South Asia Analysis Group


Note No. 174

31. 01. 2003

  

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Sri Lanka: The issue of High Security Zones: has the potential to become a major contentious issue? : Update No 42

by Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

The controversy over the continuance of High Security Zones ( HSZ) erupted into a major contentious issue in the last round of talks between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE.  With a view to avoid a breakdown in the talks, both sides were wise enough to side step the issue and look for consensus on other issues.  At the end of the talks both sides claimed victory- the Sri Lankan side in having persuaded the LTTE to agree to resettlement outside the HSZs first and the LTTE- in pulling out of the sub committee on "de-escalation normalisation."

It was hoped that some compromise will be reached before the next round of talks taking place between 7th and 8th February.  It is learnt that the venue of the talks has been shifted to Berlin and the talks will be only for two days. Balasingham’s poor health and lack of time for him to consult Prabakaran have been given as reasons for the change.  The real reason however appears to be that no progress could be made on the High Security Zones since the last round and the visit for a preliminary study of the HSZs by an Indian General had only further complicated the issue!

One of the points of agreement in the last round of talks was to make an independent appraisal of the High Security Zones and the retired Gen. Satish Nambiar of the Indian Army was invited to Sri Lanka and study.  A preliminary report has been submitted by Gen. Nambiar and he has again been requested to make a more detailed study in the coming weeks.  The report must have been a confidential one and yet has been deliberately leaked to embarrass the government.  Though the full text is not available the observations made by Gen. Nambiar, as seen in the media appear to be authentic. These are -

1.Any review of the scope and content of the High Security Zones will only come about if the LTTE deposits its weapons to neutral supervision and initiates measures to withdraw from front line positions into nominated areas.  This would give a measure of assurance to the Sri Lankan Army that surprise LTTE attacks could be discounted.

2. There has to be some reassurance that there would be no coercion of civilians and officials by LTTE cadres given access to areas on dismantling the HSZs.

3. Reacting to the Press reports of the possibility of LTTE being allowed a separate army he said " In my view, any such rumour or misunderstanding should be scotched at this very stage by the Prime minister and the Defence minister making it absolutely clear that no matter what the constitutional system is finally agreed upon, there can be only one army for the country, namely the Sri Lankan Army."

4. It is important to consider the humanitarian angle and the need to resettle people in their own lands and dwellings.  But "the operational vulnerabilities perceived by the military cannot be ignored. " He stressed " There is merit in both the humanitarian and the military perception.  Hence, till one aspect takes overriding precedence over the other, both need to be factored into any assessment of the current scenario that forms the basis of dialogue and political understanding at the talks at various levels."

5. A factor of serious concern to SLA in regard to the security situation within the HSZs is the locals in the area do not see any future in co-operating with the government of Sri Lanka or its army. One unfortunate aspect as he sees is that the Sri Lankan Army has been unable to secure the good will and cooperation of the locals in the absence of effective social projects for improvement of living conditions of the people in the area.

LTTE condemns Gen. Satish Nambiar’s report: As expected LTTE’s reaction to the report of Gen. Nambiar has been quick and harsh. Balasingham said ( as reported in Tamil Guardian)

"In our view any attempt to connect the return of refugees and IDP’s ( Internally displaced persons) to their own homes in the Jaffna Peninsula to the demobilisation of LTTE’s fighting formations confined to barracks in Vanni jungles is illogical and ridiculous.  Re-modification of the security system of the so called ‘high security zones’ to facilitate the return of the refugees and displaced is a cardinal obligation of the state . . . LTTE will fiercely oppose and reject any proposal that makes resettlement of refugees conditional upon de-commissioning of LTTE weapons."

It is said that Gen. Nambiar’s selection to go into all aspects of the High Security Zones had the approval of LTTE.  Yet this could have been avoided. This is highly divisive issue bound to be rejected by one party or other and no outside General should have been invited at all.  Even if it had to be done, not withstanding the excellent credentials of Gen. Nambiar of his capability, experience and integrity, a General of some other country could have been chosen. Firstly he is from India and secondly he was the Director General of Military operations during the last phase of IPKF operations in Sri Lanka.  Thirdly, though it is termed as a private visit, any objective study is bound to infuriate one party or other.  It would have been better if the brief given to Gen. Nambiar was restricted to the military aspects as to how best to shrink the High Security Zones without compromising Sri Lankan Army’s security, taking into consideration the humanitarian aspects.  Other political aspects need not have been included in the study. Gen. Nambiar’s remarks, if true on one army for the country etc appear to be beyond his brief and could have been avoided.

There is no doubt that the Sri Lankan Army has occupied large tracts of territory in the Jaffna Peninsula and media reports indicate that the "no go" areas constitute 190 sq .kms of the total area of 880 sq.kms and there are in all 18 HSZs in the Jaffna Peninsula alone. There are allegations ( LTTE broadcast of 28th Jan) that new HSZs are also being established. There are also varying figures given over number of dwellings and public places occupied by the Security forces.  While these figures can be verified by the monitoring missions by physical verification, the larger issue of the dismantling/reduction of HSZs will continue to be intractable.

Both sides have driven themselves to a corner with no escape routes.  The all powerful executive President or the people friendly Prime minister cannot ignore the stand taken by the Jaffna Forces commander Gen. Fonseka of linking dismantling of HSZs with decommissioning of weapons by the LTTE and that too when this view has been reinforced firstly by the SLMM Norwegian commander and now by Gen. Satish Nambiar.  For the LTTE, this is a prestige issue of utmost importance.  The LTTE representatives cannot ignore the call given by Prabakaran on the Heroes’day when he said that Jaffna can never be peaceful with the continued presence of High Security Zones and over 40,000 Sinhala troops.

An interesting suggestion has been made by an academic of Perediniya University reported in Ceylon daily news of January 24 to convert the High Security Zones in Peace Zones.  The idea is to make both the LTTE and the Security forces remove their arms from these zones which can be expanded over a period of time. This is said to solve two problems.  One, the sensitive issue of decommissioning of arms can be put off to a later phase in the negotiations and the resettlement and normalisation of life in the Tamil home land demanded by the LTTE could also be met.

This needs a total change of mind set of both parties.  The problem for Prime minister Wickremasinghe is that he cannot be seen to be making any more concession to the LTTE with President Chandrika breathing down his neck and threatening to sack him once a while. On the other hand LTTE is keen to consolidate its hold in the Jaffna Peninsula which it cannot do unless the High Security Zones are dismantled. The saving feature is that both sides cannot walk away from the talks and here there is hope.

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