Paper no. 2546	11-Jan.-2008
India's Emerging Strategic Security Paradigm  and Sri Lanka Policy Col R Hariharan (retd.)  The Sri Lanka government has formally ended its ceasefire agreement signed in 2002 with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It only regularises an existing state of war that had been going on since December 2005. It is a sad development because it shuts the door on the peace process sponsored by the Tokyo Donors Conference. While the four co-chairs of the Tokyo Conference –the EU, Japan, Norway and the US, can walk out of the peace process, India as a close strategic neighbour of Sri Lanka, India cannot afford to ignore the development. It will also face the fall out of yet another round of full scale war in Sri Lanka in some ways, because India-Sri Lanka relations have become closer than ever before.   The hesitation of the Indian Prime Minister Manhmohan Singh in accepting the invitation of Sri Lanka to visit Sri Lanka on the occasion of the 60th Independence anniversary on February 4, 2008 would indicate that he understood the gravity of the developing situation.     Sri Lanka's close physical proximity, cultural, religious and linguistic affinity with India have imparted a unique status to the relations between the two countries. Tamil minorities' struggle for their rights in Sri Lanka had been a major source of friction between the two countries, till the two countries signed the India-Sri Lanka Agreement in 1987. After India's bid to help the country resolve the issue through physical intervention between 1987 and 1990 failed, this issue enjoys a low priority in Indian foreign policy. However, it continues to draw the sympathy of the government and population of India, particularly in the state of Tamil Nadu. In the last ten years or so, India-Sri Lanka relations which had gone cold in 1990 have thawed. Both countries have assiduously built them with a convergence of strategic and economic interests. Still at the popular level there is a lot of misunderstanding and mutual suspicion on both sides of the Palk Straits over each others intentions and objectives in fostering the relations. Based upon the extent of India' involvement, its Sri Lanka policy can be considered in three stages: pre 1983 phase, active intervention phase 1983-90, and post intervention phase 1991-to date. The first two phases of this relation have been widely discussed, and debated. But, there is a lack of objective analysis of the relationship in the post-1991 phase mainly due to the continuing Tamil quest for equal rights and as a corollary the LTTE insurgency.     Learning from active intervention 1983-90 Sri Lanka government has a long history of political confrontation with Tamils clamouring for equal rights since 1956. The situation progressively degenerated with the state increasingly depending upon the use of force to handle the Tamil agitators. As Tamils politicians lost their credibility support for a new breed of militants increased among the population.  The LTTE came into limelight in July 1983 when it carried out an ambush in which 13 soldiers of Sri Lanka army were killed. In retaliation violent mobs carried out a pogrom against Tamils. The 'Black July pogrom' and its aftermath marked a watershed in India's Sri Lanka policy. From 1983 to 87 the objective of India's engagement with Sri Lanka was two fold. India wanted to help Sri Lanka government and the Tamils to evolve a workable solution to the Tamil problem. At the same time, India wanted to prevent Sri Lanka from becoming the cockpit of super power domination of the region intruding in India's sphere of influence. Initially, when Tamils were suffering at the hands of Sri Lanka security forces, India provided refuge for the militants. They were also helped with financial and arms support. Though India's efforts at enabling the two sides to evolve a solution at Thimphu talks failed, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's keenness saw the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement in 1987. The Indian Peace Keeping Force troops sent to Sri Lanka to assist the implementation of the 1987 agreement got involved in prolonged insurgency war with the LTTE which went back on its support to the agreement.  India pulled out the troops in 1990 after the Sri Lanka President Premadasa and the LTTE leader Prabhakaran got together to show India out of the country. The Indo-Sri Lanka relations took a nosedive as a result. In 1991 the LTTE carried out the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in a fit of vengeance. It also masterminded the massacre of Sri Lankan Tamil leaders taking refuge in India. That ended the little credibility the LTTE managed to retain among the public. From this bitter experience India appears to have learnt one clear strategic lesson: India's strategic involvement in Sri Lanka should be on a firm foundation based upon long-term engagement with the country than on the basis of reactive intervention.  Probably it also learnt the limits of external intervention in dealing with the vexing issue of Tamil rights: for achieving a durable solution the Sri Lanka government and the Tamils themselves will have to work it out. Strategic shifts 1987-2007  During the last two decades, India's strategic priorities in Indian Ocean Region, and as a corollary Sri Lanka, have changed. This is in keeping with a number of changes in the global economic scene and strategic power balance. Unlike the 80s, national security now means more than physical security. It has been enlarged to include economic security, free trade and commerce, energy security, and lastly upgrade the social security of the population. In keeping with this, India's foreign policy perceptions, conditioned earlier by the cold war considerations, have also changed. In the present world dominated by the U.S. as the sole super power, building better India - U.S relations has become number one priority. This is an important component of India's strategic linkages to safeguard its interests globally. The proposed Indo-US nuclear initiative is part of this change in outlook. The US sees India as not only a valuable and stable democratic power in this region but also as a rapidly growing market and source knowledge power. The US also sees India  as an important ally in its global war on terrorism because its multicultural and multi-religious society bridges the Islamic world and the rest of Asia. At the same time, India would like to maintain its close traditional ties with Russia, which continues to be an important strategic partner of India. India's Look East policy evolved since 1990s aims at building closer ties with the ASEAN group of nations to expand India's commercial reach. It has signed a Free Trade Agreement with Thailand as a part of this policy. It is trying to built close trading relations with Myanmar and use it as a gateway to open up the troubled India's northeast for trade with ASEAN. India is developing infrastructure to develop physical links with the region. India had been holding talks with Pakistan to revamp its relations. Similarly, India and China have been trying to synergise their areas of convergence for mutual benefit. Though many see India as a counterpoise to check the assertion of Chinese power in this region, India would like to develop a friendly rather than confrontational relation with China. Indian armed forces are undergoing modernisation to make them mobile, with greater fire power. India's missile development programmes are well on way to make it a missile power with intermediate range missiles as its component. Globally there had been increasing recognition of India's ability  The sea-lanes of Indian Ocean have become vital for India's expanding global trade. They carry fossil fuels so vital for India's ever increasing energy needs. India sees Sri Lanka as a sentinel of its security astride the Indian Ocean. Indian navy's development as a blue water navy is on the cards to protect its maritime and economic interests. India's shift in relationship with Sri Lanka has to be understood in this broad strategic context, than in the background of its historical baggage of cold war period.     The India-Sri Lanka strategic relations In keeping with these developments India's strategic interest in Sri Lanka has been enlarged to protect and project India's strategic and economic interests by building strong bonds with Sri Lanka. India has developed strong trading links with Sri Lanka.  It is poised to become $ 5 billion by the year 2010 as the FTA between the two countries is being given more form and content. As a result in both the countries there is greater appreciation of each other's perceptions and actions at all levels. India is vigorously trying to build a win-win bilateral relation and cooperation in the political, economic and cultural spheres with Sri Lanka. However, the extent of this cooperation would depend on what Sri Lanka desires. This desire and the changes in India's strategic perception are reflected in its present approach to the Sri Lanka Tamil struggle for their rights. After its experience during the period of active intervention, India feels the Sri Lanka Tamil issue is best resolved by Sri Lankans themselves. India's relations with Sri Lanka in the post-Rajiv Gandhi period (as spelt out by J. N. Dixit in his book My South Block Years) are broadly on the following lines: India continues to be supportive of the legitimate political, social and cultural aspirations of the Tamils. India, however, opposes the LTTE's quest for exclusive power and its violent and terrorist methods to attain its goals. India would be supportive of initiatives aimed at resolving the crisis in Sri Lanka through political dialogue. India's support to the current peace process in Sri Lanka underwritten by the Four Co-chairs of the Tokyo donors' conference with Norway as a mediator reflects this belief. India does not believe the issue can be resolved through military means only. The attitude of the Government of India and the Government of Tamil Nadu to the ongoing Eelam War-4 is based upon a clear stand that war alone would not be enough to find a solution to the Tamil problem. India has repeatedly stressed the need for Sri Lanka to evolve a formula for devolving powers to the Tamils. This shows their continued support to the demand of Tamils, while not permitting or condoning any LTTE activity in Indian soil. To the extent possible, the governments are ensuring that the LTTE does not enjoy shelter or sanctuary in India. India's coast guard and navy have been actively cooperating with the Sri Lankan counterparts to prevent smuggling of supplies for the LTTE from India. This is in keeping with India's avowed policy of opposing any secessionist or terrorist group operating from its territory. Internal political considerations Coalition politics at both the state and central level has come to stay for over a decade now. In many states regional parties focusing on local rather than national issues are in power. In Tamil Nadu the two Dravidian parties - the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and its clone the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) have been ruling the state for four decades, with the national parties downgraded to become partners of electoral fronts without a share in power.   In 1983 when the Tamil refugees fled to Tamil Nadu they were welcomed by the public. There was a spontaneous groundswell of public sympathy for the Tamil struggle and Tamil militants were hailed as warriors fighting for the cause. However, two developments split this support base for militants in Tamil Nadu in 1987: the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, and the military operations of the IPKF against the LTTE. was not accepted by most of the Tamil people, who had romantic notions about it.  The AIADMK in power in the state as sponsor of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord fully supported it. On the other hand its foe the DMK came out strongly against the war on LTTE. This became an important election plank for the DMK to launch itself back to power. However, after the IPKF was pulled out the issue was progressively getting marginalised when the LTTE went on a rampage in Tamil Nadu massacring the entire leadership of the Eelam Peoples Liberation Front (EPRLF) who had taken refuge in Chennai. Close on the heels of this attack, Prabhakaran with his skewed vision engineered the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the architect of  the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and former prime minister in Chennai. The people of the state were shocked and from then onwards support for the Sri Lanka Tamil cause has become a non-issue in politics.  Only a small section of Tamil Nadu politicians vocally espouse the Tamil cause now. The widespread admiration that the LTTE enjoyed earlier has become abhorrence of its violent methods for most of the people. There had been other social changes in India in general and Tamil Nadu in particular. The country is riding the crest of an economic boom and Tamil Nadu has become the hub of IT based services and automobile manufacturing industry. The population appears to be more concerned with its India-centric preoccupations of economic progress than old style politics of the eighties. So their support for the Tamil struggle in Sri Lanka remains mostly limited to expression of sympathy only.  Looking ahead Sri Lankan leaders of all political hues including Tamil politicians have been inviting India to play a major role in Sri Lanka peace process. Even President Mahinda Rajapakse soon after he was elected in 2005 requested India to join the four Co-chairs sponsoring the peace process. India had been reluctant to do so. But it has been supporting the international effort at peace making. At the same time its support had been consistent on three issues: unity of Sri Lanka as a single national entity, equal rights for Tamils and their language, and preferably a federal system of administration for Tamil areas. India's continued and consistent stand against the LTTE insurgency as well as the government's adoption of a military solution without offering a devolution package for Tamils is ample testimony to this. Even while commenting on the recent abrogation of the CFA, India has reiterated its stand. It has said "what is required in Sri Lanka is a settlement of political, constitutional and other issues within the framework of united Sri Lanka". This should allay the fears of Indian hegemony used by elements of Sinhala polity and media, and surprisingly the LTTE also, as a red rag to whip up emotions among the gullible public on India's intentions. Of course, India's actions shall always be in its own national interest. With the close relations with Sri Lanka built during the last ten years, a peaceful, stable and prosperous Sri Lanka is an asset for India. The same holds true from India's strategic security point of view. Some Tamils would like India to end its hostility to the LTTE,  "in the interest of Tamils." India has never seen the LTTE as the sole arbiter of Tamil destiny. There is no ambiguity about it. Moreover the LTTE remains a banned organisation in India after Prabhakaran masterminded the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. India is not likely to condone the LTTE and its leader, who have not cared even to apologise for this dastardly act on Indian soil. Politically no party either in Tamil Nadu or rest of India will be able to sell the idea to the public. Even Tamil leaders with known pro-LTTE sympathies like Vaiko and Dr Ramadoss have been soft pedalling this issue. Except for a small section in Tamil Nadu, the people do not see the current war against the LTTE as a war against Tamils. However, the Government of India's action, if any, to bring to book the three leaders of LTTE including Prabhakaran who are prime-accused in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case is not known. Indian stand does not preclude the possibility of India supporting any move by the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE to bury the hatchet. This was shown by the support India had extended to the peace process of 2002.      With the four co-chairs and the international community that supported the peace initiative unhappy with the ending of the CFA, Sri Lanka is likely to look at India for greater understanding and support. However, this is likely to put India in a bind. President Rajapaksa's actions in opting for military operations before dealing with the more complex political issue of devolving equitable powers to Tamils has not endeared him to India. While this might be correct in the light of LTTE's own incorrigible acts of violence during ceasefire, such logic does not necessarily drive public perceptions. His much-publicised initiative in working out a political consensus is yet to fructify. The 'mysterious' killings, and dismal human rights record of the government machinery have raised many eyebrows in India about his intentions. If he wants to upscale Indian support, his actions have to be comfortable for the Manmohan Singh's coalition of parties who will be facing a parliamentary election in India this year. And mere implementation of the 13th amendment of the Sri Lanka constitution might not be adequate to do the trick.    The reaction of Tamil Nadu to national policy shifts on Sri Lanka will continue to be an important factor. The Sri Lanka Tamil issue was never the main piece of Tamil Nadu public or political agenda. But it was a key issue. Right now it stands downgraded. However, if war breaks out in full scale and the refugee inflows increase it will stage a comeback particularly among minor political partners in the central coalition. In principle the DMK is unlikely to change its stand. However, it might change its mind if political compulsions are there. So Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's utterances and actions on Sri Lanka will continue to be cautious and watchful lest the carefully contrived coalition suffers any tectonic shocks before the elections.  This indicates India's internal political dimensions of power rather than ambivalence in India's foreign policy on Sri Lanka.  However, if the Tamils can evolve a viable formula with some chances of success the DMK may well be persuaded to take it up with the Indian government for support. And that would be the light at the end of the tunnel, but where is it?  (Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com)
Back to the top Home  | Papers  | Notes  | Forum  | Search  | Feedback  | Links Copyright © South Asia Analysis Group  All rights reserved. Permission is given to refer this on-line document for use in research papers and articles, provided the source and the author's name  are acknowledged. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes.