayee Government.  The challenge in 2005 for India’s foreign policy on West Asia are going to be: Re-assure Israel that India values its existing strategic cooperation with it and would like to it to be made more substantive. India would politically support the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Israel. Emphasise to Israel that it must invest in a continued Israel-India strategic partnership. Emphasise to Israel that the above should  not become a hostage to the tenor of US-India relations. For greater elaboration of this subject, see this author’s paper: “Israel-India Strategic Cooperation And Prime Minister Sharon’s Visit: The Added Dimensions “(SAAG Paper No. 777 dt 02-09-03)”.  India’s foreign policy planners for West Asia have a bigger challenge in keeping alive its good relations with Iran in the face of stiff opposition from the United States. The United States till such time it militarily intervenes in Iran (prevented by its military overstretch) has embarked on international isolation of Iran. India should not be a part of any such effort.  Both India and Iran must continue to pursue vigorously the thrust enshrined in the Teheran Declaration and the Delhi Declaration.  For different reasons, Israel and Iran assist India’s natural security interests and these two should be the focus of India’s foreign policy in 2005.  South East Asia- The Need for Two-Tier Diplomatic Engagement: India’s “Look East” policy devised by late Narshimha Rao has borne fruit in the last decade and a half. India today enjoys good relations with all the countries in the region. India has good interface with ASEAN in various capacities as well as setting up regional economic and development groupings like BIMSTECH and Mekong Ganga Project. While these over arching efforts need to be reinforced and pursued vigorously, relationships with all the countries cannot be pursued with the same intensity.  India’s foreign policy challenge in 2005 would be to fashion a two-tier diplomatic engagement with the region. Tier 1 countries should be those with which India has more substantive political, economic and military links. These include Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore. Tier II countries should incorporate the remainder of the region. Vietnam has strategic convergences with India and has extended strategic cooperation all along. India needs to build further  and enlarge on this base its ties with Vietnam. East Asia and South Pacific Challenges The challenge here is that the major countries located in this region i.e. Japan, South Korea and Australia are strong United States allies linked to USA with substantive defence ties. Hence their attitudes towards India will be determined by existing USA attitudes towards India.  However of late it seems that Japan while attaching value to the Japan-US security linkages is embarking on a more independent political course. Under the Vajpayee Govt. high-level exchanges have taken place from both sides. India and Japan have also agreed to work together for demanding a UN Security Council Permanent Membership with full veto powers.  Japan has revived interest in significant investments in India’s infrastructure and enough convergences exist in the strategic area also.  India’s foreign policy challenge in 2005 should be to vigorously pursue Japan towards a strategic partnership with India. South Asia Foreign Policies Should Ignore Pakistan and Dwell on the Rest of the SAARC Countries: In the last five years, India’s foreign policies in South Asia, under American prodding or pressure has led to the following: ·        Legitimising Pakistan’s military dictatorship by inviting Musharraf  for the Agra summit. ·        Equating Pakistan with India by engaging in unconditional talks with a terrorist and proxy war state and an implacable foe of India. ·        Seeking peace with a country whose very existence which has been framed by the Pakistan Army and its Generals as a “Warrior State” not amenable to peace in South Asia. ·        Misreading Pakistani masses yearning for peace with India as the political aspiration of the Pakistani military dictatorship.   India should long ago have dispensed with its Pakistan-centric South Asian foreign policies. It is high time that India’s foreign policy planners ignore Pakistan totally from their strategic calculus for South Asia. India should concentrate in a focused manner to improve and enhance its relationships with Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. The political stability of these countries is more critical for a South Asian stable security environment than pandering to an inflated egoist state like the militarized Pakistan.  India if it has to exercise political magnanimity in South Asia, it should be towards these countries and not Pakistan as American interlocutors suggest.  Pakistan even under a combination of a rabid Mullah-cum-Pakistan Army dictatorship cannot pose more military threats to India than it has done so far.  Pakistan should be left in the American lap, a situation relished by both. Let USA take care of Pakistan’s stability and India should concentrate on the rest of South Asia.  Concluding Observations: The old adage in foreign affairs stipulates that a nation does not have permanent friends or foes; only its national interests are permanent. India’s foreign policy challenges for 2005 arise squarely from this precept.  In terms of the above, the prevailing global security environment, the existing global power structure and the United States redefinition of its South Asian priorities suggest: India’s proximate relations with the United States,  and particularly the strategic partnership which it so assiduously pursued in the last decade, no longer serve India’s national security interests. Russia and India which veered off their quarter of a century old strategic partnership (USA as a causative factor due to political and economic inducements to both separately) have enough convergence of interests to re-kindle their strategic partnership. China, for whatever reasons has invested heavily in an enlarged economic relationship with India. It needs to further invest in an enhanced political relationship with India by divesting its South Asian policies of its Pakistan strategic nexus policy priorities. Pakistan is squarely in America’s lap as a major non-NATO ally. One of the underlying aims of NATO is the containment of China. China needs to take notice of Pakistan's new anti-China status. India’s foreign policy challenges in 2005 therefore lie in going in for course-corrections of the overall foreign policy directions followed by the Narshimha Rao Govt and the Vajpayee Government.  India’s quest for strategic partnerships lie elsewhere than the United States and it is this challenge which India’s foreign policy planners must face in 2005 and craft policies which while keeping USA engaged politically, look elsewhere for countervailing power, counter-pressure points and multi-polarity. (The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email drsubhashkapila @yahoo.com)
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