Terrorism: Present Challenges & Trends

Terrorism: Present Challenges & Trends

Guest Column by R. Swaminathan

Conventional wisdom in the “good old days” had it that external security threats stemmed from hostile countries and internal security threats were all totally indigenous. In the last few decades, India’s security scenario has undergone a sea change; and many internal security threats are externally sponsored or guided or inspired or supported or tolerated. We no longer enjoy the luxury of merely blaming the “foreign hand”, but have to gear up to face the challenges that exist and that may come about in the future. The rapidly developing political, economic and military strength of India, if unfortunately accompanied by a fragile internal security scenario, could become a significant factor for instability in the region and in the world.

India is widely accepted to be the country most affected by terrorism, in terms of casualties, duration of challenges, types of terrorism (and their causes) etc. Amongst the various types of violence against society that are faced by India (not necessarily all at the same time and/or with the same intensity) the following could be identified for studying the causes, options for countering them and possible solutions:

·         Ethnic struggles for their rights, often leading to demands for secession, militant insurgency, terrorist acts against government targets and even innocent civilians.
·         Left wing (naxalite or Maoist) extremism, originally stemming from extreme deprivation.
·         Linguistic, caste-based agitations and other parochial movements.
·         Cross-border terrorism mostly sponsored or tolerated by unfriendly or ineffective governments.
·         Jihadi terrorism, spawned by pan-Islamic fundamentalism.
·         Spill-over terrorism from neighbours.

Ethnic Militancy & Maoist Insurgency

Though this paper essentially deals with terrorism and counter-terrorism responses, a brief discussion about the related issues of ethnic militancy and Maoist insurgency may be appropriate.

There is still some ambiguity about the definition of terrorism and who is a terrorist and this leads to a tendency to lump together terms like militants, insurgents, extremists, fundamentalists and (real) terrorists. Some analysts club together the security threats posed by ethnic insurgencies (mostly in the north-east) and Maoist insurgency (widely spread in many states of India) together with the threats posed by terrorism. The insurgencies are socio-political phenomena and are basically territory-related, in the sense that the ethnic insurgencies want to have a separate status (within or outside India) for the areas in which the particular ethnic group is in a majority; and the Maoists want to control territory and, through such control, impose a different system of governance. While all kinds of people fighting for different causes may at times indulge in violent acts, a terrorist is one whose primary aim is to cause maximum destruction, often targeting totally unconnected persons, with the sole purpose of causing and promoting fear and thus influence decision-making. The terrorists seek to influence the minds of the people, terrorise them into losing their faith in the government and impose a state of fear about public safety.

The Maoist (Naxalite) movement has gripped a significantly large portion of India and, as repeatedly stated by the Prime Minister, it presently poses arguably the most serious threat to our internal security. Though the “ideology” and the “methodology” may be imported, the basic causes are indigenous. There is a wide-spread perception that “land reforms” and efforts at redress of genuine grievances have only been superficial and that the “exploiters” continue to “exploit” the poor and the landless agriculturists. It cannot be a coincidence that the Maoists are most effective in areas of past maximum exploitation of tribal communities. If there is any element of truth in this perception, urgent steps need to be taken to remedy the situation on the ground, without necessarily tying them to a cease-fire. The grievances have to be handled by a judicious combination of social, economic and political measures, coupled with police action for the preservation of public safety and Law & Order.

China had, at one stage, provided shelter and support to ethnic-separatist militancy in the north-east. Various militant groups operating in India’s northeast have often found safe haven and operational bases in Bangladesh. The linkages between the Maoists in Nepal and those in the bordering states in India would remain a cause for major concern. One, however, has to recognize, accept and cater for the fact that while external factors could provide, seen-or-unseen, real-or-virtual, inspiration and support (like fertilizer and water) to various groups that pose internal security threats, only the pre-existence of the basic grievances and causes (like soil and seeds) could make them functional.

Present Challenges

The terrorist challenges presently faced by India are mostly India-specific and not really a part of "global terrorism”. The so-called "global war on terror" is not likely to be of much help to India. Some terrorist groups may follow similar methodologies and techniques as used elsewhere; and some get inspiration (and support) from outside to exploit the idea of Islamic jihad as a motivating factor. One of the unfortunate consequences of the raise of Islamic fundamentalism is the mostly indigenous “retaliatory” raise in fundamentalist revivals amongst Hindus and other religionists. Such revivals have the dangerous potential of being accepted by the majority as totally justified. In addition to direct and indirect terrorist challenges, India has also to handle instances of mass violence based on religious, communal, linguistic and such other fault lines.

The first challenge is to be able to recognize that our internal security can be ensured only if there is a political consensus on national security policies. Political entities need to agree to eschew the temptation of exploiting (for narrow party interests or for creating/maintaining vote-banks) divisive issues which have the potential of posing threats to national cohesion and security. Such issues should be discussed between all the concerned political entities and the concerned people and agreed policy approaches worked out. The relatively easy procedure of inciting emotions and passions on potentially divisive issues needs to be given up, though at some cost to the popular “image”.

The adjectives “Jihadi” or “Islamist” are often used in relation to certain terrorist incidents mainly because no other terror group invokes religious sanction or quotes religious texts to justify its terrorist acts. Further, such groups do not shy away from admitting the religious nature of their ultimate goal, i.e. the Islamisation of society. Literature found with activists of Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) talks of this goal seriously. As jihadi terrorists cloak themselves in religious idiom, they can easily draw support from innocent Muslims. Jihadi terrorists are very active against India, not because India is the number one enemy of Islam, but because it is considered to be a soft target.

Jihadi terrorism, inspired by externally generated ideas about taking revenge for perceived wrongs committed against Islam over centuries and the grandiose ambition of establishing an Islamic Caliphate across international borders, continues to pose a major threat. The earlier self-congratulatory claim about Indian Muslims not being involved in jihadi terrorism has been belied by the increasing numbers of Indian Muslims seen to be involved in such incidents in recent times. It is not as if the jihadi terrorists have a joint “global” or "national” headquarters or if such groups hold any defined territories from which alone they operate. There may be similarities in methodologies and techniques; but it would be a big mistake to try and evolve a grand plan of macro solutions to this problem. In order to gain local support, every such group would have to focus on specific local-oriented politico-economic-religious issues; and these may have to be tackled through customised approaches that include the addressing of genuine grievances.

Pakistan has since 1956 been using state-sponsored and state-supported terrorism as an instrument of its state policy and a strategic weapon against India. Sponsorship, support and safe havens provided in Pakistan and Bangladesh have kept cross-border terrorism alive in Kashmir, north-east and elsewhere. The ISI-sponsored militant groups have grown to carry out their jihad not just against the Govt. of India and Hindus in general, but pursue the ultimate objective of the formation of an Islamic caliphate in South Asia, by attacking many targets within Pakistan also. It would seem that the Pakistani state that had sought strategic gains through the sponsorship of terrorism is finding the enterprise increasingly unprofitable; and it is doubtful if the state has the capability to put the genie back in the bottle, or even if it has any such intention.

While (rightly) laying a major part of the blame for cross-border jihadi terrorism on Pakistan and Bangladesh, one has to admit that a disturbingly significant part of jihadi terrorism in India is indigenous. Angry individual Muslims, many of them well educated, not belonging to any organisation, have been active. Dr. Sageman, a retired CIA official, has called them leaderless jihadis and Raman calls them citizen jihadis. They are terrorists born out of the anger of the moment, giving vent to their anger through tactical strikes, but they have no strategic objective. The threats emanating from increasing nexus between local criminal gangs like Dawood’s and LeT terrorists cannot be under-estimated.

Vote bank politics and minorityism are among the factors that inhibit significant action against jihadi terrorists. There is already a creeping feeling that the majority is treated as “second class” citizens and this could blow up as a major reaction, unless the government improves its performance in countering jihadi terrorists.

Trends

I had mentioned (five years ago) in a paper that one of the greatest risks would be an increase in suicide terrorist missions. With the improved overall security arrangements, suicide missions may become the preferred low-cost option. That perception is still valid. Suicide missions need not always be related to bomb-in-truck kind of use of explosives and could include well-planned commando-style missions as in Mumbai in November 2008. Special efforts are needed to reduce the casualties in such attacks, to ensure zero-escapes and meaningful (and prompt) follow-up action against the surviving terrorists; and to mount a viable threat of possible retaliation, so that the costs of such missions become unacceptably high.

The Times of India (14 March 2010) mentioned recent intelligence reports from Pakistan pointing to the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) recruiting surrendered Taliban militants for possible use in India. 130 such militants are said to be under training in an "institute" in Lahore, for the past three months. This might result in an increase in suicide bombings or high-risk commando style attacks.

The bombing in Pune points to the possibility of jihadi terrorists targeting smaller (Tier II) cities. Smaller cities normally have smaller police forces and are likely to be less well protected. There are better chances of succeeding without being caught. Apart from this, as the basic objective of terrorist attacks is to create a fear psychosis (and resultant loss of faith in the government) amongst the people, the wider the target net, the better would be the result for the terrorists. Mass casualty terrorism (as in the cases of 9/11 in New York and 26/11 in Mumbai) are spectacular and has its own value in the terrorists' scheme of things. Attacking smaller cities, resulting in relatively lower casualties will cause wide-spread "We are not safe anywhere" syndrome and help lower the morale of the government and the public. The fight against terrorism of this nature, in the bigger or smaller cities, cannot succeed without the active involvement of enlightened and security-conscious citizenry. The law enforcement and security agencies have not so far been able to enlist the aam admi in the fight against terrorism.

Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram spoke on 11 March 2010 about a real-time decision support system to track down terrorists and organised criminals. “Today, we are fighting our battles on individual pitches. We need to connect, coordinate and supplement our efforts both at micro and macro levels.” Referring to the Home Ministry's Rs. 2,000-crore Crime, Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) project, he said a conscious decision had been taken to mandate the NCRB to roll out the CCTNS through which a national databank of crime and criminals and their biometric profiles could be created. This database would have a handshake with databases of 21 other agencies of the criminal justice system such as courts, jails, immigration and passport authorities, and subsequently, be extended to other national agencies through the NATGRID so that terror and crime could be fought more professionally.

Without becoming very technical, I distinguish between maritime security and coastal security by considering the former to be mainly concerned with protecting assets on the high seas from attacks at sea; and the latter as aimed at protecting assets on land from sea-borne attacks. As the terrorists found infiltration via the sea quite effective in Mumbai, it is possible that the methodology may be tried again along different coastlines. Many proposals to strengthen the Coast Guard and the State Marine Police have been approved and are under implementation. During research for a paper jointly authored by Prof. V.Suryanarayan and me (scheduled to be released soon by the Center for Asia Studies, Chennai), it was found that the progress on most of these schemes is painfully and dangerously slow Similarly, despite frequent public statements about measures being taken to ensure coordinated coastal security measures, the situation does not seem to have changed significantly on the ground.

Terrorists continue to be innovative in their deadly tactics and expansive in their reach, while security forces are always preparing to rectify the shortfalls of the last “failure”. A disturbing trend is the increase in attacks on security forces (mostly Frontier Corps) protecting nuclear installations in Pakistan and possible infiltration of the Frontier Corps – probably pointing to jihadi terrorists wanting to go nuclear. Such a development poses a serious challenge to India and to the international community. A similar effort in India cannot be ruled out.

Public Perceptions

On the part of the government, it has to recognize the public perception that while considerable progress has been made in the area of collection of intelligence, through technical means, about the activities of terrorist and militant groups, such progress does not seem to have been matched in the areas of penetration of those groups and collection of intelligence through human agents. If this perception is correct, necessary measures to rectify the imbalance need to be initiated urgently.

Further, though the required mechanisms are stated to have been created for effective co-ordination between state and central agencies, as also amongst central agencies themselves, the results do not reflect the effectiveness of these mechanisms. What the public see and hear, soon after any “incident” or “failure of security”, is a prompt litany of complaints from state and central security agencies, against each other. This effort to shift “blame” often takes precedence over speedy investigation and even relief measures. We have seen this phenomenon even relating to the recent blasts at the German Bakery in Pune. The Union Home Minister and the Maharashtra State Home Minister have issued contradictory statements about the alerts issued prior to the blasts. Obviously, one of them is misleading the people.

The finger-pointing blame game is possible mainly because there is a total lack of democratic accountability and legislative oversight (or even awareness) of our security services. Let us compare this situation with a White House statement (relating to the Christmas Day attempted bombing of a commercial aircraft) issued on 7 January2010, in which President Obama said that ultimately it was his responsibility to keep Americans safe from terror plots. He added that “the US government failed to connect the dots that would have prevented a known terrorist from boarding a plane for America.” Though the failure was not the fault of any one individual, from now on the President would hold all intelligence and security officials accountable for the safety of US citizens. The lessons relating to total accountability and that it is not enough to have good systems in place, but it is also important to ensure that the systems work as intended, should not be ignored by those in authority in India.

A necessary step towards targeting terrorism is to form a citizens’ network of information by co-opting civil society organizations like village panchayats, area committees, Residents Welfare Associations or housing societies, private security agencies etc. These organisations have, in the course of their normal activities, access to information that will help in monitoring suspicious activities; and this wealth of information is normally wasted as they lack a viable method of sharing the information with law enforcement and security agencies. The Model Police Act has a salutary provision for the establishment of community liaison cells at different levels of police functioning, which would help in preventing this loss of valuable and actionable intelligence inputs. It is unfortunate that many States that have drafted or enacted new Police Acts in pursuance of the 2006 directives of the Supreme Court have chosen to ignore this provision. Frequent references are made by senior police officers and political leaders about public-private-partnership in counter terrorism efforts, but no worthwhile steps seem to have been initiated on the ground.

Counter Terrorism

Is the Indian establishment really serious about improving our counter-terrorist capabilities or are we satisfied with rhetoric and public pronouncements about proposed schemes? Are these followed up by real action and effective systems? High rhetoric and wishful thinking do not win battles and wars. Terrorism is definitely one of those things that cannot be wished away or handled via the oft-practised bureaucratic procrastination. Careful examination of the threats, design and speedy setting up of systems to counter them, creation of the necessary infrastructure and equipping the intelligence and security forces with the needed equipment, provision of good training and motivation, the setting up of the mechanisms for total coordination / command and control, and prescription of precise lines of accountability are amongst the essential requirements. The public would like the security establishment to reduce “spin” and take them into confidence – to the maximum extent possible. Otherwise, the uneasy feeling that we are not fully prepared to meet the challenge posed by terrorists would persist.

A major requirement is that the State should not descend into brutalizing the society and respond to terror with terror. We have to avoid repeated human rights violations committed in the name of security. Fake encounters, disappearances, mass graves, torture, cruel / inhuman / degrading treatment, arbitrary and long detention, unfair trials, suppression of political dissent, minority persecution etc. are all efforts to hide the neglect or evasion of identifying the root causes of terrorism (in each series of incidents) and tackling them effectively. The much-maligned “experiment” of Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh is a case in point. The tactics that may have had some success in Gill’s Punjab is not necessarily a good example to follow everywhere else.

It is the whole society, not just the government, which can effectively fight terrorism. Long term measures should include an overhaul of our educational system so that separatists and extremists do not breed more terrorists, taking advantage of constitutional guarantees. We need a minimally uniform mandatory curriculum that would teach the students the essence of all the religions and instil religious tolerance. At the very crucial stage of a child's upbringing, we have to inculcate pluralism through understanding.

Conclusions

The Christmas Day incident in the USA, the White House “gate crashers” at the President Obama’s formal dinner for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and the more recent (21 March 2010) presence of an “explosive” in the cargo hold of a flight from Bengaluru to Tiruvananthapuram should remind us that the best designed and normally well implemented systems could also have failures caused by defective implementation and/or human failure. While such failures cannot probably be avoided one hundred percent, it is essential that system checks should ensure that they are kept to the absolute minimum. In addition to well prepared security exercises, it is essential to have work audits carried out by occasional surprise alert drills, to assess the response times and response qualities. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that deficiencies caused by faulty or inadequate system design and/or inadequate or poorly trained or equipped manpower would be unpardonable.

Terrorism can be contained and should be defeated. India has to make the supreme effort needed to overcome the general inability of democracies to put together the political will, resources and strategies that are necessary to prevail over terrorism. The Govt of India should be prepared to lower the threshold of tolerance in relation to cross-border terrorism and be able to serve credible notice that India is ready to exercise her right of hot pursuit and/or retaliation. Once India's capabilities and determination are made clear, the state sponsors of terrorist acts against Indian interests would realise the futility of such sponsorship.

Terrorism has not succeeded in severely disrupting communal harmony or political stability or economic growth in India. There is gratifying confidence still displayed by the international community, including the business class, in India’s ability to deal with the problem of terrorism and to protect them. Despite the frequent incidents of terrorism, India has not been doing too badly overall. Very few other governments could have done much better, in the given circumstances.

(This note formed the basis of a presentation made at a Panel Discussion on “Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism” organised by the Center for Asia Studies, Chennai, on 25 March 2010. The author, R.Swaminathan, is currently the Chairman of the International Institute for Security & Safety Management (New Delhi) and is former Special Secretary, DG (Security), Government of India. He can be contacted at rsnathan@gmail.com)