South Asia Analysis Group


Note No. 197

30. 08. 2003

  

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NEPAL: Back to Confrontation Mode: What next? Update 36.

by Dr. S. Chandrasekharan 

The peace process in Nepal has been derailed.  One may argue that is not the time to comment on what went wrong and who was wrong, but certainly both the King and his government as well as the Maoists should have a serious introspection and find ways to restore the peace process.  But the way the two parties have begun the post cease fire suspension period gives the impression that they do not care either for the stability of Nepal or the welfare of the people.  The five agitating political parties who have been pouring venom on the King and his government as well as the Maoists are worried and have begun to realise the folly of their actions but yet do not want to give up. Outside players like India cannot do much at this stage except to condemn the violence that has occurred in the post cease fire period.

On 24th July, the Maoists gave a two day ultimatum to accept their demand for a constituent assembly.  The governments’ attempt to institutionalise the feudal monarchy and the authoritarianism of the army and give continuity to them "through the backing of foreign forces" was seen by them as the main causes for obstacles in the process.

The ultimatum ended on 26th and on 27th Maoist leader Prachanda called off cease fire and declared that the rationale for cease fire, code of conduct and talks process is over "for the time being. " The statement made the following points in calling off the cease fire.

* The main causes for the cease fire break were the massacre of 17 non armed Maoist cadres and the concept paper presented by the government in the third round of talks.  The concept paper did not address even the demands of the parliamentarian parties.

* The party "adjourned " the demand for a republic for the time being and came for talks with the demand of a constituent assembly only to fulfill the people’s desire for peace.

* The talks became an orphan when the army rejected the agreement in the second round limiting the army within five kilometres.

* The rationale for peace talks ended at the very moment when the government asked the Maoists to surrender their weapons in the third round.  This proposal was rejected by the Maoists and their position was made clear that the fourth round will be conducted if a new proposal for a constituent assembly is brought.

* The Maoists will not close the door for talks and they can again sit for talks, if people’s sovereign right and their basic welfare are guaranteed.

There were two major incidents both involving attacks on army officers on 28th morning.  A senior army colonel Kiran Basnet was shot dead at Baneshwar in Kathmandu.  In another incident another army officer Col.  Rabindra KC was seriously injured when his vehicle he was travelling was attacked at Samakoshi.  A state-owned bank (Rashtriya Vanijya Bank) was attacked at Tulsipur and 7.2 million Nepali Rupees were looted by suspected Maoists. The army also raided two Maoist camps at Dolpa and killing some.

In the back drop of the two incidents, the cabinet met on 28th and in retaliation took the extreme step of declaring the Maoists as a "terrorist outfit."

What went wrong?

* It looks that the government’s refusal to accede to elections to a constituent assembly could not have been the immediate cause for the breakdown in the peace talks. The agenda for reforms was placed before the Maoist negotiating team on the first day of talks in the third round.  It was known that the government stuck to the position of the constitutional monarchy and did not accede to the demand for bringing the army under parliamentary control. Yet, the Maoists though rejecting the agenda continued with the talks the next two days.

* What triggered the breakdown was the incident on August 17, when seventeen Maoist cadres were killed at Doramba, Ramechap. While the army claims that they acted in self defence, the Maoists claim that the dead cadres were all unarmed. The Maoists found that the army was covering up its actions by bringing their own human rights team to investigate the incident.

* Another issue which had shaken the Maoists was the demand of the Government team on the Maoists to lay down their arms during the talks. The Maoists it is learnt were taken by surprise though the Indian Ambassador had made a similar demand just a few days earlier. It looks that the Maoists saw a "connection" between the two.

* We have said it before and we need to point out that the monitoring mechanism and the infra structure to oversee the cease fire were very weak and there were bound to be many incidents.  A code of conduct and association of human rights members would not be enough in a country where the terrain is inhospitable with many remote areas, with a trigger-happy army and the Maoists who are out to establish their influence in the interregnum in the quickest time.  Another major blunder on the part of the government was first agreeing to limit the army within 5 kilometers in the second round and reneging on it under pressure from the army. Most of the clashes with the army have taken place outside the 5 kilometre area.  Much is made on the attack on the convoy of former Prime minister Deuba near Dang. Eye witness accounts say that the fire was aimed mainly on the army escort vehicles and it is likely that the Maoists as is claimed were not aware of the presence of Deuba in the convoy.

Back to square one?

It is learnt that the government is seriously thinking of declaring an emergency once again. The top Maoists leadership have already gone underground.  The Army with its increased strength, specialised training and acquisition of sophisticated weapons is under the impression that the Maoists can be brought under control militarily. The Maoists are also not what they were in 1996. Their strength has increased exponentially and by now have acquired sufficient arms for a prolonged conflict. They have considerable influence in all the seventy-five districts

There is enough political space for the Maoists to take a leading role if they give up violence. The government has already conceded space for them in the interim administration leading to elections. Neither side can expect a military victory.  There is need to go back to the negotiating table. The statement of Prachanda gives hope that the Maoists have not given up the negotiating route altogether. Here is an opportunity for the King also to seek a compromise with the agitating political parties.  Instead of staying in London for a medical check up and perhaps consulting the British, he should come back soon and start talking to the political parties of all hues to find a viable solution to the present crisis and thus avoid plunging the country into another round of unnecessary killings and counter killings.

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