Paper no. 3289

3-July-2009

IRAN’S POLITICAL TURBULENCE: THE STRATEGIC FALLOUT 

By Dr. Subhash Kapila 

Introductory Observations 

Iran had been in a state of political turbulence from mid-June 2009 onwards as a sequel to the disputed Presidential Election results.  President Ahmedinejad’s return to power for a second term was disputed by his main opponent, Mir Hussein Mousavi a former Prime Minister. 

In scenes reminiscent of the Iranian Revolution, Teheran was rocked with daily widespread protest demonstrations by Monsavi’s supporters demanding that the return of President Ahmedinjad was fraudently contrived by rigging the elections. 

Mousavi’s appeal to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamnei to intervene did not bring any political relief.  On the contrary he asserted that no rigging had taken place and that President Ahmedinejad’s  re-election was in order. 

In retrospect, it seems that the Teheran political demonstrations against the present regime were spontaneous outbursts of long suppressed political outrage of the Iranian middle-class against the present political order. 

That these political demonstrations are not taking place any longer indicates that the present regime has cracked down heavily on the political unrest. 

Iran has been a constant focus of regional and global strategic attention, moreso, in view of its nuclear ambitions and its aspirations for regional leadership.  After the recent political turbulence, it still continues to be in focus in terms of strategic and political fallout. The United States and other countries are still figuring out as to what this political unrest portends. 

This Paper intends to analyze the strategic fallout of Iran’s political turbulence under the following heads: 

  • Iran’s Political Turbulence: The Domestic and Regional Fallout
  • Major Arab Powers Virtually Silent on Iranian Political Unrest
  • Iran’s Political Turbulence: The Strategic Fallout

Iran’s Political Turbulence:  The Domestic and Regional Fallout 

Iran’s political turbulence in terms of domestic fallout needs to be viewed from the following perspectives:

  • Iran present political structures and political systems stand challenged.
  • Widespread open protest demonstrations on the capital’s streets indicates that the political outrage, especially of the middle class, suppressed for long, has now reached a boiling point.
  • Present crackdowns may have curtailed the protests, but political unrest can be expected to simmer.  Next time even a small cinder has the potential to spark a political upheaval.

In terms of Iran’s apex level leadership the political turbulence impacts as follows: 

  • Supreme Leader’s unquestioned leadership stands challenged
  • President Ahmedinejad’s second term would continue with diluted authority and a diminished image.
  • Within the Ayatollah fraternity there seems to be a leadership struggle and divisions with reports suggesting that former President Ayatollah Rafsanjani was strongly backing Mousavi in the present political challenge.

In terms of regional fallout in the Middle East region, the following can be expected: 

  • Monarchial and authoritarian regimes of the Middle East can expect increased political turbulence and political challenges to their authority.
  • Peoples in these countries will be encouraged by the Iranian pattern of political demonstrations against all authoritarian rule and not permitting free political activity.
  • Increased political turbulence in the Middle East could alter the strategic landscape

Major Arab Powers Virtually Silent on Iranian Political Unrest 

Possibly as a consequence of the likely political fall-out indicated above, the major Arab powers like Iran’s regional power rival Saudi Arabia and Egypt have been noticeably silent in not coming out with any official comments on the Iranian unrest. 

The same goes with other Gulf Region countries which have large Shia population. 

Another underlying reason may be that all these Arab countries fear Iran not only as a predominant regional power in the Middle East, but also fear Iran’s potential to whip up unrest and disturbances in their countries through its various protégés in Arab countries. 

Iran’s Political Turbulence:  The Strategic Fallout 

The strategic fallout of Iran’s political turbulence needs to be viewed in the context of the following factors:

  • Iran’s nuclear weapons program
  • Iran’s regional power aspirations
  • Iran’s international relations

Iran’s nuclear weapons program is unlikely to be affected by political unrest. Should even Monsavi have come to power, Iran’s national aspiration to have a nuclear weapons arsenal would not have been curtailed.  This is a strategic reality. 

On the contrary, the present political unrest, perceived by the Iranian regime as externally inspired could speed up the Iranian nuclear weapons program, to what may now be perceived as enhanced threats to Iran’s security 

Iran’s regional power aspirations get linked up to the above in terms of national aspirations and national pride. With Iran quite self sufficient in the armament industry with Russian and Chinese help, Iran’s military profile will be a growing activity. Its significant geo-strategic location further enhances its regional power attributes as compared to her neighbors. 

Iran’s International Relations 

It is debatable whether Iran’s international relations would suffer a serious setback as a result of the recent political unrest. 

Iran’s relations with the United States and the European Union have never been cordial even since 1979.  In recent years, their relations have become more conflictual over the Iranian nuclear weapons program 

What the present political unrest may impact is the move by the US Obama Administration to adopt a more conciliatory approach towards Iran for an opening for better relations. 

One does not see any indications that there could be a breakdown in the US diplomatic initiatives on this account. The United States today needs Iran strategically more than Iran needs the United States. 

However, in terms of the Middle East Peace Initiatives and especially the Israel-Palestine rift, the present events could slow down the process.  Israel can claim that Iran still persists as a threat directly and through its Shia militias which endanger Israel’s security. 

It would be erroneous to expect that Iranian political unrest could provide strong leverages to the United States and Israel to make Iran submit to coercive moves, diplomatically or otherwise to deter it from its nuclear weapons program. 

Concluding Observations 

Iran’s political turbulence indicates that the Iranian people seek a change in their political structures and systems. 

The important thing to differentiate in political assessments is that the Iranian people are looking for a “transformational political change” and not a “revolutionary political change”. 

If that is correctly understood then all the rest of the perspectives in terms of political and strategic fallout falls neatly into place. 

Significantly, therefore, arising from the above would be the major deduction that the Iranian people, irrespective of political changes would not forego their national aspirations, namely their nuclear weapons program and their role as the predominant regional power.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst.  He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group.  Email:drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)

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