A tantalising fifth day has been added to
Mr.Clinton's originally -anticipated programme for a four-day visit to India--two days in
New Delhi and two outside covering Agra, Mumbai and one or two other cities in the South.
While the Chief Ministers of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka have been making a strong bid
for a presidential visit to Hyderabad and Bangalore, it would appear that one of the
American business firms with a satisfying presence in Tamil Nadu is interested in Chennai
figuring in the itinerary.
The addition of the fifth day is to provide flexibility for a
hit-and-run visit to Islamabad, if the atmosphere there changes for the better before the
President leaves Washington for South Asia in March.
Many Governmental and non-governmental analysts of Washington
want the President to spend at least a few hours at Islamabad to allay apprehensions in
Pakistan that closer ties with India marked a downgrading of Pakistan's importance for the
US and to sooth ruffled feelings due to what is perceived as the USA's pro-Indian stance
during the Kargil conflict and on the terrorism issue.
Washington is worried over the further deterioration in
Indo-Pakistani relations after Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani Chief of the Army
staff (COAS), seized power on October 12 last and proclaimed himself the Chief Executive.
It has noted with increasing concern New Delhi's excessive
preoccupation with Gen. Musharraf's uniform and his pre-October 12 image as an officer
close to the religious fundamentalists which, in its view, has been coming in the way of
an objective evaluation of his repeated post-October calls for a resumption of the
dialogue.
In Washington's perception, one of the benchmarks for judging the
success of the forthcoming presidential visit and bilateral discussions preceding it would
be whether it succeeds in breaking the Indo-Pakistani log jam.
US analysts point out that this would not be possible without a
presidential arm-twisting in Islamabad. The US dilemma in taking a quick decision arises
from the continued absence of even a fig leaf of judicially-proclaimed legitimacy of the
Musharraf regime and the possible repercussions in Jakarta of a presidential endorsement
of the General as a man with whom the US can do business despite his uniform.
In Jakarta, the differences between Gen. Wiranto, the Senior
Coordinating Minister for Political and Social Affairs, and the elected President,
Mr.Abdurrahman Wahid, have been coming to a head and Washington has openly warned the army
against any temptations for a coup---similar to what it had issued to Gen.Musharraf before
October.
What message would the Indonesian Generals get if they find
Mr.Clinton now giving a pat on the back to Gen. Musharraf after having warned him against
a coup last year?
The precipitate action of Gen.Musharraf last week in removing
from the Supreme Court the Chief Justice and five other Judges on the eve of the hearing
of the Pakistan Muslim League's petition challenging the legitimacy of his regime was
meant to facilitate a quick favourable decision on legitimacy through a compliant bench
before Mr.Clinton's South Asia visit was announced, but his hopes have been belied by the
reported further adjournment of the hearing by the newly-constituted bench till next
month.
Thus, a judicial proclamation on legitimacy is unlikely to come
till March.Any decision on a presidential visit would be difficult till then.
In the meanwhile, Washington would keep up pressure on
Gen.Musharraf for satisfaction on its demands relating to non-proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and terrorism. Pakistan's signature on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) is the least difficult of the issues now.
The more difficult issues for the General are the demands for
moderating the Taliban's policies, assistance in bringing Osama bin Laden to face trial
before a court in the US or in some other third country acceptable to the US and taking
the first step in allaying India's concerns over cross-border terrorism by at least
banning the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.
The other demand relating to benchmarks for the restoration of
democracy need not be that difficult as he could always announce them to facilitate a
presidential visit and go back on them later, as Zia-ul-Haq, his mentor, repeatedly did.
At a time when there is growing disappointment in Pakistan over
his performance in his first 100 days in office and over his failure to make the economy
move again and concealed anger over his accepting the IMF conditionalities in toto after
having criticised Mr.Nawaz Sharif for doing the same, compliance with the US demands could
seriously damage his carefully-cultivated image as a no-nonsense General, stirring up the
nests of the religious fundamentalists.
"Washington's indecisiveness is also due to the uncertainty of
Mrs.Hillary Clinton's New York Senate election campaign managers as to the impact of a
presidential decision to or not to visit Pakistan on the
Pakistani American voters, many of whom have traditionally supported the Pakistan Muslim
League. From his jail, Mr. Nawaz Sharif has reportedly appealed to them through his wife
to vote for Mrs. Clinton."
What can New Delhi hope to get from the visit to India? A greater recognition of its
importance and potential, a formalisation of the US acceptance of its minimum nuclear
deterrent provided the minimum is defined purely in terms of India's present security
needs and not in terms of its visions (or delusions) of future grandeur on par not only
with China, but also other nuclear powers, and a less restrictive US decision-making on
India's quest for dual-purpose technologies, with the future decisions based on a
presumption of benign use unless there is evidence to the contrary in place of the present
presumption of a possible malign use (for weapons purposes) unless there are guarantees to
the contrary.
The BJP-led Government has been projecting the meeting of the
Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism as a new landmark in Indo-US relations and as a
feather in its cap. The security bureaucracies of the two countries have a long history of
mutually satisfactory co-operation despite differences over the US reluctance to declare
Pakistan a State-sponsor of international terrorism.
For reasons which still remain valid, the pre-1996 governments
had kept this co-operation in low profile lest there be fears in China over the extent and
ramifications of this co-operation. Following the publication of details of the alleged
co-operation of Indian secret agencies with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in
assisting the Khampa revolt in Tibet in the 1950s, Beijing has had misgivings whether the
Indo-US co-operation is restricted only to counter-terrorism as publicly proclaimed or
whether there is also a hidden agenda to it.
Such misgivings are likely to be aggravated by the recent arrival
of the Karmapa in India on the eve of the visit to New Delhi of Mrs.Julie Taft, the State
Department's Special Co-ordinator on Tibet, and her subsequent visit to Dharamsala to meet
the Dalai Lama and reportedly also the Karmapa.
In our efforts to score a propaganda point over Pakistan by
highlighting the co-operation of the security bureaucracies of India and the US, we should
not end up by adding to the disquiet of Beijing.
