India’s Foreign Policies On Pakistan Reach A Dead-End

INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICIES ON PAKISTAN REACH A DEAD-END

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

India’s foreign policies on Pakistan have been brought to a dead-end with the dawn of the year 2009. Painfully, it needed the Mumbai 9/11 murderous massacres on November 26, 2008 by Pakistani Special Forces trained Islamic Jihadi commando terrorists to bring home the realization to India’s political leaders and the policy establishment that India’s policies and formulations on Pakistan have been an utter failure.

India’s foreign policies on Pakistan, and more specifically in the first decade of the 21^st Century, stand failed because Pakistan as a state in fractional asymmetry to India, strategically and politically, existing on borrowed and reflected strengths of the United States and China has forced India to run out of decisive options in the post-Mumbai 9/11 phase.

India’s foreign policies on Pakistan have failed in the lost 63 years because India submitting itself to external pressures and shirking from the use of her preponderant strengths over Pakistan, fostered a perception in the Pakistani military establishment that India could be trifled with impunity and without punitive reprisals.

Pakistan as a “garrison state” run by a military adventurist Pakistan Army required an Indian foreign policy based on Indian national security determinants only, without conceding strategic space to the national interests of the intrusive external powers in South Asia.

Strangely, in the last fifteen years, India’s political leaders and its foreign policy establishment failed to translate India’s growing global economic clout into political and strategic muscle to attain its foreign policy objectives of neutralizing Pakistan and its state- sponsored terrorism against India in the name of Islamic Jihad.

The measure of India’s failure in its Pakistan policies has been brought home by the signal change in tunes within a month, of the United States ad Britain from siding with India, to the defense of Pakistan and its instruments of state not being involved in Mumbai 9/11. Where did they get evidence of this? Or is this only a surmise?

India’s foreign policies on Pakistan have reached a dead-end not only because of India’s own policy flaws and systemic failures but also more significantly because the United States as Pakistan’s vital strategic patron has time and again forgiven Pakistan’s strategically destablizing policies against India. In this process Pakistan stood further emboldened, conscious that Pakistan would not be disciplined by the United States.

India’s foreign policies on Pakistan have reached a dead-end and a policy audit is required in addition to looking into the immediate future, as to where should India now go from here.

This is covered under the following heads in brief outline:

India’s Political Leadership: Faulty Political and Strategic Perceptions on Pakistan
India’s Foreign Policy Establishment: Rudderless Policy Formulations on Pakistan
United States Needs to be De-hyphenated from India’s Pakistan Policies
The Way Ahead: Immediate Indian Imperatives of Hard-Line Declaratory Policies towards Pakistan

India’s Political Leadership: Faulty Political and Strategic Perceptions on Pakistan

The Indian political leadership, irrespective of political affiliations, has successively failed in providing a realistic political template of assessments on Pakistan, on which the Indian foreign policy establishment and the Indian military establishment could base their operational strategies on.

The Indian political leadership’s failure, strictly in the political sense, arises from:

Perceptional failings in their readings of Pakistan’s political dynamics, Pakistani political leaders, and the propensities of the Pakistan Army. Historical patterns are neither studied nor paid attention to in their assessments, if any.
Indian political leaders failing to perceive that, 60 years of India’s peaceful and conciliatory policies towards Pakistan, restraint against grave provocations and Track II diplomacy has not yielded any success to India in the evolution of a peaceful India-Pakistan relationship.
Political leadership not indulging in independent analysis of Pakistani events but totally dependant on estimates of party think-tanks comprising retired senior diplomats, intelligence officials and military officers, most of whom try to ‘situate’ their assessments to be in line with their political patrons’ views or being out of touch with contemporary realities

Indian political leaders have failed to strike personal links with political leaders of major countries which could facilitate informal and non-institutional exchange of political perceptions and also as an alternative to pressurize Pakistan. Indian political leaders have denied themselves vital inputs by:

Remaining strategically ill-equipped by not spending time on frequent briefings and brain-storming with India’s uniformed fraternity but relying on bureaucratic inputs.
Not facilitating the growth of an independent Indian strategic culture.
Not giving primacy to India’s national security determinants over political expediency in Pakistan policy formulations.
Strategic fears in the Indian political leadership and their policy advisors that should India undertake military strikes against Pakistan, there would be forceful retaliation by Pakistan. Of course there would be Pakistani retaliation and expectedly so. Should that deter India as an emerging power to stop using the prerogatives of its power and buckle down against Pakistani “War of Terror” against India.

Cumulatively arising from the above, in relation to Pakistan, India’s political leadership was led to the following strategic blunders:

Nehru agreeing to a cease-fire in Kashmir on 1948-49 when the Indian Army was virtually on the doorsteps of Muzaffrabad and the whole of Kashmir would have been of India.
Shastri agreeing to return the Haji Pir Bulge & Kargil Heights after India’s victory over Pakistan in 1965 war.
Indira Gandhi agreeing to return 90,000 Pakistan prisoners of war captured by Indian Army in 1971 without written guarantees from Bhutto on Kashmir and relying on his verbal assurances.
Rajiv Gandhi very nearly agreed to a compromise on Siachen with Benazir Bhutto.
Vajpayee policy blunders of convening Agra Summit and not pushing PRAKARM to its logical conclusion.

Dr. Manmohan Singh, the present Indian Prime Minister, has more strategic blunders to account for in relation to Pakistan, namely:

Implicitly trusting Musharraf under US nudging

Siachen was virtually sold out.
India’s Pakistan policy was totally subordinated to United States policies, perceptions and strategic interests in Pakistan.
Signing the infamous Havana Declaration with Musharraf and setting up a Joint Terror Mechanism – a virtual “Dance with the Wolves”.
Following it, major terrorist strikes against India from Pakistan kept taking place without any reprisals from India.
Policy paralysis in not exercising the hard option against Pakistan post-Mumbai 9/11.

India’s Foreign Policy Establishment: Rudderless Policy Formulations on Pakistan

As a spin-off of the above and without institutional assertiveness by India’s diplomatic establishment, India’s foreign policy on Pakistan growingly stood encroached by the Prime Minister’s Office. The resultant outcome has been as what can be described as rudderless policy formulations on Pakistan, divorced from institutional strategic vision, deliberation and analysis.

This stood further compounded by the following factors:

India’s High Commissioners in Pakistan, with few exceptions, focused more on being “cultural ambassadors” rather than the diplomatic representatives of South Asia’s only regional power and consequently indulging in hard-headed diplomacy.
Reliance on “Special Envoys” system of the Prime Minister which distorted policy formulations. Nor did any substantial diplomatic gains accrued from the system of “Special Envoys”.
Unjustified confidence in Track II diplomacy with Pakistan. It has not produced any results.
Indian Foreign Office’s propensity lately to take cues from Washington on Indian foreign policy formulations on Pakistan and reliance on US assessments of Pakistan’s political and military establishment.
India’s diplomatic establishments inability in the last 63 years to come up with policies which could provide “Indian leverages on Pakistan”. India today has no independent political, military, economic or multi-lateral leverages over Pakistan.

The lowest ebb in India’s foreign policy establishment role lately was in the following:

Incessant helpless refrain that India will do business with whosoever was in power in Pakistan. Did that presage dealing with the Taliban also?
The Prime Minister not being dissuaded from signing the Havana Agreement with Musharraf and thereby devaluating and neutralizing India’s stands and credibility on Pakistan’s proxy war and state-sponsored terrorism. Mumbai 9/11 can be in a sense said to have been the out come of this mis-step.
Not prevailing on the political leadership to go in for the hard-option post-Mumbai 9/11.

India’s foreign office and its diplomatic establishment must realize that they are as much “custodians of India’s national security” as are the armed forces, and in this custodial responsibility they should not allow the politicians (who come and go and are influenced by domestic political considerations) to play around with India’s security due to perceptive failures or ignorance of strategic realities.

United States Needs to be De-hyphenated from India’s Pakistan Policies Formulations

United States involvement in the shaping of India’s Pakistan-policies formulations would have been a welcome step had the United States played the rule of an “honest broker” in South Asia. The record has been otherwise, even with President Bush who has been the best US President that India could have so far.

United States actions and role in post-Mumbai 9/11 fall into the above category. It does not inspire confidence in India. After supporting India’s demands initially on Pakistan in relation to a Mumbai 9/11 they have down-slided to support Pakistan’s adamancy

As far back as December 2002, the observations made by this Author in his Paper: “ India’s Foreign Policy Predicaments” (SAAG Paper 570 dated 24.12.2002) need to be highlighted once again in the present context:

“US policies and actions post-9/11 belies the earlier stated and mutual high expectations of a “natural allies” relationship.”
If it were truly so, then the combination of 9/11 and 13/12 would have spurred the United States to recognize, respect and integrate the Islamic Jehadi threats against India with the overall American operations against global terrorism (read Islamic Jehadi terrorism)”
“More inexplicable has been the US shielding of Pakistan from Indian military wrath post 13/12. It virtually amounted to a Papal condonation of Pakistan’s mortal sins”.
“India therefore needs to develop a more conditional foreign policy relationship with USA.”
“India’s foreign policy responses to the United States must depend on the American respect for India in the context of its South Asian policies. India is in a position to lay down bench-marks, this strength should emanate from her strategic potential in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.”

History seems to be repeating itself once again. Instead of Pakistan being subjected to punitive approaches by the United States for its role in Mumbai 9/11, the United States is pressurizing India to exercise restraint. On the contrary moves are afoot once again to use the Kashmir issue as a leverage against India and in favor of Pakistan and further US military supplies to Pakistan continue.

Just as the United States claims it has de-hyphenated its India-Pakistan relationships, India must realize that in terms of her national security interests, India has to “de-hyphenate” the United States-Pakistan relationship” in its foreign policies on Pakistan.

The Way Ahead: Immediate Indian Imperatives of Hard-Line Declaratory Policies Towards Pakistan

The following recommendations were made by the Author in the above quoted Paper in December 2002 in terms of India’s declaratory policy assertions.

“Kashmir is non-negotiable and all external powers need to lay-off this issue.”
“India’s dominance model may be an anathema for Pakistan but that country has to adjust and adapt to this strategic reality. India’s foreign policy initiatives must emphasize to external powers to respect this reality and prevail over their protégé Pakistan, to recognize it.”
“India must declare that any threats to its external or internal security will be met with disproportionate force if necessary.”
“No external pressures will be accepted by India to deflect it from its pursuance of just war or preemptive strikes to deter aggression against India.”

These assertions would eater to the neutralization of Pakistan’s main strategies against India in terms of Kashmir, proxy war and terrorism. They as declaratory policies would lay down ‘red lines’ for Pakistan.

Six years down the line, Indian political leadership nor its policy establishment has made any such assertions due to obliviousness to national security imperatives or having no time from political chicanery pre-occupations or lacking the sheer will to make forceful declarations.

Post-Mumbai 9/11, India has already fore-closed its military strike options in reprisals against Pakistan, and all that it has left now is to indulge in the non-military options to pressurize Pakistan.

The following non-military options, if implemented immediately could be perceived as hard-line options to foreclose any further state-sponsored terrorism from Pakistan in the wake of Mumbai 9/11.

Break diplomatic relations with Pakistan.
Abrogate the Havana Agreement
Declare Pakistan as a “terrorist state” and the ISI as a “terrorist organization.”
Snap all CBM’s implemented on Kashmir from cross-border travel to trade etc.
Review Indus Waters Treaty and stop flow of river waters to Pakistan
Snap all Pak transit overflights
Stop train and air services to Pakistan.
Peace Process and Composite Dialogue to be called off.
Black-list all countries selling defense equipment to Pakistan and not invite them to tender for Indian military purchases.
Resume ‘covert operations’ against Pakistan with focus on Pakistan’s military establishment and terrorist organization.
India should give political, moral and material support to the “freedom fighters” in Baluchistan, Northern Areas and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
Isolate Pakistan in South Asia by disbanding SAARC and focus on alternative regional organizations excluding Pakistan.
Psychological warfare, visibly exposing Pakistan Army’s and ISI disruptive activities in neighbouring countries. “Radio Free Pakistan” and TV channels be established. The emphasis in this campaign should be that India and Indians are not against the Pakistani people and that India is definitely against the Pakistan Army establishment, the ISI and their affiliated terrorist organisations indulging in unrestrained “War of Terror” against India, Afghanistan and in Pakistan’s frontier areas.
Establish a maritime ‘cordon sanitairre’ in the North Arabian Sea excluding all trade by dhows and fishing trawlers traffic.
No tourists from Pakistan or foreigners transiting through Pakistan be given entry to India.
India should not pursue the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project both in the present context and otherwise too.

In the execution of the above measures, India should not become amendable to any external pressures. Should Pakistan consequently ratchet on the above, the military confrontation along the LOC or the other borders, India should prepare itself for war.

USSR’s first Foreign Minister, Leon Trotsky was recently quoted by noted Indian journalist M J Abbar, in another context as: “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.”

India’s political leaders should be mindful of this maxim as war is a recurrent reality in global affairs and cannot be wished away.

Concluding Observations

India’s peaceful and conciliatory approaches to Pakistan and traditional exercise of restraint despite grave provocations by Pakistan in the last 63 years have been misread by Pakistan as responses from a timid state devoid of political will for hard responses. It seems to be convinced that Indian political leaders lack the courage to come up with firm responses.

The dead-end reached by India in its foreign policies towards Pakistan is a by-product of the above. India can only by-pass this dead-end by hard-line policies if not hard strike reprisals for Mumbai 9/11.

India’s political leaders can no longer ignore the overwhelming Indian public opinion that the time has come for India to deal with Pakistan firmly.

Pakistan cannot be saved from its ‘dysfunctional state’ downslide by India’s permissiveness of tolerating endless Pakistan-originated terrorists strikes. Nor can Pakistan be saved from military rule by Indian restraint.

Pakistan can only be saved by the people of Pakistan rising against their military establishment as did the Iranians. who overthrew the powerfully backed Shah of Iran and his Imperial Ground Forces in 1979 as a result of groundswell of public unrest.

As written elsewhere by this Author, India needs to assert itself against Pakistan boldly and fearlessly, if it believes that it has a ‘Manifest Destiny” to emerge as “the regional power” and an aspirant for global power status.

India s should not be cowed down or its leaders deterred by fears of Pakistan’s military retaliation. Of course, there would be human and material losses. But then India’s political leaders need to recognize the strategic reality that:

“Power Status does not come cheaply and nor does it come without the guts to bear losses in the pursuit of power. Power accrues only to those who are bold and audacious.”

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)