Sri Lanka: Hiccups in the Fourth round- Update
No. 41
by Dr. S. Chandrasekharan
“We will have to recognise the reality that at
the end of every session there is not going to be a dramatic break
through” G.L.Peiris, Chief Representative of Sri Lankan govt in the
peace talks.
It was expected that beyond the first three preliminary rounds, the going
will be tougher when core issues are taken up by both sides in the peace
talks. But the controversy arose not on the core issues as such but
on the continuation of “High Security Zones” in Jaffna. The
LTTE’s position as made out by Prabakaran in his Heroes’ day speech
was that the “occupation of Jaffna by more than 40,000 Sinhala troops
and the presence of High Security zones made Jaffna an open jail” and
that unless this issue is sorted out Jaffna can never be peaceful in the
real sense.
The issue of High Security zones in Jaffna was discussed at length
in the second meeting of the Sub Committee on D-escalation and
Normalisation (SDN) on 14th December, 2002. The issue as
put forth officially was that a solution has to be found for the
rehabilitation and resettlement of internally displaced people in the
present High Security zones and other areas perceived as inaccessible to
the public. To this end the Jaffna commander Maj. General Fonseka
was to submit a report which was to be discussed by the LTTE before the
fourth round of talks.
The report of Gen. Fonseka was perhaps not properly whetted before
it was handed over to the LTTE headquarters at Killinochi. Fonseka
had made seven important points and these according Sunday times are
- * Resettlement of civilians should be arranged in
such a way that Security Forces should not compromise their security.
- * Security to be relaxed only in stages corresponding
with de-escalation by the LTTE- disarming of cadres and
de-commissioning of LTTE long-rang weapons.
- * Effective and accurate system of activities to be
formulated between LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka with SLMM (Sri
Lanka Monitoring Commission) co-ordination. This is to ensure
re-settlement of troops does not hamper security or expose the lay out
of Defence installations to civilians.
- * Security of command and logistics elements to be
ensured. Vulnerable and sensitive decence air and sea
communication agencies should not be sacrificed.
- * Security of IDPs (internally displaced
persons) to be considered important since they may be vulnerable to
terrorist activities, mines/IEDs (improvised explosive devices)
present in High Security Zones.
- * Vulnerability of Government infrastructure
facilities.
- * Security of law enforcement agencies to be
considered for smooth functioning of Government authority.
The first and major objection of the LTTE was the linking
of resettlement and rehabilitation in Jaffna to disarming of LTTE cadres
and de-commissioning of LTTE long range weapons. “ The hardline position
on the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of displaced people, adopted
by the Army Commander and the Army Commander for Jaffna and supported by
President Chandrika has rendered the Sub-committee on De-escalation and
Normalisation defunct” was the angry reaction of Balasingham before he
went for the talks in Thailand (6th to 9th Jan). On
disarming he made it clear that the LTTE will not disarm until a final
solution is reached to the ethnic conflict.
Describing the LTTE cadres as terrorists was another mistake made by the
General, when the LTTE has been de-proscribed and brought to the
negotiating table. Balasingham was also very critical of SLMM which
agreed with the Army’s view that settlement in HSZ would involve in a
shift of balance of power.” The statement that “simply
dismantling High Security Zones” for resettlement and handing over land
for cultivation will decrease both security and combat potential of the
Government forces” by the SIMM was described by Balasingham as
“unsolicited comment and value judgement.” This criticism is
unjustified as the Norwegian interlocutors have been accepted by both
parties as mediators and not facilitators and have every right to state
their views clearly.
It is understood that the Generals’ report contained issues which went
far beyond the scope of the security forces and these include
- * Resettling civilians in the High Security Zones
would be a big “political success” for the LTTE having a direct
impact on the political situation in Jaffna going probably in favour
of the LTTE
- * Cannot ignore political criticism in the south in
such resettlement
- * Adjustment or variations in Security Zones should
not create a political turmoil in the south and should be considered
as “critical.”
The General had exceeded his brief, but instead of pulling
him up, President Chandrika is reported to have personally congratulated
him for his bold stand!
What infuriated the LTTE more was the call by Chandrika to LTTE to disband
their “black Tigers” outfit- their suicide squads. In a reference to
the HSZ, she had said that the zones will remain as long as LTTE retains
“military capability” to target key bases. In an attempt to put
pressure on Prime minister Wickremasinghe she said that the government
would not be allowed to act unilaterally on this issue. As head of
the security forces she went over directly to the top brass and directed
them that they should not concede strategic ground.
Balasingham admitted that the Black Tigers contributed to the bargaining
power of the Tamil people and so had to keep them to pressurise the
government to bring about a settlement. He said that the biggest threat to
peace process is the dual power structure with president and prime
minister. He accused the President of creating difficulties for both
parties, namely the government and the LTTE.
The fact of the matter is that the LTTE cannot have full political control
of Jaffna Peninsula, if the Sri Lankan Army continues to occupy large
tracts in populated areas in the name of security.
Both sides have high stakes in continuing the talks. In all
likelihood the LTTE may even start a peaceful agitation by the civilian
population to get the high security areas vacated. It is expected
that some compromise may be found before the next round of talks as
the Norwegian facilitators are working out a plan to reduce the area of
HSZ on a step by step basis.
The full text of the official release of the Royal Norwegian government on
the fourth round of talks containing the details of the “Accelerated
action on resettlement and humanitarian action, progress of human
rights” is given as an appendix to this note.
The Press release frankly admits the failure of both parties to reach an
agreement on the continuation of the work of the Sub Committee on
De-escalation and normalisation (SDN). In another context there is
mention of an agreement that a Muslim delegation will be invited to the
peace talks at an appropriate time for deliberations on relevant
substantive political issues. Rauf Hakeem of SLMC was present during the
talks and given the internal dissensions within the party, LTTE had
reservations about Hakeem representing the interests of all the Muslims.
Secondly, what Hakeem wants is a tripartite talk with the Muslims as a
separate and an independent entity which perhaps was not acceptable to
both the parties.
To conclude, the hiccups witnessed in the fourth round over the
continuation of High Security Zones are not serious enough to derail the
talks but what could be more serious and damaging is the continuing feud
between the President and the Prime minister and the former’s attempt to
snipe at every decision of the government in the talks. What
is needed now is, first a few rounds of peace talks between President
Chandrika and Prime minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, before the talks with
the LTTE are continued.
Appendix
Statement
of the Royal Norwegian Government
ACCELERATED
ACTION ON RESETTLEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION, PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
STATEMENT
Date: 9 January 2003
The
Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
held the fourth session of peace talks at the Rose Garden in Thailand 6
– 9 January 2003.
Deliberations were
conducted in a frank and constructive atmosphere, with both parties
demonstrating their conviction that the peace process must be sustained
even when difficult issues are addressed.
The main focus of the
parties was on the need to ensure implementation of urgent humanitarian
priorities. It was strongly emphasized that the significant political
breakthrough made at the third session of talks in Oslo in December 2002,
at which the basic principles for a political settlement were outlined,
will be sustained through continued discussions on political matters. At
the same time, political progress must be underpinned by tangible
improvements in the daily lives of people. To this end, there is a need
for more effective implementation by the parties as well as the speedy
provision of funds by donor governments.
The parties recognized
that the situation with regard to the High Security Zones involves major
humanitarian and security concerns for both parties. Recent controversies
surrounding this matter were discussed in depth. The parties did not reach
agreement on the continuation of the work of the Sub-Committee on
De-Escalation and Normalization (SDN).
Notwithstanding the
disagreement on this particular issue, the parties emphasized the need for
progress in resettling the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons. To
this effect, the parties agreed on an “Action Plan for an Accelerated
Resettlement Programme for the Jaffna District.” As the clear majority
of resettlement cases relate to areas outside the High Security Zones, the
first phase of the Action Plan will focus on such areas.
The plan sets out four
specific tasks and corresponding deadlines:
-
A
preliminary physical assessment to be completed by 7 February 2003
-
The
formulation of project recommendations and identification of potential
implementing agencies by 14 February 2003
-
The
identification of available resources from appropriate funds by 20
January 2003
-
A plan
to release premises presently used by the Security Forces to the
original owners or intended purposes, to be submitted by 31 January
2003.
Members
of the Sub-Committee for Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN),
representing both the GOSL and the LTTE, will meet with the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) shortly to discuss UNHCR
participation in effectuating this plan. The particular needs of the
displaced Muslim population will be duly accommodated in the resettlement
process.
The second phase of the
Action Plan will focus on resettlement of IDPs and refugees in areas
within the High Security Zones, as and when they are released by the
Security Forces for resettlement. For this purpose, the GOSL will carry
out a review with the assistance of an internationally recognized military
expert, taking into account relevant humanitarian and security needs.
Following the strong
political and financial support pledged by the international community at
the Sri Lanka Support Meeting held in Oslo on 25 November 2002, the
parties stressed the need for moving from planning to implementation of
humanitarian and rehabilitation programmes. The rapid establishment of the
North East Reconstruction Fund (NERF) will be decisive for the speedy
disbursement of international assistance. The parties welcomed a decision
by the Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN)
to select the World Bank as the custodian of the NERF. Furthermore, the
parties confirmed the SIHRN as the prime decision-making body for meeting
immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation needs in the north and east. The
GOSL in particular undertook to ensure that the respective roles of
government institutions engaged in the north and east are properly
clarified and co-ordinated with the SIHRN.
In line with the
agreement on basic principles for a political settlement, in which a
number of issues were identified for discussion, the parties will commence
a process for discussion of human rights issues. Human rights will
constitute an important element of a Final Declaration. As first steps in
furthering human rights issues in the process, the parties agreed on the
following:
-
A
schedule on human rights issues will be worked out following
discussions at the next session of peace talks. For this purpose, the
assistance of the agreed human rights adviser to the parties will be
sought.
-
An
independent verification mechanism will be established for persons
Missing in Action (MIA) and Involuntary Disappearances, with the
assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
As a means
to reinforce respect for the provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement,
monthly meetings will be held between the GOSL, the LTTE and the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) in order to discuss issues arising from the
regular SLMM summary of total recorded complaints and violations of the
Ceasefire Agreement. Mr. Fernando (GOSL) and Mr. Karuna (LTTE) will be
responsible for organizing these meetings and will report on progress made
and any outstanding problems at each session of the peace talks.
The government expressed serious concerns related to the recent incident
involving transportation of prisoners through Vanni. The LTTE gave
assurances that the case will be examined and that appropriate action will
be taken as a matter of urgency.
More generally, the parties agreed to ask the facilitator to propose
procedures to ensure rapid corrective action by the parties in cases of
incidents that are or can be perceived as disrupting the peace process.
Following an agreement made at the third session of talks, a committee was
established to ensure the effective inclusion of gender issues in the
peace process. The terms of reference for the committee will be formulated
by the members at their first meeting. The committee will be facilitated
by the Royal Norwegian Government, which will seek to provide a senior
Norwegian resource person and necessary financial resources. The committee
will consist of the following five representatives of each party:
-
LTTE:
Ms. Sivahimi Subramaniyam, Ms. Renuga Sanmugaraja, Ms. Mathimalar
Balasingam, Ms. Sridevy Sinnathampi, Ms. Vasanthapireminy Samasundaram.
-
GOSL:
Dr. Kumari Jayawardena, Dr. Deepika Udagama, Ms. Kumuduni Samuel, Ms.
Faizoon Zakariya, Dr. Fazeela Riyas.
The
parties agreed that a Muslim delegation will be invited to the peace talks
at an appropriate time for deliberations on relevant substantive political
issues.
The parties confirmed
that subsequent sessions of peace talks will take place on 7 – 10
February and 18 – 21 March 2003. The parties also agreed that additional
sessions will be held on 29 April – 2 May, as well as at an appropriate
time in June to be determined once dates for the International Donor
Conference in Japan are established.
