PAK ARMY CHIEF CAUGHT
YAPPING
The transcripts of
the taped conversations of Gen.Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff
(COAS), who was then in Beijing, with Lt.Gen.Mohd. Aziz, Chief of the General Staff (CGS),
in Rawalpindi on May 26 and 29 speak poorly of the security consciousness of the Pakistani
COAS.
Generally, when
public servants, holding sensitive charges, travel abroad, they go to their Embassy in the
host country whenever they have to hold sensitive discussions with their entourage or make
or receive telephone calls. Even in the Embassy, they take precautions such as keeping a
T.V. or radio on at high volume while holding discussions with their entourage and using a
scrambler while talking on telephone.
Surprisingly,
Gen.Musharraf had been using the telephone of the room of the hotel in which he had been
put up for receiving situation reports from his CGS on the Pakistan Army's activities in
the Kargil sector and for giving instructions on further action to be taken. This is
evident from the fact that the CGS rings up the hotel exchange and asks for his chief's
room. Apparently, he was not even using a scrambler.
From this, it
follows inevitably that the Pakistani Army chief's telephone conversations with his CGS
must have been recorded by the Chinese intelligence too through hidden recording devices
in his room and by the agencies of the US and other Western countries which have very
comprehensive arrangements for monitoring all international telephone conversations
through satellites.
Thus, all these
agencies would now be having recordings of the COAS' admission that the proxy invasion of
India through the foreign mercenaries, officered by Pakistanis, was being orchestrated by
the Pakistan Army and of his advice to his Foreign Office as to how it should cover up the
violation of the Line of Control (LoC) by taking up the stand that the LoC was not clearly
demarcated in this area.
During his Press
conference at the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi on June 12, Mr.Sartaj Aziz, the
Pakistani Foreign Minister, belittled the evidentiary value of these tapes, but the
Pakistani authorities must be greatly worried over the possibility of the Governments of
China, the US and other Western countries having their own independent recordings of these
highly incriminating telephone conversations.
One does not know
when President Clinton's letter to the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mr.Nawaz Sharif, to
respect the LoC was drafted. If it was after May 29, it would not be far-fetched to
surmise that the CIA must have brought these conversations to the notice of Mr.Clinton,
thereby triggering off the letter.
China's low-key
reactions to Pakistani allegations against India could also be attributed to their
knowledge of the Pakistani Army's hand in Kargil.
Another highly
incriminating admission made by the CGS is that the mercenaries are under the control of
the Pakistan Army. In the past, Pakistan had always been denying any links with the
mercenaries and claiming that it was giving only political, diplomatic and moral support
to the Kashmiri insurgents.
And here is their
CGS saying that the mercenaries sent into the Kargil sector were under the control of the
Pakistani Army which would be able to ensure that they did not exceed the Army's brief.
These mercenaries have come partly from the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, which was declared an
international terrorist organisation by the US in October, 1997, and which has been
categorised by the latest annual report of the Counter-Terrorism Division of the State
Department as a supporter of Osama bin Laden, the Lashkar-e-Toiba, which the State
Department is reportedly planning to similarly declare an international terrorist
organisation, and bin Laden's force itself, many of whose leaders are wanted in
terrorism-related cases in the USA and Egypt. US courts have issued warrants for their
arrest.
The US cannot have
any more clinching evidence to declare Pakistan a State-sponsor of international
terrorism.
A careful
examination of the tapes also shows that one of the principal objectives of the Pakistani
Army's proxy invasion is to disrupt the Indian Army's re-stocking of essential supplies to
the Indian troops on the Siachen glacier during the current summer in order to create
difficulties for our troops during the coming winter.
The CGS reports to
his chief about his having told the Pakistani Foreign Office that during his talks in New
Delhi, Mr.Sartaj Aziz should not agree to a cease-fire because "then vehicles will be
moving " (on the Drass-Kargil Highway)
At what stage did
Mr.Sharif become aware of the Pakistani Army's proxy invasion plans? The CGS, while
reporting on May 29 to the COAS on a meeting held by Mr. Sharif says: "He said I
(Sharif) came to know seven days back, when Corps Commanders were told. The entire reason
for the success of this operation was this total secrecy. Our experience was that our
earlier efforts failed because of lack of secrecy. So, the top priority is to accord
confidentiality, to ensure success. We should respect this and the advantage we have from
this would give us a handle."
There are two ways
of interpreting this. First, as claimed by Mr.George Fernandes, our Defence Minister, the
Army secretly planned and started the execution of this operation and informed Mr.Sharif
thereafter.
The second
interpretation is that at the inter-departmental meeting convened by Mr.Sharif, the
Foreign Office representative expressed their unhappiness over the Army not keeping them
in the picture since they had to handle the diplomatic fall-out.
Mr.Sharif tried to
soothe their ruffled feathers by claiming that he himself was informed only seven days
earlier in the interest of operational secrecy. This does not necessarily mean that Mr.
Sharif was not in the picture from the very beginning.
While the Pakistani
Press and public are expressing their solidarity with their Army, one could discern in the
comments of some independent analysts gnawing fears that Gen. Musharraf is becoming
over-assertive at the expense of the credibility of the elected political leadership and
that this operation could ultimately boomerang on Pakistan.
Thus, the
"News" said in an article on May 29: "It is undeniable that armed men have
crossed the Line in large numbers, if only because they themselves have admitted their
presence and given Press statements by satellite telephone. They were not stopped by
Pakistan Army patrols."
Mr.Azhar Abbas said
in an article in the May issue of the "Herald", the monthly journal of the
"Dawn" group:" The assumption here (in Pakistan) is that India cannot
respond to this kind of (covert) warfare with a conventional attack on Pakistan....
"The Army
appears convinced of the wisdom of keeping India bleeding in Kashmir and in the presence
of an effective deterrent (in the form of nuclear weapons in the hands of Pakistan), the
temptation to do so would be even greater.....
"Several
retired Army officers believe that the new Army Chief is far more assertive than his
predecessor (Gen. Jehangir Karamat) and, in the event of the Nawaz Government taking issue
with the new doctrine, is unlikely to bow out as easily as Karamat. This points to
troubled civil-military relations in the future...."
The article
concludes: " Skeptics are already warning that in the guise of changing threat
perceptions and bailing out the (internal) system, the Army may only be searching for a
new power-sharing formula after the dissolution of the infamous Troika. If the Army's new
doctrine is, indeed, little more than the quest for a new power-sharing arrangement, it is
time for the Nawaz Government to disillusion the Army....If the Government fails to do
that, in the words of Dr. Eqbal Ahmad (a highly-respected Pakistani analyst), this change
of threat perception can cost us, in the long run, our entire future."
The article was
analysing not only Gen. Musharraf's perception of India, but also his vigorous
justification of the Army agreeing to take over purely civilian responsibilities such as
running the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). Mr.Sharif asked the Army to run
the WAPDA to end corruption and to improve its efficiency.
After taking over,
Gen. Musharraf, to the discomfiture of Mr.Sharif, is reported to have issued orders
that the Army would not only be responsible for the day-to-day running, but would also
conduct all future negotiations with the independent power producers, thereby denying any
role in this matter to the political leadership and civilian bureaucrats.
The comments within
brackets are those of the writer of this article.
B.RAMAN
(14-6-99)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,
Chennai. E-mail: corde@vsnl.com ).
