NEPAL: Back to Confrontation Mode: What next? Update
36.
by Dr. S. Chandrasekharan
The peace process in Nepal has been derailed. One may argue that
is not the time to comment on what went wrong and who was wrong, but
certainly both the King and his government as well as the Maoists should
have a serious introspection and find ways to restore the peace
process. But the way the two parties have begun the post cease fire
suspension period gives the impression that they do not care either for
the stability of Nepal or the welfare of the people. The five
agitating political parties who have been pouring venom on the King and
his government as well as the Maoists are worried and have begun to
realise the folly of their actions but yet do not want to give up. Outside
players like India cannot do much at this stage except to condemn the
violence that has occurred in the post cease fire period.
On 24th July, the Maoists gave a two day ultimatum to accept
their demand for a constituent assembly. The governments’ attempt
to institutionalise the feudal monarchy and the authoritarianism of the
army and give continuity to them "through the backing of foreign
forces" was seen by them as the main causes for obstacles in the
process.
The ultimatum ended on 26th and on 27th Maoist
leader Prachanda called off cease fire and declared that the rationale for
cease fire, code of conduct and talks process is over "for the time
being. " The statement made the following points in calling off the
cease fire.
* The main causes for the cease fire break were the massacre of 17
non armed Maoist cadres and the concept paper presented by the
government in the third round of talks. The concept paper did not
address even the demands of the parliamentarian parties.
* The party "adjourned " the demand for a republic for the
time being and came for talks with the demand of a constituent assembly
only to fulfill the people’s desire for peace.
* The talks became an orphan when the army rejected the agreement in
the second round limiting the army within five kilometres.
* The rationale for peace talks ended at the very moment when the
government asked the Maoists to surrender their weapons in the third
round. This proposal was rejected by the Maoists and their
position was made clear that the fourth round will be conducted if a new
proposal for a constituent assembly is brought.
* The Maoists will not close the door for talks and they can again
sit for talks, if people’s sovereign right and their basic welfare are
guaranteed.
There were two major incidents both involving attacks on army officers
on 28th morning. A senior army colonel Kiran Basnet was
shot dead at Baneshwar in Kathmandu. In another incident another
army officer Col. Rabindra KC was seriously injured when his vehicle
he was travelling was attacked at Samakoshi. A state-owned bank
(Rashtriya Vanijya Bank) was attacked at Tulsipur and 7.2 million Nepali
Rupees were looted by suspected Maoists. The army also raided two Maoist
camps at Dolpa and killing some.
In the back drop of the two incidents, the cabinet met on 28th
and in retaliation took the extreme step of declaring the Maoists as a
"terrorist outfit."
What went wrong?
* It looks that the government’s refusal to accede to elections to a
constituent assembly could not have been the immediate cause for the
breakdown in the peace talks. The agenda for reforms was placed before the
Maoist negotiating team on the first day of talks in the third
round. It was known that the government stuck to the position of the
constitutional monarchy and did not accede to the demand for bringing the
army under parliamentary control. Yet, the Maoists though rejecting the
agenda continued with the talks the next two days.
* What triggered the breakdown was the incident on August 17, when
seventeen Maoist cadres were killed at Doramba, Ramechap. While the army
claims that they acted in self defence, the Maoists claim that the dead
cadres were all unarmed. The Maoists found that the army was covering up
its actions by bringing their own human rights team to investigate the
incident.
* Another issue which had shaken the Maoists was the demand of the
Government team on the Maoists to lay down their arms during the talks.
The Maoists it is learnt were taken by surprise though the Indian
Ambassador had made a similar demand just a few days earlier. It looks
that the Maoists saw a "connection" between the two.
* We have said it before and we need to point out that the monitoring
mechanism and the infra structure to oversee the cease fire were very weak
and there were bound to be many incidents. A code of conduct and
association of human rights members would not be enough in a country where
the terrain is inhospitable with many remote areas, with a trigger-happy
army and the Maoists who are out to establish their influence in the
interregnum in the quickest time. Another major blunder on the part
of the government was first agreeing to limit the army within 5 kilometers
in the second round and reneging on it under pressure from the army. Most
of the clashes with the army have taken place outside the 5 kilometre
area. Much is made on the attack on the convoy of former Prime
minister Deuba near Dang. Eye witness accounts say that the fire was aimed
mainly on the army escort vehicles and it is likely that the Maoists as is
claimed were not aware of the presence of Deuba in the convoy.
Back to square one?
It is learnt that the government is seriously thinking of declaring an
emergency once again. The top Maoists leadership have already gone
underground. The Army with its increased strength, specialised
training and acquisition of sophisticated weapons is under the impression
that the Maoists can be brought under control militarily. The Maoists are
also not what they were in 1996. Their strength has increased
exponentially and by now have acquired sufficient arms for a prolonged
conflict. They have considerable influence in all the seventy-five
districts
There is enough political space for the Maoists to take a leading role
if they give up violence. The government has already conceded space for
them in the interim administration leading to elections. Neither side can
expect a military victory. There is need to go back to the
negotiating table. The statement of Prachanda gives hope that the Maoists
have not given up the negotiating route altogether. Here is an opportunity
for the King also to seek a compromise with the agitating political
parties. Instead of staying in London for a medical check up and
perhaps consulting the British, he should come back soon and start talking
to the political parties of all hues to find a viable solution to the
present crisis and thus avoid plunging the country into another round of
unnecessary killings and counter killings.