Indian strategy in full
circle: Is taming the Tiger, is to tame the
Lion?
Guest
Column: By Ravi Sundaralingam
Abstract:
The issues facing the Tamils are many, mainly
due to three reasons. One, they are struggling
without a proper political leadership. Two,
their economy has deteriorated leaving the
ordinary people in dire straits, while their
neighbours are improving; three, we have always
been reactive than proactive with our Indian
neighbour and, have consistently fail to
understand its political-behaviour, stands and
the policies and, importantly our Tamil
brethren. We briefly explore the present
situation and suggest that we should move our
agenda forward with a leadership to match it.
For this purpose, we also suggest five
principles the Tamil political parties and
militant groups must adhere to, based on
empowerment of our people as the practical and
philosophical parameter.
It
seems from some angles that there is no hope of
a resolution for the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka
at least from the Tamils point of view, for the
moment. The propaganda by the Sri Lankan media,
picked up and amplified by the foreign news
agencies is convincing enough that the war by
the Sinhala state against the LTTE has become a
great success and seemed moving towards a
decisive phase. The ground situation tells us
that the LTTE has abandoned large chunk of its
de facto Tamil state and dispersing into the
jungles, in a phased withdrawal, enduring only
the necessary and calculated number of
casualties. It is true, faced with the Sri
Lankan military arsenal in terms of quality and
quantity, an army one of the largest in the
region, and at present the ‘international
license to go after the Tigers’, LTTE would be
militarily defeated if they stood up and faced
their enemy, but why should they?
As for
the LTTE it would want us to recall the
comebacks it has made, against the Sinhala army
and another time out-manoeuvring the mighty
Indians, and so expect the Tamils to abide by
them, but can they afford to? Anyone closely
observing these LTTE comebacks would have
noticed that every one of them was at great
costs to the concept and strength of the Tamil
struggle. The differences among the Tamil
communities are now fully exposed and exploited
by the state to its advantage, and each comeback
has forced more of them to seek safety and
economic life elsewhere, mainly in the Western
province. Many dejected and desperate Tamils now
live in Puthalam in large numbers among the
Tamil speaking Muslims, who were callously
ejected by the Tigers from Northern Province.
The catchment areas and the age group have been
dwindling for Tiger recruitment, as the people
desert their lands. These military successes
have also brought in the attention of the
leading international powers, they in reality
want to curtail the ascendance of the LTTE more
than their concern about its terrorism, hence
the banning of the organisation and its arms and
freezing of its assets.
Whatever
the Tamil peoples reasoning, hopes and real
expectations are, the regional reality check has
dawned on the combatants reminding them that the
prevailing condition in the region is called
India. The question is not whether India can
establish its regional control euphemistically
referred to as regional security, but what do
the Sinhala state and the Tamils in Ceylon will
get out from it, and give up for it? Until now,
there is no doubt, it is the Tamils who are
paying up front for something they are forced to
buy without even knowing what it is, and it is a
fact that it is the Tamils who have been
suffering in the murkiness created by the
policies of the Indians and the misconceptions
and actions of the Tigers.
There
are certain maxims in life, though not precise
as in science, like the 2nd law of
thermodynamics (it asserts that efficiency of
any machine cannot ever reach 100%), which
cannot be rewritten. One such edict teaches us
that the art of fighting a war is not winning a
few battles, but the war to win over the losing
rebel army and the people who support it,
otherwise one could only be contemplating
genocide like the Anglo-Saxon invaders’ approach
to the natives in Australia, Canada or USA.
The
Americans as the superpower have been trying to
disprove this historical truism, despite own
failures in Vietnam, Indo-China, South America,
and now Iraq and in Afghanistan, one of the
poorest in the world where the richest, the
Americans, believe the meaning of civilisation
is being fought. Perhaps, because of their
Anglo-Saxon roots and colonial heritage, USA and
its Western allies still believe that with just
the military might and the willingness to use
it, and some control over resources they can
institutionally subdue anybody of people
anywhere.
Their
want of trying is an affordable exercise to
them, and even in failures they have their
success, as they return the people they are
fighting against to stone age by the carnage
they generate to such an extent, even valuable
resources the natives possess become totally
useless for their immediate purpose; just watch
the disintegration of the Iraqis. For countries
like Sri Lanka however, fighting a war means
only a war within their borders, as they are
never going to be a power to project it over any
other, even countries of the size of San Marino,
nor have such a history to boast. Their pride,
bravado, identity, and history are all about the
fights with the tribes next door and exerting
their numerical power over the smaller nations
and minority communities within their
territories, presented to them by their colonial
masters.
The
espoused economic reasons by the apologists, as
in the case of Sinhalese, for invading into the
lands belonging to the smaller nations and
minorities, and turning colonisation as
legitimate state policy tell us the failure of
these people as innovators and masters of their
economies; primitive in their inception, and not
surprisingly primitive in ambitions. These utter
failures become palpably obvious even to the
ardent or secret anti-Indian Lankan, when India
is flying its mega-size rocket to start off its
long-term program of space exploration, Pakistan
is filing in for bankruptcy and fighting a war
within and with the invading Americans and
Afghans to preserve the state and define its
meaning; and Sri Lanka, well it has reached yet
another orbit of hyperbole, undeterred by the
noises rising from its giant neighbour. For such
countries and nations learning this basic truth
about wars, in our modern times, can only come
through enforced experience.
Sri
Lanka will soon learn this truth, as for now it
wants to glorify itself by addressing the Tamils
as the vanquished and the Sinhalese as the
masters of the island by pursuing a military
solution to the island’s ethnic crisis. To this
extent its propaganda aims to use its recent
military victories as a psychological tool with
the sole purpose of convincing the Tamil
communities, mainly those living abroad, that
they should give up their support for the
struggle. Amid all the propaganda of Mahinda’s
Sinhala government, the claim that it has
defeated the LTTE is the most dubious, but the
lack of any offer of a political solution is
critical. In such circumstances the call for
the surrender of the LTTE is not aimed at LTTE,
but at the Tamil communities, and the talk of an
end game is aimed at squaring the circle with
Indians.
It
is sad that Sri Lanka has consistently failed to
truly understand and accept that the Tamil
grievances as real and are due to it peoples’
fallacious understanding of the island history
and its oppression of the Tamil communities. The
rise of the LTTE and its dominance of Tamil
politics may have complicated and exasperated
already existing problem, but the defeat of the
LTTE certainly will not mean the elimination of
the fundamental problems; the national question
and the democratic rights of its minorities.
Presenting the Tamils struggle and the LTTE as
one and the same has only benefited the Sinhala
chauvinist state and we can see the reasons why
it wants to persist with that claim. Military
defeat for a militarist outfit like the Tigers
might only mean the inherent failure in their
military strategy, and if more, their basic
demand for a separate state for the Tamils,
Tamil Eelam. Does this mean that Tamils are now
have to come to terms with the ‘reality’ that
the island belongs to the Sinhalese, because
they are the dominant and victorious people as
the xenophobic Sinhala leaders or some of the
Tamil quislings began to suggest? Defeat or not
for the LTTE, the Tamils have all the reasons to
continue with their struggle against the Sinhala
state, but in what form?
Indian
strategy
Many
amongst us will slate India saying that it does
not possess a consistent policy towards Sri
Lanka and its ethnic crisis. While this may be
true in part in its assertion about the national
question, only a fool will say that India did
not know its own interest in the island. India
has intervened many times in Sri Lanka,
militarily and politically: every time to save
the state, which it had decided is part of its
regional interest, a policy that is consistent
and hasn’t changed a bit despite its support for
the Tamil militancy in the eighties.
Indian
policy makers follow the ancient philosophical
position comes tradition of the Kshatriyas, like
the great teacher Drona in Mahabarath. For whom
the concept of a state is not how it is
constituted, but what was at the beginning and,
how and who should change it. It is like a big
land bought with trees, bushes, animals and
birds, and the question is how you go about
making a living off that land while making a
home within it, with minimum change possible?
Drona wasn’t and wouldn’t have been concerned
whether Dharmar or Duriyodana represented the
state, or what it meant, but the state itself
had a meaning.
In a
caste driven society with a clear consciousness
about tribal, national, regional distinctions
those who are the counsel for the Indian state,
perhaps, feel that they alone are responsible
for keeping “things together” for the
politicians to change them in their great wars,
whatever that may be along the timeline.
“Keeping things together” means there can be
interference to change the dynamics, but there
can be no interference to change the aggregate
or overall content at the outset. Keeping things
together in India means preserving the power of
the state irrespective of its meaning, not
allowing anyone or people to take overall
control such as to dictate terms to the
political institutions of the time, which can go
through changes in a time allowed ‘natural’ way:
evolution and not revolution. An exemplification
can be found in the extremely contrasting modes
of Great Asoka’s approach to his people yet, the
underlying theme for a certain type of dynamics,
via good conduct, and the aim to preserve the
state run through both of them; one, according
to him, his desire to create, ‘the hell on
earth’ to extend and preserve the state power,
and two, convinced by the Buddhism and of its
view on non-violence and sanctity of life, his
direction to the state’s officials to erect
pillars carved with its main teaching all over
his state, and to create an army of
state-informers to ensure people behave
accordingly. For those unfamiliar with the great
Indian epics from North or South, its history,
and with no intimate or respectful relationship
with its people, all these will sound
contradictory in terms and logic: “absolute
nonsense”.
Indian
policy at work has always that basic tenet of
our argument: India, “interferes to preserve”
than “interferes to destroy” that doesn’t mean
it is averse to changes. In Sri Lanka, India
intervened to preserve the state, which it
perhaps considers as an envelope that hold
‘something inside’ or ‘things together’. It came
in to save the state from the JVP attempts to
overthrow it, but was willing to save its
leadership when they were at the point of
extinction and later work with them to alter the
dynamics within the state. It supported the
Tamil militancy to prevent the state being
overrun by alien influence, according to its own
definitions, but will support the state against
the LTTE to prevent the tigers dictating terms
to the state entirely by military means. It
argued and worked for the preservation of a
Hindu-Monarchy in Nepal, but once it realised
the same can be achieved, probably in a more
effect way, accepted the Maoist and their
allies, without much of a fuss.
Though
Indian policy making hasn’t deviated from this
basic belief, in the manner it has been
advocating its action has gone through
considerable changes, mainly due its ever
improving self-confidence. In this sense at the
beginning of it interference in the Sri Lankan
crisis India perhaps, had self-doubts about
advocating anything concrete philosophically and
sociologically to the Lankans, while it has so
many historical questions itself. Regional
interests then strictly guided Indian policies,
while they were also going through adjustments
due to global changes, and of its concern to the
reactions in Tamil Nadu. And allied to these
policies, an element of aggression was also
added as a policy in order to enforce them. The
lack of self-confidence can always be detected
by the aggressive mannerism and violent
tendency, and not allowing any room for
discussions or diplomacy: another social maxim
that applies to peoples and individuals. Whether
in Thimpu, Bangalore or Delhi no quarters were
given to the Sri Lankan or Tamil sides for too
much discussions, as the overall outcome in each
case was predetermined.
It is
noticeable, even at its lowest confidence level
India was mindful not to give the Tamils the
equal parity with the established state, instead
entered into a bilateral agreement on their
behalf. We don’t see the possibility of a change
in this policy even though we have been
consistently arguing for a tripartite agreement
between India, Sri Lanka, and the Tamils. Then
again India is not the same that went into a
bilateral agreement on behalf of a people
belonging to ‘another country’ and sent it
troops to supervise its enactment. It is a
confident middle class India, recently
emboldened by its nuclear deal not just with the
USA, which not so distance past imposed
sanctions in protest against India’s atomic
tests, also with the French who are American’s
competitors in the business even before the US
Senate ratified the 123 agreement. In other
words, India has all the reasons to believe it
has the full licence to impose its will in the
region.
If
Indian policy makers are steadfast about the
sanctity of a state, irrespective of its
constitution, they are equally determined how
the changes can be made to it. The cliché, “no
military solution to a political crisis”
repetitively mentioned in every communication,
one feels carries the same weight as India’s
willingness to save the Lankan state. India has
confirmed its personnel are with the Sri Lankan
army, its generals routinely visit the fronts,
perhaps even share ideas, provides satellite
images to the state, trains and equips its army,
helped to deplete LTTE’s military supplies and
to destroy its storage deports in the high seas,
and even said to be the cause for the decline of
Tiger’s navy. It was in part responsible for the
splitting of the Karuna faction from the LTTE,
and tactically accepted the de-linking of the
Eastern province, in contrary to its demand in
the Indo-Lanka accord, just to discredit LTTE’s
demand for sole-representation and its de facto
state. Beyond its military and diplomatic
support for the Lankan state, it has been
providing financial aid to Sri Lanka, at crucial
times, all this has built a factor of trust and
reliability as far as the Sri Lankan state is
concerned.
When
collectively viewed it seems India has decided
that in order to have a solution to the island’s
ethnic crisis, the LTTE has to be brought to
size, for which it feels the time is right.
That means there will be room for the Tigers
only as a guerrilla force and not a conventional
force threatening to militarily dismantle the
Sri Lankan state, or in a position to dismiss
all other political factors and factions as
irrelevant ‘traitors’. Does this preclude all
possibility that the people of the island,
Sinhalese or Tamils have forever lost their
right to change the nature of the state? Or do
they need the Indian’s consent to do so? As far
as the Indian policy makers are concerned, they
don’t see the contradiction in an armed struggle
against the state, but how it argues for a new
augmented state, but does this suffice for the
citizens of another country? How can Indian
policy makers demand or impose a condition that
their own citizens would not accept?
At
present this seems this only a theoretical and
spurious debate for a small people caught up
between a fire and a storm, and has no
consequence to their predicament. There are
those who spend their time counting the few
countries that have escaped the clutches of such
regional or global conditions; Kosovo and East
Timor are the two often mentioned Abkashia and
South Osscestia are two more additions to the
list. What they fail to see, these are born out
of special circumstances, which evolved due to
global changes in geo-politics based on economic
developments. Can anyone actually see the
likeness, between our situation and any in the
list above let alone the likelihood of our
circumstances changing into such momentous
conditions?
On the
other hand, if there is no conventional military
threat to the Lankan state, India can question
the need for the state for such an arsenal and
personnel, and therefore can demand a scaling
down, which will put and end for the need of
alien military aid.
If our
information and calculated speculations are
confirmed facts, then this logical reasoning can
be extended, and we can confidently suggest that
India will continue this process to reign in the
Sinhala state and bring them down into their
spectrum as well. The trust and reliability they
have built with them, along the Indian idea of a
state, and the economical interdependency built
over a long period, which will become stronger
in the developing global economic scenario, may
be tools India feels that can help to fine-tune
a state already in transition with the 13th
amendment. If need be, there is always the
excuse of the Tamil Nadu factor and the support
for Tamil militancy, which can be used to knock
a few ideas the Lankans have into shape. But,
are they enough to make a state, which is
primitive in its construct as much as in
practice to behave the way and yield a solution
to the ethnic crisis, at least as much as the
India wants? We have serious doubts about this
as a concept or proposition, as much as we
recognise the basic aims of the Indian policy
makers, especially those in Delhi. But, how do
we approach them or have a dialogue to convince
them of their misconceptions about Sri Lankans?
If some of the Tamils feel that their own mother
has mugged them, having imposed the leadership
of LTTE on them one can understand a sense of
proportion in their argument.
Question
of a leadership than leaders
During
our current phase, some of our intellectuals
have started to write and profess their newfound
wisdom: “Tamils are exposed”. And those recently
parachuted into the ‘struggle’ without a bit of
knowledge of our struggle or India or Tamil
Nadu, suddenly feel overcome by the talk of
differences among the Tamil communities, and
they desperately want to poly-fill those social
cracks patently obvious and laid bare for
everyone to see. So, they utter their immortal
words, “the Tamils are now exposed as a
consequence of the defeats the LTTE has
suffered”.
What
these people with opaque eyes don’t see, their
preset minds will never comprehend is that ‘it
well and truly happened a long time ago’:
exactly when the Tamils were forced to accept
the leadership of the LTTE. Is this a rhetorical
statement and no more? Well think about it, if
India is promoting or allowing an organisation,
with one-man leadership, willing to commit
atrocities beyond the call of duty, with an
utmost commitment to a separate Tamil state,
which it has said it will never allow as it
penetrated the Tamil militancy with the offer of
military assistance, what were they thinking
about? Did it mean India accepted even as early
as that, it has to accept the inevitability of
an LTTE like natural born killers to become
leaders of a separate state in their backyard?
If these thumb-screwing intellectuals, doubling
up as sofa-generals are still persisting with
their borrowed military theories like dodgy
second-hand car dealers, that the Tamils can
assert military superiority over the numerically
vastly greater, internationally recognised
state, then how can anyone blame the leadership
of the LTTE, which doesn’t know anything other
than absolute violence to understand the scale
and the insurmountable task it faces? However,
they continue to spin out their dreamt up
scenarios of economic collapse and
self-destruction of the Sinhala political
system, new global conditions with the election
of Obama, and collapse of the capitalist system
worldwide. According to these soothsayers, when
an opportune time arises the LTTE, even if they
are left with only 300 members (Remember Granma
Crossing; were there 5 or 9 revolutionaries with
Castro?), would prevail against all odds, armed
with only clubs and machetes. However, they
conveniently forget that even if one such
fantasy should come close to be true, there is
always India to close the doors on them: it will
not allow the military defeat or the economic or
social collapse of the Sri Lankan state. This is
not something we like or wish, but our
observation about the regional reality.
Tamils
started to be exposed when the Indians realised
that we are as many peoples among Tamils as the
number of militant groups landed on their
shores; when these groups competed with each
other for the patronage of the Tamil Nadu
political parties, and showed their preparedness
to kill amongst and talk and do nothing but
violence. Tamils were exposed when India was
able to promote the petty and innate ambitions,
and naked aggression of these groups as a ploy
to pre-empt a politically united national
framework to evolve, finally allowing for the
eradication of every group by a process of,
Indian influenced ‘natural selection’. Tamils
were exposed when Indian strategists decided
that they should not and shall not allow a Tamil
leadership that can develop a democratic
decision making process within itself as a group
and outside as a people, so that there is
political directive all the time, especially at
difficult times. The evidence for this can be
seen every time LTTE begins to lose militarily,
wherein its voice begin to fade and Tamils sink
into the darkness filled by empty slogans and
noise of the outsiders, the so called
supporters. We may ask, if Tamils were not
exposed as early as that, why do we need the
Tamil Nadu politicians to raise their antics to
save them, or plead for the India or the
international community to come to their rescue,
whenever we feel the LTTE is losing or not
getting the attention from anyone to our plight?
Worse
still are these people’s expectations of the
LTTE. Real Tigers for all their faults are
humble enough and knew where their weaknesses
lie: in their assumptions about peoples, nation,
and humanity, and socio-economic expectations,
but pursued them regardless because they truly
believed in their military capabilities, and
believed that it alone will overcome all their
deficiencies. If the international conditions,
particularly the Indians weren’t prevailing they
could have even established some military
supremacy over the Sinhala army momentarily,
like the Eritreans during a brief period over
the Ethiopians. However, no other Tamil militant
group would have chosen the military path as it
did, and would have ever produced men and women
of valour as the LTTE. The individual feats at
the fronts, the pain and endurance, the enormous
sacrifice they are ever so willing to make are
marks of the LTTE that have been etched on our
people’s history despite the noise of their
enemies, mainly their own creations.
But,
the sad truth is that these victories and
sacrifices were never translated into anything
tangible over the long period the Tigers had
taken control of the Tamils’ lives, and their
bogus supervision over our peoples’ destiny. It
is this fact above all else, their voracious
killing spree and suppression of opponents and
discussion, total disregard for human kindness
and humanity, proves that the military prowess
alone and, unfortunately their great sacrifice,
mean nothing in the international arena. Tamils’
military superiority over the Sri Lankan state
can only be established in a bubble, when the
international community restrict the Sinhala
state’s vigour and ability to fight. When these
true facts are known, when the ordinary men and
women, in most cases teenagers, of the LTTE have
laid their lives without questions, to expect
them to continue with their sacrifices without
any positive results, is the most treacherous of
crimes. These expectations of the LTTE by the
so-called supporters are nothing but an
absolution and abandonment of their own
self-responsibilities, and it is beyond humane
beliefs. It is time, instead of the pretentious
support for the LTTE, just by giving some money
and parroting the slogan for Tamil Eelam, some
of these people should put their heads above the
parapets and be counted. Don’t forget, the
present phase was brought about the LTTE’s
decision to select Mahinda as the Sinhala
President over Ranil, it is alleged, after
receiving sack full of Dollars from Rajapakse
family.
Tamils
are exposed, yes, because of the Indian
interference, misadventure of the LTTE and their
persistent believe in a failed military
strategy, false belief in a nation without the
thought of building one, and many other
subjective conditions we can list, but most of
all they are exposed because of the lack of
leadership, a fact Tamils must rectify if they
are to advance.
If we
are correct in our understanding of the India’s
Lankan policy, we are not entirely convinced of
its ability to deliver. There is always the
nagging feeling, what if the Sri Lankans call it
a bluff and go for a military solution despite
Indians’ wishes and their actions to prevent it?
If the USA can come around to make a nuclear
deal with the Indians, despite their
protestations of their nuclear ambitions only a
decade ago, why can’t the Indians accommodate
the Sinhala state, because they have to, after
demolishing the Tamils of Ceylon as a people
with traditional homelands and as a sizeable
minority to maintain ethnic pluralism in the
island? Obviously, we do not know of all the
tools and parameters India may have to control
the actions and activities of the Lankan state.
If the
Indian council in Delhi is entirely soundproof
to the cries of pain and foul of our
long-suffering people in Ceylon, and willing to
wipe the history and the memories in their
dealing with the Lankan state, then they might
even be prepared for the sacking of the Tamils
as a people in the island and accept what the Sinhala chauvinists want. Then, they would have
accepted a change beyond redemption, contrary to
their basic belief we have highlighted; the
dynamics in the island no more, only a static
position would be the result. Would India
sincerely prefer the imposition of such a
scenario and its implications on itself?
However, we as a people suffering under Sri
Lankan oppression, and the unfulfilled promises
of the Indians and their policies have no need
to search for the answers or thrust them.
Meanwhile, though as Tamils we will feel enraged
and argue about the moralities of these actions,
we also know they are as unproductive as thrust
in others. What we should not forget is our
responsibilities towards our people, and try to
adopt our efforts with an understanding of these
Indian actions in a regional context and the
underlying theme within them. It is with this
knowledge we can survive this atrocious phase to
continue with our peoples struggle for full
democratic rights. For this we need to construct
a leadership for all times, and a
socio-political strategy allied to an armed
struggle if necessary in which all our peoples
can be fully take part, and have a sense of
belonging.
When in
our community have questions about leadership,
it is often misunderstood and taken as sly
remarks against one or another leader.
Individually and collectively they all fail to
understand it is about a collective decision
making process as leaders of different
communities and groups, and within their own
groups and communities. Because of our economic
underdevelopment these two positions are often
in conflict and confusion ensues. However, we
can transcend beyond these barriers, if the
intellectuals and community leaders, especially
among the Expatriate communities, play their
roles responsibly, without primitive partisan
views and unintelligible theoretical responses.
Can
there be an acknowledgement that asking for more
sacrifice from any particular group and our
eternally suffering Tamil speaking communities
is inappropriate and is a horrid way of shirking
of our responsibilities? Can we accept, whether
we like it or not, we are now exposed than ever,
without the support of anybody in the
international communities, other than our Indian
brethren for better or worse? Can we accept
that there is no nation to talk about, unless we
are prepared to build one and defend it for the
benefit of all those live in it? Can we also
understand, despite our wishes, there are
international and regional conditions that
cannot be changed by us alone, a small aspiring
people without a nation and any international
support beyond empty words, and diplomatic
jargons and double-talk? Our choice in some
sense simple enough: one, we persist with our
hope that the LTTE will alone deliver; two
accept that Sinhalese reign supreme in the
island and surrender to the chauvinist power as
an inevitability; three, we accept there is
India and the regional reality it brings
therefore, work with it to advance our cause
without getting entangled in philosophical
discourses. But, if we are to make any choice
that we can call it our own, then we need to
build a leadership that can understand and
articulate our ever evolving internal and
external conditions with the responsibility it
deserves. If such a feat is possible, it could
have only come through the understanding and
acceptance of the following principles.
The
leadership of the Tamils must accept that the,
- Sri
Lankan state has to be fundamentally
reconstituted to accommodate the aspirations
of all its peoples,
- fundamental tenets of the Thimpu principles
in its entirety must be enshrined within the
new constitutional framework,
- full implication of their regional
responsibilities,
- nation building is more important than the
assumption of a nation, therefore,
empowerment of our people as communities and
individuals are the immediate priorities,
and
- action program must incorporate the content
and the concepts of all the five points,
with an inbuilt priority given to the fourth
point, above.
We hope
that those feel that they are born leaders and
those in the front for the limelight forever
playing the second fiddle as supporters of our
peoples’ struggle are responsible and courageous
enough to take our call for discussion further
in a constructive manner
(Ravi
Sundaralingam is the Academic Secretary of
ASATiC and can be reached at
Academic_secretary@gmail.com)