CHINA: Media Anger on
Arunachal Pradesh Continues Unabated
By
D. S. Rajan
1. The Chinese
President Hu Jintao and the Indian Prime
Minister Dr Manmohan Singh have met in
Yekaterinburg (Russia) on 15 June 2009. The
former referred to his country’s policy of
promoting relationship with India from a
‘strategic and long term perspective’ and
hoped for a solution to the border dispute
with India at ‘an early date’ through
negotiations in the spirit of ‘equal
consultations, mutual respect and mutual
accommodation’. Dr Manmohan Singh, on his
part, stated that India would give ‘top
priority’ to its relations with China and
that India is seeking a ‘fair and
reasonable’ solution to the boundary problem
‘acceptable to both sides’. The two leaders
at the same time called for maintaining
‘peace and tranquility along the border’,
till a solution to the boundary issue could
be found. (Xinhua, 16 June 2009).
2. The meeting in
Russia has taken place in the background of
Chinese media concerns over two important
developments -India’s dispatch of
additional troops to and deployment of SU-30
fighter aircraft in the border as well as
the Indian Prime Minister’s statement (9
June 2009) ruling out any compromise on the
border issue. It is not known whether such
concerns figured in the meeting, but what is
important is that both sides have agreed on
the occasion to maintain ‘peace and
tranquility’ in the border pending a final
solution.
3. Beijing’s practice
to articulate on its strategic concerns
through its media is well known. It is
therefore not surprising that the Chinese
state-controlled strategic and military
journals are coming out with more and more
hard-hitting articles, castigating India on
the border issue. The following are some
samples.
4. Global Times
(Chinese, 16 June 2009), an affiliate of the
party central organ, the People’s Daily, has
accused certain Indian bodies and officials
like the Indian Air Force Chief of raising
the bogey of Chinese military threat and in
this connection, noted a statement of the
Indian Defence Minister advising the
military leaders not to make open statements
on issues relating to India including on
China’s military strength.
5. A comment reflecting
a military viewpoint (www.mil.people.com.cn,
Chinese, 17 June 2009) has alleged that the
dispatch of additional Indian troops soon
after the conclusion of the Indian general
election would mean, “the new government of
Dr.Manmohan Singh will adopt a hard and
uncompromising stand on important questions
relating to national security and
interests”.
6. A report in the
‘International Herald Leader’, a journal
associated with Xinhua, quoted (16 June
2009) one Kuo Shaowen, now with the Chinese
Foreign Ministry and earlier worked in the
Chinese Embassy in New Delhi as saying that
the geographical terrain in the Sino-Indian
border is difficult, denying taking of
positions there by large scale armies. “ If
the Indian military is not planning to
attack China, then the deployment of its
additional troops in the border may not have
great military significance. Perhaps, India
wants to exploit the factor of additional
troops as a ‘political card’ in the border
talks”. Pointing out that India’s 33rd
Corps, 15th Corps and the 3rd
Mountain Infantry Division, along with the
special force comprising Tibetans, are meant
to deal with China, it has stated that the
“strengthening of its war preparedness in
the border by India, contradicts with its
policy of having friendly relations between
the Chinese and Indian armies. Perhaps,
India feels the necessity for both”.
7. An article in the
same journal (17 June 2009), has tried to
address the question whether the Indian
Prime Minister’s ‘hawkish’ remarks on 9 June
2009 had anything to do with India’s ground
level actions like dispatch of additional
troops to and deployment of SU-30 fighter
aircraft in the border. Taking note of the
remarks made by Dr Srikanth of the
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi,
during an interview with the paper’s
correspondent that it is natural for a head
of the government like Dr Manmohan Singh to
dwell on an issue of territorial integrity,
the paper has opined that what Dr.Manmohan
Singh has said may perhaps have had no links
with actions like dispatch of troops. It has
also admitted that ‘fierce’ language was
used in the Chinese media’s comments on the
Indian prime minister. An effort to project
the Indian Prime Minister in a positive
light is thus being seen, in contrast to the
general media trend so far in China to
criticize him.
8. The article, while
covering the ‘quick’ reactions of the Indian
scholars and media to the Chinese press
criticisms of India on the border issue, has
highlighted two examples – the article in
the Times of India and another in the
Chennai Centre for China Studies website,
both of 12 June 2009. On the latter, it has
said, “ Mr Rajan, of the Chennai Centre for
China Studies, who can read and understand
Chinese, has especially mentioned about the
satirical tone in the language used by the
Chinese media to criticise India and
commented on a Chinese website article
captioned ‘India is a paper tiger and its
use of force against China will be
trounced’”. In conclusion, it has said, “no
matter whether it is ‘Tiger’ China or
‘Elephant’ India, the border and national
security issues will always remain sensitive
to them. As such, the officials, military
circles and public opinion in both the
countries should earnestly search for “a
neighbourly path” and any move or action
causing provocation intentionally or
unintentionally, will not be beneficial for
the coexistence of the two nations”.
9. According to a
high-level Chinese military strategist,
writing under the pseudonym “China
Strategy”, (China Centre for International
and Strategic Studies, Chinese, 17 June
2009), India has started thinking in recent
years that its power has already exceeded
that of China. New Delhi also perceives that
the international situation has become
extremely beneficial to it; in particular,
it feels that India is getting the support
of the US and Europe in pressurising
Pakistan and in turn in “restricting China’s
military”. The writer has alleged that
accordingly, India is trying to change the
Sino-Indian border status quo, while
accusing the Chinese troops of carrying out
incursions into the borders. Noting in this
connection India’s dispatch to ‘Arunachal
Pradesh’ (i.e China’s Southern Tibet) of
additional two divisions with a total of
50000-60000 troops and induction of two
squadrons of SU-30 MK1 fighter aircraft,
each consisting of 18 aircraft, the write-up
has assessed that the key question before
China and India now relates to the border
and that the ‘China factor’ now occupies a
greater place in India’s strategy. Observing
that under this strategy, India has even
reached the Western Pacific through its Look
East policy, strengthened military relations
with China’s surrounding nations, allied
with the US and Japan to conduct strategic
containment of China and taken steps to
control the strategic location of Malacca
straits, it viewed India’s dispatch of
additional troops to the border as an
attempt to achieve ‘absolute military
superiority’ and a ‘strategic balance’
vis-à-vis China.
10. Arguing that the
Chinese troops in the border are well
experienced in operating from the high
altitude Tibetan plateau, an advantage the
Indian soldiers may not enjoy, the ‘Chinese
strategist’ has pointed to the completion of
Qinghai-Tibet railway with capacity to
transport 63,000 tonnes of material to Tibet
in a week, in support of the Chinese troops
in Tibet belonging to 5 mountain brigades.
‘The railway would mean that India no longer
enjoys power to threaten the Chinese army
from the rear or to check the speed of the
latter in marching up to the borders’.
11. The Chinese
specialist has also disclosed, rather
unusual in China, the military ORBAT in the
Sino-Indian border, in an effort to prove
that the Indian military may not be a match
to China’s troop strength. ‘India will not
be in a position to conduct any border clash
or any small or middle-scale war in the
border’. According to the given ORBAT, the
Chinese People’s Liberation army (PLA) has
deployed a total of 13 Border Defence
Regiments in Eastern and Western sectors of
Sino-Indian border, the 52 Mountain Infantry
Brigade to protect Southern Qinghai- Tibet
region, the 53 Mountain Infantry Brigade to
protect the high plateau in the Western
sector, the 149th Division of the
13th Group Army in the Eastern
Sector and the 61st Division of
the 21st Group Army in the
Western Sector.
12. In sum, the
write-up has analysed that with China
completing its basic infrastructure building
in Tibet to connect the latter with the
inland, particularly through the
construction of the Qinghai-Tibet railway
and A LI airport, the border military
conditions in Eastern and Western Sectors
have improved and as against this, if India,
by dispatching additional troops, wants to
gain ‘military balance’, the same will be
‘impractical’. It has finally warned the
“Indian top brains” behind such dispatch
that they “ will feel dizzy in acting
rashly against China; India’s loss will
outweigh its gains”.
13. There is no need to
emphasise the importance for India of what
the Chinese media have said on the border
issue; this is particularly so for India’s
foreign policy planners. An examination of
the articles coming out since the appearence
of reports on India's despatch of additional
troops to the border, reveals the following
notable points
- The Chinese military viewpoint
foreseeing adoption of a hard and
an uncompromising border position by the
new government of Dr.Manmohan Singh
- China’s unrelenting stand that
Arunachal Pradesh, called by it as
Southern Tibet, belongs to the PRC
- Beijing’s perception of India’s
dispatch of additional troops to the
border. The Chinese appear to see a new
element in the border issue.
- The Chinese
opinion that India’s dispatch of
additional troops to the border will
affect Sino-Indian border talks (Prof.Sun
Shihai, Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences,
www.people.com.cn,
12 June 2009
- Some
Chinese opinions on India making its
dispatch of additional troops as a
bargaining chip during border talks.
- The role of
the newly formed Department of Boundary
and Ocean Affairs under China’s foreign
ministry, in Sino-Indian border talks.
The main agenda of this department is to
develop policies concerning land and
maritime boundaries including handling
of external boundary matters (Foreign
Ministry Spokesperson, 5 May 2009).
- The Chinese
suggestion at academic levels that the
India-China border dispute can be solved
taking the Sino-Russian border agreement
as a model. (Refer SAAG article entitled
“Solving the Sino-Indian Boundary
Problem: China-Russia Border Agreement
Could be a Model, feel Chinese
scholars”, SAAG Paper No.3247dated 11
June 2009)
- The Chinese
position that its military deployment
across Indian border is strong and
India, in spite of the additional
troops, will not be a match to China.
- Beijing’s
linkage of India’s additional troops in
the border with the alleged Indian
foreign policy of joining with the US
and Japan to contain China.
(The
writer, Mr.D.S.Rajan, is the Director of the
Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai,
India. Necessary translation done by him.
Email: dsrajan@gmail.com)