Sri Lanka: Uncertainty in Sri Lanka-A political blunder
by Chandrika: Update 53.
by S. Chandrasekharan
Using her executive prerogative, on 4th November President
Chandrika Kumaratunge sacked three of the cabinet minsters holding
important portfolios of Defence, Home and Information in Wickremasinghe
government on the ground that they were acting against the security
interests of the country- serious allegations indeed. Information has just
been received that the President has declared an emergency. This is
likely to put the whole peace talks with the LTTE in jeopardy.
2. Constitutionally, Chandrika’s actions were correct but politically
to say the least, it is a great blunder. The timing was equally bad
when her Prime minister was away in USA and the LTTE had just
submitted its proposals for an interim administration of North East. She
has prorogued the Parliament for a fortnight and when it opens she would
need the help of JVP to re align the groups in her favour. With the
declaration of emergency, the Parliament may not be convened at all.
3. The JVP- it is well known is totally opposed to any concessions to
the Tamils and even the ongoing peace process. Yet in her address to the
nation she has assured the minorities that their interests will be
protected.
4. The three ministers sacked were very close to Prime minister
Wickremasinghe. More significantly, they were the most active supporters
of the cease fire talks with the LTTE. Sadly, the sacking would send a
wrong signal to the LTTE.
5. The President’s party, the SLFP without waiting to make a serious
study of the proposals had strongly criticised it just two days ago and
this combined with the present sacking of the ministers most supportive of
the talks would only confirm the suspicion the LTTE had, that President
Chandrika was not serious of the peace process and that at some point or
other she would scuttle the whole process.
6. What is forgotten is, that instead of vague generalities which have
been the hall mark of LTTE as well as other Tamil militant groups since
July 1983 after the state inspired riots- for the first time the LTTE has
come up with specific proposals for an interim administration for the
North East. There could be criticisms that the proposal is silent on the
role GOSL ( Government of Sri Lanka), or that of the federal concept
conceded in the peace talks or on the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka now
emphasised by the President - but it is important to note that the
LTTE has given the parameters of autonomy they want to hold in their home
land for a discussion.
7. Soon after submitting the proposals for the interim administration (ISGA),
it was the LTTE that took the initiative for talks on the proposals and
had requested the Norwegian interlocutor to convene the now suspended
meeting soon. The last round (sixth) was held on 18th February,
2003.
8. The first major mistake made by Prime minister Wickremasinghe was in
not taking the President into confidence when the preliminary MOU relating
to the cease fire was drafted and signed. In a cohabitation government
where the President has enormous executive powers it should have occurred
to Wickremasinghe that consensus of the two arms of the government was
absolutely necessary and more so, when the President is from the
opposition party. This was not done. The President on the other hand in
spite of making periodic statements that she was not against the peace
process went about openly criticising the Prime minister on every action
of his with no holds barred. The impression that one got was that if ever
the peace process is going to be scuttled it may not due to the
intransigence of the LTTE, but due to the infighting between the
President and the Prime minister.
9. The first reaction of India as revealed by the spokesman of the
External Affairs was that it was "surprised " by the
developments in Sri Lanka. The surprise is that India is surprised, as it
was fully aware of the ongoing tussle between the President and the Prime
minister. Both were close to the Indian government and both have been
informing the decision makers here directly and through emissaries the
problem each was facing from the other. Where India failed was that in
spite of its assessment that the peace talks had no chance of success
without the two wings of the government (who represent the majority
Sinhala community) arriving at a consensus, nothing was done to get them
together on this important issue which not only affects the stability of
Sri Lanka but of the entire region.
10. Now what next? How would the Norwegian interlocutors react? Norway
has already incurred the ire of the President who had asked for the
withdrawal of the Norwegian chief of the cease fire monitoring team who is
alleged to have acted against the security interests of the host country!
She made such serious allegations directly to the Prime minister of Norway
without even consulting her Prime minister! Those who have dealt with the
Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, know very well how difficult is the
task for any third party to mediate. Yet the Norwegians showed extra
ordinary patience and perseverance in continuing with the peace process
and never gave up.
11. More important would be the reaction of the LTTE. Officially the
LTTE sources have said that they are watching the developments. They are
unlikely to respond to any peace overtures coming directly from the
President. They have already prepared themselves fairly well for any
renewal of the conflict. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the LTTE cadres
outside the area of their control have been asked to return. If the cease
fire breaks down ( hope it does not), it is not the President or the Prime
minister who would suffer, but the people on both sides of the ethnic
divide. The question is- Can this be avoided?
