2. The
Pakistani media has carried conflicting
versions of the suicide attack. The "News" (
June 26) reported that "a suicide bomber
ripped through an Army vehicle near Shaukat
Lines, Muzaffarabad" without giving other
details. The "Daily Times" of Lahore (June
26) reported that "he blew himself up near
an army vehicle."
3. However,
in its online edition of June 26, the "Dawn"
of Karachi gave a different and more
detailed version. To quote it: " According
to witnesses, a bearded man in his twenties
walked through a ground used by army
personnel for physical training and local
youths as a playground and entered the
barracks of non-commissioned army men at
about 6.30am. 'The bomber was intercepted by
a soldier whom he tried to engage in a
conversation presumably to attract other
soldiers around for causing maximum
casualties’ and then blew himself up,
official sources said. A soldier was killed
on the spot and four others were injured and
taken to the Combined Military Hospital
where one of them died. An army pick-up
parked a few yards away overturned and
another vehicle was damaged. The blast was
heard in most parts of the town. An
intelligence official said the ground was
splattered with blood and limbs. He said
four legs and other limbs had been found in
the ground and under the overturned vehicle
which indicated that more than one bomber
might have been involved in the attack. The
junior section of the Army Public School,
several other educational institutions and
the 5-AK Brigade headquarters are around the
place where the blast took place."
4. The "Dawn"
report gave another significant detail. It
said: "The barracks fall under the 5-AK
Brigade of the Azad Kashmir (AK) Regiment
which is reportedly taking part in the
operation against militants in Swat and
adjoining areas."
5. The Azad
Kashmir Regiment (AKR) has had an
interesting history. When the Pakistan Army
tried to capture Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) in
1947-48, it first sent into the state a
large number of Mehsuds, Wazirs and other
tribes recruited by it in the
Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
and trained and armed by it. Pakistan denied
any responsibility for their actions and
projected them during the debates in the UN
Security Council as Kashmiris, who had risen
in revolt against the then Maharaja of J&K
and the Government of India. It used to
describe them as Kashmiri irregulars over
whom it had no control.
6. After the
1948 ceasefire, the Pakistan Army
constituted these so-called irregulars into
a unit called the Azad Kashmir Regular
Forces (AKRF), which was shown as a para-military
force of the POK Government. It was placed
under the over-all control of the Pakistan
Army. The tribals of the AKRF were again
used by the then President Ayub Khan for
spearheading the invasion of J&K in 1965.
The invasion, which led to fighting between
the Indian and Pakistan Armies, failed.
7. When the
Bengalis of the then East Pakistan rose in
revolt in 1971, Yahya Khan sent the fanatic
tribals of the AKRF to East Pakistan where
they indulged in large-scale massacre of
Bengalis. In 1972, in recognition of its
"services" in East Pakistan, the Pakistan
Army absorbed the AKRF into the regular army
and renamed it the Azad Kashmir Regiment (AKR).
Its Regimental Center is located at Mansar,
Attock District, Punjab. Initially, the AKR
consisted largely of Pashtun tribals
recruited in the FATA officered by Punjabis.
Now it has a larger percentage of Punjabis.
Exact present figures of Pashtuns and
Punjabis in the AKR are not available.
8. When
there were fears in Pakistan of a military
retaliation by the Indian Armed Forces after
the Mumbai terrorist attack of November
2008, Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the TTP,
had reportedly said that if India attacked
Pakistan, the TTP would stop its fight
against the Pakistan Army and join it in
fighting against India. This was welcomed
by a Pakistani Army spokesman as a patriotic
gesture. Subsequently, there were reports of
differences developing between the TTP on
the one side and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET),
the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami(HUJI) and the
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) on the other because
of the unhappiness of these four
Kashmir-centric organisations over the
attacks being carried out by the TTP on the
Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI). They reportedly felt
that the TTP and other organisations should
focus on attacking the NATO forces in
Afghanistan in collaboration with the Afghan
Taliban and Al Qaeda and should not attack
the Pakistan Army. Only the Jaish-e-Mohammad
(JEM) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), the
anti-Shia organisation, supported the TTP's
fight against the Pakistan Army. They felt
that since the Pakistan Army was letting
itself be used by the US against Al Qaeda,
attacks on it were justified. Following these
differences, the TTP reportedly ordered
these four organisations to close down their
training camps in the tribal belt.
9. Since the
TTP came into existence in 2007 after the
Pakistan Army's commando raid into the Lal
Masjid of Islamabad in July, 2007, it has
carried out over a hundred acts of suicide terrorism. Many of them were in non-tribal
areas and important cities and cantonments
such as Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Karachi,
Lahore, Sargodha and other places. Many of
these attacks were directed at the Army, the
ISI, the Special Services Group (SSG), the
US-trained commando group, the Air Force,
the Navy, the Police and the Federal
Investigation Agency. Recently, the TTP had
warned of an attack in Multan from where the
operations of the helicopter gunships in the
Swat Valley are co-ordinated.
10. But it
had carefully refrained from any act of
suicide terrorism in the POK. This is the
first time there has been an act of suicide
terrorism in the POK, which has been
attributed to the TTP. The Associated Press
and sections of the Pakistani media have
quoted Hakimullah Mehsud, a close associate
of Baitullah, who is responsible for the TTP
activities in the Orakzai, Khyber and Kurram
areas and who also coordinates Taliban
attacks on trucks carrying logistic supplies
to the NATO troops in Afghanistan, as
claiming responsibility on behalf of the TTP
for the Muzaffarabad attack. A person
claiming to be Hakimullah was reported to
have told the AP over phone that the
attack was made to prove that Baitullah had
not been weakened by more than a week of
strikes on his suspected hideouts in South
Waziristan.. “We are in a position to
respond to the army’s attacks, and time will
prove that these military operations have
not weakened us," he reportedly said. It
also needs to be noted that since the co-ordinated
hunt for Baitullah started, Hakimullah's men
have stepped up their attacks on Shias in
the Kurram Agency.
11.
Presuming that this call was, in fact, made
by Hakimullah and that it was the TTP which
had carried out the attack, the Muzaffarabad
attack reflects the concerns of the TTP and
Baitullah over the co-ordinated operations
launched by the Pakistani and US forces in
South Waziristan in order to neutralise
Baitullah and his close associates. The TTP
has apparently come to the conclusion that
only fears of reprisal attacks in the POK
could prevent the Pakistan Army from
reinforcing its ground forces in South
Waziristan for the operations against
Baitullah and his forces.
12. The
Pakistan Army, which has by now got used to
a wave of suicide attacks all over Pakistan,
is unlikely to be deterred from the South
Waziristan operation by a single attack in
the POK by the TTP. But if there are more
such attacks and in quick succession, it
might be unnerved by the prospects of
instability in the POK as a result of its
operations in the NWFP and the FATA. As of
now, the TTP does not appear to have the
capability for sustained operations in the
POK. Even if it has, it is unlikely to use
it since any attempt to create instability
in the POK would aggravate the divide
between it and the people of Pakistan. Its
anti-Army activities in the POK could also
be opposed by the anti-India,
Kashmir-centric jihadi groups.
(
The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt.of India,New
Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute
For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail:
seventyone2@gmail.com )