Sri Lanka: Fifth round of talks: Wickremasinghe’s government acts in a responsible manner. Update 43.

South Asia Analysis Group

Note No.176

11. 02. 2003

Sri Lanka: Fifth round of talks: Wickremasinghe’s government acts in a responsible manner. Update 43.

by Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

The fifth round of talks between Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in Berlin on 7 and 8 February, had all the ingredients for a major clash between the two parties having the potential to a breakdown irreversibly and it is to the credit of G.L.Peiris the Sri Lankan government representative that while heated discussions took place behind the scenes, the press release after the end of talks revealed that both sides understood that they cannot afford to derail the talks. Firstly, there was the question of High Security zones and the continued controversy. LTTE had declined to participate in the SDM (Sub committee on de-escalation and normalisation). Secondly there was a serious incident off the Delft island where three LTTE cadres blew themselves up along with the cargo of a trawler suspected to be carrying weapons when the SLMM members boarded the trawler.

President Chandrika on the offensive: On the eve of the peace talks, President Chandrika in a speech to party workers broadcast nation wide, described the peace talks as a "peace circus" and that nothing of substance was being discussed. This to say the least was very uncharitable. She had also opened separate talks with the JVP which analysts see as another attempt to topple the government. Her long letter to the Prime minister on the issue of import of FM broadcasting equipment by the LTTE facilitated by the Norwegian embassy with a copy of the letter to the Norwegian Prime minister is yet another indication of the continuing vexed problem of cohabitation between the government and the President. The growing interest being taken by Japan in rehabilitation and resettlement in North east is also not being taken kindly by the President. It may be recalled that last month she cancelled an engagement she had with the Japanese representative on grounds of being busy with some political work and all these throw doubts and uncertainty on the peace talks.

For many years, Japan has been largest donor to Sri Lanka and until the ceasefire, the entire amount was being spent in the Sinhala area. Since in their assessment peace is getting stabilised, they have offered unconditionally (unlike other donor countries) to provide assistance for reconstruction of the north east. Yet they have been unfairly criticised by a section of the press and the politicians in the south.

The LTTE appears to be unmindful of the problems faced by the Wickremasinghe government as the incident off Delft Island showed. The incident off Delft Island was the most serious violation of the cease fire agreement that came into force a year ago. It all started when the Sri Lankan navy accosted an LTTE boat escorting a trawler on 6^th Feb. (on the eve of the talks at Berlin) and sought an inspection of the cargo. The LTTE crew refused to allow the Navy personnel to board the craft and threatened to commit suicide if done and negotiations went on till late in the night and the next morning. It was agreed finally that the trawler will be inspected by two SLMM monitors. While they detected a false hold with parts of a 23-millimetre anti aircraft gun, one of the crew members set fire to the trawler. The two monitors jumped into the sea and later the three LTTE crew members took their own lives while the monitors were in the sea. The full details of the incident as given by the SLMM ( Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission) are given in Appendix I. It is unfortunate that the Press release mentioned the term "Indian Type trawler" an insinuation that could have been avoided.

This incident raises many questions. Firstly it strengthens Sri Lankan Army’s stand that the High Security zones will have to be continued until the LTTE disarms itself. Their case becomes stronger when the destination of the trawler was Jaffna area from the LTTE stronghold of Mullaithivu coast. Second, one would have expected that after one year of cease fire the LTTE would have got out of the habit of suicides if they were convinced that peace would continue indefinitely. The fact they were willing to give up their lives for the cause of "Eelam" shows not only their motivation but the difficulty Prabakaran will be having in convincing his cadres of a dispensation short of Eelam. Third, any final settlement will have to have the approval of the Sinhala majority and that too when there are entrenched provisions in the constitution which makes it rather difficult if not impossible to get out of the unitary provisions. Lastly the current Prime minister has this time ( his position during the Indo Sri Lanka agreement and later when President Chandrika made some bold proposals soon after she took over in the nineties gives no confidence) gone out of the way in ensuring peace in spite of strong opposition from the President. He will not only be embarrassed but is likely to take a hard line position when substantive issues are taken up in the peace talks. If the LTTE is interested in a solution short of Eelam with a substantial federal structure including "internal right to self determination," then incidents like this one would hardly contribute towards such an end and even the donor countries may hesitate to pledge more funds for rehabilitation of the Tamil northeast.

The fact that the Delft Island incident did not adversely affect the peace talks in Berlin underscores the high stakes both sides have in the cease-fire and beyond. The official press release of the Royal Norwegian embassy, Berlin is given as Appendix II. On a report on the return of displaced persons the two sides agreed to establish three committees, one in each district of the Eastern Province, to consider the land issue and other aspects of mutual concern. Human rights issues relating to the peace process figured prominently in the discussions and emphasis was given on training aspects both for the LTTE cadres, Government of Sri Lanka officials including Police and Prison officials in human rights and humanitarian law. Another issue which was an embarrassment for the LTTE was the issue of recruitment of child soldiers. There is a commitment from them to cessation of recruitment of and recruitment campaigns aimed at persons less than 18 years of age. The UNICEF is expected to get involved in the welfare and rehabilitation of children especially those in the north east affected by war.

One forward movement has been the agreement from both sides to discuss the fiscal aspects of a federal structure in the next session of talks to be held in Japan from 18 to 21^st March.

Appendix I

The Tragic Delft Incident - Course of Events

Around 14.00 on Thursday February 6th the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was requested to assist the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) that had intercepted a trawler being towed by a speedboat with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) crew on board, South of Delft Island off the Northwest coast of Sri Lanka. Initial information from the SLN to SLMM in Jaffna was that the “LTTE was about to board an Indian type trawler by force”. SLN was about to intercept the two boats and requested for the presence of a SLMM monitor. One SLMM Monitor arrived on the scene on board a SLN vessel 3 Nautical miles south of Delft Island at 16.00 hours. The trawler’s engine was not working and it was anchored. The Captain on board the LTTE speedboat stated that both boats belonged to the LTTE and the trawler was being towed to the shore by the speedboat since its engine had broken down while fishing.

The LTTE crews threatened to commit suicide if the SLN would attempt to inspect their boats, but welcomed inspections by SLMM. The speedboat had 12 persons on board, was open and without a wheelhouse and was easily inspected. After SLMM’s inspection, the speedboat was declared clean of any illegal items according to the Ceasefire Agreement and was allowed by SLN to leave the area around 17.00 hours. The SLMM monitor surveyed the wheelhouse, hull, fish-hold and other open compartments of the trawler and found no illegal items in these areas. However, the monitor stated that the assistance of another SLMM monitor would be needed to deal with the situation and so a second monitor arrived with a SLN vessel from Jaffna at 19.00 hours. At this time there were 3 SLN vessels on the scene and the LTTE trawler was still anchored. The trawler was approached in the dark, with the searchlight on the SLN vessel lighting up the scene. The SLMM monitors stated that now, one SLN officer would come on board to inspect the trawler along with the two SLMM Monitors. The LTTE crew threatened to put the trawler on fire and again threatened to commit suicide if SLN would take part in the inspection. The SLN vessel, with the SLMM monitors on board, subsequently withdrew from the trawler.

On Thursday evening the Head of SLMM was in direct contact with the Peace delegations of the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE in Berlin and ordered the monitors to wait for further instructions. The Government peace delegation accepted that SLMM would be allowed to inspect the trawler on their own and the LTTE peace delegation agreed on that solution. A condition for this solution was that it would not set any precedence for future inspections. This agreement was relayed to the monitors on board the SLN vessel at 01.15 early morning of Friday 7th.

At 07.00 hours in the morning of Friday, February 7th, the two SLMM Monitors boarded the trawler to do the full inspection. Their Tamil interpreter stayed on the SLN vessel lying alongside the trawler and translated the discussions between the SLMM Monitors and the three members of the LTTE trawler crew. The monitors stated that they were doing this inspection according to an agreement made by the both Peace delegations in Berlin. The trawler was thoroughly inspected. Dry and clean fishing nets were on the front deck but no fish or signs of fishing activities were noted on board. By measuring the compartments on the trawler, the monitors realized that a hidden compartment of approximately one meter length and as wide as the trawler, was below deck. At 07.30 hours one monitor went into the fish-hold where he removed a new wooden panel with new nails and thus broke through a false wall into a hidden compartment below deck. In this compartment the following items were stored:

a.1 X 23MM Gun barrel (built as Anti-Aircraft).

b. 1 X Complete Mechanism for the 23MM Barrel.

c.1 X Complete steel mounting for the 23MM gun.

d. Several hundred rounds of 23MM                ammunition in a plastic barrel and 2 metal boxes.

e. Several hundred rounds of AK47 assault rifle ammunition in a sealed metal container.

The gun barrel and the mechanism were wrapped in clean cotton cloth bags and plastic sheeting fitting these items. The steel mounting for the 23MM gun is designed to be bolted on a flat deck with bolts. The LTTE speedboat that was towing the trawler did not have any bedding for the type of gun and steel mounting found on the trawler. On the other hand, the speedboat only had a fixed tripod useable for a light machine gun. In addition to the items mentioned above, 3 X hand grenades were on the boat; one found in the wheelhouse and two handed over to the SLMM monitors by the LTTE crew. The monitors photographed both LTTE boats on the scene and the above-mentioned items. The monitors stated that transporting these items was a clear violation of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) as the agreement signed by both parties states the following: “the parties shall not move munitions or military equipment into the area controlled by the other Party.” (Art. 1.7 CFA) and “The Sri Lankan armed forces shall continue to perform their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, without engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE.” (Art. 1.3 CFA). The SLMM Monitors put the hand grenades in a box and handed it over to the SLN vessel as a safety precaution.

At 09.00 the Head of SLMM had informed both Peace Delegations in Berlin about the findings of SLMM. When asked for suggestions, Head of SLMM suggested the following: 1. The trawler should be towed to the nearest port by the SLN. 2. SLN would confiscate the military equipment and do their own inspection of the trawler. 3. SLMM should be responsible for the three LTTE cadres and transport them in a SLMM vehicle to the LTTE controlled territory. This suggestion of SLMM was to be discussed promptly by the Peace delegations in Berlin and their decision was awaited. Around 11.00 hours the sea south of Delft was getting more rough, weather was worsening and it started to rain. It was agreed between the SLMM Monitors and the officer in charge of the SLN vessel, that due to these conditions, the trawler should be towed closer to the island of Delft. The SLMM monitors stayed on the trawler with the LTTE cadres and stated that they would stay with them all the time and they would not be handed over to the SLN. One LTTE crewmember assisted the monitors in cutting the anchor line and at 11.30 the SLN started towing the trawler in direction of Delft. Around 12.00 hours the SLN vessel stopped 4,4 Nautical miles south of Delft and relayed a message from LTTE in Kilinochchi via SLMM in Jaffna and SLN KKS Naval base that the LTTE crew should contact their Headquarters via radio. At 12.05 one of the LTTE crewmembers got in contact with his Headquarters through the radio on board the trawler and had a 15 minutes conversation. The SLMM Monitors overheard the Tamil conversation. They could not understand it, but the communications through the radio were both loud and clear. Around 12.20 the radio conversation was over. Just before the conversation was finished one LTTE crewmember went to the back of the trawler. Just as the conversation was over, a second crewmember already had a bottle and a lighter in his hands inside the wheelhouse. One monitor took the lighter from him and threw it into the sea. At the same moment the SLMM monitors saw that all the back of the trawler was already on fire. Then the monitors ran to the front of the trawler and jumped into the sea. The monitors were in the sea for 10-15 minutes until they were picked up by the SLN vessel. According to the SLN personnel and the SLMM interpreter on board the SLN vessel, the LTTE crewmembers took their own lives while the monitors were in the sea. The Head of SLMM informed the Peace delegations in Berlin about this a few minutes later. The SLN vessel stayed on the scene for approximately 2 ½ hours with the monitors on board and then headed to KKS naval base in Jaffna. When the monitors left, two SLN vessels were left on the scene with the trawler still burning.

During an incident in the same area in July 2002 two SLMM Monitors were held against their will on a LTTE trawler, while it escaped a SLN vessel. After that, the SLMM decided, that as a general rule, SLMM Monitors would not board LTTE boats except for monitoring inspections done by SLN and during pre-arranged Sea Movements of LTTE agreed by the Government of Sri Lanka. SLMM did not follow this rule during the events South of Delft, in order to diffuse the situation created when the LTTE crew threatened to commit suicide. It should be underlined that the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE leadership agreed that SLMM would inspect the LTTE trawler south of Delft and that this arrangement was an exemption from the general rule that SLN should inspect LTTE boats with SLMM only monitoring the inspection.

Both the SLN crews and the LTTE crews behaved in a professional and cooperative manner with SLMM from the beginning of these events until the trawler was set on fire. SLMM takes responsibility for either incomplete or incorrect information that it gave out during the early stages of these developments. This should serve as a correction to earlier reports, including initial verbal reports on the trawler having an Indian registration and information that the SLMM interpreter had been on the trawler when it was set on fire.

The two monitors involved in this incident and the whole of SLMM would like to convey its deepest sympathy to the families of the three men who lost their lives on Friday the 7th of February.

Released By
SLMM HQ
Colombo

Ref: SLMM HQ/10th Feb.2003/MED/6022

Appendix II

Royal Norwegian Embassy Berlin

08 February 2003

The Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) held the fifth and shortened session of peace talks at the Norwegian Embassy in Berlin on 7 – 8 February 2003. The discussions focused on complex issues in a spirit of cooperation and conciliation.

The parties expressed their concern about the situation at sea and their strong commitment to ensure that an incident such as the one which resulted in the tragic loss of three lives on a Sea Tiger vessel near the Delft islands on 7 February 2003 does not recur. Recognising the gravity of the consequences of incidents of this kind, the parties agreed that a meeting will be held soon between the GOSL, LTTE and Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), to work out effective safeguards.

The parties reviewed progress reports on the work of the Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East (SIHRN). Both parties underscored the urgent need to commence humanitarian and rehabilitation activities in the north and east. The parties reported that the agreement on World Bank custodianship of the Northeast Reconstruction Fund (NERF) is close to finalisation and will be signed within the next week. The parties once again appealed to the international community to make funds rapidly available for immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation needs in the north and east.

The parties reported that the implementation of the Action Plan for Accelerated Resettlement in the Jaffna district (ARP) is ahead of schedule. The seven Assessment Teams, comprising representatives from the GOSL, LTTE and UNHCR, have completed preliminary needs assessments and are identifying the activities required to facilitate resettlement. The parties also reported that the concept papers approved at the previous meeting of SIHRN on 15 – 16 January have been developed into proposals for concrete projects

that can be approved and begun immediately. As requested by SIHRN at the last meeting, the report on the return of displaced Muslims in the Northern Province has been submitted for their consideration.

The parties agreed to establish three committees, one in each district of the Eastern Province, to address land issues and other areas of mutual concern. The committees will consist of six representatives of the Muslim population and six representatives of the LTTE. The work of the committees will start immediately. Similar committees will be appointed to address such issues relating to other communities as and when required.

Following a thorough discussion of human rights, the parties agreed to ask their international Human Rights Adviser, Mr. Ian Martin, to draw up a roadmap for human rights issues relating to the peace process. The draft roadmap will be prepared for discussion in the sixth session of talks in Japan in March and will include

-         substantive human rights activities and commitments to be implemented throughout the negotiation process

-         effective mechanisms for the monitoring of human rights

-         training of LTTE cadres and GOSL officials in human rights and humanitarian law

-         training of police and prison officers.

Both parties agreed that children living in the north east of Sri Lanka have been the most seriously affected by the war between the GOSL and the LTTE. UNICEF estimates that there are 900 000 children in the north east, all of whom have been seriously affected. Many of these children are faced with malnutrition, poor health care and education facilities, continued displacement, loss of parents and families, and land mines. The LTTE has agreed to work with UNICEF to draw up an action plan for children affected by the armed conflict in the north east. Such an action plan will include an intensified effort by the LTTE to stop underage recruitment. The LTTE restated its pledge to bring the practice to an end. The action plan will include a credible review mechanism. The LTTE has agreed to a complete cessation of recruitment of, and recruitment campaigns aimed at, persons under 18 years of age. In this context, the LTTE has handed over 350 children who had joined the organisation, for reunification with their parents or guardians. The plan will also include rehabilitation assistance, including provisions for schooling, vocational training, employment facilitation, and health and psychosocial care, with the active support of the government.

The parties intend to commence a discussion on the fiscal aspects of a federal structure at the next session. It was noted that the LTTE has already taken action to set up a Political Affairs Committee with a view to addressing in depth issues pertaining to alternative structures of powersharing.

The parties confirmed that the sixth session of peace talks will take place on 18 – 21 March 2003 in Japan and that the seventh session will be held on 29 April – 2 May 2003.

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