POST MUMBAI 9/11: INDIA
PARALYZED BY PAKISTAN’S SUPERIORITY IN
“BATTLE OF PERCEPTIONS”
By Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory
Observations
Pondering agonizingly
over India’s paralysis in not striking back
credibly against Pakistan in response to the
Pakistan Army and its ISI-sponsored “war of
terror” assault on India’s sovereignty at
Mumbai on November 26, 2008, this Author
came across a feature in “The Jerusalem
Post” written against the back drop of the
assaults on Israel’s sovereignty by
Hezbollah earlier and Hamas presently and
why Israel strikes back forcefully.
The point that caught
attention in this feature was that
currently, the Israeli Defense Forces in
their senior commanders training lays
emphasis on how modern warfare is
conducted. Israel believes that emphasis
today should not be on which side conquers
more territory or loses more fighters and
fighter aircraft – as was the case in
conventional battles such as the 1967 Six
War, “but rather on perceptions. In other
words, the victor is the side that is
perceived to have won”.
Applying this precept
in the context of Mumbai 9/11 and India’s
paralysis in the post-Mumbai 9/11 phase of
over a month, one painfully comes to the
conclusion that the root cause of India’s
lack of credible responses against the
Pakistani military establishment, the ISI
and their affiliated Islamic Jihadi
terrorist organizations, is that Pakistan
established a superiority over India in the
“Battle of Perceptions”.
India’s long history of
not striking back at major
Pakistan-sponsored terrorism incidents from
1992 onwards, India’s misplaced faith that
“Friends of Pakistan” would dissuade
Pakistan and restrain Pakistan’s war-like
provocations against India and Indian
political leadership of the day shirking
from the will to use power, despite
preponderant instruments of power at their
command, led to Mumbai 9/11 – a “war of
terror” on India when a handful of Pakistan
terrorists held India to ransom for three
days in sustained gun battles and blasts.
In those three days more than 200 lives were
lost.
Post-Mumbai 9/11,
India’s political leadership fell back in
its traditional mould of shirking to use
power to safeguard India’s “National Honour”
and the unprovoked assault on her
sovereignty.
Brave statements were
made by India’s political leaders that “all
options are on the table” in terms of a
riposte to Pakistan. But the one option
that India should have exercised in the
first few days of Mumbai 9/11, “continues to
lie on the table” even after a month of the
attacks.
India’s political
leaders to strategically chastise Pakistan
for its proven involvement and culpability
in Mumbai 9/11 attacks moved away from their
strident calls on Pakistan to atone for
Mumbai 9/11 to a “diplomatic offensive” to
present clinching evidence to world
capitals. The Indian policy establishment
should realize that it is not fighting a
“court case” where evidence will count.
Does it not occur to the Indian Government
that it is dealing in terms of terrorism
with a “rogue state” dominated by Pakistan
Army on whose agenda, peace with India does
not figure. Nor would any guarantees by
Pakistan military establishment count that
no further terrorist war against India would
take place. Are not Pakistan’s broken
pledges to the United States to wage war on
terrorism, a lesson to be learnt and kept in
mind?
India continued to be
let down by its political leaders, policy
advisors and policy formulation mechanisms
in not responding firmly at the outset and
thereby further reinforcing Pakistan’s
“perceptions” that India can be played
around with and will not respond even after
a "thousand bleeding cuts"
The Pakistani policy
establishment and its more powerful military
establishment stood emboldened by their
“perceptions” of India’s leadership
vulnerabilities to launch Mumbai 9/11 and
stand further emboldened by the
“perceptions” once again that India would be
unable to strike back and continue to seek
assistance and support from “Friends of
Pakistan”, rather than acting on her own
strengths.
Pakistan therefore
stands to have won the “Battle of
Perceptions” on both counts due to India’s
flawed counter-terrorism responses.
This Author’s last
paper entitled “India: Policy Establishments
Failure on Pakistan Threat Assessment (SAAG
Paper No. 2987 dated 19 Dec. 2008 has
already brought out in fair detail the
flawed threat assessments on President
Zardari and General Kiyani, Pakistan Army
Chief of India’s political leadership and
India’s policy establishment.
This Paper intends to
be a study of the following aspects of the
“Battle of Perceptions” between India and
Pakistan and is discussed under the
following heads:
- India’s Flawed
Perceptions on Pakistan
- India’s Misplaced
Perceptions of Trust in “Friends of
Pakistan” to Restrain Pakistan’s “War of
Terror” Against India
- Pakistan’s
Perceptions of India’s Paralysis to
Strike Back, Post -Mumbai 9/11
This Paper is not going
to elaborate on what India’s responses
should be, which is a separate subject by
itself but focus entirely on why India fails
to strike back credibly and creates “wrong
perceptions” in Pakistan. Only if India had
done so in the past and does so now after
her “diplomatic offensive” is over, can then
India hope that the “appropriate
perceptions” have been created in the
Pakistani military establishment's mind that
India cannot be messed around with.
But before addressing
the above aspects, a bit of digression is
required to highlight Indian political
leader’s propensity to shirk from
safeguarding India’s “National Honor” and
India’s propensity to rely on the
international community to discipline
Pakistan’s “War of Terror”.
India’s Political
Leaders Propensity to Shirk from
Safeguarding India’s National Honour and
Propensity to Seek International Support to
Discipline Pakistan’s “War of Terror”
India’s political
leadership of both the previous Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) and the present ruling
Congress Party have both demonstrated a
propensity to shirk from safeguarding
India’s National Honour” and a marked
propensity to seek international support,
more specifically from the United State to
discipline Pakistan’s “War of Terror”
against India. Both have abdicated their
responsibilities and seek to “outsource
India’s counter-terrorism” to the
international community.
The BJP after armed
attacks on India’s Parliament House in
December 2002 mobilized the entire Indian
Army on Pakistan’s borders and promised an
“Aar Pas Ki Larai”, the mother of all
battles, to end Pakistan’s terrorism against
India. It was a bold move which could have
brought decisive results had Indian forces
struck in the first few months. The BJP
leadership let the strategic advantage
fizzle out after a year, under pressure from
the United States.
The Congress government
in the wake of Mumbai 9/11 gave strong
indications that it would indulge in air and
missile strikes and should Pakistan enlarge
the conflict use India’s conventional
might. Once again, history has been
repeated and the Congress Government, like
the BJP Government buckled under United
States pressures for restraint. Once again
India’s strategic advantages over Pakistan
were foreclosed.
India’s political
leaders of all political dispensations need
to be reminded of a few home-truths on both
these counts from two quotations from the
noted British strategist Maj. Gen. Fuller,
which this Author incorporated in the last
chapter entitled “Prescriptions for India’s
National Security” in his book “India’s
Defence Policies & Strategic Thought: A
Comparative Analysis”. They read as
follows. First on “National Honour”:
“There is only one balsam which can make
peace worth living – Honour, which is
righteousness. There are sublimer ideals
than mere peacefulness, and honour is one of
these. Peace without honour is degradation
and as a noble woman safeguards her honour,
and will even sacrifice her life to maintain
it in order to keep the family clean, and as
a man will give up his life to protect her
and her children, so will an upright nation
because of its honour, not only protect but
sacrifice itself for righteousness cause.
All may be lost save honour, for without
honour mankind ceases to be human”
and then the thoughts
on nations relying on international support
to safeguard “National Honour” and this
presently applies to India in more ways than
one:
“The nation which depends for the
security of its honour on some international
force (or support from a superpower: my
emphasis) has become but a kept woman among
nations. There is only one guardian of
honour – a virile arm backed by a virile
brain. Again a state, which is not prepared
to defend its honour by a righteous war, and
depends on the benevolence of others to
guarantee its existence, when life is
threatened, is but a paralytic living in an
alm-house; it has scarcely the right to
live, for it lacks the might to thrive”
These two messages for
all Indian political leaders should be
self-explanatory and also denote what Indian
public opinion expect from their political
leaders, especially when after Mumbai 9/11
Indian nationalism stands aroused.
If India’s political
leaders pay heed to these two maxims, they
would be able to ensure that the next time
around India is subjected to another
Pak-initiated terrorist strike, India’s
instruments of power stand readied and are
used for flick-knife retaliation without the
agony of unending debates on Indian TV and
media as to what India’s options should be.
Nor would there be any requirement to heed
advice of “Look before you leap”, India
should at all times be ready for a strategic
and military leap to chastise its
aggressors.
India’s Flawed
Perceptions on Pakistan
India’s political
leaderships and policy establishment’s
flawed perceptions and misplaced readings on
the emergence of President Zardari and
General Kayani and their impact on Indo-Pak
security environment stand discussed in the
last Paper of this Author. Timely warnings
on these two dignitaries on this account,
given months in advance of Mumbai 9/11 stood
reflected in this Author’s Papers since
mid-2008.
India’s flawed
perceptions on Pakistan prevailing in the
mindsets of Indian political leaders and
policy making establishment are reflected
below in brief.
Strategically and
militarily, the following misperceptions
seem to prevail in India’s policy making
circles: (1) Pakistan with its nuclear
weapons arsenal is the strategic equal of
India (2) In case of Indian military strikes
against Pakistan, that country could strike
back with nuclear weapons (3) Pakistan has
the capability and wherewithal to enlarge a
limited war into a general war (4) China
could enlarge and intervene in any
Indo-Pakistan armed conflict (5) Pakistan
can inflict massive damage in retaliation of
Indian strikes.
India should welcome
Pakistan crossing the nuclear threshold as
it would be a suicidal step for the
destruction and disintegration of Pakistan.
China in the current security environment
where Pakistan’s “war of terror” could visit
Xinjiang also would not be tempted to go
beyond rhetoric in any Indo-Pak armed
conflict.
Politically, the Indian
policy making mindset is dominated by the
following misperceptions (1) Pakistan could
develop into a peaceful neighbor with more
political patience and understanding from
India (2) Pakistan’s politics domination by
Islamic fundamentalist elements could fade
away (3) Pakistan Army could be brought
under firm control of a civilian democratic
political government (4) Pakistan’s civil
society wants peace with India (5)
Pakistan’s civil society could bring about
the over throw of Pakistan Army’s political
dominance of Pakistan’s governance (6) Track
II diplomacy and use of Special Indian
Envoys to Pakistan could facilitate peaceful
Indo-Pak relations (7) Pakistan is a
responsible stake-holder in regional peace
and a responsible member of the
international community.
To any discerning
Indian policy maker it should be evidently
clear that all the above perceptions of
Indian policy establishment on Pakistan are
misplaced and wrong. There are no concrete
indications on the ground to suggest
otherwise.
It are these strategic,
military and more substantially the
political misperceptions on Pakistan which
have distorted Indian policy-makers
formulations on Pakistan and the absence of
an Indian credible response to Pakistan’s
provocation “war of terror” against India.
India’s political leaders and policy
establishment needs to recognize the reality
that more than a decade of Track II
diplomacy and the flitting of Special Envoys
between New Delhi and Islamabad have not
brought the two countries to peaceful
co-existence. This is for the simple reason
that the Pakistan Army calls the shots in
Pakistan on its foreign policies and peace
with India is not Pakistan Army’s
objective.
India’s Misplaced
Perceptions of Trust in “Friends of
Pakistan” to Restrain Pakistan’s “War of
Terror” Against India
Pakistan would like to
claim the international community as
“Friends of Pakistan” because most of the
Western countries, China and the oil-rich
Islamic monarchies of the Gulf Region
bankroll Pakistan’s sustenance,
notwithstanding that the bulk of these
finances are diverted to the Pakistan Army
and the operation of Pakistan’s “War of
Terror” against India and Afghanistan.
In terms of discussion
of India’s misplaced trust in “Friends of
Pakistan” to restrain Pakistan’s “War of
Terror” against India, the discussion in
this Paper would focus on the role of the
United States, China and Saudi Arabia.
Despite 9/11 when
the United States itself was subjected to a
combination of Pakistani operated and
Saudi-financed terrorism onslaught against
mainland USA, the United States has been
reluctant to recognize that the Pakistani
“War of Terror” against India is also part
of the global Islamic Jihad and needs to be
firmly dealt with in a concerted manner by
the global community by backing strong
actions by India against Pakistan, rather
than diplomacy.
The United States has
the strategic, military, political and
economic clout to stop Pakistan’s “War of
Terror” against India. But it would not use
that clout, because Pakistan colludes in
American strategy in the region and India
does not.
India’s trust that an
evolving US-India Strategic Partnership
would make America play a different
ball-game in South Asia, vis-à-vis Pakistan,
is grossly misplaced, in light of Mumbai
9/11.
The flurry of top US
dignitaries visiting New Delhi in the wake
of Mumbai 9/11 were not intended to
reinforce New Delhi’s resolve to strike back
at Pakistan but to pressurize India not to
resort to military strikes against Pakistan
and exercise restraint.
China enjoys even more
stronger strategic, military, political and
economic clout over Pakistan. In the wake
of Mumbai 9/11 and moreso in the years
preceding it, China was in a strong and
coercive position to restrain Pakistan’s
“War of Terror” against India. It did not
do so for reasons best known to every
Indian.
In the wake of Mumbai
9/11, China has advocated restraint on both
India and Pakistan. However the actual
message should have been a stern and
salutary message by China to Pakistan, that
its “War of Terror” in the region, which may
eventually engulf Xinjiang too, should
stop. China can be expected to continue to
support Pakistan even now in its face-off
with India.
Saudi Arabia as far as
international terrorism is concerned is
along with Pakistan is the “Real Axis of
Evil”. Saudi Arabian Islamic charities
finance Pakistani terrorist organizations
“War of Terror” on both flanks of Pakistan.
Pakistan is heavily dependant on Saudi
Arabia for free oil supplies, financial aid
and political backing. Saudi Arabia more
than USA and China could discipline Pakistan
in a second if it wishes to.
The visit of Saudi
Arabia’s Foreign Minister last month was
meaningless. He hesitated and shirked from
condemning Pakistan’s “War of Terror”
against India. His visit was meaningless
even if India intended that through it to
send a message to Islamic Countries.
In any case it should
have struck the Indian policy establishment
that no Gulf Region Islamic countries have
come out with any outright condemnation of
Pakistan following 9/11. Further the media
in these countries has been spewing
vitriolic outbursts that India is now
involved in American-Zionist conspiracies to
fragment Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal –
the only one in the Islamic world. More
cynically that Mumbai 9/11 was fabricated by
India intelligence agencies as an excuse for
the above.
All in all, the stark
pointer is that India cannot rely on the
international community to curb Pakistan’s
“War of Terror”. The “Friends of Pakistan”
count on Pakistan to serve their strategic
ends and would go to great lengths to
protect Pakistan from India’s wrath however
well placed.
Pakistan’s
Perceptions of India’s Paralysis to Strike
Back, Post Mumbai 9/11
In the “Battle of
Perceptions” post-Mumbai 9/11 Pakistan seems
to have established a superiority over India
by correctly perceiving India’s paralysis.
Gleaning through the
demonstrated performance and statements of
Pakistan’s political and military leaders
and the writings of Pakistani columnists in
their media, the Pakistani perceptions of
India’s paralysis to strike back post-Mumbai
9/11 were read as follows: (1) India failed
to strike back against Pakistan in 2002-2003
OP PRAKARM despite an initial advantage of
surprise and strength. (2) In the large
number of major terrorist attacks in India
by Pak-sponsored terrorists or their modules
within India there were no retaliatory
responses from India (3) India every time
took the “softer route” of attempting to
enlist international condemnation against
Pakistan (4) Pakistan this time too was
confident that after the first few days of
general condemnation, the international
community would lapse back as hithertofore
(5) Pakistani columnists harped on India’s
military machine not being fully prepared
for war due to incomplete inventories and
slow inflow of Russian military hardware (6)
Pakistan’s military establishment was
confident in their perceptions that India
would not be able to obtain substantial USA,
China, Saudi Arabia backing for Indian
retaliatory strikes against Pakistan.(7)
India would be held back by fears that any
assertive step could lead to
internationalizing of the Kashmir issue.
Indian political
leader’s propensity to shirk away from using
“hard options” to protect India’s “National
Honour” and rely more on international
condemnation of Pakistan was correctly read
by the Pakistani military establishment.
The course of events
even after a month post-Mumbai 9/11 seem to
bear out Pakistan’s military establishments
perceptions of India in terms of retaliatory
strikes or other hard actions.
To that extent it can
be said that Pakistan has established
superiority over India in the “Battle of
Perceptions” unless India now decides to
change course, in confronting Pakistan’s
“War of Terror” against India.
The current "diplomatic
offensive" by India and providing dossiers
of clinching involvement of Pakistan's
official establishment in Mumbai 9/11 will
not shame the Pakistani military
establishment or prompt it to any positive
action to dismantle its terror-networks or
extradite the wanted terrorists to India for
trial.
At the end of this
"diplomatic offensive" Pakistan's military
establishment's "Perceptions" of India's
soft responses would continue.
India would be left
then with only two options, namely to
execute military strikes against Pakistan or
just accept a "lump-it" situation.
Concluding
Observations
The major concluding
observations that need to be made are as
under:
- India cannot
endlessly go on buckling to Pakistan
Army sponsored and Pakistan based “War
of Terror” against India.
- The next such “War
of Terror” strike against India would
perforce pressurize the present Indian
Government or the one that succeeds it
to go in for the “hard option” of
retaliatory military strikes,
irrespective of the cost.
- USA, China and
Saudi Arabia would be well-advised as
“Friends of Pakistan” to clamp down on
Pakistan Army sponsored terrorist
organization in Pakistan and their
disruptive activities as any future
conflict on this count could also
jeopardize their respective national
security interests in this region.
- Pakistan itself
needs to realize that when its
traditional intransigence against India
pushes India to the wall, it could
result in another fragmentation of
Pakistan as in 1971.
- India needs to
recognize that “diplomatic offensives”
do not tame strategic delinquencies of
military-dominated nations like
Pakistan. Hard options are called for:
- Finally, India’s
political leaders need to recognize that
threats to Indian “National Honour”,
sovereignty and security have to met
squarely and eliminated by India and
India alone. India's
counter-terrorism operations cannot be
"out-sourced" to others.
(The author is an International Relations
and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the
Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South
Asia Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila@yahoo.com)