General Pervez Musharraf's military coup in Pakistan had drawn
heavy condemnation worldwide. However what people seem to have condemned is the
elimination of a democratically elected Govt. in Pakistan, without examining critically
whether this Govt. has led to the deprivation of any rights or advantages democracy is
believed to confer on the people, so far as can be seen, the people of Pakistan are none
the worse for the coup.
Musharraf has not curbed the rule of law. The Press and the
Public, including the political parties, still enjoy freedom of expression. The courts are
functioning as before. What has gone is a corrupt coterie, representatives of political
class, perceived unaccountable to moral or temporal principles, which in the so called
decade of democracy in Pakistan after Zia-ul-Huq, gave the people of Pakistan little of
substantial value, was concerned mainly with enriching itself and was now trying to play
politics with the Army in order to make its hold over the State even more absolute.
In this decade Pakistan has often been characterised as a failing
state. The Pakistani Army is the only institution of stature and strength in the country.
No wonder the Army sees itself to be the ultimate guarantor of the state and views the
politicians as a pack of sophisticated crooks. Nawaz Sharif's mistake was to try to mess
with the senior commanders. Having succeeded earlier in removing the 8th
Amendment to the constitution which empowered a President to dismiss an elected Prime
Minister; one President; one Chief Justice and two Chief's of Staff, he wanted to
demonstrate the he could humble the institution of the Army also. In the aftermath of
Kargil fiasco he had the army eat a humble pie by forcing its withdrawal from the Kargil
heights. His vaulting ambitions finally brought him down. Sharif's removal was enacted as
if the 8th Amendment was still in operation. Only, the prime mover was not the
President but the Chief of Army Staff.
This appreciation underscores that the military coup has not led
to any fundamental or qualitative change in Pakistan except in form. Musharraf has since
declared that he will not revert to the old order until he has fully addressed the pending
agenda in Pakistan concerning political, economic and social issues. The problems have
been of a long standing nature. They relate to political iniquities, distributive
injustices, poverty, illiteracy and a host of other matters affecting the life of a
citizen on a daily basis and which make the gulf between the ruler and the ruled wider
each year. No Government is capable of solving them in a hurry. The inference is,
therefore, inescapable the military rule is there to stay. Its life should be counted in
several years, not months or an year or two.
Even at the end of it one question will be quite troubling: what
should be the equation between the civil and military powers in Pakistan. In a democracy
the civilian executive does not fear Armed Forces and the latter accept the overriding
supervision of the former. Such an equation is highly unlikely to evolve in Pakistan in
the foreseeable future. The shadow of the people in uniforms will always be a hauntingly
disturbing presence if the civilians govern the nation.
Perhaps a solution on the lines of the Turkish model provides an
answer. Kemal Ataturk gave Turkey a constitution laced with secular and democratic
principles. The Turkish Armed forces act as the guarantor of the values enshrined in their
constitution. They correct shift towards fundamentalism, excessive conservatism or other
serious breaches by stepping in if necessary. After restoring the balances they step out.
The politicians in Turkey know that there is a Laxman Rekha they cannot cross. The world
accepts calmly this unusual arrangement.
Recognition of the reality that the Armed Forces in Pakistan are
also the focus of political power may call for a new strategy in India to deal with Indo
Pak problems. In the past the major interlocutors from Pakistan have generally been the
representatives of the political executives or the foreign office. They lacked authority
in themselves for working out substantive agreements with India. There is a need to
discover a way which will enable the real centres of powers in the two countries, civilian
in India and military in Pakistan, to communicate directly with each other.
Zia-ul-Huq's regime in Pakistan had provided such an opportunity
towards the closing part of its life. He was both the President and the Chief of Army
Staff and was, thus, in an admirable position to speak on behalf of the political and
military interests of Pakistan. Some major developments were in the offing in 1988 which
would have steered the Indo Pak relations into a new era of neighbourliness and
co-operation. Zia's untimely death in an aircrash the same year ended all such promising
initiatives.
Zia's readiness to look for rapprochement with India was born out
an awareness that continued confrontation with India resulted in a heavy drain on the
meager resources of Pakistan, depriving its people unfairly the funds needed for their
development. The state of the people of Pakistan today is no different from what caused
Zia to be plagued by such thoughts. And it also happens that power today resides again in
the hands of a person who can speak for both the political and military national interests
of Pakistan.
General Pervez Musharraf should not, therefore be identified
merely as an usurper which he may well be. Pakistan's low intensity war in Kashmir
and the ISI web of activities elsewhere in India notwithstanding, his emergence at the
centre of power creates an opportunity which ought to be put to right use. The people of
Pakistan do overwhelmingly desire a relationship of peace and tranquility with India. Gen.
Musharraf may prove to be the dark horse who in today's circumstances, is best placed to
realise such hopes for his people as well as to do deal with substantive issues between
India and Pakistan. His current exercises are certainly not the way he should be going
about, but does that mean that the scenarios should remain frozen?
The Oslo peace talks changed dramatically the rigid adversarial
relationships between the Israelis and Palestinians. Can an Oslo be found somewhere in the
context of India and Pakistan problems? The Kargil episode and the hijacking of an IC 814
flight would seem to underscore the need to discover such an Oslo earliest. In any case an
intense debate within the country seems necessary, not within the portals of South Block
alone, in the expectations, that some new thinking emerges where it matters.
A.K.Verma
17.1.2000
(The writer is former Secretary of the Cabinet
Secretariat)
