The unconstitutional action of Gen.Pervez Musharraf, the
constitutionally-dismissed Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), in anointing himself
the unchallenged supreme ruler of the country is not that of a wise and strong man, but of
one who has rushed into unwise action without careful thinking about the implications.
His first concern would be how to prevent an economic collapse.
Pakistan's economic woes have been mainly due to the widespread
non-payment of utility charges and taxes by large sections of the population, an
inefficient tax administration, the resistance of the Punjabi farmers to agricultural tax
and the opposition from the armed forces to any major reduction in the defence
expenditure. In Pakistan, nobody wants any new tax and nobody likes to pay the existing
taxes either.
Any past ruler, civilian or military, who tried to enforce
collection of dues and vigorously introduce an agricultural tax and sales tax on retail
sales, had to face an agitation. Even Zia-ul-Haq, in his 11 years of military rule, could
not change this state of affairs.
It is estimated that in Karachi about 80 per cent of the
population does not pay its electricity and telephone bills. The percentage is less in
Lahore and other cities, but still very high.
Even though the Army took over the administration of the Water
and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) in the beginning of this year, it has not so far
been able to improve matters. It took action against some high-profile defaulters such as
Mrs.Abida Hussain, a member of Mr.Nawaz Sharif's Cabinet, but could not make the ordinary
sections of the population pay their bills.
The rapid increase in the anti-Sharif sentiments was not due to
only his arbitrary style of functioning, suppression of the press, withdrawal of the army
from Kargil and so on. These were issues which agitated the minds of the elite, but not of
the man in the street.
The agitations in July by the political and religious parties
against the Kargil withdrawal did not evoke any significant response, but when Mr.Sharif,
faced with a worsening post-Kargil economic situation, started implementing the IMF
conditionalities, the mobs came out in large numbers into the streets and joined the
political clamour for his removal.
Thus, for preventing an economic collapse, the General will have
to do the same things, which the opposition and the people accused Mr.Sharif of
doing---force the people to pay their dues and the armed forces to cut down their
expenditure.
Mr.Sharif at least had Western opinion in his favour, despite
criticism of his suppression of the press and the opposition parties, because he showed
greater sensitivity to Western concerns over issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, the
need to control religious terrorism and the Taliban and resume the dialogue with India and
so on.
As a result, he was able to secure a re-scheduling of Pakistan's
foreign debt repayments and financial accommodation from the Gulf countries. Assistance
from the IMF, stopped after the Chagai nuclear tests, was resumed though the release of
the latest tranche got stalled due to his inability to make the people accept the general
sales tax on retail sales and persuade Gen.Musharraf to peg, if not reduce, the military
expenditure.
While inheriting these problems---some of them of the General's
creation-- from Mr.Sharif, Gen. Musharraf starts with the distinct disadvantage of a
hostile international opinion to his take-over. Unless he softens this hostility, money
may not start flowing again.
The Corps Commanders, who supported his take-over, seem to have
advised him to show some moderation on issues such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) and religious terrorism in order to soften the US. It would be interesting to see
whether he would do this, if so, how, and whether this would be sufficient to enable
resumption of aid flows.
His second concern would be the recent recrudescence of
Shia-Sunni violence in Pakistan following the failed attempt to assassinate Mullah
Mohammad Omer, the Taliban Amir, at Kandahar, through an explosives-laden truck on August
24. Some relatives of the Amir and six bodyguards of bin Laden were reportedly killed.
The Amir has ruled out US involvement and suspects that the Shias
of Pakistan, possibly encouraged by Iran, tried to kill him in reprisal for the murder of
some Iranian diplomats at Mazar-e-Sharif and the massacre of Shias (Hazaras) in Bamiyan.
The extremist Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba, a proclaimed ally of the
Taliban and Osama bin Laden, went on an ant-Shia rampage in Pakistan killing over 30
during the last three weeks.
In his attempts to reassure the Shias of his determination to
stop this, Gen. Musharraf would be embarrassed by his past image of being anti-Shia.
Zia-ul-Haq did not have an anti-Shia image when he assumed power,
but subsequently acquired this. The result: His death in the plane crash of August, 1988,
widely blamed on a Shia airman, and the subsequent assassination of Lt.Gen. Fazle Haq, a
close associate of Zia, by a Shia in October,1991 at Peshawar.
The Shias, not only in the general population, but also in the
armed forces would be closely watching how he handles the Sunni extremists. After Zia's
assassination, the Pakistani armed forces reduced their intake of Shias and kept them out
of sensitive posts. But, there are still many Shias, particularly in the Air Force. If
they become restive, the General's problems could be aggravated.
The third concern of Gen.Musharraf--of a personal nature-- would
be the fact that he is a Mohajir. For the first time in the history of Pakistan after the
assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, a Mohajir is at the head of the federal
administration.
Today, in the euphoria over the removal of the widely-disliked
Mr.Sharif, different sections of the population, irrespective of their ethnic and
sectarian origin, are hailing him as the saviour.
Yet, it should have been ominously significant to the General
that despite their dislike of Mr.Sharif's style of functioning, the leaders of the
Pakistan Muslim League (PML), largely a Punjabi dominated party, and the President,
Mr.Mohammad Rafiq Tarar, his former mentor, who suggested his name to Mr.Sharif for
appointment as the Chief of the Army Staff in October last, were unwilling to be used by
him for giving a civilian façade to his administration.
The moment people start forgetting the misdeeds of Mr.Sharif --as
they will--- every action of the General could be perceived by the population in terms of
his Mohajir ethnicity, thereby possibly aggravating the ethnic tensions, particularly in
Punjab and Sindh.
Externally, the main preoccupation will be managing relations
with India and the US. Despite his past image as an anti-India hawk, any immediate
enhancement of overall threat to India is unlikely due to the coming winter and the
importance to him of not doing anything which could harden Western hostility.
However, greater vigil in the Kargil and Siachen areas would be
needed. A recurring theme of his speeches to his soldiers and the Pakistani public has
been what he views as the Indian perfidy in occupying Siachen in the early 1980s by taking
advantage of the withdrawal of Pakistani troops during winter.
Whatever be his past attitudes, Gen. Musharraf would be keen to
improve his image in the US and to remove perceptions of his proximity to the religious
extremists, the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. Though he accused Mr.Sharif of being amenable
to US pressure, he may not be as insensitive to US concerns over various issues as one
would be led to believe from his past record.
India needs to wait and watch the evolving situation, while
avoiding any open expression of anti-Musharraf views and concerns. Maintain a rational and
healthy watchfulness, but avoid irrational fears and reactions, which could prove
self-fulfilling. That should be our policy for the present.
B.RAMAN (16-10-99)
