Although media reports of the foiled attempt to kill the Sri Lankan President, Mrs.
Chandrika Kumaratunga, by a suspected LTTE woman suicide bomber are still sketchy,certain
observations would still be relevant.
This is the third time in recent years that alert bodyguards had
foiled an attempt to kill the leader of a country after the assailant had successfully
penetrated the security cordon. The other two instances were those relating to the then US
President, Mr.Ronald Reagan, in 1982 and the Egyptian President, Mr.Hosni Mubarak, in
1995.
The success of the bodyguards of Mrs.Chandrika is even more
creditable than those of Mr.Reagan and Mr. Mubarak because the LTTE had sought to use a
suicide bomber whereas the assailant-assailants of Mr.Reagan and Mr.Mubarak had used only
fire-arms.
The modus operandi in the attack on Mrs. Chandrika brings to mind
that used by the LTTE against Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. Whereas the penetration in Rajiv
Gandhi's case was made possible by an unsatisfactory security cordon, the BBC
correspondent in Colombo has reported that the security cordon around Mrs. Chandrika was
quite tight, with everyone in the meeting venue, including journalists, subjected to
physical search before they were allowed access. It is, therefore, mysterious as to how
the suicide bomber gained access evading detection.
In Rajiv Gandhi's case, the killer played the role of suicide
bomber to perfection, totally avoiding any abrupt movements or gestures, which might have
alerted the bodyguards. In Mrs. Chandrika's case, it would appear that in view of the
distance of 25 feet kept by the security between the President and the crowd, the bomber
had to pounce forward after the President's address in order to reach within killing range
of Mrs. Chandrika.
This alerted the bodyguards, who would have had two
options---drag the President to a safe distance away from the assailant, which might have
saved the President, but killed a large number of civilians, or drag the assailant to a
safe distance away from the VIP, which would have neutralised the threat to the VIP and
killed the bodyguards, but reduced civilian casualties. They seem to have chosen the
second alternative in a split-second reaction, saving the President and sacrificing their
own lives in the process.
The fact that the LTTE was able to mount almost simultaneously in
different parts of Colombo two suicide attacks on the President and Mr.Ranil
Wickremesinghe, the candidate of the United National Party in the presidential election,
shows disconcertingly that the morale of the LTTE cadres is still high, despite the past
claims of the Government to the contrary. This was also earlier shown by the successes
scored by the LTTE in the ground operations in the Vanni area.
A suicide bomber, who operates alone, unlike a foot soldier who
fights in a group, requires a very high degree of self-motivation and faith in the cause
for which he or she has chosen to sacrifice his or her life. The fact that the LTTE has
had no dearth of volunteers for such suicide missions and that the volunteers entrusted
with this task have been reaching the intended targets like homing pigeons, unconcerned
about their lives, highlights this self-motivation.
The recent set-backs suffered by the Sri Lankan security forces
at the hands of the LTTE and the two incidents in Colombo on December 18 underline once
again the lack of wisdom of intelligence analysts in assessing the presumed success of
counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency operations purely in terms of body-counts (those
killed and captured) and territory gained or lost. A more important indicator is the state
of morale and motivation of the terrorist or insurgent group.
Seen against this, the Sri Lankan forces have a long and costly
(in human and material terms) counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency campaign still
ahead of them in the new millennium.
Political partisanship in dealing with the LTTE, with the ruling
party and the opposition taking advantage of each other's discomfiture in dealing with the
problem instead of adopting a united political and operational approach, is only playing
into the hands of the LTTE. An effective counter-terrorism policy has to be combined with
an imaginative political strategy jointly worked out by all the political parties.
The world has to be seriously concerned over the implications of
the continuing and even improving capability of the LTTE. The final months of the passing
millennium saw the growing concern of the world over the possibility of ruthless terrorist
groups such as Osama bin Laden's Al Quaida one day acquiring chemical or such other
weapons of mass destruction.
There have so far been no reports of the LTTE's interest in such
weapons, but experienced counter-terrorism experts would know that it is one terrorist
organisation in the world, which has the intelligence, human and material resources,
motivation and innovative spirit to acquire such weapons if it one day decides to do so.
It would, therefore, be in the interest of the rest of the world
to extend to Sri Lanka whatever co-operation it needs in dealing effectively with the
LTTE.
B.RAMAN
(19-12-99)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,
Chennai. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com)
