CHINA-Recessionary Spiral?
Guest Column by Dr Sheo Nandan Pandey
Introduction
The People’s
Republic of China (PRC) has been caught on
its wrong foot in its mimic of the free
market economy of the west and export led
growth model of the East Asian tiger
economies of yesteryears. It is in a wind,
and has little room to get off the spate of
recessionary spiral with pep talks,
earlier run through on war footing, with the
Chinese President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen
Jiabao, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, and
Governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC)
Zhou Xiaochuan in the lead role.[i]
World Bank (WB) projections seem far off the
ground realities.[ii]
Worse, for most part, the primary reset and
recovery parameters stand frozen, if not
immune to active monetary and fiscal policy
instruments.
[iii]
Annual rate of
growth of China’s gross domestic product
(GDP), for example, touched the nadir 6.1
per cent year-on-year during the first
quarter of 2009.[iv]
It
was 4.5 percentage points lower than the
first quarter of 2008 and down 0.7
percentage points from the previous
quarter. When calculated quarter-on-quarter
basis, the scenario is still more
depressing. The decline has been continuous
and sharp right since the global down turn
gathered momentum. Earlier, during
2003-2007, the PRC had experienced
double-digit growth. It registered 9 per
cent growth in 2008. The drop down as such
accounts for less than half to its peak
performance. Aggregate demand for goods and
services, in particular its external
component remains substantially weak. Output
glut, massive lay offs, shutdowns, drop in
energy consumption, decline in output, fall
in government revenue and increase in budget
deficits, cutback in private investments and
the like tend to rule the roost. Among the
Chinese think-tanks, Fan Jianping, the Chief
Economist of the State Council Information
Office, has been the sole exception to speak
out the ground realities and indicated loose
ends of the Chinese capabilities to early
reset and recovery.
[v]
In the short run,
China’s absolute as much as relative
capability to ward off recession and/ or
early reset remains dependent on creating
effective demand for the entire range of
goods and services in the home and new
foreign markets, plummeting under the weight
of the global down turn. There is since then
a stimulus package, made up of both monetary
and fiscal policy instruments, in place.[vi]
However, in the best of times, it could be
effective only if there was an inelastic
demand for the goods and services. The
ground situation in China was just the
opposite. Drop in the demand for exportable
goods and services relate to totally elastic
demand. The demand for capital and wage
goods in respect of low income as much as
laid off workers fall in a little different
category. For long term solutions, China has
but to make paradigm shift in technology,
product mix, direction of product markets,
and the like.
China’s rescue
potentials to a single and / or group of
countries, in the short run, again stand
constricted to handful of goods and
services. It would largely relate to wage
and capitals goods with highly inelastic
demand. The same would hold good for
services as well. The scope is, of course,
quite large in the long run. Other things
remaining the same, it would pertain to
large number of wage goods, offering
comparative advantage. It would relate to
still larger number of capitals goods,
needed for improving the competitiveness of
Chinese products, in particular environment
friendly and energy efficient technology.
The upper limits of such rescue potentials
are set by an array of variables, the most
critical ones being the comparability and
compatibility of the GDP and disposable
incomes.
While considered 3rd largest
economy, its share in the global GDP is just
6 per cent.[vii]
The
distribution of income being skewed, the
average disposable across the country and
social groups suffer handicaps of being
representative in character at macro level.
China’s foreign exchange reserve of US$1.92
trillion was again not as liquid as people
normally think. Where China could hold this
option, it was but at a high premium. The
pep talk could turn a reality only when
the rest of the world turned a corner with
their stimulus package.
The paper
essentially aims at probing into the
plausibility of early reset and recovery of
the Chinese economy in response to the
interventions, essentially composed of
monetary and fiscal policy instruments.
[viii]
In the run up, it would focus on: the Onset
Factors and Features of the Bust Cycle; the
Monetary Policy Instruments and their
Liquidity Raising Potentials; the Fiscal
Policy Instruments and their Purchasing
Power Raising Potentials; and, the
Actualization Process and Simmers.
Assumptions of
the study include: first, the phenomenon,
thus far globally synchronized and
essentially part of boom and short cycles,
is the inevitable and yet, necessary cost of
capitalism; second, the current economic
malaise, in global and not just Chinese
context, is the outcome of too much reliance
on the prescriptions of both the Keynesians,
like Paul Krugman and the classical
economists, like Milton Friedman. The
transmission mechanism for monetary policy,
as Hyman Minsky advocates, is through the
financial markets and, the financial markets
can experience wide swings that lead to
booms and busts in the real economy; third,
the Chinese monetary and fiscal policy
instruments, tailored respectively to prime
and/ or pulsate otherwise shutting down
export oriented enterprises and dormant
domestic demand for their products, stood
witness to China’s transition to inclusive
in place of buoyant exports-led growth and
development model; fourth, the streaks of
simultaneous down turn and up rush
symptoms, currently discernible in the
Chinese economy, is but a product of endemic
characteristics of Chinese economy, largely
a feature of simultaneous existence of the
new and traditional, the high and low tech,
the broad based and selective etc. features
in structures and functions of different
economic sectors; and, the sixth, the most
and least affected geographic region,
enterprises, urban/ rural residents, high
and low income susceptible families are
bound to respond differently to the
interventions for a host of regions. At long
last, at macro level, the imminent problem
before the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
was to reverse the slide down in the GDP
growth, the minimal level of which is 8 per
cent and more lest the wherewithal of
expansionary Chinese socio-economic
structure should crumble.
Onset Factors and
Features of the Bust Cycle
The PRC got to
the bust cycle after decades of boom. The
peak and trough, thus far unveiled, carry
some exclusive features. The new and
unanticipated aspects would call for a new
approach and treatments for recovery. It
does not turn history outright obsolete. The
situation is essentially borne of calculated
risk suffering toll of exuberance. Robert J.
Barbera is perhaps right that the society
which enjoys the fruits of free market has
to be ready for pay up for periodic down
hill.[ix]
Prior to the
bust, the GDP of China had peaked 13 year
best of 11.4 per cent year on year to RMB
24.6619 trillion Yuan (US$3.43 trillion).
The growth rate was 0.3 percentage points
higher than the 2006 level revised at 11.1
percent.
[x]
Quarter wise, the GDP in the PRC in 2007 had
expanded 11.1 percent in the first quarter,
11.9 percent in the second, 11.5 percent in
the third and 11.2 percent in the fourth.
Now, as the Chinese economy got caught up in
the loop of global recessionary spiral, the
growth rate has tumbled 5.8 percentage
points in comparison with the best fit of
the second quarter performance and 5.3
percentage points of the annual average.
The “credit
crunch”, as term for financial market, was
first heard in China in the third quarter of
2007 while it came to public attention to
the outside world in August 2007.[xi]
It happened just when the US economy
encountered bust in Dec 2007.[xii]
US GDP
then grew by 0.6 per cent compared with 4.9
per cent in the previous quarter. Ireland,
Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden,
Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Portugal,
Spain, and Switzerland have had recession
ranging from two to seven quarters.
Much has happened
due to China’s export-led developmental
paradigm turning unsustainable. When the
growth rate of the Chinese economy peaked to
11.4 per cent, the contribution of export
proceeds ran to 40 per cent. According to an
estimate, 1 per cent growth in China’s
exports contributed 0.82 per cent increase
in the GDP of the PRC. As the global
economy, in particular US, European Union,
Japan and other notable export destinations
of China fell into the whirlpool of
recessions, Chinese exports got a bloody
blow. In the very first punch, as the
Chinese Commerce Minister then acknowledged,
the slow down in exports to US and EU in the
first quarter of 2008 caused 12 percentage
point drop in China’s over all export
growth.
[xiii]
Not surprising that the Chinese economy
cooled to its slowest pace in 2008,
expanding 9 per cent year-on-year, the
slowest since 2001. In the first six months
of 2008, as many as 67000 small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) pulled down their
shutters. Industrial output dropped 5.6
percentage points.
[xiv]
20 million workers were laid off. The trend
continues even now and reset, much less
recovery awaits China’s alternate
consumer-led developmental paradigm to hold
ground..
[xv]
Chinese
recession, for reasons as such, now stand
globally synchronized. As the epicenter
happened to be the US, and the aftershock is
spread across all continents, the duration
and amplitude of recovery of the Chinese
economy has but to take place along the rest
of the world. While external shock is
largely responsible for rocking the Chinese
boat, the correctives have but to take care
of side effects of an array of other shocks,
in particular those which carry bearings on
competitiveness of Chinese goods and
services.
Monetary Policy
Instruments and their Liquidity Raising
Potentials
As part
of monetary policy manoeuvres, the People’s
Bank of China (PBOC) switched over to
“moderately easy” from “tight” monetary
policy”.[xvi]
Chinese tend to call the moderately easy
monetary and fiscal policy options as
“prudent” as against tight. There is then
“active” monetary and fiscal policy that
stands for easy monetary and fiscal policy.
As Zhou Xiaochuan, the Governor of PBOC told
11th National People’s Congress (NPC)
session in Mar 09, the objective in policy
shift was to “check
slip of confidence and spur fast recovery of
the economy amid the crisis”.
China
had cut interest rates for the first time in
six years on Sept. 15, 2008. This was the
time when Chinese economy had got to
experience the heat of worsening credit
turmoil and weakening export demand.[xvii]
The one-year lending and deposit rates were
lowered by 0.27 percentage point to 6.93
percent and 3.87 percent. In three months
thereafter until Dec. 23, 2008, the PBOC
announced as many as five cuts in the
interest rates, down from 7.47 per cent to
5.31 per cent. The deposit rate was always
cut by the same amount, down from 4.14 per
cent to 2.25 percent.[xviii]
The
PBOC simultaneously brought about cuts in
the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) of large
and small as well as medium sized banks in
five subsequent different stages from 17.5
per cent. For small and medium sized banks,
it was trimmed to 13.5 per cent. In the case
of large banks, it was kept at 15.5 per
cent.[xix]
The mechanism is meant for influencing the
rate of money supply. A lower RRR as this
against a higher RRR obviously gives greater
leeway to the commercial banks for lending
money to the market.
The
credit ceiling of the Chinese commercial
banks in respect of priority projects, rural
areas, smaller enterprises, technical
innovations and industrial rationalization
through mergers and acquisitions. It was in
tandem with the policy decision to keep
credit
expansion "rational" and "target specific”.
1% in lending results in a 0.105% increase
in money supply.
China followed a
differential loaning policy to jack up
demand for the worst affected industrial
products, in particular automobiles,
electronics and the like. Lower upfront
payments and subsidies of different kinds
including coupons constituted major devices.
China’s current
account surpluses do as well contribute to
add to the liquidity position with a
difference. In order to achieve its exchange
rate objectives, the Chinese government has
to buy hard currency, in particular US
dollars or else RMB would appreciate. In
order to buy these dollars, it has been
printing RMB, which, in turn, goes to
increase the amount of money in
circulation. There are estimates that a 1%
increase in China’s Foreign exchange
reserves would require a 0.111% increase in
money supply to sterilize it. The figure
could grow with the increase in the volume
China’s Foreign exchange reserves as time
passes.
Overheating of
the economy being a constant feature, the
PBOC has taken recourse of ‘punishment
bonds’, issued to commercial banks at
variable maturities and interest rates with
obvious goals of putting reins on money
supply. In 2008, the PBOC issued Rmb4.3trn
of bonds in this way.
Chinese
academics held positive and yet, hold
differing views on the impact of the
monetary policy interventions. Jin Xin, an
Everbright Securities Analyst, held it good
news for the banks, whose profitability has
been deteriorating. Jin said the move would
widen the gap between the lending and
deposit rates, which is where banks make
money. As a result, in Jin’s estimate the
net profit of banks would expand by 4.2
percentage point in 2009. Quite
simultaneously, the reduced reserve
requirement would free more than RMB 640
billion Yuan (US$91.4 billion) into the
system.[xx]
In the estimation of Wu Yongyang, another
Securities Analyst, the move of the PBOC to
cut interest rate and reserve ratio would
free nearly RMB 710 billion Yuan (US$ 103.9
billion) into the system. He said the impact
would be positive for big banks like the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and
China Construction Bank, but surely negative
for small and medium sized banks. She Minhua,
a CITIC Jiantou Security Analyst, said, the
latest act of the PBOC has had largely
eliminated the rationale for further
reductions, and as a result, listed banks
were likely to see their profits wiped out
or might experience a loss in 2009.
Notwithstanding, the Monetary Policy
Committee, the key decision making body at
the PBPC, said, in its latest meeting on
April 12, 2009, that China would maintain a
“moderately loose” monetary policy amid the
worsening global crisis. The statement said
it was essential for “continuity and
stability of policy making”.[xxi]
PBOC statement later said: “The central bank
will continue to ensure ample liquidity in
the banking system and reasonably increase
loans to fund the economy.”
Zhou
Xiaochuan, the Governor of PBOC and the
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao had earlier
dropped a broad hint to this effect in the
course of 11th press briefing at
the concluding day of the 10-day session of
the Second Session of the 11th
National people’s Congress (NPC) in March
2009. The two had favoured moderately easy
monetary policy for 2009 with perceived
objectives of boosting “fast but steady
economic growth by expanding domestic
demand”.[xxii]
The Chinese Premier had then called 2009 a
most difficult year ahead and wanted the
tight monetary policy in vogue to be
“relaxed to prevent an economic down slide.
The
rationale is not hard to imagine. In the
first half of 2008, over 67000 SMEs, each
with sales income exceeding 5 million Yuan
(US$ 0.7 million), were closed down. It
rendered 20 million workforce unemployed.
The figure did not include service industry
and SMEs whose sales were less than 5
million Yuan.[xxiii]
The
Chinese banking system responded quite fast.
New loans in the first quarter of 2009
touched RMB 4.58 trillion Yuan (US$ 670
billion). At the present pace, new loans,
averaging just RMB 500 billion Yuan (US $
72.3 billion) per month for the rest three
quarters of 2009 stand to take bank lending
to over RMB 9 trillion (US$ 1.32 trillion).
While
lucrative, the overdose of medicine held the
spectre of incalculable side effects. Growth
in M2, the broadest measure of money supply,
hit a record 25.5 per cent in March 2009.[xxiv]
It pushed up consumer price index (CPI);
eroded real wages; and, put the lives of
people in jeopardy, in particular the
multitude of laid off and migrant workers
who suffered the brunt of loss of their
urban jobs. Worse still, where CPI and
producer price index (PPI) has shown signs
of declines, it is but deflationary in
nature and effects.[xxv]
China Banking Regulatory Commission and wide
section of Chinese think-tank feared “rise
of non-performing assets”, encouragement to
“fraudulent activities” including “fake
mortgages”, and last but not the least,
“seepage of money into stock markets”.
[xxvi]
Notwithstanding,
the recent performance of the industrial
sector do as well provide grounds for
concern over this rapid credit growth. A
National Statistics Bureau survey of 22
regions found industrial profits totaled
only 323 billion Yuan (US$ 47.29 billion)
during the first quarter, down 32 percent
from a year earlier. That means annual
profits for all industries will amount to
only about 1.6 trillion Yuan (US$ 234.2
billion) this year. Outstanding loans
currently stand at 35 trillion Yuan (US$
5.12 trillion) . Assuming companies have
kept a moderate debt ratio averaging less
than 50 per cent, their capital investments
now exceed 35 trillion Yuan (US$ 5.12
trillion). And profits of 1.6 trillion Yuan
(US$ 234.2 trillion) versus 35 trillion Yuan
(US$ 5.12 trillion) in capital investment
means an annual return rate of only 4.57
percent, below the weighted loan interest
rate of 4.76 percent we saw in March 09. In
this sense, the Chinese companies seem to be
in a rather weak position to finance debt
with earnings.
[xxvii]
Not
surprising, Ba Shusong, an economist with
Development Research Center and quite a few
others have warned the government against
the hazard of pushing the panic button too
hard. “Monetary policy”, Ba told Economic
Information Daily “should revert from being
easy to avoid steep ups and downs in credit
expansion, which could otherwise affect the
economy, and put pressure on the operation
of the banks in future. PBOC, too, has taken
cognizance of the problem. It called upon
major Chinese banks to lend at a steadier,
more rational pace.
Fiscal Policy
Instruments and their Domestic Demand
Raising Potentials
In line with the
easy monetary policy as such, the PRC has
gone for expansionary fiscal policy.
[xxviii]
Conceptually, save to the extent of
“crowding out” effects, it sounds well.
[xxix]
It is deemed that the measure would stem out
flaccid and/ or dormant aggregate demand,
and usher economic objectives of price
stability, full employment and economic
growth. The crowding out effect, borne of
interest push across the market, was again
quite manageable affair.
Sundry elements
apart,
RMB 4
trillion Yuan (US$585.5 billion) stimulus
package, announced on Nov 09, 2008, hitherto
constituted China’s enviable flag fiscal
instrument to spur domestic demand.[xxx]
The decision came about two months after the
global financial crisis deepened in Sep
2008. It was aimed at creating domestic
demand, both in lieu for the down slides in
external demand and outright new. However,
not until recently, it remained shrouded in
controversy on many counts, primarily, the
new components. The mystery was not resolved
until the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao gave
final clearance to the debate four months
later.[xxxi]
“Completely new” element in the RMB 4
trillion Yuan (US$585.5 billion) stimulus
package, as the Chinese Premier added,
constituted of RMB 1.18 trillion Yuan (US$
172.76 billion), funded by the central
government. The rest RMB 2.82 trillion Yuan
(US$ 412.74) were part of already committed
investments.
The
expenditure plan of the package has been
then spread over to two years. While not
spelled out in the first go, the best fit of
availability of the central fund for 2009
and 2010 could estimably be RMB 590 billion
Yuan (US$ 86.3 billion) each. It works out
to just 3.68 per cent of China’s GDP of RMB
15.9878 trillion Yuan (US$ 2.34 trillion).
It again works out 3.2 per cent of the
estimated RMB 18 trillion investment plan.
There are yet other components. It included
RMB 600 billion Yuan (US$ 87.8 billion) tax
cuts and RMB 850 billion Yuan three year
investment in health care reform besides
proposed increase in the emoluments of 12
million teachers. The Chinese Premier has,
of course, hinted for some more steps in the
direction.[xxxii]
Breakdown of the expenditure, unveiled by
China’s top planning body, the National
Development and Reforms Commission (NDRC) in
early MARCH 2009, suggested typical Chinese
characteristics of making virtue of its
otherwise utter necessity to socio-economic
survival. Rehabilitation works in May 12,
2008 earthquake hit Wenchuan and other areas
in Sichuan province must not have waited any
further. It has claimed the bulk of 25 per
cent (RMB 1000 billion Yuan) of the total
stimulus plan. Public infrastructure,
involving as much as 38 per cent (1500
billion Yuan) of the total resource bear out
rather repackaging manoeuvres of the
committed planned expenditures. The stated
plan to spend RMB 370 billion Yuan on
technology advancement is perhaps the long
awaited need. Obsolete high energy consuming
industrial structure is the bane of the
Chinese industrial structure.
Social
welfare and rural development, constituting
respectively RMB 4oo billion Yuan and RMB
370 billion Yuan, stand scrutiny to China’s
efforts to address the dislocations in the
life system of vast multitude of rural
populace including 120 million migrant
workers, forced to return to their villages
in interior Chinese provinces. Projects
related to so called sustainable
development, in particular those catering
environmental protection would cost RMB 210
billion Yuan while education and culture
related projects would invite expenditure of
150 billion Yuan. Given the nature of
populace, getting due purchasing power, the
demand, largely for the wage goods among
consumer goods were slated to get major shot
in the arms. Theoretically, save the extent
of induced consumer expenditure, it held
potentials of adding up, and may be even
spurring demands for goods and services in
existing traditional segments. It carried
again little prospect to be a substitute for
sagging external demands.
Composition of the stimulus package 8-9
months later now is much different than what
it was originally conceived and planned out.
The
stimulus package was supposed to be divided
between investment to help companies and
social welfare to help stimulate demand.
The central government had pledged RMB 1.18
trillion Yuan (us$ 172.6 billion), which
accounted for 29.5 per cent of the total RMB
4 trillion Yuan stimulus package.
The rest was supposed to come from local
governments and lending by state owned
banks. The central government has lived by
its commitment. The banks share made up of
lending went into overdrive and the local
governments only put up about half. RMB 200
billion Yuan (US$29.3 billion) local
government bond sale, approved by the
Chinese Ministry of Finance (MoF),
constituted part of China’s RMB 950 billion
Yuan (US$139.09 billion) book entry treasury
bond sale plan.
[xxxiii]
The
National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) as well as central State Owned
Enterprises have been issuing corporate
bonds.
Actualization
Process and the Simmers
Aware of the
enormity of the problem in easy reset and
recovery of the economy, the Chinese
political and professional leaderships have
been constantly revising and reorienting
strategic and tactical moves. The malaise,
inter alia, owes its genesis to drastic fall
in the exports. The glut has created
imponderable situation. As many as 3.18
million small and medium size enterprises
had closed or suspended their operation by
Dec 2008, and rendered 40 million workforces
jobless. There are host of others, including
Chinese logistics to have suffered indirect
brunt. Peng Xingyun, Director, Monetary
Policy Decision, Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, Beijing recently expressed his
concern about large scale bankruptcies among
small and medium size companies in coastal
provinces. The Chinese strategy in vogue
strives to access new markets while reviving
and consolidating old ones. Chinese
leadership and trade delegation have been
visiting various destinations and clinching
every possible deal. As the global economy
is slated to contract by 2.9 per cent 2009
and could hardly grow more than 2 per cent
in 2010, the Chinese exports may not
experience reckonable turn around.
Spur in bank
lending in the last six months of 2009 in
response to RMB 4 trillion Yuan (US$ 585.5
billion) stimulus package and other
investments plans, in particular RMB 800
billion Yuan (US$117 billion) health care
network programme is being eulogized as well
thought short run palliative to neutralize
the negative impacts of down slides in
exports!
In the first
quarter of 2009, the Chinese state-owned
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd.,
China Construction Bank Corporation and Bank
of China lent 4.58 trillion Yuan (US$670.5
billion). This cash surge accounted for
total bank lending in 2008.[xxxiv]
An article, captioned ““China's Loan Binge:
Stimulus or Insanity?” (Caijing, May
6, 2009), says that the Industrial &
Commercial Bank of China Ltd., Bank of
Agriculture and Bank of China actually
accelerated the pace of new loans as the
quarter drew to a close. Wen Chunling, a
Beijing-based analyst at Fitch Ratings (Bloomberg,
April 30, 2009), suspects that the banks in
question have since compromised their risk
management principles under the pressure of
the government, and there was every chance
for such loans turning non-performing in the
next few years.
[xxxv]
Fearing the bubbles, the Chairman of China
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
Chairman Liu Mingkang called upon banks to
moderate their loaning pace in April 2009.
In announcing the
stimulus package of RMB 4 trillion Yuan, the
Chinese State Council stipulated that all
the funds would be allocated for the 10
priority projects by the end of 2010. After
spending 100 billion Yuan in Q4 ’08 and 130
billion Yuan in Q1 ’09, there are only 7
quarters left before the deadline to spend
94.25% of the stimulus package. Whether or
not the Chinese government will adhere to
the plan’s deadline remains to be seen,
however, it is clear spending is going to
drastically ramp up over the next few
quarters.
Points apart, the
Chinese leadership and professionals pinned
their hopes in early reset and recovery of
the Chinese economy on specific premise of
raising domestic consumption on the strength
of new monetary and fiscal policy
instruments as such in vogue. Besides adding
liquidity to the system, the measures sought
to spur marginal propensity to consume over
marginal propensity to save.
In its stride,
the Chinese State Council announced a spate
of measures to jack up domestic consumption,
which, inter alia, included raising pension
and minimum allowance for low income people.
The local governments, at their levels, went
ahead with issuing concession vouchers
during festive occasions. Property buying
has been made a lot easier. A recent
offering calls for investors to come up with
30 per cent down payment to receive a 4 per
cent loan for the remaining 70 per cent. The
3 per cent deed tax and 0.05 per cent stamp
duty is now historically very low. The
capital gains tax has been reduced to 5 per
cent of the gain versus what had been 5 per
cent of the entire amount. Simultaneously,
China halved the purchase tax on passenger
cars to 5 per cent for models with engine
displacements of less than 1.6 liters.
NBS data,
released on May 20, 2009, showed that
China’s retail sales rose 14.8 per cent in
April year on year. It was 0.1 percentage
points higher than in March. Rural spending,
driven by a Government rebate policy on
home-appliance purchases and other
commodities, grew by 16.7 per cent in April,
which was 2.8 percentage points higher than
urban growth. Property sales rose by 17.5
per cent in acreage from a year earlier in
the first four months of 2009. Nevertheless,
private sector housing sales rose 8.6 per
cent year on year in 70 mid-sized and large
cities in the first quarter, including
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong and other
metropolises. 2.67 million Vehicles were
sold in the first quarter, up 3.88 per cent
year on year. In April 2009, more than 1.5
million vehicles were sold. In the first
quarter of 2009 as whole, the vehicle sales
went up 11.1 per cent. Zhuang Jian, a senior
economist with the Asian Development Bank,
put a caveat for future sustainability of
momentum in sales growth, in particular
property and cars until the Chinese
government undertook new measures to kindle
consumer confidence. “It is difficult for
automobile sales to maintain their current
momentum, unless new favourable credit
policies are released on the purchasing
side,” said Wu Tujin, an analyst with Great
Wall Securities Co Ltd.[xxxvi]
It could be a
silver lining. Once domestic demand for
goods and services moves up, and in
particular if it was capable of offsetting
the fall in aggregate demand due to fall in
external demand, the Chinese economy stood
every chance of crossing the threshold for
reset and recovery. Accompanying tell tale
on-ground developments included unbound
resumption of market forces, and rekindling
of whole range of economic activities. The
NBS report stated that China’s industrial
output rose 7.3 per cent and 8.9 per cent
year on year in April and May 2009
respectively. Hao Daming, a Beijing based
economist with Galaxy Securities attributed
the phenomenon to “rapid improvements in
domestic demand”.[xxxvii]
This can otherwise be true as there is
little rationale for production activities
to pick up in the face continuous spell of
declines in exports and imports.
[xxxviii]
However, the fact is otherwise. The growth
as such is investment driven, and could add
up the glut as the domestic market is still
far less geared to absorb and the prospect
for exports stand bleak until the major
Chinese export destinations in US, EU and
such other economies post net demand for
Chinese goods and services.
[xxxix]
Notwithstanding, a certain section of
economists in the world doubt the figure as
the Chinese industrial output growth figure
is not matched with energy generation and
consumption figures.
[xl]
Record production
is then seldom expected to be met with
record consumption. According to World Steel
Association, the demand for steel in China
shall fall by 5 per cent in 2009. So could
be the case of products other set of basic
industries. Eventually even state owned
industries can not keep on producing unsold
products. In the case of SMEs, a large
proportion of target consumers are in the
process of de-leveraging, and actually
saving. They would not be in buying spree of
SME products.
The Chinese
monetary and fiscal policy instruments to
reset and recovery thus have a bleak future.
(Dr.
Sheonandan Pandey is a China watcher with a
long stint in the Government of India and
finally retied from National Technical
Research Organization. He can be contacted
at
sheonandan@hotmail.com)
[i]
China got into pep talks mode right
when the Chinese President Hu Jintao
attended Nov 2008 G-20 Washington summit and
visited Costa Rica, Cuba, Peru and Greece.
He sought to assure that the Chinese economy
had potentials to recover back much early
than expected and China would play
quintessential role in the recovery of the
world economy. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao,
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and the
Governor of China’s Central Bank, the
People’s Bank of China (PBOC)Zhou Xiaochuan
feverishly spoke about China’s potential to
lift the world economy and not just the
Chinese economy from its down hill journey,
caused by global financial crisis and global
economic down turn.
[ii]In
its quarterly updates, released on June 18,
2009, the WB joined Goldman Sach’s Group
Inc, Morgan Stanley and UBS AG in raising
growth forecasts for China for 2009 to 7.2
per cent after its RMB 4 trillion Yuan (US$
585.5 billion) stimulus package, announced
in Nov 2008, triggered record loans and
surging investments. In March 2009, the WB
had scaled down its projection to 6.5 per
cent from its earlier projections of 7.5 per
cent in Nov 2008, and 9.2 per cent still
earlier. In the first three quarters,
China’s economic growth had plummeted to 9.9
per cent after five years of double digit
growth, the top most being 13 per cent in
2007. China insists on its potential to
realize 8 per cent growth, which is the
minimum to retain China’s employment level
at its place.
[iii]
Recovery connotes a bounce back to the
previous peak of growth while reset implies
a positive turn.
[iv]
China’s GDP stood at RMB 6574.5 billion Yuan
(US$ 939 billion) during the first quarter
of 2009, where the primary, secondary and
tertiary sectors contributed respectively
RMB 470.0 billion Yuan (), RMB 3196.8 Yuan
and RMB 2907.7 billion Yuan (). The three
sectors respectively recorded growth rate of
3.5 per cent, 5.3 per cent and 7.4 per
cent.
[v]
In his paper, published in China Security
Journal, and quoted in China Daily in its
issue dated 22 April 2009, Fan said:
“Possibility for China to have steady and
quick recovery is not big due to the current
external economic situation and structural
problems with the domestic economy. The
impact of global crisis is spreading and
exerting greater and deeper effects on
China. Fan added further: “China still
suffered from excess capacity in some
undertakings, meaning that some obsolete
products capacity should start to be phased
out beginning this very quarter. The process
could take several years before a logical
readjustment could complete”.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-04/22/content_7704145.htm
[vi]
Lack of clarity about the total quantum of
the stimulus package continues even as the
top Chinese leadership, the Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao included, quite often sought to
explain away the doubts. RMB 4 trillion Yuan
(US$585.6 billion) package, announced in Nov
2008, has, at best, RMB 1.18 trillion Yuan
(US $172.7 billion as the central government
component and the rest RMB 2.82 trillion
Yuan (US $ 412.9 billion) as local
government component. Responding to the
doubts about the resource at hand and their
viability, the Chinese Premier told media on
the concluding day of the second annual
session of the 11th National
People’s congress that the proposed RMB 4
trillion Yuan stimulus package excluded
other projects, including the RMB 600
billion Yuan US$ 87.84 billion) tax cuts,
old-age pension increase for those who had
retired from the enterprises and hitherto
lived on quite paltry sum, salary increase
to 12 million teachers, subsidies to farmers
as well as an RMB 850 billion (US$ 124.45
billion) expenditure in health care. All
this amount was then not available for 2009.
RMB 4 trillion Yuan was a two year package
while other expenditures including those on
health care were meant for subsequent three
years period.
[vii]
China displaced Germany with marginal
increase in GDP in 2008. Interestingly,
there is wide gap in comparison with the top
first, the US and top second, Japan. The two
respectively hold 28.76 and 09.11 per cent
shares in the global economy.
Notwithstanding, Germany, France, UK and the
rest others in the European Union suffering
the bout of recession jointly hold 30.49 per
cent share in the global economy.
[viii]
Monetary and fiscal policies refer to
“demand management” techniques. Monetary
policy is the process, where the monetary
authority of a country controls (i) the
supply of money, (ii) availability of money,
and (iii) cost of money. It can be
expansionary to combat recession or
contractionary to address heating of the
economy. The economic policy is often
referred as accommodative, neutral of tight
depending on interest being to add to
growth, remain ambivalent or poised to curb
inflation. The tool of monetary policies
include: increasing interest rates by fiat;
reducing the monetary base; and, increasing
reserve requirements. Fiscal policy
relate to direct intervention of the
authority, where the tools available at the
disposal of the government included change
in the level of government expenditure or
taxation. The two can be used independently
or in conjunction with each others,
depending on the ideology of the
authority.
[ix]
Barbera, Robert J., The Cost of Capitalism:
Understanding Market Mayhem and Stabilizing
our Economic Future, March 2009,
[x]
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/24/content_7485388.htm
[xi]
“ Credit Crisis- How it Began” In Guardian,
Aug 5, 2008.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/aug/05/northernrock.banking
[xii]
The classic definition of a recession is two
consecutive quarters of negative gross
domestic product (GDP). The Business Cycle
Dating Committee of the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER), the US panel
recognized as the official arbiter of
business cycles, adjudicated onset of
recession in the USA right since early
December 2007. The NBER, however, did not
identify economic activity solely with real
GDP growth but used a range of indicators,
such as employment, personal income and
industrial output, in determining the onset
of recession.
[xiii]
http://www.financialexpress.com/news/china-predicts-stable-export-growth-in-2008/283591
[xiv]
Xinhua News Agency, January 22, 2009.
[xv]
In April 2009, China’s exports fell 22.6 per
cent from a year earlier in the 6th
straight monthly decline. Total Chinese
exports in the month ran to US$ 91.94
billion. It was sharper than March 2009
decline of 17. 1 per cent and the median
forecasts of 18.4 per cent in Dow Jones
Newswire survey of 16 economists. In January
2009 and February 2009, the Chinese exports
fell by 17.5 per cent and 25.1 per cent
respectively on year on year basis.
[xvi]
PBOC plays pivotal role in monetary policy
formulation and implementation after
assuming the charge of central bank in 1984.
For quite long, it resorted to direct
administrative methods to balance the
aggregates. After abolition of credit
ceiling in Jan 1998 and, the expansion of
open market operations, it has come to
depend on indirect methods.
[xvii]
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009
raised its head right in July 2007 when the
loss of confidence of investors in the value
of securitized mortgage in the US resulted
in liquidity crisis. In Sep 2008, the crisis
deepened, as stock markets world wide
crashed and entered a period of high
volatility, and a considerable number of
banks, mortgage lenders, and insurance
companies got into failure spree.
[xviii]
The impact of the cuts in the interest rates
in improving the liquidity situation in
automatic natural process remains
constricted as the lending and deposit rates
for commercial banks is set by the Chinese
Ministry of Finance in tandem with policy
decision of the government and party. The
market mechanism have little role. This
limits the pass through of changes in the
PBOC interest rates.
[xix]
China had ratcheted up the reserve ratio,
from 6 per cent in Aug 2003 TO 14.5 per cent
in Dec. 2007 and 17.5 per cent in June 2008.
The 1 percentage point cut in the reserve
ratio brought to bear upon for the first
time in Sep 2008 did not apply for the five
large banks e.g. the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China, the Agricultural
Bank of China, The Bank of China, the China
Construction Bank, and the Banks of
Communications. It did not apply for the
Postal Savings Banks as well.
[xx]
http://en.chinagate.cn/top.news/2008-12/07/content_16910501_2.htm
[xxi]
http://www.thearynews.com/english/newsdatail.asp?nid=25003
[xxii]
Xinhua, March 06, 2009.
[xxiii]
http://en.cc.cn/business/enterprse/200812/06/t20081206_17599073.shtml
[xxiv]
M2, a measure of money supply that includes
M1, plus savings and small time deposits,
overnight repos at commercial banks, and
non-institutional money market accounts.
[xxv]
NBS data released on May 10, 2009 shoed that
CPI in China fell by 0.9 per cent
year-on-year in the first five months of
2009. In May 2009, it declined by 1.4 per
cent. It was nearly constant in comparison
to April 2009 when it had dropped by 1.5 per
cent. 32 per cent drop in pork price due to
governmental initiative for various
non-economic reasons contributed in the drop
of prices of food items by 0.6 per cent. The
prices of non-food items dropped by 1.7 per
cent. It was mainly due to fall in the
effective demand in the face of scary
recession. Producer Price Index (PPI) in May
fell by staggering 7.7 per cent year-on
year. For the first quarter, the decline in
PPI worked out to be 4.6 percent. In the
preceding April 2009, it accounted for 6.6
per cent.
http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com.cn/dailybriefing/2009_06_10/CPI_PPIfall_in_May.html.
[xxvi]
Estimates about non-performing loans (NPL)
in China vary. At least 2 per cent of the
loans made since 2007 have been reported as
non-performing. The proportion was as high
as 60 percent for older lending. China had
so far RMB 35 trillion Yuan outstanding bank
loans. With the present doze of RMB 9
trillion Yuan loan in the market, the total
would run to RMB 44 trillion Yuan. Experts
put the figure to range between 20-40 per
cent. Ernst and Young had put the figure at
US$ 900 billion as of May 2008, which it
later retracted. Fitch Ratings put the
figures at US$470 billion.
[xxvii]
Lu Lei, No End in Sight for Loose Monetary
Policy, Caijing,
http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-06-04/1101
[xxviii]
Expansionary stance of fiscal policy
involves a net increase in government
spending (G>T). The other two stances are
neutral and contractionary. A neutral stance
of fiscal policy implies a balanced budget
(G=T) while a contractionary stance stands
for surplus budget (G<T). The deficit in
expansionary stance is relative in
perspective. It was possible first, when the
government spending far exceeded tax revenue
or a smaller budget surplus in comparison to
what it was earlier, or a deficit if the
government previously had a balanced
budget.
[xxix]
Crowding out stand for a situation when the
government borrowing pushed demand for
credit, and the interest rates across the
market jump to a limit when aggregate demand
slides down in its totality.
[xxx]
RMB 850 billion Yuan expenditure on building
health infrastructure, proposal to give
reckonable raise in the salary of teachers,
etc constitute the sundry elements in the
stimulus package.
[xxxi]
As the analysts world over doubted the
credentials of the Chinese stimulus package,
the exasperated Chinese Premier Wen went on
record to say on Mar 13, 2009 that RMB 1.18
trillion Yuan in the package was “completely
new” investment, slated to be spent on
projects concerning people’s well being,
technology upgrading, environmental
protection, and major infrastructure
projects. Wen admitted publicly that some
projects in the stimulus package, such as
roads and railways, were factually already
included in China’s 11th five
year development plan.
[xxxii]
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90885/6613552.htm
[xxxiii]
Of RMB 200 billion Yuan bond, allocated by
the MoF to the local governments, Sichuan,
the May 12, 2008 earthquake hit province,
was to get RMB 18 billion, Guangdong RMB 11
billion Yuan, Yunnan RMB 8.4 billion Yuan,
Liaoning RMB 6.6 billion Yuan, Guangxi RMB
6.5 billion Yuan, Guizhou RMB 6.4 billion
Yuan, Shaanxi RMB 6.0 billion Yuan, Hebei
RMB 6.0 billion Yuan, Anhui RMB 4 billion
Yuan, Ningxia RMB 3 billion Yuan, Xinjiang
RMB 3 billion Yuan and Beijing, the capital
RMB 5.6 billion Yuan. The allocation of
bonds for the por other region awaited
decision.
[xxxiv]
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd.
advanced 636.4 billion Yuan (US$93.3
billion) of new loans, almost quadruple the
amount extended in the same period a year
ago and more than the bank’s total lending
in 2008. China Construction Bank Corporation
offered 521 billion Yuan of new credit in
the first three months, compared with 161
billion Yuan a year earlier. Bank of China
made 511 billion Yuan of new loans, more
than twice the amount a year earlier. All
three banks are state-owned and based in
Beijing.
[xxxv]
The size of China’s bad loan has been a
source of constant controversy. Gordon
Chang, a China expert and author of "The
Coming Collapse of China," told the hearing
of the US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission that China's banks and
instrumentalities were probably sitting on a
trillion dollars of doubtful loans. He
warned that "a bank failure in the next few
years is possible, if not likely" and that
China's banks, "almost without exception,
are hopelessly insolvent from a balance
sheet point of view.” Chinese banks are
blowing up their balance sheets at
unprecedented rates," he said, adding that
banking failure would "almost certainly lead
to a collapse of the economy" and cause the
political system to be even more fragile.
Chang also said that China was burdened by
too much debt. Beijing claims that China's
debt to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio
is only 18 percent but Chang said it was a
staggering 81 percent, based on his
"conservative" calculations.
[xxxvi]
Xinhua, May 14, 2009.
[xxxvii]
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/breaking_news_detail.asp?id=15012
[xxxviii]
Chinese exports and imports in fell 26.4 per
cent and 25.2 per cent in year on year in
May 2009. The fall is consecutive in a row
for the last seven months, and at an
accelerated pace from April 2009.
Notwithstanding, May 2009 trade surplus of
US$ 13.4 billion was below forecasts of
US$14.8 billion. Expected drop in exports
and imports were 23.1 per cent and 22.0 per
cent year on year.
[xxxix]
Investment leaped 40 per cent in May 2009 on
the back of government pump priming. As per
the NBS data, investment in urban areas in
fixed assets rose 32.9 per cent in the first
5 months from a year earlier, compared to
30.5 per cent in the first 4 months.
[xl]
Statistics released by the Chinese State
Grid Corporation of China shows that power
generation in April 2009 fell 3.55 per cent
from a year earlier, to 274.76 billion
kilowatt hours. Since the Chinese industry
consumes nearly 70 per cent of Chinese
power, it is almost a riddle how drops in
power generation and increase in industrial
out put could logically go hand in hand. In
fact, electricity consumption in all other
sectors, say agriculture, tertiary industry,
and residential use have had significant
rise during the first quarter of 2009. The
agriculture, tertiary and household sectors
registered respectively increase of 5.12 per
cent, 7.41 per cent and 9.88 percent. Drop
in energy consumption secondary industry
started much before the Chinese government
announced stimulus package of RMB 4 trillion
Yuan. It started falling with the fall in
export orders, in particular in Guangdong,
Zhejiang, Shenzhen and other such export
bases in China.