At last, Norway has taken up the challenging task of
"facilitating " talks between the Govt. of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. In one of our
first updates on Sri Lanka of 2nd October 1998, while discussing about loss of Killinochi
by the Sri Lankan army, we had made two points. One. Before any negotiated settlement is
thought of, the majority Sinhalese will have to come to a consensus. And Two. Powers like
Norway, Great Britain or Japan will be in an ideal position to mediate.
In the aftermath of the failed assassination bid and her
reelection as President on the Sinhala sympathy vote, it was thought that Chandrika would
go for a tougher line on talks with the LTTE. Her strident speech against the LTTE soon
after the elections also confirmed this position. The war in the northeast also continued
with the same ferocity with neither side winning.
Realising the ground situation the Sri Lankan government is seen
to be finally working towards a consensus within the majority community and giving the go
ahead to the emissary from Norway to facilitate the talks between the government and the
LTTE.
The Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek arrived in Colombo
on 18th Feb. to formally initiate talks between the warring parties. The Sri Lankan High
Commissioner in New Delhi Mangala Moonsinghe has also been called to be present in Colombo
during the visit of Vollebaek. Moonsinghe’s presence appears to be more to assuage
Indian feelings and to keep India informed of the progress of the talks.
Vollebaek’s visit to Colombo was preceded by his visit to
London where he met Anton BalaSingham, the LTTE’s representative in England. It is
our assessment that while Balasingham’s services may be utilised to initiate the
dialogue, substantive talks even for a cease-fire or for determining other parameters of
the talks will be done by another senior member of the LTTE.
There are reports that Tamil Selvan who is a close confidante of
LTTE leader Prabakaran may participate in the preliminary talks to be held in Oslo soon.
He may have left Sri Lanka by now.
The stage for talks was set by three important events; 1. The
courageous and statesman like statement by the Leader of Opposition, Ranil Wickramesinghe
that "they will support the government proposals in Parliament" on this issue.
2. Chandrika’s address on the independence day when she said "I invite one more
time, all democratic leaders to do battle for their country by reaching a consensus on the
means of resolution of the conflict that has dogged us long." She made a call to the
LTTE separately and said "We also invite the LTTE to participate in this noble and
great process with us all. The LTTE has a vital role to play in concluding this
extended sadness for the Tamil people." (Emphasis ours). 3. The visit of the
Norwegian government’s foreign affairs envoy Leiv Lunde to discuss the preliminaries.
Some cynics have suggested that the opposition leader has some
hidden agenda in agreeing to support the government and that he is another J.R. in the
making who needs to be carefully watched. The result was that Chandrika took some time to
decide and call the Leader of Opposition to discuss the issue. It is important that both
the PA and the UNP reach a consensus both on the modalities of the talks with the LTTE as
well as on the substantive issue of constitutional reforms to meet the just aspirations of
the Tamil minority.
Separately Chandrika has directed her party, the PA, to finalise
the government’s package of constitutional reforms by the end of Feb. 2000. This
package will then be discussed with the opposition parties and the non LTTE Tamil groups
before negotiations begin with the LTTE. Three months time (dead line) has been given by
the President to finalise the proposals. The government has also given itself one
year’s time to complete the talks with the LTTE.
While all this looks well on paper, it is doubtful whether any
dead line could be given for the various stages envisaged. Four years ago Chandrika on
winning the elections made draft constitutional proposals on devolution with the concept
of "union of Regions". The proposals as we said before were innovative and had
many good points. After 68 meetings in the Parliament Select committee, nothing came out
of the proposals and Chandrika in the mean time got reelected once again. It is to be
hoped that the current proposals do not go the way of the previous ones.
Chandrika’s move to discuss the constitutional reforms with
the Non LTTE Tamil groups before the package is discussed with LTTE will not be taken
kindly by the LTTE. It is a recipe for failure. This will also place the Norwegian
facilitator at a disadvantage. Hypothetically if the proposals finalised after discussions
with the opposition and the non LTTE Tamil groups are rejected outright by the LTTE, what
happens next? Is the Sri Lankan government in a position to go for a military solution
then?
In spite of the move towards peace talks, both sides seem to
preparing for a long haul. The government has gone for new recruitment in the army for an
additional strength of 15,000 soldiers. The defence budget in terms of Sri Lankan rupees
has been increased, though there is no change in terms of its proportion to the GDP. On
the LTTE side, the Jaffna Bishop who visited LTTE controlled areas of Madhu, Killnochi and
Mullaithivu on January 14 has reportedly said that there are no signs of LTTE preparing
for peace and that on the contrary they are preparing for a long haul. On the eve of the
Norwegian minister’s visit, there was a major offensive by the LTTE on the Elephant
Pass camp and there were heavy losses on both sides after many hours of fighting. In a
separate incident, a police convoy in the eastern district of Batticola was ambushed by
the LTTE resulting in the death of 13 policemen and 14 others injured.
There are reports that the preliminary talks with LTTE will be
held in Oslo soon. The LTTE is bound to demand the withdrawal of troops from Jaffna as a
first step for any negotiations. Restoring LTTE’s presence in Jaffna appears to be
the main motive of LTTE to agree to the preliminary talks with Sri Lanka government at
Oslo. Militarily the LTTE’s position is stronger today than ever before although
their offensive to capture the heavily defended Sri Lankan army camp at Elephant Pass has
been stalled with heavy losses to LTTE. The Sri Lankan government is not likely to accept
any withdrawal from Jaffna at the preliminary stage.
The position of the Norwegian facilitator is therefore neither
easy nor an enviable one.
Dr. S.Chandrasekharan
21.2.2000
