Targeted Attacks on
Iranian Scientists Continue
By B. Raman
The targeted attacks on qualified Iranian
scientists by unidentified elements continue
under a suspected covert action programme of
Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence
agency, to disrupt Iran's military nuclear
programme.
2. The first incident came to notice on
February 4, 2007, when the Sunday Times of
London reported as follows: "A
prize-winning Iranian nuclear scientist has
died in mysterious circumstances, according
to Radio Farda, which is funded by the US
State Department and broadcasts to Iran. An
intelligence source suggested that Ardeshire
Hassanpour, 44, a nuclear physicist, had
been assassinated by Mossad, the Israeli
security service. Hassanpour worked at a
plant in Isfahan where uranium hexafluoride
gas is produced. The gas is needed to enrich
uranium in another plant at Natanz which has
become the focus of concerns that Iran may
be developing nuclear weapons. According to
Radio Farda, Iranian reports of Hassanpour's
death emerged on January 21 after a delay of
six days, giving the cause as gas poisoning.
The Iranian reports did not say how or where
Hassanpour was poisoned, but his death was
said to have been announced at a conference
on nuclear safety."
3. This was followed by an incident of
mysterious disappearance of an Iranian
scientist who had gone on pilgrimage to
Saudi Arabia last month. He reportedly did
not return to Iran. The Iranian authorities
alleged that the US was behind his
disappearance. The Saudi authorities denied
that any such incident had taken place in
their territory. The US did not comment on
the Iranian allegation.
4. In a third incident targeting Iranian
scientists, Massoud Ali Mohammadi, a
particle physics professor at the Tehran
University, is reported to have been killed
on January, 12, 2010, by the
remote-controlled explosion of an improvised
explosive device attached to an unattended
motor-cycle as he was getting into his car
outside his house in a posh suburb of
Tehran. The Iranian authorities have blamed
"mercenaries" in the pay of the Israeli and
US intelligence agencies for his death.
5. Ramin Mehmanparast, a spokesman of the
Iranian Foreign Office, has been quoted as
saying: "One can see in preliminary
investigations signs of evil by the triangle
of the Zionist regime, America and their
mercenaries in Iran in this terrorist
incident. "Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi, Tehran's
chief prosecutor, told the news service of
the State-controlled radio: "Given the fact
that Massoud Ali Mohammadi was a nuclear
scientist, the CIA and Mossad services and
agents most likely have had a hand in it. On
the one hand, US government spy agents
kidnap Iranians in third countries and
transfer them to America and on the other
hand their sellout agents in Iran
assassinate a scholarly citizen.
Intelligence and security bodies will try to
identify and arrest the perpetrators of this
crime and expose their foreign backers." A
spokesman of the US State Department has
denied the allegations as absurd.
6. Quoting a statement of Basij, the student
militia of the University, the official IRNA
news agency has alleged that Mohammadi's
name figured in a list prepared by Western
Governments of Iranian scientists connected
with the nuclear programme for whom visas
should be refused as part of the sanctions
against Iran for refusing to give up its
nuclear enrichment programme. The news
agency said: "Dr Massoud Ali Mohammadi,
whose name was on the list of sanctioned
individuals ... was one of the outstanding
professors of Tehran University's physics
faculty." Other reports have claimed that
Mohammadi's name had appeared on a list of
academics backing Iranian opposition leader
Mir Hossein Mousavi for the disputed June
12, 2009, presidential election, which gave
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a second
term. Allegations of irregularities in the
elections have led to widespread and
continuing unreest by the opponents of
Ahmadinejad.
7. In my article of February 5, 2007, (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/common/uploaded_files/paper2121.html).
I had drawn attention to the Psywar campaign
against Iran initiated by the Bush
Administration and the Israeli agencies.
This Psywar campaign apparently continues
under the Obama Administration too
with discreet support to the opposition
elements after the disputed elections
through Radio and TV stations of the Iranian
exiles in the West and through the Internet.
However, this continuing Psywar campaign
shows no signs of making Iran change its
policies and be more responsive to Western
demands.
8. For the first time in many months, Gen.
David Petraeus, the chief of the US Central
Command, made detailed comments on the
possibility of military options against Iran
in a CNN interview with Christiane Amanpour
on January 11, 2010. Relevant extracts from
the interview are annexed. His comments seem
to be part of the stepped up Psywar.
(The writer is
Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and,
presently, Director, Institute For Topical
Studies, Chennai. E-mail:
seventyone2@gmail.com)
ANNEXURE
EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTS OF GEN. DAVID
PETRAEUS
AMANPOUR: Again, the noise is growing about
a potential strike, a potential military
strike by Israel on Iran's nuclear
capabilities. Do you think it's possible to
do it?
PETRAEUS: Well, I won't talk about the
military capabilities of -- of one of our
close allies, in this case, Israel.
Certainly, there has been a good bit
published about what Israel could and
perhaps could not do. And I think, also,
there has been quite a bit written about the
implications of this and the second- and
third- and fourth-order effects of it.
AMANPOUR: In terms of an actual physical
capability, could Iran's nuclear facilities
be bombed, in terms of effectively, because
there are a lot of tunnels people are
talking about?
PETRAEUS: They certainly can be bombed. The
-- the level of effect would vary with who
it is that carries it out, what ordnance
they have, and what capability they can
bring to bear.
AMANPOUR: What is the difference now, in
terms of Iran's physical infrastructure,
compared to, for instance, what Israel did
back in 1980 or '81 against the Osirak
reactor in Iraq or, indeed, against the
Syrian reactor a couple of years ago?
PETRAEUS: Well, I think it's well known that
Iran has gone to considerable lengths to
harden, to put underground, to use tunnels
and so forth, to -- to reduce the
vulnerability of its various nuclear
facilities.
AMANPOUR: What are the drawbacks to military
action there?
PETRAEUS: Well, in a sense, the -- the
consequences of this, really - - you know,
they're just very, very difficult to
calculate. We have done quite a bit of
thinking about this, as you would expect.
That's what we get paid to do. It would be
almost literally irresponsible if CENTCOM
were not to have been thinking about the
various "what ifs" and to make plans for a
whole variety of different contingencies.
And we generally try not to be
irresponsible.
As you think through this, of course, the
disruptions to the global economy, the
challenges to infrastructure in that
particular very, very important region,
again, important to the whole world, not
just to those countries themselves, threats
against various U.S. forces -- of course,
we've got some 230,000 soldiers, sailors,
airmen and Marines deployed in the Central
Command area of responsibility and so forth.
But, again, we have done quite a bit of
thinking about this. We have done quite a
bit of contingency planning. And, again,
that's what we get paid to do, and -- and
that's what we've sought to do.
AMANPOUR: Is there sort of a deadline on
whether you implement that planning?
PETRAEUS: We don't -- we don't see a
deadline. There's a variety of different
timelines out there that folks have -- have
discussed. We think there's a period of
time, certainly, before all this might come
to a head, if you will. There's certainly
more room for the P5-plus-one to engage,
perhaps, in a bit -- bit more diplomacy and
then certainly to explore heightened
economic sanctions and -- and so forth."