India
cannot disregard China while choosing to attack Pakistan,
feel Chinese Strategists
By D. S. Rajan
(To be read with an earlier article
of the writer, entitled “ China’s Reaction to Mumbai Terror
Strikes: Pro-Pakistan Bias? – South Asia Analysis Group
Paper No.2972 dated 8 December 2008,
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org
)
The People’s Republic of China (PRC)
has so far officially taken a cautious and neutral stand
with regard to India-Pakistan tensions arising out of
November 26,2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai, asking both the
sides to ‘strengthen dialogue and bilateral cooperation’.
Even after the recent visit of Chinese special envoy He
Yafei to Islamabad and New Delhi, there has been no visible
categorical position on the part of Beijing, especially
despite the evidences to the origins of perpetrators
reportedly given by India to the visiting Chinese leader. In
the main, China is yet to acknowledge in public the basic
fact, now recognized by rest of the world, that the
terrorists came to Mumbai from Pakistan and that they have
had a Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LET) connection. The only
redeeming feature from the Indian posit of view could
probably have been China’s backing to the UN Security
Council resolution of 11 December 2008, banning Pakistan’s
Jamat-ul-Dawah as a global terrorist organization.
On the other hand, strategists in
China, close to the power structure, are exhibiting a strong
pro-Pakistan bias in their analyses of the situation. The
Chinese media observations earlier that the terrorists could
have come from within India and references to social
tensions in India as factors behind terrorist attack need to
be seen as attempts, though in vain, to exonerate Pakistan.
These are not being repeated now; also there is a tendency
not to stress the possibilities of an India-Pakistan war as
done earlier by the Chinese experts.
New themes being taken up by the PRC
scholars now include that the China factor could deter an
Indian attack on Pakistan and that China must maintain its
alliance with Pakistan in its geo-political interests. Two
assessments of PRC strategic experts, appearing in the
online edition of the China International Institute of
Strategic Studies (CIISS, in Chinese) assume importance in
this context. A comment (11 January 2008) criticizes
‘Indian circles’ with ‘colonial mind’, for viewing the very
recent ‘winter training exercise’ of the 4th PLA Infantry
Divn of the Xinjiang MR in Karakorum Mountain as ‘a Chinese
reinforcement effort to help Pakistan in the Sino-Indian
border’. Describing the exercise as ‘normal’ as that Divn is
responsible for region’s security, it states that such fears
may possibly go to expose India’s underlying intentions to
attack Pakistan; India at the same time realizes that it
cannot disregard China and that with fighting Pakistan in
the front and China in the back, it might face defeat.
Pointing out that immediately after the Mumbai attack,
India desired to conduct a ‘surgical strike’ against
Pakistan, the comment adds that New Delhi could gradually
understand this folly against chances of getting no support
to such operation from ‘old friends’; under the compulsion
arising out of the premise that it has to deal with China
factor permanently, India is searching now for other
options.
A second evaluation (CIISS, 9 January
2008) while underscoring the point that the PRC should
respect and ally with ‘brother’ Pakistan in recognition of
the latter’s consistent support to China internationally,
identifies following factors as reflecting the geo-
political importance of Pakistan to China - Pakistan is
China’s tool to restrict India, Pakistan is China’s gateway
to the Middle East and a forward base for its naval vessels
for entering the Indian Ocean, particularly the Persian
Gulf, Pakistan is China’s contact point for Iran and Central
Asia which can help in countering Eastern Turkestan
terrorist activities in Xinjiang, China’s West can benefit
from the economic and trades ties with Pakistan and
lastly, Pakistan can help China in playing its role in the
third world.
Going by the latest views of Chinese
experts, unlike in early stages after the Mumbai attack,
they seem to be ruling out now an India-Pakistan armed
conflict. Important however are their hints that China
would back Pakistan in the unforeseen event of an Indian
attack or ‘surgical’ operation against Pakistan. This could
even come in the form of a Chinese diversionary tactic in
‘Southern Tibet’ (Arunachal Pradesh of India), as surmised
earlier by a scholar (Reference 8 December 2008 article
mentioned in the beginning). In this context, Pakistan’s
statement that with China’s backing, it does not suffer from
isolation internationally, assumes some meaning. Worth
noting is the conclusion of China-Pakistan Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighbourly Relations (5
April 2005), which is being seen within China as binding the
two ‘allies’ against any foreign threat to each other
(Professor Yu Dunxin, China Institute of Contemporary
International Relations, APP, 22 November 2006). The ‘legal’
importance of the treaty for the long term China-Pakistan
Strategic Partnership has been stressed once again as late
as October 2008 during President Zardari’s visit to China.
The subsequent defence pact (15 December 2008) between the
two sides, signed well after the Mumbai attack, has added
substance to China-Pakistan alliance.
For China, modernization is the
declared goal; ‘harmonious world’ and peaceful periphery are
sine-qua-non-for this purpose. Hence, Beijing may not like
any turbulence in the neighbouring South Asia and give
priority to defusing the situation in the Sub-Continent. The
Chinese special envoy’s visit appears to echo the same.
China (along with the US) has certain leverage with
Pakistan and India can not be wrong in hoping that the PRC
would be able to convince the Pakistan authorities to attend
to India’s concerns on cross-border terrorism. But, China
could be caught in a dilemma if its peace making efforts
fail for some reasons and if India, for which the Mumbai
attack is more than a terrorism issue, targeted at the
country’s economic rise, is forced to carry out punitive
measures such as a surgical operation against a Pakistan
which is failing to act against the terrorists based in its
soil. Beijing could then be compelled to shed its neutrality
and treaty-bound as it is, could go to the aid of Pakistan;
if India implements other counter measures like cutting
trade links and recalling envoy etc, Beijing in all
probability may criticize India in order to show that it is
on the side of Pakistan. Implications of such Chinese tilt
towards Pakistan, if takes place, for the South Asian power
balance would be obvious, as so far Beijing by choice has
been following a ‘balanced’ South Asia policy, providing
equal weight to relations with the two regional rivals. More
importantly, any ganging up of China and Pakistan against
India on the terrorism issue could cause damage to the
Sino-Indian relation, which, as being described by Beijing,
stands at ‘best time of history’.
(The writer,
D.S.Rajan, is Director of the Chennai Centre for China
Studies, Chennai, India. Email:
dsrajan@gmail.com)