Japan-India Joint Declaration On Security Cooperation (2008) Overhyped

JAPAN-INDIA JOINT DECLARATION ON SECURITY COOPERATION (2008) OVERHYPED

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

Japan-India Strategic Partnership in its purist strategic dimensions has been a theme which has been vigorously pursued by this Author for nearly a decade. So has been vigorously pursued by this Author the theme of a greater strategic role by Japan and India, individually and jointly in the security management of Asia.

Regrettably, both Japan and India have demonstrated apologetic attitudes towards the exercise of their strategic power and strengths. Both Japan and India need to recognize that strategic rhetoric in their periodic “declarations” on “strategic partnership” and “security cooperation” alone will not equip these two nations to emerge as multiple poles in the global configuration of power.

Japan’s and India’s apologetic attitudes were once again in evidence, when during the recent visit of Indian Prime Minister, both Prime Ministers signed the “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation Between Japan and India” on October 22, 2008 in Tokyo.

No sooner was this Joint Declaration signed that both the Indian Prime Minister and the Japanese Prime Minister, Taro Aso, rushed with apologetic assertions that this Joint Security Declaration was not aimed at China.

In India, leading strategic analysts and political commentators over-hyped this Joint Security Declaration as some “highly significant seismic strategic development” which would change the security architecture of Asia.

The Joint Security Declaration would have been a seismic strategic development, had the apologetic protestations by the Japanese and Indian Prime Ministers not taken place. It goes beyond saying that it was China which weighed heavily on such an initiative. Further, had the Joint Security Declaration included “Elements for Cooperation” more than what already has been taking place between Japan and India for a member of years in the military sphere it could have been considered as significant.

In terms of China’s reactions, any strident criticisms in Chinese language strategic literature cannot be taken as that China has been strategically startled or become militarily fearful of a Japan-India Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. China is fully aware that presently Japan and India in their policy fixations exercise “cautious deference” to China’s strategic sensitivities and hence the follow-up apologetic assertions by the Japanese and Indian Prime Ministers following their signatures on the Declaration.

With the above contextual background, this Paper proceeds to analyse the following elements and perspectives on Japan-India Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.

Japan-India Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation: Nothing New and Nothing Strategically Startling
Japan and India’s Unwarranted “Cautious Deference” to China’s Strategic Sensitivities
Japan and India’s National Security Interests: Differing Strategic Visions

Japan-India Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation: Nothing New and Nothing Strategically Starting

The Joint Declaration signed on October 22, 2008 in Tokyo is laid out in three parts (1) A longish “Preamble” of “Reiterations”, “Recognitions” and “Committals” (2) A short listing of “Elements for Cooperation” and (3) “Mechanisms of Cooperation” outlining the consultation and cooperation process.

Nowhere in the “Preamble” is listed any reiteration or recognition that Japan and India envisage the imperatives for a collaborative effort towards Asian security and Asian security management and that this Declaration is a step towards that end.

In the Preamble, Japan has cleverly slipped in a reference to Japanese Navy’s replenishment activities in the Indian Ocean which essentially is of the US and Western Navies and the Pakistan Navy, purportedly as part of the global war on terrorism.

Affirmed in the Preamble, is a reference to a Strategic and Global Partnership (Japan and India) “that is driven by long-term political, economic and strategic interests, aspirations and concerns”. The irony is that during this Summit Meeting in Tokyo, Japan could not agree to the signing of a “Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement” that India was hoping for. If reservations exist on a “Strategic Economic Partnership” what future does have security cooperation between Japan and India?

Coming to the most important part of the Joint Declaration, in the “Elements for (Security) Cooperation” nine elements are listed in the Joint Declaration. A comparative analysis of these nine elements with the Joint Statement signed by the Japanese and Indian Defence Ministers in May 2006 would reveal that essentially in terms of contents, these nine elements of security cooperation already are operative and most of them were operative before 2006 also.

And the same goes for the “Mechanisms of Cooperation” with the exception of a few additions. The level for “military-to-military” level talks from the Indian side has been designated at “Joint Secretary level”. Nothing de-values the Indian approach to Japan-India military-to-military level talks than the Joint Security level designation especially for a country like Japan which has strong military traditions. How can a civilian Joint Secretary from India substantially contribute at military-to-military level exchanges.

This Joint Declaration at best may have been an attempt as a “political signaling exercise” to China, but even that stands diluted by apologetic assertions by both Prime Ministers.

More charitably at best, this Joint Declaration can best be viewed as a reiteration but an apologetic reiteration of the desire to cooperate in the security sphere by Japan and India.

Japan and India’s Unwarranted “Cautious Deference” to China’s Strategic Sensitivities

China has never hesitated to destabilize the security environments of Japan and India and never ever has been apologetic about doing so. The following stands reiterated in this connection in this Author’s earlier Papers on the subject”

China deliberately and consciously built up the nuclear and missile capabilities of North Korea for strategic and political coercion of Japan by proxy.
China deliberately and consciously armed Pakistan with nuclear weapons and nuclear capable missiles to strategically destabilize India by proxy.
China facilitated transfer of North Korea’s long range strategic missiles to Pakistan to offset India’s superiority in the missile field.

With such a record, does China merit a “cautious deference” to China’s strategic sensitivities as so abjectly displayed by the Indian Prime Minister and the Japanese Prime Minister while signing the Joint Security Declaration?

Japan and India need to recognize the harsh political reality that in dealing with China there exists no space for strategic naivety or political niceties. China exercises power diplomacy and it is time that Japan and India should shrug off their apologetic attitudes towards power.

China seems to subscribe to Henry Kissinger's famous quote that “Power is the great aphrodisiac". Where do the Japanese and Indian Prime Ministers turn to for an aphrodisiac that could steel them in their resolve to meet the China challenge?

Japan and India’s National Security Interests: Differing Strategic Visions

Japan and India are geo-politically located in different political spectrums of Asia’s strategic architecture. It naturally follows that both Japan and India would have differing strategic visions.

Japan’s national security interests and its strategic vision earlier in the Cold War was focused on the Russian threat. In the post Cold War period China looms large in Japan’s threat perceptions and is so reflected in its Defense While Papers.

Japan’s strategic vision envisions a strategic reliance on the United States to off-set the current potent “China threat” and a nascent Russia threat. The US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty with the United States has provided the bed-rock of Japan’s security for the last 60 years. In return, Japan forms an integral part of US strategic planning and management of East Asia Security and confronting China.

Contrastingly, India had to depend on its own self-reliant defence capabilities and on Russia’s countervailing power later to off-set the strategic pressures it was subjected to during the Cold War by the United States and China. India has developed a self-reliant nuclear and conventional military posture. China today looms large in India’s treat perceptions.

India’s strategic vision however differs widely from Japan when it comes to countering the China threat. While Japan is strategically dependent on USA for offsetting the China threat, India on the other hand expects to deal with the China threat on its own and not in alliance with others.

However, scope exists for Japan and India to forge strategic cooperation framework between the two nations. As mentioned in my earlier Papers on the subject any such strategic cooperative framework between Japan and India to offset China’s domination of the Asian security space has to be independent of the United States alliance security framework in East Asia.

The present Indian Government may have given an impression in the last year or two that it is willing to be a participant in the additional layers of security coating in Japan-US security framework in East Asia by participating in talks in Japan-US-India Trilateral and Japan-USA-Australia-India Quadrilateral. The Japan-India Joint Security Cooperation Declaration should not be viewed as one more security layer. In India the mood in the strategic community is for “strategic autonomy” in India’s defence postures and strategic partnerships.

The strategic challenge therefore is more for Japan as to how it can craft such an independent strategic cooperation framework for joint security cooperation with India.

Concluding Observations

The existing global powers have invested heavily on the prospects of Japan and India strategically emerging as global powers to manage Asia’s security and stability and contribute to overall global security.

This global strategic investment on Japan and India basically emerges from the unpredictabilities and insecurities caused by China’s not so transparent strategic aspirations and its military build-up.

Japan and India have yet to demonstrate that they are politically ready to play the “power game” in Asia more specifically. It goes beyond saying that the global power games are basically focused on China today and that challenge can only be restrained by “exercise of power” and not “rhetorical psychiatry” as Japan and India seem to be doing at present.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila@yahoo.com)